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Abstract 
This study undertakes a comparative analysis of the approaches towards merger 
control regime taken at the EC and the national levels, namely the Baltic countries. 
The emergence and further development of competition law and policy 
(particularly merger control rules) in the unexplored Baltic countries represent a 
novelty of the work, as there are no comprehensive legal writings in this area. The 
comparative research revealed that the EC incorporates both a negative and a 
positive approach vis-a-vis merger control rules; after shifting towards a more 
economic based approach, the EC regulatory authorities have explicitly 
recognised possible pro-competitive effects of mergers on competition. Whereas, 
the situation differs in the Baltic countries: despite committing themselves to 
applying the EC competition policy, these countries employ a negative approach 
towards merger transactions by placing focus on finding `dominance' rather than 
stressing emphasis on a merger's effects on competition. This negative approach 
may mean that the Baltic countries are reluctant to admit pro-competitive effects 
of merger transactions on competition, which can be seen as a sign that the merger 
control regimes in the Baltic countries are orientated towards dominance or 
market power rather than efficiency enhancing. 
The law used in the research is stated on the basis of materials available to the 
researcher on 31 May 2006. 
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Chapter 1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE MERGER CONTROL 
REGIME IN THE EC AND THE BALTIC STATES JURISDICTIONS 
1. Introduction 
Challenging economical and political changes in the world have led 
towards globalisation by accelerating the internationalisation of industry and 
reshaping industrial structure at a global level. One area that has been impacted 
upon by globalisation is merger and acquisition transactions', which has expanded 
in recent times. The increase in mergers has not gone unnoticed and is in fact a 
constant source of concern for competition authorities. The Baltic countries are 
not immune from this global increase in mergers: after re-gaining their 
independence in 1991, these transactions have occurred in Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania. 
Considering the controversial aspects of merger transactions on 
competition, the inexperienced Competition Authorities of the Baltic countries 
have faced an uneasy task to deal with merger cases. On one hand, mergers may 
give undertakings the power to prevent effective competition, for instance, by 
creating market power with the ability to raise prices without loosing consumers. 
On the other hand, mergers are not always harmful to competition. Under certain 
circumstances, merger transactions may be the sole means to achieve efficiencies. 
Such mergers may contribute to the process of optimal reallocation of resources 
and improve the competitive performance of affected markets and as a result 
intensify competition. Contemplating that mergers can have anti-competitive 
and/or pro-competitive effects, two basic errors may occur within the work of the 
competition authorities. On one hand, the competition authorities might approve a 
merger transaction with anti-competitive effects on competition. On the other 
hand, the authorities may prohibit a merger with potential exploitation of 
efficiencies and as a result of it prevent consumers from getting the benefits, 
which achieved efficiencies would offer. 
This research undertakes a critical analysis of the approaches towards 
merger control mechanisms taken by the European Community (thereafter the 
'Term `merger' will be used interchangeably with concentration, acquisition, take-over etc. in this 
research. 
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EC) and by the Competition Authorities of the Baltic countries, which is placed in 
seven chapters. The thesis employs a comparative analysis with an 
interdisciplinary approach. The scope of the research is limited to the merger 
control regimes in the EC and in the Baltic countries with the emphasis being 
placed on the substantive issues. The analysis is based on all markets in general, 
as without benchmark on any particular sector. 
Chapter 1 involves the historical analysis of the introduction of the merger 
control mechanisms within the EC and the Baltic states, as in Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania. The question in this chapter will be raised as to what extent the Baltic 
countries share a similar historical development experience with the EC as far as 
merger control is concerned. The researcher argues that these countries have had 
less auspicious environments for the introduction and enforcing of the merger 
regime. The implementation of the merger control mechanism in the Baltic 
countries is not a single act per se. It constitutes a new revolution for these 
countries, as their whole legal, economic and political environment has been 
changed. The Baltic states have walked from a Socialist legal system to a Civil 
law legal system, from a centrally-planned to a market economy; and from being 
occupied to independent and democratic countries. The merger regime was 
introduced into the legal systems of the Baltic countries as a part of the acquis 
communautaire while the Baltic states have still been going through economic, 
legal and political reforms. 
Chapter 2 discusses and explains the theoretical framework together with 
the methodology used in the thesis. The thesis employs a comparative law 
method. Traditional legal analysis has been undertaken in the research, however, 
this approach is not an adequate framework to analyse and explain the 
development of competition law and policy within the EC and the Baltic states' 
jurisdictions. Thus, an interdisciplinary approach has also been adopted. Explicit 
recourse to economic theory is essential to understand the rationale behind the 
law, as its basic precepts and the goals of competition policy. The chapter will 
further explore the methods used in the study, the problems occurred and the 
solutions proposed. Also, it will provide and explain a mixed model of research in 
conjunction with a conducted empirical research and legal analysis completed by 
the researcher. It also contains the main conceptual distribution of this thesis. 
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A merger control is a predictive exercise for two main players in opposite 
front-lines: companies with their impetuses to merge and regulatory authorities 
with an intention to block anti-competitive mergers for the sake of fair 
competition. Chapter 3 is based on commercial analysis, as the impetuses for 
firms to merge will be checked. In addition, the benchmark is within the context 
of the Baltic states: (i) what are the impetuses for firms in the Baltic jurisdictions 
to merge; and (ii) do these motives have specific implications within the Baltic 
countries in comparison with theory. The examination of mergers' motives is a 
useful tool for predicting the future behaviour of firms involved in a merger. The 
endeavour of this chapter is to expose a broader picture of merger transactions' 
effects with economic and socio-political aspects especially in the context of the 
Baltic states. 
Chapter 4 contains the economic analysis on two countervailing motives 
depicted from chapter 3 and their effects on competition. These are a merger 
motive to achieve efficiencies, which has pro-competitive effects on competition, 
and a motive to obtain a market power leading to anti-competitive effects on 
competition. This chapter will also check to what extent the presumed anti- 
competitive effects accepted by the EC merger regime apply to small market 
economies and to what extent they can be traded-off by the efficiencies; the 
analysis will be made under the auspices of economic paradigms, researches and 
theories. A background for this is the theory of Prof. Gal, which states that small 
market economies2 require different competition rules; this is because in small 
markets there are a limited number of market players and market can serve only to 
a limited number of players as a result only a limited number of firms can act 
effectively in the market. 
Chapter 5 is devoted to the competition policy within the context of the 
merger regime. The attempt is to identify the goal or goals of the EC's 
competition policy and the competition policy of the Baltic states. The Baltic 
countries' experience has been to follow dictation from above: as regards the EC 
competition policy (especially the merger regime), the Baltic countries have 
attempted to apply and explore those rules without questioning whether and to 
2Note: There is a presumption in this research that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania refer to small 
market economies. It will be further explained in chapters 2 and 4. 
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what extent those rules might contradict underlying interests in the Baltic 
countries. 
Chapter 6 differs from chapter 3 and 4, which have an emphasis on 
commercial/economic analysis, by focusing on merger control regime from purely 
legal perspective. The questions in the last chapter will be raised to what extent 
the motives analysed in chapter 4 affect and influence the regulatory authorities of 
the Baltic states and to what extent the approach vis-a-vis merger control rules 
taken by the Baltic countries is different from its counter-part - the EC. The thesis 
will check the perception of the Baltic states of the EC Merger Regulation in 
delivering its goals. 
The final chapter 7 will generalise the conclusions obtained from the each 
chapter and will draw the issues for future research. 
The EC incorporates both a negative and a positive approach vis-a-vis 
merger control rules; after shifting towards a more economic based approach, the 
EC regulatory authorities explicitly have recognised possible pro-competitive 
effects of mergers on competition. Whereas, the situation differs in the Baltic 
countries: despite committing themselves to apply the EC competition policy, 
these countries employ a negative approach towards merger transactions by 
placing emphasis on finding `dominance'. This negative approach may mean that 
the Baltic countries are reluctant to admit pro-competitive effects of merger 
transactions on competition. The lack of efficiency considerations can be logically 
interpreted as a sign that the merger control regimes in the Baltic countries are 
orientated towards dominance or market power rather than efficiency enhancing. 
As a result of this logic it might be predisposed that the regulators of the 
Competition Authorities mistreat the possibilities of the pro-competitive effects 
that merger transactions can provide and therefore look suspiciously at the effects 
of the mergers on competition. 
The aim of the research is to be able to explain the necessity of 
introducing a more economic based approach towards merger control rules in 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The final decision of prohibiting mergers is advised 
to be taken after balancing the anti-competitive and pro-competitive effects of the 
merger. The focus on finding `dominance' is proven to be mistaken especially in 
small market economies context. 
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l. l. Background 
The globalisation process together with technological advancements, 
improvements in e-commerce, liberalisation of capital movement, investment and 
privatisation programs and other factors cause a surge of cross-border as well as 
domestic merger transactions. After the collapse of the Soviet Empire and a 
decision of the Baltic countries to open up their borders for international trade, 
these transactions have occurred in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. However, the 
globalisation process in particular through merger transactions cannot flow 
without limits. Merger control rules are designed to prevent any mergers with 
anti-competitive effects on competition. Chapter 1 involves the historical analysis 
of the introduction of the merger control mechanism within the EC and the Baltic 
states, as in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The question in this chapter will be 
raised as to what extent the Baltic countries share a similar historical development 
experience with the EC as far as merger control is concerned. The researcher 
argues that these countries have had less auspicious environments for introducing 
and enforcing the merger regime. The implementation of the merger control 
mechanism in the Baltic countries is not a single act per se. It constitutes a new 
revolution for these countries, as their whole legal, economic and political 
environment has been changed. The Baltic states have walked from a Socialist 
legal system to a Civil law legal system, from a centrally-planned to a market 
economy; and from being occupied to independent and democratic countries. The 
merger regime was introduced into the legal systems of the Baltic countries as a 
part of the acquis communautaire while the Baltic states have still been going 
through economic, legal and political reforms. 
1.1.1. Globalisation process 
Challenging economic and political changes in the world have led towards 
globalisation. Technological advancements, improvements in communication, 
information, and e-commerce, falling transportation costs and many other factors 
have put steps towards globalisation. Domestic government policies with the 
opening up of borders for foreign traders and signing up to the international 
and/or regional organisations, elimination of trade barriers and customs 
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distortions, liberalisation of capital movement and investment, and privatisation 
programs have contributed a lot by creating opportunities for foreign companies 
to expand business. The collapse of the Soviet Empire and the end of the Cold 
War is also accepted as adding further weight to globalisation. This is because no 
significant group of countries stands outside globalisation and capital now holds 
exclusive sway in all parts of the world governed by a global power. 
Globalisation with global financial systems and many other driving forces 
have spurred a surge in cross-border businesses. According to Riegar and Leibfied 
(2003), for companies globalisation means two main things. First, it means a 
considerable expansion in opportunities to obtain competitive advantages beyond 
the border of the home market. For instance, the collapse of the Soviet Empire 
opened the opportunities for the Baltic firms to expand internationally. However, 
in practice this works if companies are capable and willing to exploit those 
opportunities. The Baltic countries have had difficulties especially at the earlier 
years after the re-gaining of independence to gain access to foreign markets due to 
unknown trade marks of the Baltic countries. Second, the situation has reverse 
effects: companies, which were before protected from foreign competition, must 
now reckon with increased foreign competition in their home markets3. Being part 
of the Soviet Empire, the Baltic countries were protected from foreign 
competition as the state exercised a monopoly over foreign economic relations. 
Since the Soviet Union has disappeared as a political entity and the Baltic 
countries re-gained their independence, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have taken 
steps forwards by opening their markets towards global trade and as a result 
facing competition from foreign firms. Starting with bilateral agreement with the 
countries situated nearby, the Baltic countries expanded co-operation towards the 
international organisations such as the World Trade Organisation (thereafter 
WTO), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (thereafter 
OECD)4 and finally they made the commitments to the EU. 
Foreign competition can occur through foreign direct investment 
(thereafter FDI) in the forms of the establishment of foreign-owned suppliers (i. e. 
greenfield) or cross-border mergers. The statistics show the increase in the FDI in 
3 For further reading, see Rieger, E., Leibfried, Limits to Globalization Welfare State and the 
World Economy, Polity, 2003, pp. 187. 
4 The author gives here some examples without having intention to name all the international 
organisations that the Baltic countries belong to. 
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the Baltic countries. The inward FDI to Estonia has tripled in 1998-2003 and has 
reached 6.5 billion USD in 2003. Meanwhile, in Latvia the increase in FDI was 
noticed during the 1990-2000 period with a dramatic slump in 2001, and in 2003 
the sum of 3.3 billion USD had been accumulated. The FDI inflows grew 
appreciably in Lithuania and reached a value of 4.8 billion USD in 2003 
(UNSTAD, 2003). Most of the FDI in the Baltic states belongs to the 
multinational companies, which have utilized the advantage to expand their 
activities into the Eastern and Central European market by using the high-skilled 
and low-wage Baltic employees5. 
There has been a tendency in foreign direct investment through mergers 
and acquisitions rather than greenfield investment (Kang and Johansson, 2000). 
Considering that the benchmark of this study is on merger transactions, the 
analysis involved is based on these transactions. Cross-border mergers may offer 
a quick and efficient entry mode in to foreign markets. As time is especially 
important in business, a merger appears to be a superior strategy to greenfield 
investment6, since it allows immediate seizure of new market opportunity (Blanc 
and Corteel, 1999). Cross-border mergers may be motivated by the desire to 
consolidate capacities in order to serve global markets. The concentration of 
resources on core competencies in order to achieve benefits from global scale 
economies and the full utilisation of intangible assets (technology, human 
resources, brand names etc. ) through geographical diversification are some of the 
strategies of multinational firms. Also, cross-border mergers may play a role in 
revitalising ailing companies and/or creating jobs through the restructuring 
process. In general, cross-border mergers may enhance economies of scale and 
scope through technology and knowledge transfer, industrial restructuring and/or 
job creation, may diversify risks geographically and may attribute other 
favourable patterns. 
However, merger transactions may have some unfavourable aspects, as 
very often one merger has lead to a chain reaction of additional consolidation. For 
5 See, for instance, J. Hyvarinen, FDI and Spillovers in the Baltic countries, The Finnish Economy 
and Society 304, pp. 86-88. 
6 The Researcher does not say here that it is always the best strategy as other factors should also be 
taken into account. There is the possibility that mergers might fail, because of cultural clashes, 
inadequate planning, `wrongly' defined strategy etc. This research excludes issues on success or 
failure of merger transactions. For further reading, see Tichy, G., What do we know about success 
and failure of mergers, EUNIpb, 2001. 
7 
instance, BP / Amoco? merger in 1998 was followed by Exxon / Mobil8, BP / 
Arco9 and TotalFina /EU1° mergers". As a result of a series of mergers, the whole 
industry on a world-wide basis might be too concentrative, as in the hands of a 
few players. The accumulated financial power of a few players may, moreover, 
raise the entry hurdle for potential competitors and may make the intrusion by 
these firms into other markets following with the anti-competitive practice, such 
as dumping (Horn, 2001: 18). Furthermore, the emergence of a few global firms 
can mean that there might be little scope left for smaller players, which will be 
forced to leave the market (Schaub, 2000). 
Globalisation process may not only cause a surge of cross-border mergers 
but also may give stimulus for domestic mergers. National firms merge in order to 
be able to face increased international competition. The economists explain this 
phenomenon with the theory of oligopoly equilibrium. As if there is an 
oligopolistic equilibrium, by meaning stable market shares of the largest 
companies within the national economy, then increased imports or entry by big 
foreign companies would lead to dis-equilibrium. This in turn will cause national 
firms to merge and challenge the increased competition (Hughes and Singh, 
1980: 9). 
1.1.1.1. Limits on globalisation process 
However, globalisation process, namely in the form of merger 
transactions, does not flow without limits. There are restrictions placed on 
mergers. In fact, cross-border mergers and to some extent domestic mergers mean 
for large firms putting efforts to deal with two trends that push in different 
directions. One direction is technological innovations, which force firms to think 
globally and respond to the pressures of obtaining scale in a rapidly consolidating 
global economy. Another, governments have placed limits on globalisation by 
COMP/M. 1293. 
8 COMP/M. 1383. 
9 COMP/M. 1532. 
10 COMP/M. 1628. 
11 For further reading of the concerns of the chain of these mergers, see, for instance, Mega 
Mergers of Oil Giants Hurt Consumers, Competition, Public citizen, 03/09/1999, available at web- 
site: 
http : //www. c itizen. org/cmep/energy_enviro_nuclear/electricity/Oil_and_Gas/Gasoline/articles. cfm 
? ID=6318 
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enforcing competition law in their legal systems to ensure industrial 
competitiveness. This is because with the emergence of a global trade the 
international competition has increased. Together with the opening border for 
foreign competitors the national governments in the world have raised the 
concerns of protecting their market from unfair competition. After unlocking the 
gate to international trade, the Baltic countries have also faced the impact of 
globalisation process, including one of its forms -a new phenomenon of merger 
transactions. It is not enough to open up the border for global trade and start 
moving from a command-and-control economy towards the market economy, as 
in the Baltic countries case scenario. Economist Stigletz (2002) argues that 
countries face disaster when they try to create market economies without having 
sound competition laws and institutions in place. The governments need to 
enforce competition locally in order to have their place in the global system. 
Hence, the Baltic countries had to introduce the competition laws in order to 
protect competition in their jurisdictions. With the emergence of merger 
transactions in the Baltic countries, the enforcement of merger control rules in 
these countries has a significant importance. Thus, the research attempts to 
analyse this highly important phenomenon for the Baltic states. 
Competition law together with competition enforcement institutions were 
introduced to many jurisdictions in the world. However, the governments from 
different jurisdiction have realised that national competition law could not give a 
final solution as a trade has been increasing globally and competition law is 
national. Thus, the importance of bilateral and multilateral co-operations among 
the national competition authorities and influence of trans-national regulatory 
institutions have augmented. This reflected in the growth of the international 
organisations as such the WTO, International Competition Network (thereafter 
ICN), the OECD and on a regional scale - the EU. 
Bearing in mind that the globalisation process might be considered as a 
foundation for the emergence of global businesses (including merger transactions 
as a part of it) and international competition, a further analysis of this process is 
required. Globalisation is defined as a political, economic and social phenomenon 
of the new millennium with more opened economies and societies (Moore, 
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2003: 15). According to Twining `globalisation' refers to the processes, which 
tend to create and consolidate a unified world economy, a single ecological 
system and a complex network of communications that covers the whole globe 
even without penetrating every part of it (Twining, 2000: 4). Furthermore, 
Twining, who has further developed the Santo's theory, stated that the global does 
not necessarily exclude the local, as they would rather interact to each other. As 
Boaventura de Sousa Santos (1995) mentioned in the theory there is 
distinguishing features between `globalized localism' and `localized globalism'. 
The first one consists of process by which a local phenomenon is successfully 
globalised, for instance, the worldwide operation of transnational corporations, the 
spread of the competition law and policy etc. It is commonly recognised that 
American antitrust law and the EC competition law have an influence worldwide. 
Meanwhile, `localized globalism' occurs as `the impact of transnational practices 
and imperatives on local conditions, that are thereby destructured and 
restructured in order to respond to transnational imperatives', the example 
includes free trade enclaves etc. (Santos, 1995: 263). In addition, Santo 
distinguishes `core countries' and `peripheral countries', where the former 
specialises in `globalized localisms' and the latter is imposed the choice of 
`localized globalisms' 12. The example of the core countries might be the US with 
the influence of antitrust law. The researcher further argues that to some extent the 
international organisations or even the regional unions, as the EU could be 
presumably referred to the core countries. Due to the specification of the 
formation of the EU, which includes merging the basic principles and aspect of 
law from the core countries13, the EU may fall into the classification of a `core 
country' in this context. For instance, the influence of the competition law and 
policy of the EU is imposed not only on the Member States, but also is spread to 
the rest of Europe or even the world14. At this point it can be stated that the 
competition law and policy of the EU and the US Antitrust law form the basis for 
the international competition law and have influence within a single country 
12 For further reading see Boaventura de Santos, Towards a New Common Sense: Law, Science 
and Politics in Paradigmatic Transition, 1995. 
13 For instance, France, Germany and the UK have had the most influence in forming the EU legal 
order. 
14 For instance, some countries in Europe but outside the EU and some Latin American countries 
use the EU model of competition law and policy. 
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world-wide 15 . 
The Baltic countries, meanwhile, might be an example of the 
peripheral countries referring to the obligation to impose the principles of the EU 
into their legal systems. The theory will be further explored towards one direction 
- the interaction between the core system - the EU and the Baltic states as 
peripheral countries within the context of competition law and policy, in particular 
merger control mechanism. 
1.2. EU policy, basic principles and competition law 
1.2.1. Overview 
Unlike the international organisations, the EU is, in fact, unique. Its 
Member States by signing the Treaty have set up common European 
Community's institutions to which they delegate some of their sovereignty so that 
decisions on specific matters of joint interest can be made democratically at 
European level. The European Union may be considered `[.. ] as the legal and 
political concept which gives expression to this underlying unity' (Hartley, 
2003: 9). It cannot easily be compared with other political entities, as it contains 
some elements of a traditional international organisation, however with some 
`supranational powers', or some elements of a federation with regards to the 
judicial and legal system of the Community' 6. The European Union is considered 
as the most powerful first of all economic grouping; despite differences in culture, 
languages and emphasis on nationalism, it is a socially and economically 
integrated unit with a position to negotiate and operate as a whole in its external 
economic relations (Heidensohn, 1995: 1). 
Economic and political integration between the member states of the 
European Union means that these countries have to take joint decisions on many 
matters. Thus, they have developed common policies in a very wide range of 
fields - from agriculture to culture, from consumer affairs to competition, from 
15 The commentators recognise that the EU and the US represent today the two most influential 
spheres of antitrust law and policy worldwide. See, for instance, Egge, Bay, Calzado, 2004, IBA 
8`h Annual Competition Conference. 
16 For further reading, see Hartley, The Foundations of European Community Law, 5th edition, 
Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 9-10. Also see Hartley, Federalism, Courts and Legal Systems: 
The Emerging Constitution of the European Community, 1986,34 Am. Jo. Comp. L. 229. 
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environment and energy to transport and trade'7. The influence of the EU is 
significant. As Holton states, the EU `[.. ] offers an even stronger example of 
transnational regulatory economic arrangements moving beyond 
intergovernmentalism than the global organizations' (Holton, 1998: 79). After the 
latest enlargement by the signing and ratifying of the Treaty of Nice, comprising 
25 members and 454 million consumers, introducing the EU Constitution, having 
its own legislative and decision making bodies as the Council, Commission, 
Parliament and Court, the EU is the largest trading bloc in the world in political 
and legal terms. 
1.2.2. The roots of the European integration and the origins of the EU 
`Europe', daughter of the King Tyre was abducted by Zeus and taken to Crete to 
become queen and found dynasty. The kingdom of Tyre was seen as the ancestor 
of European civilisation and the womb of different religions and cultures. ' (Sir 
Nicoll and Salmon, 2001: 3). 
Historically, the idea to integrate Europe from the mythology has been 
developed through many different periods of history. For instance, the Roman 
legacy of culture, language and values gave the concept of Europe a wider 
foundation (Nicoll and Salmon, 2001: 3). Napoleon with the French Revolution 
also began the informal integration of the European and world economies by 
instigating a major increase in the flow of people, goods and services between the 
states (Nicoll and Salmon'8,2001: 4). 
Despite some thoughts towards European integration, the actual progress 
started after the Second World War behind the idea for the European co-operation 
within a particular area of activity in order to recover after the wars19. The first 
institution to emerge in Europe was the Organisation for European Economic 
Cooperation (thereafter OEEC) in 1948, primarily as allocation of Marshall Aid 
following with the second major institution the Council of Europe, which lacked 
any supranational powers (Goyder, 1998: 16-18). It was a moment for a new 
17For further discussion, see web-site http: //europa. eu. int 
18 For further discussion on the root of the European integration, see Nicoll and Salmon, 
Understanding the European Union, Longman, 2001, I Ch. 
19 For further reading see R. Mayne, The recovery of Europe, 1970, Ch. 8-10. Also, see D. Swann, 
1984, Ch. 1. 
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radical idea, which was provided by Jean Monnet, French administrator and civil 
servant, who came up with the idea to create a common market for iron, steel and 
coal in Europe without any market restrictions, such as customs, duties, tariffs, 
quotas and administered by an independent High Authority endowed with 
supranational power over all participating countries (Goyder, 2003: 18-19). As a 
result of these ideas together with support of R. Schuman, French Foreign Minister 
at the time, the Treaty of Paris was signed in 1951 by creating the European Coal 
and Steel Community. 
Hence, the foundation of the European Communities has started from 
signing the European Coal and Steel Community (thereafter ECSC) followed by 
the Treaty of Rome in 1957, which founded the European Atomic Energy 
Community (thereafter Eurotom) and the European Economic Community 
(thereafter EEC). The aim of establishing a common market and progressively 
approximating policies of Member States to promote a harmonious development 
of economic activities and closer relations between the Member States was 
enshrined in the Treaty of Rome 20. Thus, the first organisation of European 
integration was created and there the competition law was included as an 
important part of it. With the founding Treaty of Rome four fundamental 
freedoms with the purpose to remove artificial restraints on trade and promote 
competition were established. The first freedom provides that goods moving from 
Member States are not to be subject to customs duties or other restraints; the 
second freedom involves free movements of workers within the Community. The 
third contains a provision of free movement of capital and the fourth, free 
movement of services in the Community. The Treaty of Rome envisaged a 
process of the economic integration based on competition. However, the Treaty 
did not serve only an economic objective as political objective was also involved. 
The idea was to create a common market that `[.. ] the countries of Europe would 
be tied together economically in a way that would preclude or at least reduce the 
possibility of conflicts and wars' (Gerber, 1998: 343). According to Gerber, the 
competition law was politically acceptable because it was a necessary tool for the 
economic integration21. The political aspect of the European integration was also 
20 Art. 2 (8) of the Treaty of Rome. 
21 For further reading see Gerber, Law and Competition in twentieth century Europe, 1998, ch. IX 
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supported by other scholars. For instance, according to Roney and Budd (1998: 3) 
the Communities were established `[.. J to put an end to the futile squandering of 
lives in wars' in Europe. Threat of the Soviet Empire as one of the motives 
towards integration was mentioned by Nicoll and Salmon (2001). It can be 
considered that this motive also played a role for the Baltic countries to join the 
EU. 
The Treaty of the European Union (thereafter the EU) in 1992 brought 
about some conceptual changes; the European Economic Community (EEC) 
treaty was re-named into the European Community Treaty (thereafter EC). Apart 
from the first pillar, which embraces what is known as the European Communities 
together with the four freedoms, competition rules and some other issues, two new 
pillars were created by the Treaty of the European Union. They are `common 
foreign and security policy' and `justice and home affairs'. It took some time for 
the Member States to remove all the barriers to trade virtually between them and 
to turn their `common market' into a genuine single market in which goods, 
services, people and capital could move around freely. As a result, the Single 
Market was formally completed at the end of 199222. The most important feature 
of this Single Act was the single market commitment. The Single Act inserted 
into the Treaty a few new sections, for instance, economic and social cohesion. 
Also, a new section on the environment was introduced by the Single Act. The 
concern was that different standards between the Member States in matters such 
as pollution would distort cross-border trade. Also, there was an assumption that 
the single market programme would lead to acceleration in growth of the 
Community economy. As a result two main side economic effects may occur. On 
one hand, the increased competitive pressures may tend to lead firms to focus on 
the cost savings but not on the adoption of less environmentally safe technologies 
and practices. On the other hand, on the contrary, the increased competition may 
lead to rapid technological change that could increase the opportunity for firms to 
adopt more environmentally friendly process (Swann, 1996: 53-55). 
Furthermore, the Treaty of Amsterdam introduced a new title23 on `closer 
co-operation', which was developed and re-named in the Treaty of Nice (Hartley, 
22 For further reading, see the web-site: http: //europa. eu. int/abc/history/indexen. htm 
23 See Title VII [VIa]. 
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2003: 9). The main task of the Treaty of Nice, which was signed on 26 February 
2001, was to reform institutions of the Community and to prepare them for a 
24 major enlargement following the introduction of ten new Member States. 
1.2.3. Enlargement towards eastward 
`The Community always goes forward; never backward... ' (Lord Cockfield, 1994) 
The 1" of May 2004 had opened the next page of the history of the 
European Union's expansion. Ten new countries had joined the EU. The Baltic 
countries are among new Member States. Already the Treaty of Rome set up the 
room for a future expansion of the EU. However, the EU is not a club, which can 
be joined without first undertaking fundamental changes in law and economy 
(Mayhew, 1998: 179). The Treaty allows the accession into the EU only for 
suitable European countries. At the European Council in Copenhagen in June 
1993 was decided to introduce the requirements (widely known as Copenhagen 
criteria) for the accession into the EU. A country is assumed to be applicable for 
the membership by satisfying the economic, political and administrative 
conditions. Political conditions include the ability to take on the present and future 
obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of economic, political 
and monetary union, and guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights and 
protection of minorities. Introduction of a functioning market economy, which 
would be capable to cope with competitive pressure and market forces are the 
economic conditions. The institutions to deal with these issues refer to 
administrative conditions. Furthermore, the European Council in Madrid in 1995 
introduced the pre-accession strategy. This means the creating conditions '[.. ]for 
the gradual, harmonious integration of the applicant countries through the 
development of the market economy, the adjustment of administrative structures 
and the creation of a stable economic and monetary environment' (Van Miert, 
June 1998). After the collapse of the Soviet Union and throwing off the socialist 
shackles after 50 years of occupation, the Central and Eastern European countries 
(thereafter the CEEC) showed their eagerness to rejoin the Europe from which 
these countries had been estranged by the `iron curtains' (Danta and Hall, 2000: 3). 
24 Here the author refers to the enlargement of 1 May 2004. 
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After re-gaining their independence, the Baltic countries also exposed the desire 
like other Eastern and Central European countries to join the EU. However, the 
accession of the Baltic countries arguably represents one of the most historic 
dimensions of the enlargement process first of all in terms of European geopolitics 
and continental integration (Pettai, 2003: 1). As a result of the enlargement, the EU 
embraces almost the entire Baltic Sea into one economic and political bloc, 
consolidates a part of the continent, which has long been the outside of Europe, 
and entrusts these countries to be the gate-keepers of the newly enlarged EU25. 
Since the Eastern enlargement has had an impact on both the EU and the new 
Member States26, the observation of these aspects is necessary. 
1.2.3.1. The impact of the enlargement on the EU 
First of all, the eastern enlargement has been a significant accession from a 
political point of view leading to an increase in the power and prestige of the EU 
in international arenas (Mathew, 1998: 186). After adding ten new Member States, 
the EU is the largest trading bloc with an important voice in the world in political 
and legal terms. However, the last enlargement has had two side effects as it has 
caused some challenges as well as opened some opportunities for the EU. The 
Eastern enlargement or in general the CEEC enlargement has constituted the 
challenge for the EU on an institutional level. The basis for the Treaty of Nice was 
the institutional amendments. In particular the actual impact of the Baltic states on 
the EU has been mitigated by their small size. For instance, the Baltic countries 
together in the European Parliament have 26 representatives out of 732. A 
different situation is in the European Commission where each country has one 
representative. However, the commissioners are committed to act in the interests 
of the Union as a whole and not taking instructions from national governments27. 
Despite the small size, the Baltic countries have brought three different languages 
to the political and administrative machinery of the EU and thereby placed an 
additional burden on the EU. 
25 For further reading, see V. Pettai, Historic and historical aspects of Baltic accession to the 
European Union, as published in V. Pettai and J. Zielonka, The road to the European Union, Vol. 2., 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, Manchester University press, 2003, pp. 1-13. 
26 The author here refers to new 10 Member States, which joined the EU on 1St May 2004. 
27 For further reading, see http: //europa. eu. int/institutions/comm/indexen. htm and also 
http: //europa. eu. int/comm/commission barroso/index en. htm 
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Some authors as Mayhew (1998) acknowledge the economic benefits of the 
accession of new Member States, which may occur from three different sources. 
First of all, the 106 million consumers and the thousands of companies within the 
CEEC are an important market for existing Community producers. Secondly, 
according to Mayhew the Eastern and Central European countries are a potentially 
important production location for the Community companies wishing to expand 
their businesses to lower-cost location28. For instance, it is notably the case for 
Germany, where German companies have expanded the business into the CEEC 
and shifted production sites, which the cost structure was particularly dependent 
on labour costs (Mayhew, 1998: 191). For many companies which operate in 
CEEC countries, in particular for the Nordic and the German firms operating in 
the Baltic states, have opened the opportunities to cut costs and it as a result has 
helped to compete more effectively with other firms. Thirdly, the new Member 
States have brought more competition to the market of the European Community, 
leading to a break-up of market rigidities and in the longer term a stronger 
European economy (Mayhew, 1998: 188-193). 
As regards political aspects, particularly the accession of the Baltic states 
with their `shadow of Russia', is one of the most intriguing issues for scholars of 
European integration (Pettai, 2003: 5). The Baltic countries are the first three 
former Soviet republics to join the European integration and the first with 
unsettled questions with Russia and the first to bring sizeable Russian minorities, 
especially in case of Estonia and Latvia because of the `rusification' process, on 
the territory of the EU29. Also, the internal and external links between the three 
Baltic countries and Russia brings `[ .]a new political 
dimension to the EU 
agenda' (Tilikainen, 2003: 14). Furthermore, the new role of the Baltic states as 
the gate-keeper is another challenging issue for the EU. The EU has had to entrust 
the Baltic authorities, in particular the Latvian and the Lithuanian border 
authorities to control illegal migrants to use these states as passageways to other 
European countries (Mannonnen, 1997). 
28 The CEEC can offer low cost labour costs in comparison with the western European countries. 
29 For further reading, see Tiilikainen, The political implications of the EU's enlargement to the 
Baltic states, 2003. 
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As regards competition issues, for the European Commission adding new 
members, has meant to burden the internal operations of the Community's 
competition law system because of their little experience of competition and much 
less of competition law (Gerber, 1998: 395). Also, there is a possibility that more 
merger transactions will fall under the European Commission's jurisdiction as a 
result of the enlargement with ten new countries. This is because the `one-stop- 
shop' in which companies engaged in large-scale mergers need to obtain the EC 
merger clearance, became bigger after the last enlargement. For instance, Kesko 
Food Ltd / ICA Baltic AB was the first case 30 , which was referred to the 
jurisdiction of the Commission to avoid multinational filings due to the fact that 
the proposed transaction between Nordic companies had presumed anti- 
competitive effects on competition in several countries, including all three Baltic 
states. 
1.2.3.2. The impact of the EU on the Baltic countries 
The Eastern and Central European countries, including the Baltic states, 
with weak security and economic situation needed a strong anchor, what the EU 
could offer, for the market economy and democracy (Mayhew, 1998: 194). For the 
Baltic countries the membership in the EU and NATO is the final step in their 
political recognition as independent states after the collapse of the Soviet Empire 
and re-gaining their independence in 1991. For the people in all Baltic countries 
the inclusion in the most extensive and cohesive political formation `[. ] offers a 
much greater prospect for stable development and lasting independence than at 
any time in their modern history' (Pettai, 2003: 1). 
However, the requirements for the membership of the EU have been as a 
new revolution for the Central and Eastern European countries. Life behind the 
`iron curtains' had left these countries far at the back from the western European 
countries with modem economies. Communist industry was technologically 
backward and monumentally inefficient; agriculture was stagnated because of 
collectivisation and state control (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992: 13). The conditions 
to the accession into the EU for the Baltic countries meant transforming whole 
30The Commission's decision No. COMP/M 3464. It will be discussed in the further sections. 
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economies and legal systems, dealing with outmoded technology, overcoming 
embedded political systems, even changing deep-rooted socialist mentality (Danta 
and Hall, 2000: 3-5, Lydeka, 2001). The Baltic countries have faced great 
problems in re-designing their systems. They had to set up capital markets and 
create banking, financial and monetary systems; they needed to re-draft their laws 
to allow for new forms of economic organisations, new sorts of transactions and 
obviously new patterns of ownership (by including a private ownership) (Milgrom 
and Roberts, 1992: 15-16). They had to educate people, especially business people, 
to the new rules of the game and gain acceptance for these rules, as to re-educate 
managers who can take their own strategic decisions (rather than follow orders 
from Moscow) and operate in a market system and compete in a world market 
(Lydeka, 2001, Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). They also had to decide on 
competition and regulatory policies in order to find a way how to deal with a 
problem that simply privatising the giant, inefficient state firms (inheritance from 
the Soviet Empire) will yield a system of inefficient private monopolies 31. Hence, 
the Eastern European countries, including the Baltic states, had to travel a long 
path through the transition from authoritarian politics and planned economies to 
more democratic and liberal regimes. 
The closer interest to the European Communities has not only affected the 
basic economic (as change from planned to market economy) and administrative 
framework but also the basic legal background in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. 
The transition has not been required only political decision and economic 
expertise but also comprehension of the legal conditions of a market economy, in 
particular of the European Communities (Mueller-Graff, 1993). The applicant 
states must not only accept the Community system but also have the capacity to 
implement it. This in turn means that the applicants must have a competitive 
market economy, and an adequate legal and administrative framework in both the 
public and private sector (Stavridis, Mossialos, and Morgan, 1997: 162). In 
general, the policy of the EU has meant that all candidate countries have been 
required to adapt their laws and institutions by implementing the acquis in very 
significant ways before the accession, and therefore they were left in such a 
position where they do not have any influence on the making of the European 
31 For further reading, see Milgrom and Roberts, 1992, pp. 15-16. 
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laws and policies. Thus, the Baltic countries had to meet the Copenhagen criteria 
(June 1993)32, before they could join the Community, which involve: (i) the 
stability of institutions guaranteeing a functioning democracy and the rule of law 
as the basis for society, respect for and protection of minorities; (ii) the existence 
of a functioning market economy which is developing in such a way that it can 
sustain the competitive pressure from and in the Single Market and the Economic 
and Monetary Union; (iii) and a 100% correct implementation of the acquis 
communautaire, unless otherwise agreed with the EU, together with a public 
administration that efficiently, correctly, and without corruption applies and 
enforces the acquis conformed legislation. 
A result of being a part of the Soviet Union and having the state-run 
economies, the Baltic countries were required to re-design the entire economic 
system. It is because the competition policy within the EU involves the 
monitoring and intervention into the markets of Member States to ensure that 
there is an adequate level of competition. Therefore, the purpose behind this 
competition policy is to ensure that there is an efficient allocation of resources and 
there is a belief that the market economy is a more effective way of allocating 
resources than the centrally-planned or state-run 33 economies (Barnes I. and 
Barnes P., 1995: 212). Mario Monti, the European Commissioner for Competition 
Policy, in his speech delivered in June 2001, mentioned that without a strict 
competition policy preventing any market-distorting behaviour of undertakings 
the market economy is unlikely to keep the promises and, furthermore, without a 
strict competition policy the formerly state-run economies will not be able to 
survive the competitive pressures and market forces of the internal market (Monti, 
2001). 
The other requirement for the membership into the EU was the 
governmental capacities to manage the European affairs. This was an important 
criterion, as the institutions capabilities to administer the EU matters affect not 
only the Baltic countries' ability to benefit from the EU membership but also the 
EU's governance capacity as to have the uniform application and enforcement of 
the acquis (Nakrosis, 2003: 104). Adjusting the Baltic countries' administration to 
32 Available at web-site: http: //europa. eu. int 
33 Centrally-planned economies and state-run economies are used interchangeably in this research 
as different sources refer to either of these terms. 
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deal with the EU affairs, required huge reform efforts, including cleaning up after 
the inherited system from the communist tradition, the establishment of new 
regulatory institutions and the development of new regulatory skills 34 . 
New 
institutions were established in all Baltic countries as in Estonia - Competition 
Board, the Competition Council in Latvia and the Competition Council in 
Lithuania to deal with competition affairs. 
1.2.4. Legal sources of the EU 
It is important to understand the different types of the EU legislation in 
order to comprehend the policy of the Union. For developing its policy, the 
European Community law has a number of formal legal orders: the primary 
sources contain all the founding Treaties with the following amendments, and 
secondary sources include regulations, directives and decisions. Also the 
interpretation of both primary and secondary sources by the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) and by the Court of First Instance (CFI) must be added. 
Recommendations, opinions, guidelines as opposed to the more formal measures 
such as regulations, directives, and decisions are labelled as `soft' laws as they do 
not have binding force. Meanwhile, regulations, directives and decisions refer to 
`hard' laws due to their binding nature. According to article 249 (ex. 189) 
regulations are `[.. ] binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member 
States'. Directives differ from regulations in two important aspects: (i) they do not 
have to be addressed to all the Member States; and (ii) even if they are binding, 
the choice of form and method of implementation is open to the Member States. 
Decisions as stipulated by article 249 (ex. 189) are binding in their entirety but 
only on those to whom they are addressed. And, finally, recommendations, 
opinions, guidelines and other `soft` law without binding force, have importance 
in explanation of EC law and in putting steps towards transparency. For instance, 
the Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council 
Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings35 issued by the 
34 For a further reading, see Nakrosis, who's analysis is mainly based on Lithuania, but to some 
extent can be applicable to Estonia and Latvia as well. 
35 2004/C 31/03. 
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Commission has an important impact on the way in which the Commission 
chooses to exercise its control vis-a-vis merger transactions. 
Considering that this thesis involves study about the EC Merger Regulation, 
the researcher assumes that some explanation of regulation is required. First of all, 
only regulations have a direct applicability. The precise meaning of the term 
`directly applicable' has caused some concerns and debate for the scholars36 at the 
early stage due to the absence of travaux preparatoires of the Treaty. The 
question has been raised whether the Treaty's drafters meant that by this term the 
individuals have rights, which they can enforce through the national courts in their 
own name (Craig and Burca, 1998: 106-107). Indeed, the ECJ interpreted the 
`direct applicability' in this manner and has gone even further. In the Variola / 
Amministrazione delle Finanze case37, the ECJ mentioned that a regulation from 
its entry into force and its application in favour of those subject to it are 
independent from any measure of reception into national legal systems. This case 
also explained that regulations become automatically part of national legislation 
and do not require any further implementation. This means that the EC Merger 
Regulation is binding and directly applicable in the Baltic states since joining the 
EU on 1 May 2004. 
The EC law has direct effect at both horizontal and vertical levels. 
Horizontal direct effect refers where an individual seeks to invoke a provision of 
the EC law against another private party, whereas, vertical - an individual against 
a Member State. In VanGend en Loos case38 the ECJ held that rights and duties 
according to the Treaty refer not only to governments but also to people and the 
object of the ECJ `[. ] is to secure uniform interpretation of the Treaty by national 
courts and tribunals' and `[.. ] the states have acknowledged that Community law 
has an authority which can be invoked by their nationals before those courts and 
tribunals'. Thus, the European Community legal system is such a system in which 
the EC law is a source of law in the Member States legal systems and even 
prevails over conflicting national laws. Any doubts as to the primacy of the EC 
36 See, for instance, Steiner J., Direct applicability in EEC law -a chameleon concept, 1982,98 
LQR 229; Dashwood A., The principle of direct effect in European Community Law, 1978,16 
JCMS 229. 
37 Variola /Amministrazione delle Finanze, No. 34/73, (1973), ECR 981. 
38 Van Gend en Loos/Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, No. 26/62 (1963), ECR 1. 
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law over national law was emphasised in Costa / ENEL case 39 , where the 
European Court of Justice stated that by signing the Treaty `[.. J the Member 
States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within the limited fields, and have 
thus created a body of law which binds both their nationals and themselves'. 
The discussion above shows that the development of the legal system of the 
European Community has occurred not only by the Treaty itself (not by expressed 
agreement by the Member States) but also through the interpretation and 
principles formed by the ECJ or CFI. Through the case law these courts have built 
up a bold theory of the nature of the EC law `[.. ] attributing to it the 
characteristics and force which it considered necessary to underpin a set of 
profoundly altering and potentially far-reaching common goals within a group of 
politically and geographically distinct nations and historically sovereign States' 
(Craig and Burca, 1998: 163). Thus, the questions arise here, what are the general 
principles and in what way are these general principles a source of law within the 
context of the EC 40 . For answering the 
first part of the question, Sir G. 
Fitzmaurice stated that a principle of law underlies a rule and explains the reasons 
for its existence (Fitzmaurice, 1957 as quoted in Tridimas, 1999: 1). According to 
Tridimas, principles provide a minimum substantive content and guide the judicial 
inquiry on that basis (Tridimas, 1999: 2). The principles of the European 
Community fall into a principes communs category, which is apparent to 
supranational legal systems and consists of principles common to the constituent 
parts of this legal system41, and explains the reasons for the EC law existence. As 
regards the second part of the question, the ECJ has developed a doctrine, which 
provides that the Community law may be derived from the general principles of 
law42, mainly for the reason to `cloak the nakedness of judicial law-making' 
(Hartley, 2003: 133). The idea behind it is that a legal foundation for the 
judgement will be provided, if a ruling is delivered from a common assent43. The 
39 Costa/ENEL No. 6/64 (1964) ECR 585. 
40 The EC rather than EU, due to the fact that the ECJ lacks jurisdiction over the second and the 
third pillars. For further reading see Craig and Burca, 1998, pp. 164. 
41 This category is widely known among continental authors, such as Papadopoulou, Principes 
Generaux du Droit et Droit Communautaire, Bruylant, 1996, Schermers, Waelbroeck, Judicial 
protection in the European Communities, Usher A., General principles of EC Law, Longman, 
1998, Tridimas, The general principles of EC law, 1999 etc. 
42 For instance, general principles of law are also one of the sources recognised by international 
law (Art. 38 (1) (c ), Statute of the International Court of Justice. 
43 For further discussion, see Hartley, 2003, pp. 133-135. 
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origin of these general principles is the Community Treaties and the legal systems 
of the Member States (Hartley, 2003: 133). 
As regards the particular principles, the case law has developed, for 
instance, proportionality, legal certainty and protection of legitimate expectations 
to general principles of law transcending specific provisions (Tridimas, 1999: 5). 
The Treaty of European Union added article 5 (3) (ex. 3b (3)) to incorporate the 
principle of proportionality governing the exercise of the competence of the 
Community. Due to the fact that proportionality is also incorporated by 
implication in the principle of subsidiarity, the researcher considers that firstly the 
analysis on subsidiarity should be provided. 
According to article 5 of the Treaty, the Community will take action `[.. ] 
only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficient 
achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects 
of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community'. Thus, there are two 
basic conditions for the Community jurisdiction: (1) the intended action, which 
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central or regional 
level and local level; and (2) it can be better achieved within the Community 
jurisdiction 44 
. Due to the ambiguity of this principle, the Protocol on the 
Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality was added to the 
Treaty of Amsterdam. However, there have been still some uncertainties left, 
which were expressed by the various commentators. It is not clear which areas 
should be regarded as exclusive jurisdiction of the Community (considering that 
the principle of subsidiarity only applies in the areas, which are the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Community)45. Toth (1992: 1080-1086) argues that all the areas 
of power grated to the Community under the EEC Treaty as originally concluded 
is exclusive. Steiner (1994), meanwhile, states that the only areas in which the 
Community has exclusive competence within the meaning of article 5 are those in 
which it has already legislated46. Therefore, Hartley (2003) concludes that the 
Commission has identified the areas satisfying this criteria, which include the 
removal of barriers to the free movement of goods, persons, services, and capital; 
the common commercial policy; the general rules on competition etc. (Com. 
44 For further reading, see Article 5 of the Protocol on the Application of the Principles of 
Subsidiarity and Proportionality. 
' For further comments, see Hartley, 2003, pp. 114-118. 
46 As published in O'Keeffe and Twomey, Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty, 1994. 
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Doc. Sec (92)). The Commission has also made clear that this large area would 
expand with integration47. As regards merger control, the Commission has set the 
criteria 48 and according to them the merger cases are divided between the 
European Commission and the Member States jurisdictions. First of all, threshold 
has become the means by which the principle of subsidiarity is applied. Secondly, 
other certain conditions, as stated in articles 9 and 22 of the EC Merger 
Regulation allow the transfer of cases from national to European level and vice 
versa. Thus, both qualitative and quantitative elements define the principle of 
subsidiarity within the merger regime context (Cini and McGowan, 1998: 219). 
As it was mentioned above the principle of proportionality 49 first 
`discovered' by the ECJ was later incorporated into the Treaty. Thus, the 
condition to article 5 was added, which states that `[.. ] any action by the 
Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of this 
Treaty'50. The principle applies to the Community institutions in the sense that 
they cannot go beyond what is necessary in order to bring about the EC law. 
Hence, the proportionality principle is well established as a general principle and 
can be used to challenge Community action itself as well as the legality of 
Member State action which falls within the sphere of application of the 
Community law (Craig and Burca, 1998: 350). The reason why this principle was 
added was to ensure that the Community respects the Member States' interests not 
only where it exercises concurrent competence but also where it has its exclusive 
jurisdiction, which falls outside the scope of article 5 (3) (ex. 3 b (2)) (Lenaerts 
and Van Ypersele, 1994 as quoted in Tridimas, 1999: 119). The example of the 
proportionality principle within the context of the merger regime to some extent 
can be found in article 9 of the ECMR (the EC Merger Regulation). According to 
this article with conformity of the certain conditions a Member State may lodge a 
request for referral of merger case to its jurisdiction despite the fact that the case 
falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission. 
47 See, The Principle of Subsidiarity, Com. Doc. SEC (92) 1990. Also see, Hartley's comments 
2003, pp. 115. 
48 See ECMR. These criteria will be discussed in the following section of this thesis. 
a9 The principle of proportionality was delivered from the `core' country - Germany, which 
governs the relationship of the Federal authorities and the Lander. 
50 Article 5 (3) of the Treaty. 
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Other principles are legal certainty and legitimate expectations, and 
transparency. The most apparent application of legal certainty is in the context of 
rules with an actual retroactive effect. Retroactivity may occur in one of two 
ways: (i) where the date of entry into force precedes the date of publication; or (ii) 
where the regulation applies to circumstances, which have been concluded before 
the entry into force of the measure (Craig and Burca, 1998: 357). As regards legal 
certainty and transparency in competition rules, firms must be able to know and 
understand the law in order to work within a legally defined framework of rules 
(Cini and McGowan, 1998: 218). Cini and McGowan further argue that an 
unpredictable policy may prevent firms from being law-abiding, as what is one 
day legal may become illegal the next; and it is in the institutions of the EU's (as 
regards the competition rules, the Commission's) interest to develop a clear and 
transparent policy. The examples of the development of transparent policy of the 
EU are the Notices51, Guidelines52 and other explanatory documents. 
Apart from the principles as discussed above, the Community has other 
general principles, which include human rights principles as the duty to give 
reasons, the right to due process, non bis in idem and the audi alteram partem, 
introduced by the common law tradition, with the meaning of recognition by the 
court a company's right to a fair hearing in the decision making process before an 
53 administrative body 
Since the EU's institutions play an important role in developing the European 
Union's rule of law, it is important to analyse them. 
1.2.5. The Political institutions within the EU 
According to the founding treaties, the European Union has five main 
institutions: the Commission, the Council, the European Parliament, the Court of 
Justice and the Court of Auditors. The Council is the organ, which represents the 
51 For instance, Commission Notice on Case Referral in respect of concentrations, Official Journal 
C 56,05.03.2005, pp. 2-23; Commission Notice on restrictions directly related and necessary to 
concentrations, Official Journal C 56,05.03.2005, pp. 24-3. 
52 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control 
of concentrations between undertakings, Official Journal C 31,05.02.2004, pp. 5-18. 
53 For a further analysis, see Vranken M., Fundamentals of European civil law and impact of the 
European Community, Federation press, 1997. 
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political will of the Member States and has final legislative authority54. It gave to 
the Commission the power to play a major role in shaping the competition law 
system. Considering the fact that the European Parliament and the Council of 
Ministers have only a peripheral role, and at the institutional heart of the 
supranational enforcement of competition policy is two main bodies the 
Commission and the Court of Justice, a further analysis will be based on them. 
Both these institutions are responsible for the legal supervision of the competition 
rules, including the merger control, and they also have had a pivotal role to play in 
the day-to-day administration and in shaping the substantive and procedural 
characteristics of the Competition regime of the EC (Cini and McGowan, 
1998: 38-59). 
The European Commission is the politically independent institution that 
represents the interests of the EU as a whole. It proposes legislation, policies and 
programmes of action and it is responsible for implementing the decisions of the 
Parliament and the Counci155. Furthermore, the European Commission is the 
institution responsible for the implementation of the EC competition law and 
policy at the EU level. The European Commission can apprise competition 
concern by a complaint of an undertaking (-s) or Member State (-s) or by itself 
and act on its own initiate ('ex officio') to investigate the cases fallen to its 
jurisdiction (El-Agraa, 2004: 202). 
The main role of the Court of Justice is to ensure that the EU legislation, 
which is technically known as `Community law', is interpreted and applied in the 
same way in each Member State, as it is always identical for all parties and in all 
circumstances. The Court has the power to settle legal disputes not only between 
Member States, but also between the EU institutions, businesses and individuals56 
For instance, in a several key judgements the Court of Justice enhanced the status 
of the Community law, as referring to the Van Gend en Loos case 57 which 
established the doctrine of direct effects and the supremacy of Community law 
over national law (Hartley, 2003: 52). Moreover, the Court has played a major role 
sa The Council has the final legislative authority within the Community. Meanwhile, the 
Commission has the initiative power. For a further reading on these institutions, see 
http : //europ a. eu. int 
ss For further information about role and functions of the Commission, see web-site 
http: //europa. eu. int 
56 For further information about the Court of Justice, see web-site http: //europa. eu. int 
57 Ibid, fn. 37. 
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in developing the competition law. For instance, the Court of Justice frequently 
enunciated broad principles and values without just limiting itself on the facts of 
individual cases. It has looked to the future and has guided the Commission in 
developing the competition law and policy (Gerber, 1998: 352). For supporting the 
integration as the main goal, the Court made teleology as its interpretive strategy. 
The court interpreted the provisions of the competition law in a way what was 
necessary to achieve the integrationist goals of the Treaty (Gerber, 1998: 353). The 
Continental Can case58 illustrates such teleological justification, where the Court 
disregarded both textual and historical analyses, which opposed the application of 
article 82 (86 at that time) to mergers, and held the applicability of this article to 
merger cases. The Court further stated that such interpretation was necessary for 
the Commission to accomplish its pro-integration goals 59 . Thus, 
during the 
foundational period the primary role of the Commission together with the Court of 
Justice was `making competition law'. However, the situation has changed ever 
since. The Court's decisions became less `aggressive' in the sense that the Court 
limited itself to the statements required for the decision of the concrete legal 
controversy as in opposite to the past future-oriented judgements with generalised 
significance (Everling, 1986 as quoted in Gerber, 1998: 372)60 
1.2.6. The origin of the Competition law in Europe and in the EU 
1.2.6.1. Overview 
The idea to develop a general law to protect competition in Europe started 
in 1890s in Austria as `[.. ] a product of Vienna 's extraordinarily creative 
intellectual life' (Gerber, 1998: 6). The task of the competition law proposals was 
to protect the competitive process from political and ideological onslaughts and 
they relied on bureaucratic application of a `public interest' standard. Despite the 
political events in Austria, which blocked the further development of the 
competition law ideas, the inspiration to form the competition law was debated in 
Germany. Germany enacted the first competition law as such in 1923 in response 
58 Continental Can/Commission, case 6/72, (1973) CMLR 199. 
59 For further reading, see Gerber, 1998, pp. 360-361. 
60 Some of the recent judgements by the Court will be examined in chapter 6. 
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to the post-war inflation crisis. Although the competition law was eliminated 
during the 1930s pressures, it was an important factor of economic and legal life 
in Germany and the ideas of competition law spread during the late 1920s 
throughout Europe. Many European governments after the war turned to 
competition law as a means of encouraging economic revival and embedded it in 
economic regulatory frameworks (Gerber, 1998: 8). For instance, business 
activities conflicting with good trade practices and customs were also prohibited 
in Estonia in 1931 by the provisions of law, which dealt with unfair competition. 
However, the application of the law ended together with the disappearance of the 
state of Estonia (Proos, 2002). 
Gradually competition law in Europe has become a `pillar' of the `social 
market economy' and `[.. ] has played a key role in some of post-war Europe's 
most impressive economic and political successes' (Gerber, 1998: 8 61). The 
additional stimulus for the competition law has had the creation of the European 
Economic Community in 1957 together with the task of eliminating obstacles to 
trade across the national borders and creating the conditions for the effective 
European market. 
Thus, a European competition `tradition' has started with a vague idea of a 
competition law, which has gradually acquired enough support to be enacted into 
legislation and has spanned throughout Europe, and has grown in economic and 
political importance. This competition tradition has broadcasted the ideas and 
perceptions over time across borders and has played a central role in the 
integration of Europe and economic and social progress62. Meanwhile, the Baltic 
countries, as being a part of the Soviet Union, were excluded unlike the Western 
European countries from developing a competition tradition. The competition 
policy and law was an `undiscovered island' for the Baltic states until the re- 
gaining of their independence at the very end of the 20th century. 
61 D. Gerber, American Professor in Law, is widely known for his original contribution outlining 
the German ordoliberal thinking in the development of EU competition policy and uncovering the 
key historical transformation and movement of the EU competition law. For further analysis, see, 
for instance, Gerber D., Law and Competition in Twentieth century Europe, Clarendon press, 
1998. 
62 For further reading, see D. J. Geber, 1998, pp. 6-10. 
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The creation of the European Economic Community has begun the process 
of integration in which competition law has played a pivotal role63. However, the 
Competition law of the Community has not only itself become a major factor in 
economic decision-making power through Europe, but also the Member State and 
the Candidate States have modelled their competition laws to the competition law 
of the Community (Gerber, 1998: 334). For instance, the Competition laws in the 
Baltic countries were introduced as a part of the aquis communautaire and have 
been highly influenced by the Community's law. 
1.2.7. The merger control in the Community 
1.2.7.1. The origin of the merger control mechanism within the EU 
The first trans-European provisions on merger control was introduced by 
article 66 of the ECSC64, which was influential by the US experience as there was 
no virtually European experience at that time (Gerber, 1998: 341). The High 
Authority was given a permission to restrict mergers, where the parties of the 
transaction would have power `[.. ] to influence prices, to control or restrain 
production or marketing, or to impair the maintenance of effective competition in 
a substantial part of the market for such products; or to evade the rules of 
competition [of the treaty], particularly by establishing an artificially privileged 
position involving a material advantage in access to suppliers or markets' 
(Article 66). The reasons behind articles 65 and 66 of the ECSC reflected the 
adherence of the drafters to competition as an economic way of life with the major 
concerns being that cartels (and concentrations) might become the real political 
power of the Community and possibly may constitute a challenge to the 
Community's sovereignty (Vernon, 1953 as quoted in Gerber, 1998: 337). 
However, these first merger control rules within the EU, was applicable only in 
the steel and coal industries. 
63 The EC Treaty embedded a set of wider policy goals orientated towards the objective of 
European economic integration. For instance, article 3 (1) (g) of the Treaty states that a system has 
to ensure `[. ] that competition in the internal market is not distorted'. The competition rules were 
included in the EC Treaty as a means to achieve economic integration. For further discussion, see 
chapter 5. 
64 This Treated expired in 2002 OJ C 152/5. 
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The competition law and policy without any exclusion to any particular 
industry was introduced in the European Community by the founding Treaty of 
Rome in 1957. Traditionally, the Competition policy within the European 
Community is based on the control of the behaviour of undertakings. For instance, 
articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty give the power to the Commission to enforce 
sanctions on undertakings as regards restricted agreements or abuse of a dominant 
position. However, this Treaty is silent and does not contain any specific 
provisions for merger control. Cini and McGowan (1998) give two reasons why 
merger control rules were excluded. The first one is the differences between the 
EEC and the ECSC treaties, where the former is a `[.. ] traite-cadre that 
established a framework of action but which compels further legislation to apply 
the principles' and the latter is a `trate-loi which specifies the regulatory content' 
(Bulmer, 1994: 423-424, as quoted in Cini and McGowan, 1998: 116-117). It was 
easier to agree on the rules of the specific industries than establish a more general 
regulation. The second reason was the generally held view and the economic and 
political situation in Europe in the 1950s. While signing the Treaty of Rome, the 
main concern was made on how to deal with an abuse of dominant firms or 
restrictions of competition through agreements and a merger control was left 
behind as it had little economic impact at that time. Merger transactions were not 
considered as a threat to competition, and therefore, economies of scale were held 
to benefit industrial competitiveness (Cini and McGowan, 1998: 116-117). Hence, 
merger transactions had been looked at from a positive view: providing they 
increase the industrial competitiveness. 
However, the position towards merger transactions has changed. The first 
attempt by the Commission to introduce a regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings65 in the rest of industries apart from coal and 
steel was in 1973 following with the further proposals in 1981 and in 1986. Even 
the Member States did recognise the importance of merger control, but this 
attempt was unsuccessful as the Member States could not agree on the specific 
form: whether the merger control must be left to national authorities or to the 
Commission (Craig and Burca, 1998: 1034). The gap of the absence of merger 
control was covered by articles 81 and 82 (85 and 86 at that time) of the Treaty. 
65 Commission proposal for a regulation of the Council of Ministers on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings, 1973, OJ C92/l. 
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Article 82 deals with an abuse of dominant position and article 81 focuses on anti- 
competitive agreements rather than market position. In Continental can66 case a 
US company with a dominant position was attempting to gain a control of a Dutch 
company operating in the same market. The Commission was under the opinion 
that the Continental Can is using its dominant position to acquire the target - the 
Dutch company and it would constitute an abuse according to article 82 (86 at that 
time). The Commission's decision of prohibiting the merger was overturned by 
the ECJ, but it upheld its reasoning in relation to article 82, by lifting up the 
applicability of this article towards mergers control as in the case of the expansion 
of a dominant position through mergers. 
Article 81 was also applied in a several merger cases. For instance, in 
Philip Morris 67 case, Philip Morris intended to purchase 50% of shares of 
Rothmans Holdings. After the intervention of the Commission, Philip Morris 
reduced the size down to 30.8% of the shares where there were only 24.9% of 
them with the voting rights. However, the decision appeared before the Court, as 
there were the complainants who were not happy with the decision. Thus, the 
Court in this case stated that article 81 was applicable to the acquisition of shares, 
where the acquisition leads to the ability of the acquirer to influence the conduct 
of the target undertaking, especially the acquisition of a minority shareholding in 
the undertaking. The Commission further followed this policy in 1988 by forcing 
British Airways to surrender some of its routes to its main competitors after it had 
taken over British Caledonian (Cini and McGowan, 1998: 119). Hence, the Court 
of Justice chose to interpret both articles 81 and 82 within the spirit of the Treaty 
of Rome. It was mentioned that articles 81 and 82 had to be interpreted in the 
manner to achieve the task set up in article 3 (1)(g) (ex Article 2 and 3 (f)) 
(Goyder, 2003: 337). 
Despite some experience of applying articles 81 and 82 in merger cases, 
the nature of these two articles as neither the intention of the drafters, nor actual 
wording of the articles or other evidence support the argument, that articles 81 and 
82 are responsible to cover merger control (Goyder, 2003: 335). As it was 
illustrated above, there were a number of obstacles for them being used as an 
66 Continental Can/Commission, case 6/72, (1973) CMLR 199. 
67 BAT/Commission, cases 142 & 156/84 (1987), (1988) 4 CMLR 24 hereinafter cited as Philip 
Morris/Commission case. 
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instrument of a general merger control. For instance, article 82 was applicable to 
include mergers or acquisitions by companies which already had a dominant 
position and therefore the acquisition itself was defined as abusive; the creation of 
a dominant position through a merger was out of the scope of article 82. 
Furthermore, article 82 did not cover mergers that might result in a supply 
structure that facilitates concerted practices on oligopolistic markets. In general 
terms, articles 81 and 82 were also not applicable to shelter all merger cases. 
As mentioned above the position towards merger transactions had 
changed. Sutherland, the member of the Commission responsible for Competition 
policy in 1986, remarked that the policy about the difference in competitiveness 
between European and American firms due to the sizes of European and 
American firms 68 in the 1960s had changed 69 . Furthermore, 
Sutherland was 
concerned that an increasing number of mergers, especially cross-border mergers, 
were likely to have substantial consequences on competition and trade between 
the Member States, and separate Member States were not capable of enforcing 
their merger control as regards to cross-border mergers. This is why the necessity 
of the merger regime at the Community level arose. 
1.2.7.2. Emergence of the Merger Regulation within the EC 
The Merger Regulation, which was adopted on 21 December 1989 and 
came into force on 21 September 1990, provided the Community for the first time 
with an adequate instrument to control cross-border mergers (Faull, Nikpay et al, 
1999: 205 para 4.01). Thus, the merger control within the EC was finally 
introduced because of several main reasons: first, due to the gap left in 
competition law of the European Communities as regards a merger control (for 
instance, recital 6 to the Regulation 4064/89 marks the insufficiency of articles 81 
and 82 to tackle all mergers producing anti-competitive effects); and second, 
because of the augment of cross-border mergers, there was a necessity to 
introduce a merger regime together with the requirement of mandatory pre- 
68 The previous position was expressed that the European firms were too small in size for 
competing large American firms and because of that merger transactions were favoured or 
encouraged. 
69 The speech by P. Sutherland was addressed to international Bar Association Committee on 
Antitrust Law in New York, on 17 September 1986. Mergers and Joint Ventures: New trends in 
European Community Competition policy, Commission press release, IP/86/430,17/09/1986. 
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notification of major mergers. The EC Merger Regulation has provided a means 
to prevent anti-competitive concentrations and with a single framework, where 
such transactions can be assessed (Faull, Nickpay et al, 1999: 205 para 4.02). 
However, the aim of the EC Merger Regulation is not to prohibit all large 
mergers, as the former commissioner of Competition Sutherland stated: 
`[.. ] Mergers are not inherently good or bad. Community competition policy 
which seeks to promote technological innovation and competitiveness while 
maintaining workable competition should not in a systematic way encourage or 
discourage mergers. What is essential is to separate the beneficial from the 
dangerous and this, the Commission feels, can best be done on a Community level 
where mergers can be viewed in the light of the entirety of Community policies. 
Even though in almost all Member States some control of mergers exists, albeit in 
varying degrees, there is need for a Community system. '70 
The Merger Regulation of 1989 divided a merger regime between the 
European Commission and the Member States. The allocation of mergers cases 
between the European Commission and the Member States is based on the 
principle of subsidiarity, i. e. what dimension authority is best placed to deal with 
the case. However, not all merger transactions fall under either European 
jurisdiction or that of a particular Member State. There is a de minimis rule and 
only large merger transactions, which are usually defined by the thresholds within 
a single Member State, may be investigated by the competition authorities at 
either dimension. The jurisdiction of a Community dimension in the field of 
merger control has been defined by the application of turnover thresholds in the 
ECMR71. The Commission has a sole competence to deal with concentrations 
falling to its scope, because it has more powers of investigation, remedial and 
enforcement than the limited means available to the Member States. This means 
that the Commission has jurisdiction over large-scale mergers, which have wider 
effects than simply within one Member State (Goyder, 2003: 341). According to a 
`one - stop - shop' principle, the Commission is the best place to take a merger 
case and take out the additional burden (i. e. multiply filling etc. ) of the 
transaction's participants, if the transaction may have competition concerns within 
three or more countries. This in turn means that mergers, which meet certain 
'o Ibid, fn. 67. 
71 See the Article 1, ECMR, No. 139/2004. 
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revenue thresholds, can be reviewed by the European Commission rather than by 
each Member State of the EU affected by the transaction. For instance, the 
proposed merger transaction of the Finnish company Kesko Food Ltd and the 
Swedish company ICA Baltic AB72 was referred to the Commission due to the 
fact that the transaction had to be notified to the competition authorities of several 
countries including three Baltic states. 
Moreover, there is a possibility of repatriation of merger cases from the 
European to national jurisdiction and vice versa. The right was given to the 
national authorities to deal with the merger cases, which might have impact on 
their national markets. In this case, upon the request of the Member State, the 
merger case may be referred under certain circumstances from the European to the 
national jurisdiction (the situation known as the `German clause'). This clause 
was introduced in order to encounter Germany's concerns not to entrust the 
Commission with exclusive jurisdiction over all merger cases with a Community 
dimension73. However, this situation is rarely used in practice more likely due to 
the policy of the Council and the Commission expressed in the Nineteenth Report 
on Competition Policy, which provides that this referral procedure should be 
applied only in exceptional cases74. This policy reflected in the first two cases 
Varta / Bosh 75 and Alcatel / AEG Kabel76 sought by the Bundeskartellamt but 
rejected by the Commission as not having anti-competitive effects within the 
German market. The first successful referral was the Steetley / Tarmac case77 
submitted by the UK Department of Trade and Industry in 1991. This case 
resolved the uncertainty of the scope of article 9 providing that more restrictive 
interpretation is used by the Commission. This case showed that the Commission 
can refer not entire case but a part of a case which may raise concerns to the 
national market. 
Another situation with possible referral is defined in article 21 (4) where 
national legislation would apply in order to protect their legitimate interest. There 
72 The Commission's decision No. COMP/M 3464. 
73 At that time Germany had a longstanding merger control regime, as being the first Member State 
to introduce the national Merger control rules in 1973, which had proven its efficiency, whereas 
the merger control mechanism within the Community jurisdiction was just being introduced. See 
Werner, 2004, pp. 688. 
74 Nineteenth Report on Competition Policy, pp. 265. 
75 Varta v Bosh, M. 12,25 February 1991. 
76 Alcatel v AEG Kabel, case No. M 165,1991. 
77 Steetley v Tarmac, case No. M180,1991. 
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is a contrasting situation known as the `Dutch clause', where a Member State or 
States may refer the case under the Commission's behalf even if the case does not 
fall within its jurisdiction. This provision was introduced to the regulation due to 
the concerns of some Member States, namely Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Italy, 
Luxemburg and the Netherlands for not being able to provide sufficient regulatory 
control over concentrations outside the jurisdiction of the Commission (Bael and 
Bellis, 1994: 428). This clause has lost its importance since all Member States do 
have their own systems for merger control. 
Further development of the jurisdictional issues was introduced with a new 
Merger Regulation 139/2004, where a better allocation of jurisdiction in the light 
of the subsidiarity principle has been provided while still retaining the idea of a 
'one-stop-shop'. The new streamlined referral system has presented the pre- 
notification system where the parties involved in a merger transaction have a 
possibility to make applications for referral at a very early stage. 78 
1.2.7.3. The substantive issues of the ECMR and their development 
Two basic stages may be distinguished in the development of the 
substantive test of the ECMR in its brief history: before the No. 139/2004 
regulation came into force and after it. This division portrays the major changes in 
the Commission's policy towards merger regime, insofar. The new substantive 
test was introduced with the Regulation of 139/2004, which represents the 
culmination of a long legislative history commencing with the adoption of merger 
control rules on the specific industries of coal and steal in 1950, continuing with 
the Commission's attempts to introduce general merger control rules throughout 
most of the 1970s and 1980s, the adoption of the first Merger Regulation in 1989 
and finally issuing the modernised Merger Regulation in 2004. 
A substantive test used by the Commission is one of the tools to assess 
merger's effects on competition falling to its jurisdiction. According to the former 
substantive test, a merger will be prohibited if it `1.. ] creates or strengthens a 
dominant position as a result of which effective competition would be significantly 
impeded'. The antecedent substantive test was known as a dominance test, which 
78 See Articles 4(4) and 4(5), 139/2004. The procedural issues are excluded from the scope of the 
analysis of this research. 
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consisted of two limbs: i) a creation or strengthening of a dominant position; and 
ii) significant impediment of competition. The decisive criterion was laid on the 
creation or strengthening of a dominant position leaving little independent 
significance to the significant impediment of effective competition. Many 
Member States and the Candidate States (including the Baltic states at that time79) 
followed the path of the Commission and introduced a dominance test in their 
jurisdictions. The Baltic countries were among those to instigate in their 
jurisdictions a dominance test as a substantive test for merger control. 
The idea to reform the old merger regime was foreseen in the first Merger 
Regulation80 and with the enlargement ahead it was considered that this would be 
a good opportunity for a review of the merger control mechanism (Ryan, 
European Commission, 2004). Moreover, the globalisation of economic activity 
including transnational merger transactions and the increased number of these 
transactions falling to the EU and US jurisdictions and consequently the divergent 
decisions8' between the EU Commission and the Federal Trade Commission were 
other forces for revision. It was a necessity to adapt a substantive test to a global 
environment and to bring it considerably closer to the US test as set out in the 
Clayton Act, section 7, which provides that `[.. ] effects of [.. J acquisition may be 
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly'. However, 
the Commission on several occasions issued a statement that there is no material 
difference between the dominance test and the substantial lessening of a 
competition test ('the best' substantive test is a mere matter of semantics), 
providing that neither test can stand on its own but requires the interpretation 
through guidelines or case law, or both. It is not only the wording itself that 
matters but also the theories of competition harm which are used in the 
application of either of the tests 82 . 
Although the Commission and other 
commentators agreed that application of the substantive test was more important 
than its actual wording 83 , the controversy over the existence of possible gap 
79 Note: when the Baltic countries introduced the merger control regime in their jurisdictions they 
were referred as the Candidate countries. 
80 No. 4064/89. 
81 For instance, GE v Honeywell. 
82 See for instance, Substantive criteria used for the assessment of mergers, OECD, 
DAFFE/COMP(2003)5. 
83 For further discussion, see, for instance, point 54 of the Explanatory Memorandum 
accompanying the Commission's proposal of December 11,2002. Also see Monti's speech at the 
DG Competiiton/IBA conference, November 7,2002. 
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revealed that language still matters (Fountoukakos and Ryan, 2005: 287-288). 
Furthermore, the overturning by the CFI of the three Commission's decisions to 
block mergers in Schneider / Legrand84, Airtours / First Choice85 and Tetra Laval 
/ Sidel86 cases due to shortcomings of proof in the Commission's assessments in 
2002 put a further impetus for a review. Hence, the idea to modify the substantive 
test started in 2001 with the Green Paper87, where the Commission raised the 
question of whether the market dominance test should remain in existence or 
whether the substantial lessening of competition test (thereafter SLC), which is 
applied in the USA and other jurisdictions (i. e. UK, Ireland etc. ), should be 
introduced. There were various opinions expressed in this Paper, which can be 
grouped into three main groups. 
The first group of scholars advocated that a dominance test should 
continue due to the legal certainty88 and supported the notion that `if it ain't broke 
don't fix it'. The proponents of a dominance test further commented that the actual 
application of the test is much more important than the wording, and that the 
Commission applying this test has stretched it to embrace the theories of harm 
even if it does not involve dominance per se. However, as the Airtours case89 
proves, these stretches might be insufficient providing the high burden of proof 
put on the Commission. 
The second group, led by the UK, favoured moving to a SLC test 
declaring that the SLC should be introduced mainly because the dominance test 
did not cover all mergers with anti-competitive effects on competition 90 and 
would be better for taking into consideration efficiencies resulting from merger 
transactions. The opponents of the SLC based their views on the economists' 
opinions who argue that the dominance test focuses mainly on static structural 
considerations, such as a firm's size, and the concentration of industry without 
taking into sufficient consideration dynamic and behaviour issues91. 
84 Case T-77/02; No COMP/M. 2282. 
85 Case T-342/99; No IV/M. 1524. 
86 Case T-5/02; No COMP/M. 2416. 
87 Green Paper on the review of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89,11 December 2001, 
COM(2001) 745. 
88 Many Member States had already enshrined a dominance test in their national legislation. 
89 Case T-342/99; No IV/M. 1524. 
90 For instance, oligopoly cases. 
91 For a further reading, see Green Paper, ibid, fn. 85. 
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The third group supported a hybrid-type test combining the language of 
both the dominance test and the SLC test in the manner found in the French, 
Greek or Spanish national laws (Fountoukakos and Ryan, 2005: 286). 
Finally, after fierce debates92, the new regulation opened a new chapter in 
the brief history of the EC Merger Regulation since 1989. The new substantive 
test was introduced with the new Merger Regulation93, what can be referred to as 
a `hybrid' formulation of the test, constructed essentially from the existing 
language of the old test but placing the emphasis on `significant impediment of 
competition' at the centre of the new test, while reserving the notion of dominance 
as an example of a competitive harm (Fountoukakos and Ryan, 2005: 287). 
Article 2 (3) of 139/2004 Regulation provides, that `[ .]a concentration which 
would significantly impede effective competition, in the common market or in a 
substantial part of it, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a 
dominant position, shall be declared incompatible with the common market'. The 
old dominance test has been replaced by the `significant impediment to 
competition' test (thereafter the SIEC test). Despite the fact that the same two 
limbs were left, the main parameter for the assessment is not on dominance but 
whether a merger would significantly impede effective competition (thereafter 
SIEC limb). For Fountoukakos and Ryan (2005: 288) a two limbs test, at least 
semantically is transformed into a unitary one, with one central standard, that 
mergers leading to an impediment to effective competition should be declared 
unlawful. According to the new substantive test, establishment of dominance is no 
longer a prerequisite to block a merger, but just a supportive element in assessing 
whether the merger leads to a significant impediment of effective competition. It 
focuses more clearly on the effects on competition (including dynamic aspects) 
rather than the market structure (otherwise static market effects), as was the case 
with the previous regulation and is still used by the Competition Authorities of the 
Baltic countries. 
Riesenkampff (2004: 718-727) distinguishes three distinct goals for the 
rationale of the new substantive test. The first goal is to close the gap in the 
dominance test, second - to harmonise with the US antitrust law and the final goal 
is to ensure legal certainty through the reference to the creation or strengthening 
92 The author here refers to the major disputes in the Council of Ministers. 
93 No. 139/2004. 
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of a dominant market position. As regards the first goal, the new test is broader 
compared with its predecessor, as it extends and covers situations where there are 
no dominance issues, but competition concerns nonetheless may result from the 
existence of a non-collusive oligopoly. This new element is regarded as the 
convergence with the SLC test and brings closer to the jurisdictions applying the 
SLC test and will obviously facilitate the alignment between the Commission's 
and the US Competition Authorities' (i. e. US Department of Justice and the 
Federal Trade Commission) policies (Werner, 2004: 685; McDavid and Hatton, 
May 31,2004). The application to non-collusive oligopolies of the new test will 
also facilitate the Commission's work, due to the fact that there will be no task to 
prove lasting, tacit co-ordination (Werner, 2004: 685). This in return will assist to 
avoid mistakes like it was in the Airtours / Commission case 94 . 
However, 
Riesenkampff admits that despite the similarities in the assessment criteria for 
merger transactions in the EU and the US jurisdictions and now even the language 
of the substantive tests, there can still be diverging decisions of both authorities 
due to the fact that the effects on competition may be evaluated differently on 
both sides of the Atlantic. For legal certainty, the Commission left the concept of 
the creation or strengthening of a dominant position as an example of significant 
impediment of effective competition in order to preserve the Commission and 
Courts' past practice 95 . 
According to Riesenkampft (2004: 727), the retaining 
evaluation criteria for a merger in article 2 (1) of the ECMR indicate that the same 
standards for the assessment of merger transactions will also be used in the future. 
For instance, the first element of the assessment is whether the merger creates or 
strengthens a dominant market position, and if this is the case, a significant 
impediment to effective competition can be assumed without a further 
examination. This approach offers an advantage for the jurisdictions which still 
apply a dominance test. However, the researcher argues that this approach serves 
as a disadvantage rather than an advantage for the Baltic states with small market 
economies, where in some sectors only dominant firms may be efficient and the 
evaluation of whether a merger may significantly impede effective competition 
should play a major role rather than focusing on dominance. Hence, the first 
94 Case T-342/99,2002 E. C. R. 112585. 
95 See recitals 25 and 26, the ECMR 139/2004. 
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element in the assessment of a merger case should be placed on the SIEC limb96 
rather than on dominance, which is no longer a necessary requirement and 
therefore can no longer be characterised as a `legal straight jacket' that all 
competitive scenarios must wear97. 
The reform of the merger control mechanism within the EC jurisdiction has also 
involved the re-organisation of DG-Comp98. This has included allocating cases 
along sector lines, where staff with prior knowledge and understanding of the 
particular sector would handle the case, the establishment of the peer review panel 
in order to increase the checks and balances into the system99 and the introduction 
of the chief economist office (otherwise, Chief Economist Team - CET, where 
Lars-Hendrik Roller, the first incumbent Chief Economist) to strengthen the 
economic analysis. 
1.2.7.4. Treatment of efficiencies within the EC 
In conjunction with the new substantive test, the Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines were introduced, which have explicit provisions on efficiency issues. 
The Commission indicates that efficiencies may be considered as a 
counterbalance to anti-competitive effects providing these efficiencies benefit the 
consumers, they are merger-specific and likely to materialise, and substantial 
enough to outweigh any anti-competitive effects of the proposed transactionloo 
According to Lowe, the Commission's decision on taking efficiencies into 
account more explicitly is a result of natural development. First of all, the 
European Commission is still regarded as a relative new-comer to merger control 
mechanism and in its early days the main concern was purely on applying the 
96The discussion above provides a theoretical approach towards two possible interpretations of the 
EC new substantive test. The EC practice shows that the primary stage of merger analysis 
addresses the issue of possible market power. However, the testing does not stop once dominance 
is found. Further steps are taken by evaluating efficiencies and dynamic factors. The Commission 
may be tempted to place too much emphasis on the dominance limb; this would undermine the 
role of the significant impediment of competition once dominance is found. 
97 The researcher agrees here with the interpretation provided by Fountoukakos and Ryan (2005). 
98 Directorate General for Competition. 
99 This measure was put into effect in 2002 before the regulation of 139/2004 came into force. 
ioo Accepting the conditions for the efficiencies the Commission followed the US approach, where 
similar conditions are set up in the US Merger Guidelines. 
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dominance test, without any consideration on industrial policylol For instance, in 
the previous statements (i. e. in 1996 in the Competition Policy and efficiency 
claims in horizontal agreements, OECD) the Commission stated that `1.. ] there is 
no real possibility of just fying an efficiency defence under the Merger Regulation. 
Efficiencies are assumed for all mergers up to the limit of dominance - the 
`concentration privilege'. Any efficiency issues are considered in the overall 
assessment to determine whether dominance has been created or strengthened 
and not to justify or mitigate that dominance in order to clear a concentration 
which would otherwise be prohibited' 102. This position had reflected in some 
Commission's decisions, where the claims of efficiencies were considered as 
`offence' rather than `defence' l03 The Commission was reluctant to take into 
account efficiencies to counter-balance the anti-competitive effects of mergers 
under `development of technical economic progress' provision, article 2 (1)(b) of 
the old ECMR104 However, this approach has changed. The wording of article 2 
of the new ECMR better expresses an effects-based competition test. Furthermore, 
recital 29 provides that '[.. ] it is possible that the efficiencies brought about by the 
concentration counteract the effects on competition, and in particular the 
potential harm to consumers, that it might otherwise have and that, as a 
consequence, the concentration would not significantly impede effective 
competition'. The commissioner Lowe (2002) stated that the Commission now 
has sufficient experience and knowledge to make its merger review process more 
sophisticated and finely-tuned to merger-specific efficiencies cases. This 
development of the assessment of efficiencies is in line with the endeavour of the 
Commission to enhance its economics based analysis in merger cases 105 
The following sections involve the analysis on the remaining part of this thesis - 
the Baltic countries. The analysis is about the development of the competition 
101 As presented during the Fordham Annual Antitrust Conference, New York, 30-31 October, 
2002 
102 OCDE/GD(96)65 available at web-site: http: //www. oecd. org 
103 See, for instance, cases IV/M. 050 AT&T/NCR, 1991; IV/M. 130 Delta Air Lines/Pan AM, 1991 
etc. 
104 Nonetheless, some scholars and the Competition Commissioners, as V. Verouden, expressed 
that there was no need to change article 2 of the ECMR for the purpose of analysing efficiencies. 
Verouden, Merger Analysis and the Role of Efficiencies in the EU, FTC and U. S. DOJ Merger 
Enforcement Workshop, Washington, DC, February 17-19,2004. 
105 For further discussion, see speech of Lowe P. delivered on the 30`h October 2002. 
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policy and law, including merger control regime, in the Baltic countries by 
complying the EC model. 
1.3. Introduction to the Baltic countries legal systems 
1.3.1. Overview 
Historically, the Baltic countries had come a long way from socialism, as a 
part of the Soviet Union, to civil law legal systems after gaining back their 
independence. With the collapse of socialism and the beginning of a new 
independent era the Baltic countries faced lots of changes in an economical, 
political, social and cultural climate. For the transfer to a civil law legal system 
the Baltic countries were required to resurrect and bring up to date their own 
Constitutions 106 from the 1920's together with the rule of law and the basic 
principle of democracy, to modernise codes, statutes and the normative acts, to 
restructure their public institutions and court systems. They also had to introduce 
and implement the rules and institutions of a market economy and finally after 
signing the European Agreement with the EU in 1995 Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania had to honour their commitment to the EU policy and to implement the 
acquis communautaire. The European Union was not only a unique chance for the 
Baltic countries but also a huge challenge. First of all, under the Molotov- 
Ribbentrop pact, the Baltic countries were officially distributed to the Soviet 
Union itself and disappeared as states and societies for 50 years. As a 
consequence the Baltic countries gained the bad inheritance of the Soviet system. 
This included an unstable economy together with high inflation and the big state 
monopolies, a collapsed social system, an unstable political situation with 
changeable government107, chaotic legislation, big bureaucracy and corruption. 
Then, over ten years after their independence the Baltic countries have been 
clearing up the inheritance of the Soviet system, using massive reforms. 
106 The Estonian Republic Constitution was adopted by the popular elections held in June 28, 
1992. The Constitution of Latvia was reintroduced in 1991. The Constitution of the Republic of 
Lithuania was approved by the citizens of the Republic of Lithuania in the referendum on 25 
October 1992. 
107 Note: from 1990 to 2000 the Government in Lithuania has changed five times. 
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Before discussing the reforms for the implementation of acquis and the 
merger control mechanism as a part of it, the researcher considers that more 
detailed historical analysis of each country is required in order to expose the 
knowledge of who and what the Baltic states are, their differences and similarities. 
1.3.1.1. Historical synopsis of Estonia 
Centuries of struggle for identity and independence are the hallmark of 
Estonia, which is similar to the rest of the Baltic countries. The land, which is now 
within the boundaries of the Republic of Estonia was ruled by outsiders for most 
of its history (Unwin, 2000: 133-134). The nation of Estonia was first settled in 
2,000 B. C. and remained independent until the 13th century, when the Pope called 
for a crusade against the Baltic countries and Estonia was overrun by Danish and 
German knights (Williams, 2 May, 1997108). From 1558 onwards, Estonia became 
the battleground for Denmark, Sweden, Poland and Russia. Sweden came out as 
the winner and the Swedish kingdom took control over Estonia until the beginning 
of the 18th century when Estonia was given over to the Russian empire. The 19th 
century blew the winds of numerous national movements throughout Europe. 
Estonia was no exception to this. The 19th century was the period of national 
awakening. Estonians preserved their identity through foreign dominations and 
finally reached victory during the War of Liberalisation in 1918-1920 fighting the 
Soviet Russia. On 24 February 1918 the Estonian Republic was proclaimed109 
The Soviet Russia signed a peace treaty with the parliamentary Republic of 
Estonia recognising its independence in perpetuity. However, freedom lasted until 
1939 when the independence of Estonia and the other Baltic countries were 
curtailed by the signing of the Molotov - Ribbentrop Pact between Nazi Germany 
and the Stalinist regime (Williams, 2 May, 1997; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Estonia, 27 May, 2004). Estonia was occupied by Soviet troops, then by Germany 
and finally by the Soviet Union for the second time in this period. Estonia's 
attempt to restore independence was unsuccessful with the loss of tens of 
thousands of Estonians citizens. A part of the Soviet plan was to abolish Estonian 
108 Available at web-site http: //www. geocities. com 
109 For further reading, see the publications of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Estonia available 
at web-site http: //www. vm. ee 
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statehood, including its national elites. As a consequence of the deliberate policy 
of genocide, a large Russian ethnic population still exist in Estonia 110 
Furthermore, the aim of the Soviet leaders was `[.. ] to transfer the entire nation - 
political structure, society, economy, education, media and cultural 
establishments - to the Soviet system' (Jakobson, 17 May 2004). The imposition 
of a command economy with centralised decision - making from Moscow, forced 
industrialisation and agricultural collectivisation policies. During the Soviet rule 
the industry and trade of Estonia was highly influenced by the Soviet Union 
(Unwin, 2000: 134). The introduction of the reforms such as glasnot and 
perestroika by Gorbachev gave impetus for Estonians to re-gain their 
independence. In November 1989 the supreme council of the Estonian SSR 
announced that the 1940 resolution by which Estonia was declared a part of the 
USSR was null and void. Eventually, Estonia re-gained independence in August 
1991 (Unwin, 2000: 135). 
1.3.1.2. Historical synopsis of Latvia 
Latvia was originally settled by the descendants of an ancient group of 
people known as the Balts. The Baltic tribes came into Latvia in approximately 
2,000 BC and are regarded as the ancestors of Latvians and Lithuanians (History 
of Latvia, 1993111). Despite the fact that the area was mentioned at least as early 
as the 1St century AD in connection with the amber trade with the Roman Empire, 
the territory which at present is known as Latvia occurred during the 6th century 
when East Baltic tribes were driven westwards by the Slavonic Kryvycy (Danta, 
2000: 196). Similar to the situation in Estonia, Latvia was ruined by outsiders over 
centuries. The Knights of the Sword, who became a part of the German Knights of 
the Teutonic Order in 1237, conquered all of Latvia and ruined it for three 
centuries. Latvia was partitioned between Poland and Sweden from the mid- 16th 
to early 18th century, until annexed by Russia at the end of the 18th century 112. 
Taking advantage of the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, Latvia proclaimed 
110 In 1934, there were 88.1% ethnic Estonians living in Estonia. By 1989, this number had 
dwindled to 61.5% (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Estonia). The number has changed recently as 
the majority of Russians accepted Estonian citizenship. 
111 Available at web-site http: //www. eunet. lv/VT/history. html 
112 For further reading, see History of Latvia: a brief synopsis, available at web-site 
http: //www. latvia-usa. org/hisoflatbrie. html 
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independence on 18 November 1918. Eventually, after a period of fighting, the 
Soviet Russia and Germany recognised the independence of Latvia. By 1922 
Latvia had a constitution and was on its way towards establishing an independent 
state (Danta, 2000: 196). However, similar to the situation in Estonia, Latvian 
independence was abolished by the invasion of the Red Army in Latvia after 
signing the Non-Aggression Treaty of 23 August 1939 between the Soviet Union 
and Germany with its component - the secret protocol (well known as the 
Molotov - Ribbentrop Pact). According to this Pact, Eastern Europe was divided 
into German and Soviet influence: `[ .] in the event of a territorial and political 
rearrangement in the areas belonging to the Baltic States (Finland, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania), the northern boundary of Lithuania shall represent the 
boundary of the spheres of influence of Germany and the U. S. S. R. ' (Molotov- 
Ribbentrop Pact (1), as quoted by Dr. Feldmanis113). The Russification and the 
Soviet - style administration resulted in mass deportations (35,000 in 1940 and 
about 100,000 mainly in 1949), disposal of most private property, forced 
industrialisation, collectivisation of agriculture and the relocation of ethnic 
Russians into the country, which eventually changed the proportion of natives 
from over three - quarters to over one - half 
114 (Danta, 2000: 197). Also, the 
Soviet strategy was to integrate the economy of Latvia into the rest of the Union 
by making the country dependent on the Soviet Union's resources and products, 
and to block the path for the State independence 115 After 50 years of the 
occupation, the legislature of Latvia passed a declaration of independence and by 
late 1991 Latvia's independence was recognised internationally. 
1.3.1.3. Historical synopsis of Lithuania 
Lithuanians share the descendants of the Balts with Latvia, who moved to 
the western shores of the Baltic Sea in approximately 2,000 BC. For the first time 
Lithuania was mentioned in 1009 AD in the Quedlinburg annals and Lithuania as 
a state emerged in the early 13th century after the union of the main lands (Short 
113 Available at the ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia web-site http: //www. am. gov. lv 
114 Latvians - approximately 56%, Russians - approximately 32% (2003). The number has changed 
recently as the majority of Russians accepted Latvian citizenship. 
115 For further reading, see Danta, Latvia, published in Europe goes East, edited by Hall and Danta, 
the Stationery Office, 2000, pp. 192-202. 
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Lithuania history 116, Lithuanian Home Page 117,2000). Unlike the situation in 
Estonia and Latvia, the medieval period of history of Lithuania was marked by 
territorial expansion. As a response to the threat of Germanic Knights, in 
particular the Teutonic Knights, the Grand Duke of Lithuania Mindaugas, who 
became the first King of Lithuania after the adoption of Catholicism, created the 
Grand Duchy of Lithuania from the 1230s to 1240s (Danta, 2000: 206). In contrast 
to Estonia and Latvia, at the end of 14th and the beginning of 15th century 
Lithuania became one of the most powerful states in Eastern Europe with territory 
from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. However, the growing pressure from Russia, 
forced Lithuania into closer union with Poland. The Union of Liublin was formed 
in 1569, which sealed Poland and Lithuania into a Commonwealth - 
Rzecspospolita. The agreement created a Commonwealth Republic of two nations, 
which shared one King and a joint legislature. Despite the union, Lithuania's state 
sovereignty was preserved by having its own treasury, currency, army and laws. 
Afterwards, Lithuania experienced the stability from wars, which in turns helped 
the development of agriculture, the founding of towns, the rise of culture and 
education and the codification of law (Danta, 2000: 207). Three Lithuanian 
Statutes were issued in 1529,1566 and 1588, which had an unusual legal nature, 
containing elements of the state law. However, in 1795 Lithuania was 
incorporated into Russia, which began a process of cultural assimilation and also 
banned the Lithuanian language be used in any prints (from 1864 to 1904). After 
fighting for more than one century against tsarist oppression, on 16th February 
1918 Lithuania proclaimed the act of independence and restoration of statehood, 
and was recognised by the largest states of the world as the independent state of 
Lithuania. During the 1918-1939 independence Lithuania had a constitution, 
introduced the national currency ('Litas'), passed laws that were favourable to the 
national economy and financial system, organised land reforms, and developed its 
industry. However, similar scenarios to Estonia and Latvia were repeated in 
Lithuania, when the Molotov - Ribbentrop Pact opened the door for the Soviet 
and German occupations. The familiar process of establishing totalitarian rule and 
exiling Lithuanians to Siberia began (approximately 130,000 of the population 
was deported). Soviet planning brought to Lithuania a large - scale intensive 
116 Available at web-site http: //www. litnet. lt/litinfo/history. html 
117 Available at web-site http: //neris. mii. lt/homepage/liet1-1. html 
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industrialisation together with a tight economic integration with the Soviet Union 
(Danta, 2000: 207-208). The country's economy was developed solely on the 
occupying regime, by the implementation of a giant complex of manufacturing 
equipment, machine tools, chemicals, processing metals and many more others, 
which did not reflect Lithuania's needs. 
However, taking advantage of the weakening state of the Soviet system, 
some representatives of the intelligentsia of Lithuania founded Sajudis, a 
democratic movement, which led Lithuania into independence. Thus, this 
independence was declared on 11 March 1990. Despite the declaration, only after 
the Soviet intervention, which resulted in the killing of 15 unarmed civilians in 
Lithuania, and after the Moscow Putsch collapsed, Lithuania won international 
recognition and was admitted to the United Nations on September 17,1991 
(Lithuanian Home Page, 2000). 
The history of the Baltic states proves that these countries are not newly formed 
countries in Europe, but their existence counts for centuries together of struggles 
for identity and independence. It also shows what the Baltic countries are and 
what historical inheritance they brought to the EU. 
Furthermore, some historical facts also give the reason to believe that the 
idea of integration in the Baltics arose not in the 20th century118 but many years 
ago. This look back into history of Lithuania raises some thoughts that the origins 
of European integration with regards to trade can be found within the letters of 
grand Duke Gediminas in the 14th century. In the 16th century the three Lithuanian 
Statutes, which were common to the different nations, or in 1791 the issue of the 
first Lithuanian-Polish Constitution applicable to both nations show some trends 
towards integration. Finally, in the 20th century Lithuania and the other Baltic 
countries had a chance to contribute their parts into the EU, which integrated not 
only two or four countries but twenty five with a possible enlargement in future 
(Landsbergis, 2002: 7-15). The president of Estonia A. Ruutel in explaining the 
desire of Estonia to join the EU also mentioned the earlier ties with Europe by 
118 The author here refers to the primarily thoughts of the Baltic states to join the EU. 
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stating that the Estonian culture has been connected with European culture for 
centuries (Ruutel, 2004119). 
However, in order to accomplish the idea of integration and come back to 
their European roots, the Baltic countries have had to take further steps. The 
integration process into the EU has been a big challenge for the Baltic states, 
which has taken time to deal with. Obviously, massive reforms have been 
involved in the preparation for the membership into the EU. Nevertheless, the 
magnetism of going back to their roots and being a part of the united Europe has 
been a major force in all of the reforms. 
1.3.2. The reforms in the Baltic countries 
The collapse of the Soviet empire gave the opportunity for Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania to re-gain their independence. In 1991 Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania announced their independence. There were two basic trends that the 
Baltic countries could turn to, one towards the East and another towards the West. 
The decline of the Communist system and the collapse of the Soviet bloc have not 
led to political tranquillity. Some impulsion which has led the Eastern European 
states (including the Baltic countries) to look to the EU has been the fear of 
political instability together with the possibility that, if the Yeltsin regime failed, 
Russia might lurch violently to the left and right (Swann, 1996: 184). `These have 
been the broad influences which have helped to propel the European Community 
forward' (Swann, 1996: 184). After being in occupation for 50 years in the Soviet 
Union, the Baltic countries turned towards the West. The European Union seemed 
to be the best gate-way to the Western economy. After re-gaining their 
independence in 1991 and gaining recognition by the European Community the 
same year, the Baltic countries commenced the first contacts with the European 
Community. The signing of Free Trade Agreements with the European 
Community and its Member States were the first steps of the Baltic countries to 
1 
accede to the European Union20. Shortly after the Baltic countries signed the 
119 Available at web-site: http: //www. baltictimes. com. /spec_ee. php 
120 The Free Trade Agreement Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania signed in 1994 and it came into force 
on 1 January 1995. 
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Association Agreements121 (European Agreements) and committed themselves to 
make their laws conform to the existing and future legislation of the European 
Community. Moreover, the Commission in the White Paper on the preparation of 
the Associated Countries of Central and Eastern Europe for integration into the 
internal market of the Union clearly stated that the competition policy on effective 
enforcement thereof must be considered as a pre-condition for the opening of the 
wider internal market and therefore the ultimatum of accession to the EU (Van 
Miert, June 1998). After meeting the pre-conditions for membership, the final step 
into the EU was left for the citizens of all Baltic countries to decide. Referendums 
were held in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, where their citizens voted for `yes' to 
the membership into the European Union. 
However, the turn towards the EU integration has been as a new 
revolution for the Baltic states. Since 1989, after the disintegration from the 
Soviet bloc, the Baltic countries have turned from the Socialist legal systems to 
civil law legal systems inspired by Western Europe. The Baltic countries were 
under the obligation to reform their legal systems and to adjust their economies to 
the market conditions. These countries had to exile themselves from the Socialist 
law and legal thinking which have had a profound influence of the ex-bloc 
countries. The system of law that existed in the former Soviet Union is referred to 
as the socialist legal system, which served `as the communist system 's prototype' 
based on the Marxist - Leninism theory (De Cruz, 1998: 183). The difference from 
the civil law legal system is that law and economy is highly integrated in the 
socialist legal system. For Tchikvadze, `[ .] to 
dissociate law and legality from the 
economy, to analyse the legal system independently of the existing economic 
relations is therefore incompatible with the basic principles of Soviet legal 
science. ' (Tchikvadze, 1961: 206, as quoted David and Brierley, 1985: 210). 
Furthermore, in contrast to the civil law and legal systems, the respect for law as 
the policy instrument of the leaders of the Soviet Union was a major social 
concern. As Lenin, the leader of Communism stated that there was only public 
law in the Soviet law (David and Brierley, 1985: 212-213). Generally, the vision 
of the basic form for the Soviet economy as defined by Stalin was state socialism 
121 Free Trade agreement was incorporated into the European Agreement. 
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and central planning under the direction of the Communist Party (Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1992: 13). 
After re-gaining their independence, the legal systems of the Baltic 
countries have developed gradually towards civil law legal tradition: starting with 
the fundamental law of the State - the Constitution and further going to the 
reforming of the major codified areas of law such as civil, administrative and 
criminal law and the creating of a new area of law - competition law, including 
merger control mechanism. The introduction of a competition policy in the Baltic 
states, has been one of the major challenges, which these countries had to face in 
the transition to fully-fledged market economies. 
With regards to economic issues, the Baltic countries, as a part of the 
Soviet empire, were guided by a central planning system. The scholars exploit 
different terms to describe the soviet system. Gregory and Stuart, for instance, 
stated that the soviet system had developed the `planned socialism' as `[ .] public 
ownership of the factors of production. Decision - making is centralised and is 
co-ordinated by a central plan, which offers binding directives to the system 's 
participants' (Gregory and Stuart, 1994: 29)122. The planned socialism was based 
on Marxist-Leninist doctrine, with the planned economics governed from 
Moscow. Enterprises and their managers and workers in the Soviet system were 
rewarded for achieving the goals set by the political leadership. Even the prices 
were set centrally and were often controlled for political and administrative 
purposes (Bradshaw, 1996: 266)123. Moreover, the prices were not allowed to 
direct resources to their highest value uses, as favouring purchases from low-cost 
producers and supplying the goods where the shortage is. Instead, planners in 
Moscow decided how much goods had to be produced, where inputs were to be 
obtained and where outputs had to go, and finally, what prices were to be paid 
(Milgrom and Roberts, 1992: 13-14). The market principles with prices being set 
up by the demand - supply curves plus other competition issues were non-existent 
in the Baltic states. Moreover, a common feature of centrally planned economies 
is the existence of large companies (even monopolies) whose size was not 
determined by what the market can bear. Thus, in-effective monopolies were 
122 For further reading, see Gregory, R. R., Stuart, R. C., Soviet and post-Soviet economic structure, 
5`h ed., Harper Collins, New York, 1994, pp. 29. 
123 As published in Daniels, P. W., Lever, W. F., The Global Economy in transition, Longman, 
1996. 
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another inheritance from the Soviet system that the Baltic states had to deal with. 
However, as it was stated above, the Baltic countries rejected a Soviet state 
socialism as a model for political and economic development and turned towards 
the Western system by establishing democratic political institutions and market- 
type economic systems. The task was hard, as these countries had to overcome an 
inheritance of central planning. 
During the transition period, the period from the planned economy to the 
market-economy, the Baltic countries were required to go through different 
dimensions. Bradshaw (1996) classified four main phases of transition, such as 
stabilization, liberalization, privatisation and internalisation. The Baltic countries 
have been going through all these stages during the transition period. They had to 
achieve macroeconomic stabilisation, which is the balance of the economy, as in 
terms of the level of money incomes and the supply of goods, and also in terms of 
the difference between government expenditures and revenues (Bradshaw, 
1996: 277). Then, they had to reach economic liberalisation, which generally 
refers to the removal of government restriction on economic activity. There was a 
need to free prices from state control and allow them to find their market level124. 
The third stage involved the creation of `private sector' and privatisation 
processes, which are still in progress. There have been a number of merger 
transactions in the Baltic states, which have occurred as a result of the 
privatisation. The Competition Authorities in the Baltic states did not have 
authority to block these transactions, which merely resulted in the transfer of a 
public monopoly to the private sector. Nevertheless, the Competition Authorities 
of the Baltic states may impose fines if a monopolist firm abuses its dominance. 
For instance, in Lithuania after the privatisation, fines were imposed for the abuse 
of a dominant position on AB Mazeikiu nafta125 and AB Lietuvos Telekomas126. 
The next stage, which is still an ongoing process in these countries, is 
internationalisation. Internationalisation refers to foreign trade relationships. 
Economic integration in centrally planned economies is fundamentally different 
from the integration among market economies. In market type economies or 
otherwise Western economies international commerce is conducted by private 
124 For a further reading, see Daniels and Lever, pp. 278. 
125 10/07/2000, available at web-site: www. konkuren. lt 
126 21/02/2002 No. 2/b and 22/12/2000 d. No. 16/b. 
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enterprises seeking profit opportunities everywhere in the world, where they can 
get a better deal. A reduction in or elimination of barriers to the movement of 
goods, services, capital and other factors of production go across national borders 
areas a long way towards integration. By contrast, in centrally planned economies 
all these movements across national borders require an explicit action by the 
government involved (Marer, 1984: 160-161). According to the Soviet system, this 
is due to the fact that the state exercises a monopoly over foreign economic 
relations and `[.. ] this state monopoly had the advantage of enabling foreign trade 
to be used to serve the needs of the political leadership' (Daniels and Lever, 
1996: 278). Thus, it in turn led to isolating domestic enterprises from the 
competitive pressures of the international economy, as was the case with the 
Baltic states. These countries were placed apart from competition pressure and 
were left in a worse position in comparison with Western companies. When the 
Western European companies were gaining knowledge and experience of how to 
survive in the market economy by competing with strong competitors, the Eastern 
European companies, whereas, acted under dictation from the Soviet Union 
without having any concerns about competition. Another disadvantage of the 
Baltic states in comparison with Western firms is a competitiveness of companies. 
According to the theory, companies, which were isolated and stayed behind from 
international competition, ran a risk of losing their competitiveness. If firms were 
making or buying products in their local ('home') markets instead of finding a 
better or cheaper place elsewhere, they were undercut or taken over by their rivals 
(Block, 1977: 20). The Baltic countries were isolated from such an opportunity 
while being a part of the Soviet system. The membership of the EU unlocked the 
possibility for the firms in the Baltic states to increase their competitiveness on 
one hand. However, on the other hand, many local companies were taken over by 
foreign companies 127. 
127 The further discussion will continue in chapter 3 
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1.3.3. The implementation of acquis commuizitarian in the Baltic countries 
This section of the research is concerned about the relationship between 
the Community law and the law of the Baltic countries, as to what extent the 
Community law is applicable in the Baltic states' legal systems. 
Theoretically, the law of each country decides to what extent international 
law is applicable and has the effects in the legal system of that country (Jacobs 
and Roberts, 1987: xxiv). With regards to international law, the Baltic countries 
will not implement or ratify an international treaty or organisation, which 
contradicts the main principles of the Baltic countries' constitutions. For instance, 
the Republic of Estonia does not conclude foreign agreements that are in conflict 
with the constitution (article 123, the Estonian Constitution' 28). Similarly, the 
Republic of Lithuania will participate in international organisations provided that 
they do not contradict the interests and independence of the State'29. 
Furthermore, when countries sign a treaty they normally agree to achieve a 
certain result, however, the states may still have the right to determine the means 
on how to implement it. If the achievement of the result involves changing 
national law, the law will decide whether it will come directly from the treaty 
('monist' situation) or whether additional law is required to implement the treaty 
('dualist' situation) (Hartley, 2003: 192). The Baltic countries would more likely 
be referred to so called `monist' countries rather than `dualist', where under the 
latter system direct effects of a treaty are impossible without a further set of 
legislation to give effect to the treaty in question. A good example of a `dualist' 
country is the UK, where the section 2(1) of the European Communities Act 1972 
gave effects to all provisions of Community law (both already adopted and those, 
which will be adopted in future) (Barnett, 2002: 290-291). Meanwhile, the law in 
the Baltic countries provides that once the Treaty or other International law tool is 
ratified, the international law obligations are of the same nature as national law 
obligations. For instance, article 138 of the Lithuanian Constitution states that `[.. ] 
international agreements which are ratified by the Seimas of the Republic of 
Lithuania (the Parliament of the Republic of Lithuania) shall be the constituent 
part of the legal system of the Republic ofLithuania'. 
128 Constitution of Estonia, article 123. 
129 Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, article 136. 
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However, despite the fact that the European Community law is based on the 
Treaty, the situation is different with the EU in comparison with other 
international treaties or other international obligations due to its specific nature. 
As the Court of Justice provided the Community law has direct effects in the 
national legal systems of the Member States, as by signing the Treaty the Member 
States have limited their sovereign rights. Thus, by signing the founding Treaty of 
the EU the parties agree not only to achieve a certain result but also consented on 
the means by which it would be brought; this in turn can be considered that all 
Member States undertook to adopt a `monist' situation (Hartley, 2003: 193). The 
supremacy of Community law over national law has caused a lot of debates in 
most of the Member States. However, the Community law cannot apply in the 
legal systems of the Member States unless the Member States express it, i. e. by 
signing the Treaty. For instance, in the United Kingdom in the case Thoburn / 
Sunderland District Council130 it was stated that the European Union law depends 
on the United Kingdom law and not on the EU law. Or in Brunner / European 
Union Treaty decision 131 the German Federal Constitutional Court stated that 
European Community law applies in Germany only because the German laws 
ratifying the Community Treaties said so. A similar scenario was in the Baltic 
countries, when the question of membership was left to the people of these 
countries to decide. There the referendums in all Baltic countries resulted in 
favour of membership into the EU. 
The discussion above proves that European Community law can have 
effects in Member States only by virtue of the national law of each Member State 
(Hartley, 2003: 191-196). However, all rules and regulations of the Member State 
national law cannot contradict to their constitutions, which is the highest law of 
the hierarchy in their legal systems. For instance, according to article 7 of the 
Lithuanian Constitution 132, any law or other statute, which is in conflict with the 
Constitution shall be invalid; similarly, article 3 of the Estonian Constitution 133 
states that `[.. ] the powers of state shall be exercised solely pursuant to the 
130 Thoburn v Suderland District Council, (2002) 3 WLR 247 para 69. 
131 12 October 1993, (1994) 1 CMLR 57 para 55. 
132 Constitution of Lithuania, article 7, available at web-site http: //www. lrs. lt 
133 Constitution of Estonia, article 3, available at web-site 
http: //www. president. ee/en/estoma/? gid=10760 
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Constitution and laws which are in conformity therewith'. It means that the 
Community law will not be valid if it contradicts the constitution of a Member 
State. If the constitution imposes some limits on the supremacy of the European 
Community law, then the constitution has to be amended, otherwise, the 
supremacy of the Community law will not have the desired effects. The example 
in the Baltic countries illustrates such a scenario. Before the joining the EU the 
Baltic countries were required to amend their Constitutions in order to give `direct 
effects' to the Community law. For instance, the Parliament of the Republic of 
Lithuania issued the Constitutional Act134 which delegated to the European Union 
some competencies of its State institutions in the spheres provided in the founding 
Treaties of the European Union in order to meet the commitments in these areas. 
This also recognised that the norms of acquis communautaire of the European 
Union are an integral part of the legal order of the Republic of Lithuania and in 
the case of a collision between the norms of the Community and Lithuania, the 
Community's norms prevail over the laws and other legal acts of the Republic of 
Lithuania. 1 35 Estonia also issued the Constitution Amendment Act, which states 
that `[ .] as of 
Estonia 's accession to the European Union, the Constitution of the 
Republic of Estonia applies taking account of the rights and obligations arising 
from the Accession Treaty' 136 
Although the constitutions of the Member States delegated some sovereign 
powers to the European Community, these powers are not open-ended, as they 
have to be defined in advance and the Community cannot extend its powers, as it 
is a case, for instance, in Germany (Hartley, 203: 195). The German Federal 
Constitutional Court ruled if any measure issued by the Community contradicts 
the German principle Kompetenz - Kompetenz, such measure would be 
inapplicable in Germany 137. Similar provision can be found in the Constitution of 
Latvia, which states that `[.. ] substantial changes in the terms regarding the 
membership of Latvia in the European Union shall be decided by a national 
referendum if such referendum is requested by at least one-half of the members of 
134 Note: constitutional acts in Lithuania have the same importance as the Constitution. 
135 Constitutional Act of the Republic of Lithuania on Membership of the Republic of Lithuania in 
the European Union, 13 July 2004, No. IX-2343, para 2. 
136 The Constitution of the Republic of Estonia Amendment Act, passed 14 September 2003. 
137 For further comments, see Brunner v European Union Treaty, 12 October 1993, (1994) 1 
CMLR 57. Also see Hartley, the Foundations of European Community Law, Oxford, 2003, 
pp. 193-195 for the comments on this case. 
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the Saeima (Latvian Parliament)'. An example of `significant change' can be the 
introduction of the EU Constitution. However, the Latvian President, Ms Vaira 
Vike-Freiberga, expressed that there is no need to put this question forward to a 
referendum, as `[ .] it would not 
fundamentally change the content of the 
Accession Treaty, hence, Latvia's membership conditions' 138. A similar position 
was taken in Lithuania by the president V. Adamkus, who said that the European 
Constitution must be ratified by the Seimas (Lithuanian Parliament) and there was 
no need for a referendum. Lithuania became the first country in the EU to ratify 
the European Constitution (Political - Economical report, Lithuania, October- 
139 November, 2004) 
1.3.4. The Competition Law in the Baltic countries 
The introduction of the competition law and policy in the Baltic countries 
started with signing the Europe Agreement, which provided a new framework for 
trade and related matters between the European Communities and the Member 
States on one side, and each Baltic state on a bilateral basis on the other. The 
European Agreements contained the main substantive competition rules, which 
applied if the trade between each Baltic state and the Community would be 
affected. These rules included the restrictive agreements, abuses of a dominant 
position and the provisions on state aid. However, the rules of merger control 
were not directly referred to in the Europe Agreements. Nevertheless the 
Competition Authorities of the CEEC, including the Baltic countries, were 
entitled to express their views according to the EC Merger Regulation, where the 
merger would have a significant impact on the economy of the CEEC concerned 
(Van Miert, 1998). This `flexible' position of the Community towards merger 
control regime caused differences in the approaches taken by the Baltic countries 
towards the introduction of their merger control mechanisms. 
The Competition law and policy was implemented in the Baltic countries 
as a part of the acquis communautaire. The adoption of the Competition Act140 in 
138 See Efler and Zdeb, Political probability of referendum on EU Constitution, available at web- 
site: http: //www. european-referendum. org/countries/latvia. org 
139 However, the referendums in some Member States such as France and Holland disproved the 
EU Constitution. This question is still open. 
140 which was adopted on 16 June 1993 and came into force on 1 October 1993. 
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1993 was the first step in creating pre-requisites for protecting free competition in 
Estonia and marked a decisive change in the way of economic thinking. The 
Competition Board, which replaced a Price Board was established on October 21 
1993, and was subordinated to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Communications exercises state supervision in respect of compliance with the 
Competition Act in Estonia. In Latvia, the very first Competition Law came into 
force in 1991. The Competition Council, as the Authority to enforce competition 
law, came into being after the reorganisation of the anti-monopoly Committee on 
18 June 1997 in accordance with the Competition Law. The first piece of 
legislation in the field of competition law in Lithuania was adopted on 15 
September 1992 by passing the Law on Competition. The Competition Council 
was established to enforce competition law in Lithuania. Thus, the Competition 
Laws in the Baltic countries were introduced even before their application for the 
EU accession. In comparison to the EC competition law the Baltic states have a 
`compact' version of the EC competition law and policy. In contrast to the EC, all 
competition issues in the Baltic countries are contained in one legal document, 
respectively the Competition Act in Estonia, Competition Law in Latvia and Law 
on Competition in Lithuania. Despite the fact that all Baltic countries share a 
similar approach to the introduction of competition laws, a different scenario in 
each Baltic state was taken with regard to the rules of merger control. 
1.3.5. Institutional framework in the Baltic countries 
Before the accession to the EU the Baltic countries had to show that 
competent competition authorities had been set up and that a credible enforcement 
record had been instituted. Likewise other candidate countries at that time, the 
Baltic countries had a high degree of flexibility in designing their competition 
authorities (White Paper, note 15). However, strong emphasis is placed on the 
requirement that competition authorities are independent and enjoy sufficient 
level of resources and expertise to deal with competition issues. This is because 
the links with government may have a detrimental impact on the business 
community's acceptance of decisions. Also, there is a need for independence from 
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undue political influence to prevent corruption, which is still an issue in the Baltic 
countries, especially in Lithuania 141. 
The first institutions dealing with competition issues in Lithuania were 
highly influenced by the government. The first Law on Competition in Lithuania 
empowered two state administrative bodies to deal with competition issues. The 
first body was the State Competition and Consumer Protection Office, a 
governmental agency, which had the status of a permanent executive institution. 
The second was the Competition Council, a separate entity set up by the 
government, which acted as a collegial decision making body applying sanctions 
for violations of competition (while all the preparatory and investigatory work 
was carried out by the Competition Office). Both institutions were governmental 
agencies lacking formal independence from the government. However, the 
institutional reforms introduced by the 1999 Law on Competition re-organised 
two competition organs into a single Competition Council. The current institution 
in Lithuania responsible for the enforcement of competition law, including merger 
control, is the Competition Council. Lithuania adopted an `integrated agency 
model' -a single enforcement agency, which discharges investigative, 
enforcement and adjudicative functions (Geradin and Henry, 2005). The 
Competition Council is an independent public Authority of the Republic of 
Lithuania established by the Law on Competition of 1999. The Council's 
decisions are taken without any possibility of interference by the Government. 
The Competition Authority, namely, the Competition Council of the Republic of 
Latvia was founded in 1997 on the basis of the Latvian Anti-monopoly 
Supervision Committee. The Competition Council has been established by the 
Cabinet of Ministers and subordinates to the Ministry of Economics. Hence, 
formally, the Latvian Competition Council acts under the supervision of the 
Ministry of Economics. However, the Ministry of Economics does not have the 
power to influence the investigations and the decisions of the cases taken by the 
Competition Council of Latvia. 
The Price Board in Estonia was re-named to the Estonian Competition 
Board in 1993. Two countervailing duties were imposed on the re-named body. 
The first duty was to supervise the compliance with the Competition Act, whereas, 
141 For further discussion, see chapter 3. 
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the second duty was to supervise the prices. Only after the process of 
liberalisation of prices came to the end, there was no need to monitor the price 
setting in Estonia (Proos, 2002). The current Competition Authority of Estonia is 
the Competition Board, which was transferred from the Ministry of Finance to the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications. The Estonian Competition 
Board is a governmental agency within the administrative jurisdiction of the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications. However, it could be 
considered that the Board acts as an independent body with regards to its role in 
decision-making process. In contrast to Latvia and Lithuania, the Estonian 
institutional model is based on a `bifurcated judicial model' 142, where the Board's 
officials investigate the alleged competition law violation and the court 
adjudicates upon and enforces the competition law. 
In addition, there are other ways in which government or ministry can 
exert an influence on the decision making process (Geradin and Henry, 2005). It 
can be done through cutting the competition authorities' budget, if the position 
held by the authority is contrary to the political interest. Conversely, the 
competition authority can be awarded an increased budget, if it adopts decisions 
in line with the government's interest. In order to avoid this problem it can be left 
to the Parliament to decide over the budget of the competition authority. The 
budget of the Latvian Competition Council is derisory, meanwhile, the Estonian 
Competition Board acts under the administration of the Ministry and, hence, the 
Minister decides over the budget. In Lithuania, the budget is decided by the 
Parliament. The appointment of the head members of the competition authority 
may be another example of the interference of the government. In Estonia the 
Minister appoints the Director General of the Estonian Competition Board. In 
Latvia, the Chairperson and four Council Members are confirmed in their office 
by the Cabinet of Ministers upon the recommendation of the Minister for 
Economics. Meanwhile, the Chairman and four members of the Competition 
Council of Lithuania are appointed by the President of the Republic of Lithuania 
according to the proposal of the Prime Minister. Thus, the analysis above shows 
that, theoretically, there is a possibility of the influence of government on the 
decision-making process of the Competition Authorities in the Baltic countries. 
142 As defined by Geradin and Henry, 2005. 
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In contrast to the EC, where the Court has played a major role in 
developing the competition law especially in its early days, the courts in the Baltic 
countries do not play a major role in developing the competition law and policy. 
The Court of Justice frequently enunciated broad principles and values without 
just limiting itself on the facts of individual cases. It has looked to the future and 
has guided the Commission in developing the competition law and policy. 
Meanwhile, the case in Estonia illustrates a different scenario. The Competition 
Board of Estonia in Bread Bakers Union case143 issued an order to terminate the 
infringement, as not to meet to discuss bread prices, or to make any kind of 
decision to raise prices collectively, and thereby to refrain from entering into such 
discussions or agreements in future. The Board noted that although the members 
of the Union did not enter into agreement about price increases, nevertheless, they 
discussed prices amongst themselves and the necessity of prices increases during 
the Union's Board meeting in December 1995. Hence, the exchange of 
information about product prices, according to the Competition Board, would 
make it likely for them to be able to predict each other's behaviour. However, the 
Board's decision was quashed by the court. The Competition Board's decision 
was to pre-empt such behaviour in the future rather than applying specifically to 
the present case; however, the court rejected this view. 
The courts of the Baltic countries have hardly had any practice with 
merger cases. For instance, in Lithuania due to the fact that merger cases have not 
been tested in court, there is slow progress of its development (Soviene, 2004144). 
The main competitor of Vesiga placed an appeal against the Competition Council 
decision of 1 S-86 (2005), but the case was withdrawn. 
143 The decision of Competition Board on February 13,1996. The decision of Court on March 29, 
1996. For the comments, see Loor, Estijos Duonos Gamintoju konkurencija, pp. 89-92, as 
published in Lesser, Baltijos Valstybiu ekonomika: Pavyzdziu analize, Ansora, 1998. 
144 The information obtained during the interview at the Competition Council of Lithuania 
September 2004. 
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1.3.6. The development of the Merger Regime in the Baltic countries 
1.3.6.1. Estonia 
The first Competition Act of 1993 in Estonia enacted the principles of 
competition law and policy with respect to prohibition competition through the 
agreements and concerted practices, abuse of dominance, unfair competition and 
State Aid. However, it did not contain any merger control, similar to the EC 
policy where the merger control regime was not introduced until 1989, though 
other issues of competition law were incorporated in the Treaty of Rome. A 
merger regime in Estonia was introduced by passing the Competition Act in 1998. 
Precisely, it introduced a notification requirement for mergers if the aggregate 
annual turnover of the parties involved exceeded 100 million kroons or if the 
merging parties separately or jointly had control over more than 40% of the 
market14s However, the Competition Board of Estonia did not have an authority 
to prohibit mergers with possible anti-competitive effects until 2001 when the 
new Estonian Competition Act was issued. This new Act empowered the 
Competition Board to prohibit anti-competitive merger transactions. Thus, from 
1998 to 2001 the Estonian Competition Board had worked as a Register body 
without actual power to enforce a merger control. The reason for this, as stated by 
Ms Margit Paddo 146, was to examine the Estonian market, gain some knowledge 
of it and prepare for the future work to deal with `problematic' mergers. Also, the 
OECD Global Forum on Competition acknowledged that such information gained 
was a good practice before imposing a full control over anti-competitive 
mergers 147. Apart from the power given by the Act on Competition of 2001 to the 
Competition Board to enforce a control over anti-competitive mergers, the Act of 
2001 has also changed the thresholds for the notification: the requirement of 40% 
of the market control was abrogated and instead of that other conditions were 
introduced. According to article 21, the entities involved in a merger transaction 
have an obligation to notify if `[. ] during the previous financial year, the 
145 Competition Act 1998, article 27 (1). 
lab Ms Margit Paddo, the official responsible for a merger investigation at the Competition Board 
in Estonia, who the researcher interviewed during my visit to the Competition Board on the 28th of 
September 2004. 
'47For full discussion, see OECD Global Forum on Competition, Contribution from Estonia, 04 
Oct. 2001, pp. 4. 
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aggregate worldwide turnover of the parties to the concentration exceeded 500 
million kroons and the aggregate worldwide turnover of each of at least two 
parties to the concentration exceeded 100 million kroons and if the business of at 
least one of the merging undertakings or of the whole or part of the undertaking 
of which control is acquired are carried out in Estonia'. The new aspect of this 
Act was an introduction of an international element. As from the thresholds can be 
seen under certain conditions the foreign-to-foreign concentrations have an 
obligation to get approval from the Estonian Competition Board. On one hand this 
new element was welcomed from European or even international perspective as 
Estonia was ready to take a part in international market. However, on the other 
hand, this condition was problematic, because it did not specify when the merging 
undertakings were considered to be `carried out in Estonia'. This provision 
caused major problems for the Competition Board in 2002 where the majority of 
notified transactions were between foreign undertakings, even with modest 
business activities in Estonia. The Competition Board had a position that foreign 
undertakings take place in Estonia if they have registered a branch or a subsidiary 
here 148. For instance, in Metsalliitto Osuuskunta / Thomesto Oy case 149 the 
Competition Board of Estonia dealt with the concentration between two Finnish 
undertakings, which had subsidiaries in Estonia. The permission to concentration 
was given in this case as the Competition Board came to the conclusion that the 
proposed concentration would not create a dominant position (Kalaus, 2002). 
Thus, this burden to deal with concentrations, which had little impact on the 
Estonian market, was unnecessary for the newly created Competition Board with 
little experience to enforce competition law. The sole relation to worldwide 
turnover was an example of `un-rational' provision for merger control in the 
Estonian market. This shortage was solved by amending the Act in 2004, which 
provided explicit explanation of the term `carried out in Estonia'. 
From 1 October 2001 the Competition Board has an authority to prohibit 
concentration, provided that it may create or strengthen a dominant position as a 
result of which competition would be significantly restricted in the goods 
market' 50 In the Annual Report of 2000 it was stated that the Competition Act 
148 Annual Report 2002. 
149 No. 02-KO/2001. 
150 22 (2), Competition Act of 2001. 
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establishes merger control but not prohibition of mergers. The Competition Board 
may prohibit the concentration or grant permission to concentrate, or by granting 
the permission to concentrate attach conditions and obligations directly related to 
the concentration for the parties to the concentration 151. After the modernisation of 
the ECMR, there have not been any changes made on merger control provisions in 
Estonia. Nonetheless, the Competition Board is in the process of revising its 
merger control rulesls2 
1.3.6.2. Latvia 
The Competition law of 1998 in Latvia consisted of the prohibition of the 
agreements, which may distort competition in the Latvian market, abuse of 
dominant position and unfair competition. In contrast to the situation in Estonia, it 
also contained a merger control enforced by the Competition Council. The 
notification of proposed concentrations was introduced. However, the 
Competition Council of Latvia set up high thresholds for the notification: `[ .] the 
combined turnover of the participants in the merger during the previous financial 
year was not less than 25 million lati, and at least one of the merger participants 
was in a dominant position in the concrete market prior to the merger' 153 Two 
conditions had to be met in order to fall under the jurisdiction of the Competition 
Council of Latvia: (i) undertakings had to meet the thresholds and (ii) one of the 
merging parties had to have a dominant position. Hence, the only situation, where 
a merger can strengthen a dominant position was covered by the Competition Law 
of 1998. A merger, which may create a dominant position or lead to oligopoly, 
fell outside the jurisdiction of Latvia. This in turn can be considered that a merger 
control in Latvia was not so necessary as such `problematic' concentrations could 
have been covered by the provision of an abuse of a dominant position, as was the 
case in the jurisdiction of the European Communities before the Merger 
Regulation came into force 154. The further Competition Law of 2001 did not 
introduce any changes as regards the thresholds. The amendments to the 
151 27 (2) and (3), Competition Act of 2001. 
152 The amended Competition Act is due to be issued in June, 2006. 
153 Section 15 (1)(3), Competition Law. 
154 The articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty covered to some extent merger control rules before the 
ECMR came into being. For instance, Continental Can case. 
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thresholds was made in 2004 together with further changes to the Competition 
Law as results of the joining the EU and making the Law adequately in line with 
the `new` Merger Regulation of the European Community. Thus, according to the 
current provisions on Merger Control in the Competition Law of Latvia, the 
Competition Council has a jurisdiction if `[ .] the combined turnover of the 
participants in the merger during the previous financial year was no less than 25 
million Lats'55,, or `the joint market share of market participants involved in the 
merger exceeds 40% of the relevant marketls6' Therefore, the new `foreign' 
element was introduced by clearly defining the market participant, as `[ .] any 
person (foreign person included) which performs or is preparing to perform 
business activities in the territory of Latvia or business activities of which may 
affect competition in the territory of Latvia157'. This means that the Competition 
Council has a jurisdiction to review not only domestic mergers but also foreign 
mergers with `spill-over' effects. 
As regards the substantive test, analogous to the Competition Board of 
Estonia, the Competition Council of Latvia applied a dominance test. The section 
16 (3) provided that a merger that creates or strengthens a dominant position, 
which will significantly hinder, restrict, or distort competition in any relevant 
market, shall be prohibited. According to the Competition Law of Latvia the 
market participant considers to be holding a dominant position in a concrete 
market `[.. ] if such participant or the participants in this concrete market is at 
least 40 per cent and if such participant or such participants have the capacity to 
significantly hinder, restrict or distort competition in any concrete market for a 
sufficient length of time by acting with full or partial independence from 
competitors, clients or consumers' 158. To follow the modernisation within the EC 
jurisdiction, the substantive test for merger appraisal has been changed, as to the 
modified version of a dominance test, which will be further discussed in chapter 
6. 
155 Section 15 (2) (1). 
156 Section 15 (2) (2). 
157 Section 1 (9). 
158 Section 1 (1). 
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1.3.6.3. Lithuania 
The very first Law on Competition in Lithuania was introduced on 15 
September in 1992. It contained prohibition of an abuse of a dominant position, 
restrictive agreements or coordinated activities, which may impede competition, 
unfair competition and it also included the control of concentrations of market 
structures. The compulsory notification of concentrations if they exceeded the 
thresholds established by the Competition Council was required. Any failure to 
notify the undertakings involved would result in fines. The first Law on 
Competition was enforced by the two institutions as aforementioned, which later 
were reorganised into the Competition Council of the Lithuanian Republic. 
However, there was a possibility to get an approval for a concentration by the 
written decision of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania'59 in case the 
permission to concentrate market structures had not been approved by the 
competition authorities. This involvement of the Government in Lithuania was 
annulled by the Law on Competition of 1999. The Competition Law of 1999 also 
introduced the thresholds, which are still applicable and provides that if `[.. ] 
combined aggregate income of the undertakings concerned is more than LTL 30 
million for the financial year preceding concentration and the aggregate income 
of each of at least two undertakings concerned is more than LTL 5 million for the 
financial year preceding concentration', the firms involved in the transaction 
have to notify and have to gain the permission from the Competition Council of 
Lithuania' 60 In addition to these thresholds, the Competition Council of Lithuania 
may obligate the undertakings to submit notifications on concentration and 
therefore apply the merger control procedure even if these thresholds are not 
exceeded, where `[ .] it 
becomes probable that concentration will result in the 
creation or strengthening of the dominant position, or a significant restriction of 
competition in the relevant market' 161 This alternative jurisdictional expansion of 
the power of the Competition Council by the most recent amendments to the 
Competition Law was designed to address competition concerns with some 
markets (in particular services markets), which as the practice has showed may 
159 Article 11, Law on Competition, 1-2878,15 September 1992. 
160 Article 10, Law on Competition, No VIII-1099,23 March 1999. 
161 Article 141, Law on Competition, No. VIII-1099,23/03/1999 as amended by No. IX-2126, 
15/04/2004. 
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have some anti-competitive effects even being below the thresholds defined in 
article 10162. Hence, the jurisdiction of Lithuania differs from Estonia and Latvia, 
and therefore from the EC, and applies both ex-ante and ex post procedures. There 
is a widely accepted position to apply an ex-ante system because it can be difficult 
and costly to disentangle a merger, which has already taken place. Hence, 
unnecessary burden is placed on the merging parties in Lithuania. This provision 
has not yet been applied in the Lithuanian jurisdiction, thus, is not clear whether 
and how this rule will be enforced in practice. 
The jurisdiction of Lithuania employs a dominance test. Article 14 (1) 
section 2 of the Competition Law of Lithuania provides, that the Council may 
permit `[.. ] the implementation of concentration attaching to its decision 
conditions and obligations for the participating undertakings or controlling 
persons in order to prevent creation or strengthening of a dominant position'. 
Despite the fact that after the modernisation of the ECMR, the Competition 
Council of Lithuania has modified the substantive test for merger appraisal, the 
focus is still on dominance163. 
Globalisation process has caused a surge of cross-border as well as domestic 
merger transactions within the jurisdiction of the EC. The Baltic countries are not 
an exception. After re-gaining their independence, these transactions have 
occurred in the Baltic countries. Thus, it was necessary to introduce a merger 
control regime in the Baltic countries in order to prevent the anti-competitive 
merger transactions. Different from the EC, where the merger control regime has 
been developed over time and it was introduced when the European firms had 
sufficient `size' to compete with American firms, the merger control mechanism 
in each Baltic country was transposed as part of the acquis. The implementation 
of the merger control mechanisms in the Baltic countries has not been a single act 
per se. It was constituted as a new revolution for these countries, as their whole 
legal, economic and political environment has been changed. The merger regime 
was introduced into the legal systems of the Baltic countries, while they have still 
been going through economic, legal and political reforms. 
162 See Annual Report, 2003, Lithuania. 
163 Further discussion will be provided in chapter 6. 
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The competition law and policy in the Baltic countries is a compact version of the 
competition law and policy of the EC. However, unlike in the EC competition 
law, the merger control rules and other aspects of competition law, such as an 
abuse of a dominant position, prohibited agreements and other restrictions of fair 
competition, are governed by a single document - Competition Law in each Baltic 
country. Different approaches towards introducing merger control mechanisms 
were taken in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Latvia had set up high thresholds for 
merger notification. Thus, only very large merger transactions fell under the 
jurisdiction of the Latvian Competition Council. Until 1999 the Competition 
Council's blocking merger decision could have been overturned by the 
government in the jurisdiction of Lithuania164. The Competition Board of Estonia 
was empowered to challenge anti-competitive mergers only in 2001. 
Considering that the merger control mechanisms in the Baltic states were 
introduced as a part of the acquis, there is no surprise that merger control rules 
have been highly influenced by the ECMR. The first competition law of each 
Baltic country was already to a large extent inspired by the Community 
competition rules, but nevertheless, the Baltic countries made further amendments 
as to follow the changes under the Community law. The wording of the 
substantive tests for merger appraisal in each Baltic state has been almost identical 
to the former dominance test of the ECMR. However, the situation has changed 
after the modernisation of the ECMR. There have been no changes insofar as to 
the jurisdiction of Estonia with regard to the modification of the merger control 
provisions. The Competition authorities of Latvia and Lithuania have modified 
their substantive tests for appraisal of merger transactions to correspondence to 
the modernisation of the ECMR, which will be further explored in chapter 6. 
164 it happened once, when the Council's decision was overturned by the government (in Sugar 
case). For further discussion, see chapter 6. 
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Chapter 2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY 
DISCUSSED, AND TERMINOLOGY EXPLAINED 
'ELI' on pent comparer sans craindre d'etre injuste' 165 (Perrault, 1688 : 1, as 
quoted in Legrand and Munday, 2003 : 3). 
This research undertakes a critical analysis of the approaches taken by the 
EC and the jurisdictions of the Baltic countries vis-a-vis merger control regime 
from a competition law perspective. The thesis is aimed at determining to what 
extent the approaches taken by the Baltic states, in particular Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania are different from its counter-part the EC. 
This chapter will define the methodology used in the thesis in order to 
explore this virtually unexplored topic with no comprehensive scholarly writings. 
The thesis employs a comparative law method, which uses a comparison as a tool 
in order to determine objectively what approach is taken to a particular problem, 
as a merger control regime in this case, in the EC and the Baltic states. Despite the 
fact that the Baltic countries quite often have been portrayed as one unit due to 
their historical and some socio-economic resemblances, the researcher attempts to 
define the differences in the approaches taken in each Baltic country. Referring to 
the specific nature of the Baltic countries (they are the first former Soviet 
countries to join the EU with small market economies), traditional comparative 
law methods could not be fully employed in this study. Hence, there was a need to 
include relevant historical, political and economic environments within which 
competition policy and law has been developing in each jurisdiction. Traditional 
legal analysis has been undertaken in the research, however, this approach is not 
an adequate framework to analyse and explain the development of competition 
law and policy within the EC and the Baltic states' jurisdictions. Thus, an inter- 
disciplinary approach has also been adopted. Explicit recourse to economic theory 
is also essential to understand the rationale behind the law, as its basic precepts 
and the goals of competition policy. The following sections will explore the 
methods used in the thesis, the problems that occurred and the solutions proposed. 
This chapter will also provide and explain a mixed model of research together 
165 `One may compare without fear of being unjust', as translated by Legrand and Munday, 2003, 
pp. 3. 
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with a conducted empirical research and legal analysis completed by the 
researcher. 
2.1. Comparative law approach 
2.1.1. Introductory remarks 
This thesis undertakes a comparative analysis. Despite the fact that 
comparative law as a legal discipline of its own is relatively new and the term 
`comparative law' became established in 1900 in Paris where the first 
International Congress for Comparative Law and World Exhibition was held, the 
origin of comparison of foreign law can be found as early as in the science of law 
itself, i. e. in the writings of Plato and Aristotle (384-322 B. C. )166 Bearing in mind 
that the development of comparative law as a science and the appearance of a new 
legal order only started in 1900, comparative law has been disputed by scholars 
for several decades. For instance, Kiekbaev (2003) in his article questioned what 
is comparative law per se - whether it is a scientific method, a pure science and/or 
an educational discipline? The scholars 167 supporting the first theory have 
expressed doubts of distinguishing comparative law as a distinct science purely 
because it lacks subject. The presumption has been that comparative law consists 
only of a variety of methods of investigation of jurisprudence. The comparison 
itself is put in the forefront of the comparative method theory and the comparative 
law is frequently associated with it. Other sets of scholars168 support the notion 
that comparative law acts not as a method but rather as an independent scientific 
and educational discipline. This notion has profound at the dawn of a new 
millennium. Comparative law structurally and functionally is regarded as a 
relatively independent and scientifically detached educational discipline having its 
166 Also, the drafting of the XII Tables for Rome preceded a comparative study involving enquiries 
in the Greek cities as suggested by David and Brierley (1985: 1-2). Many other historical 
precedents were also involved in a comparison studies. For instance, in Middle Ages the Canon 
law and Roman law were compared. Later, Montesquieu based his famous L'Espirit des Lois on 
comparison in order to penetrate the spirit of laws and thereby form common principles of good 
government. For further reading, see David and Brierley, Major Legal Systems in the World 
Today, Stevens, 1985, pp. 2. 
167 To this first group Kiebaev allotted the following scholars: Pollock, David, Gutteridge, 
Patterson, Grossfeld, Kahn-Freund, De Cruz and Szabo. 
168 To this group Kiekbaev included Ewald, Rabel, Saley, Watson, Constantinesco, Butler, Örücü, 
Bogdan, Saidov and others. 
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own subject, method and sphere of application. The last group is a compromise 
group of comparatists who define comparative law as a method of legal science 
and independent scientific discipline'69 
However, irrespective of perception of comparative law by the scholars 
discussed above, the thesis uses a comparative law for the comparative methods, 
which involve the comparison of the jurisdictions at the supra-national level - the 
EC and at a national level the Baltic countries, namely Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania. 
2.1.2. Definition of comparative law and/or comparative method 
There is no decisive definition of what comparative law and comparative 
method is yet (Örücü, 2002: 1). It is open to discussion whether this is an 
independent discipline and comparatists have to re-think on their subject 
(Markesinis, 1990: 1). A rather vague definition of comparative law is given by 
Zweigert and Koezt (1998: 2) there `[ .] the words suggest an intellectual activity 
with law as its object and comparison as its process'; the extra dimension is given 
to internationalism. In general terms, comparative law is the comparison of the 
different legal systems of the world. This study undertakes a comparison of the 
European legal system and the Baltic countries legal systems. The legal order of 
the European Community is for some scholars `[.. ] a real-life laboratory for the 
study of the comparative method, and comparativism plays a crucial role in the 
"nurturing" of this (relatively) new supranational system of law' (Jacobs, 
1990: 99, Hilf 1986: 550, as quoted in Vranken, 1997: 14). According to Twining 
(2000: 138), the European Union's legal order like other multiple legal orders 
bears directly on interpreting local legal issues. Considering that the European 
Union consists of the member states, the law of the European Community 
obviously is influenced by the legal traditions of its member states' 
70. Meanwhile, 
'690n the one hand, the comparative method is used as a tool for collecting information on 
compared systems or legal phenomena. On the other, comparative law is juxtaposed with general 
theory of law. For further reading, see Kiekbaev, Comparative law: Method, Science or 
Educational Discipline?, Vol. 7.3 September 2003, EJCL. 
170 For instance, the original framework of the European Community, i. e. the 1957 Treaty of Rome 
bears a strong resemblance to a civil code; further the institutions themselves, especially the 
European Court of Justice and the auxiliary office of the Advocate General has the imprints of 
French administrative law. Principle of proportionality ('verhaltinismassigkeit') and the concept of 
legitimate expectations ('vertraversschutz') originate from German law, and the principle of audi 
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as a part of the Soviet Union, the Baltic countries belonged to the socialist legal 
system. After the collapse of the Soviet Empire and the disappearance of the 
socialist legal system from the world's legal systems classification, these 
countries have turned to their civil law roots. Hence, the Baltic countries have 
been defined as countries in transition or belonging to `hybrid' legal system as 
addressed by comparatists (see for instance, Zweigert and Koetz, 1998). 
Despite being portrayed as one unit due to their historical and some socio- 
economic resemblances, the research attempts to define the differences in the 
approaches taken by each Baltic state. Wider research is placed on Lithuania, 
being Lithuanian and having practiced as competition lawyer at the Competition 
Council of Lithuania, the researcher has had a better knowledge and 
understanding about the Lithuanian legal system, and obviously better 
accessibility to the data required for the study. However, on the other hand, a 
more comprehensive analysis can be delivered if the approach towards merger 
control regime in Lithuania is analysed within the context of the Baltic countries, 
as Estonia and Latvia are the most comparable countries for Lithuania. 
2.1.3. The importance of comparative method 
Despite some discrepancies and unresolved issues as discussed above, the 
advantages offered by the comparative law are undisputed. The comparative law 
can be used as an aid to legislation and law reform, as a tool of construction, as a 
means to understand legal rules or as a contribution to the systematic unification 
and harmonisation of law (De Cruz, 1999: 18, Zweigert and Koetz, 1998: 15-31). 
The comparative law method has been adapted to suit the needs of the EU both in 
harmonising and approximating the commercial and competition laws of its 
members and in facilitating the CEECs including the Baltic countries in their 
modernisation programmes, often with the goal of membership of the EU (Örücü, 
2002: x). For states, which are new members of the EU, like the Baltic states in 
this case, the harmonisation of law by supra-national means EC guidelines, 
directives or regulations are of ever increasing significance. There are no doubts 
alteram partem was introduced by the English legal system. All these principles have found their 
ways into the general principles of the EC applied by the ECJ. For further reading, see Vranken, 
1997. 
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of the benefits that the comparative law method can deliver. Thus, the 
comparative method and comparison itself has been an essential tool for 
generating knowledge in this thesis. 
It has been revealed that academia try to take a broad approach to the 
subject of comparative law by moving beyond the `law as rules' (Hoecke and 
Warrington, 1998: 495). German comparatists Zweigert and Koezt (1998: 68-69) 
expressed that by comparing different legal systems or groups of legal systems the 
scholars should `grasp their legal styles'. The term `style' encompasses history, 
mode of thought, institutions, legal sources and ideology. Along similar lines, 
other scholars Bell (1969,1986), Marsketinis (1994), and Legrand (1995,1997) 
argued that law and the understanding of law involves more than analysis of 
statutory rules and judicial decisions. It has to be looked at from a broader 
historical, socio-economic, psychological and ideological context. Comparative 
law in this context can assist with finding the elements, which are influencing the 
law at all levels from a conceptual to ideological framework (Hoecke and 
Warrington, 1998: 496-497). In general, comparative law can be used to evaluate 
the efficacy of an approach to a legal problem (in this case merger control regime) 
in terms of a jurisdiction's cultural, economic, political and legal background. 
Thus, chapter 1 presents the evolution and development of the EC legal tradition 
in its historical, political and economic background. The second bloc to be 
analysed is the Baltic countries, there the plethora of activities has been involved 
for the membership to the EU. The closer interest to the European Communities 
has not only affected the basic economic (as change from planned to market 
economy) and administrative framework but also the basic legal background in 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The transition has not only required political 
decision and economic expertise but also comprehension of the legal conditions of 
a market economy, in particular the European Communities (Mueller-Graff, 
1993). Referring to the thesis, the road towards implementation of a competition 
regime in the Baltic countries has consisted of three crucial elements, the 
necessary legal framework, an appropriate administrative capacity and obviously 
effective enforcement, which are discussed in chapter 1. 
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2.1.4. Legal transplant, legal transfer or legal transposition? 
Theory recognises that newly formed countries, developing countries or 
countries which are reforming their systems have two main choices in selecting 
sources of laws. The choice involves adopting a law from within its own 
institutional mechanism, or transplanting rules from outside its political-legal zone 
of dominance. There is a need in the economic analysis of the law to determine a 
framework of predicting which of the two alternatives is the most efficiency- 
enhancing. More recent and sophisticated developments of comparative law 
revealed that the majority of countries choose the second alternative. According to 
Watson (1978: 94) most changes in a legal system are due to legal transplants 171, 
as `most changes in most systems are the result of borrowing'. A merger control 
mechanism or competition law in general has been introduced to the Baltic 
countries because of borrowings. Being a part of the Soviet Empire with the State 
control regime, competition was non-existent in the Baltic countries. The collapse 
of the Empire and the dismantling of the iron curtain opened the door for the 
Baltic states to become a part of the international arena. However, there was a 
need to provide a stable environment for doing business, in order to attract foreign 
investment and therefore enhance trade openness abroad. Therefore, competitive 
pressure arose to harmonise their legal systems with those in countries exporting 
capital by incorporating foreign legal frameworks that developed-country firms 
perceive to enhance their productive efficiency (Buscaglia, 1999: 572). To return 
to their European roots, membership of the EU was deemed the best opportunity 
for the Baltic states. 
There are a number of theories analysing the phenomenon of 
harmonisation of laws, in particular the one conducted by the European Union. 
For instance, De Cruz (1999: 475-496) discusses the European convergence, as 
with the impending of Single Market, the European systems are converging in the 
context of the commonality of rules, procedures, and institutions, and the growing 
similarities are apparent 172. 
171 Watson was the first to introduce the term `legal transplant'. 
172 The comparatists have formulated two main streamline theories along the `europeanisation' 
lines. They are `convergence thesis' and the `functional equivalence' theory (Teubner, 1998: 12- 
13). As regards the first theory Markesinis (1994: 30) has expressed that industrial nations 
converge towards similar social and economic structures. Meanwhile, Zweigert and Koetz 
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The merger control mechanism appeared in the jurisdiction of the Baltic 
countries because of the borrowings. However, was it legal transplant, as defined 
by Watson or something else? Watson (1993), who is considered a pioneer of the 
`legal transplant' theory argued that legal transplant is possible from one to 
another jurisdiction even in the case of a different level of development or 
`political complexion'. However, Watson's `legal transplant' has been criticised 
by other scholars. According to Legrand (1997) legal transplants are 
impossible 173, because laws are deeply embedded in the `legal culture' of nations 
and a legal institution cannot survive a `journey' from one legal culture to another. 
Teubner (1998: 12) by replacing `legal transplants' with the term `legal irritant' 
argues that the metaphor of `legal transplant' is misleading and states that `[ .] it is 
not transplanted into another organism, rather it works as a fundamental 
irritation which triggers as a whole series of new and unexpected events f. ] it 
irritates law's "binding arrangements"'. Nelken (2003: 437) instead of `legal 
transplants' recommends `legal transfers' in order to describe the process in the 
ex-communist countries or the countries seeking to harmonise their laws within 
the EU. Örücii (2002: 7) argues that the transplant theory needs some conceptual 
refinement. She suggests the term `transposition', as used in music, and the role of 
`tuning' becomes more vital 174. In the context of legal transposition, each legal 
institution or rule is introduced in the recipient's system as it was in the system of 
the model, '[.. ] the transposition occurring to suit the particular socio-legal 
culture and needs of the recipient' (Orücü, 2002: 471). The researcher considers 
(1998: 34) have used the second theory by stating that `[.. ] legal system of every society faces 
essentially the same problems and solves these problems by quite different means though very 
often with similar results'. These theories will not be explored further in this thesis as they lack 
relevance in building the methodology for this study. 
173 However, Nelken while analysing Lengrand's thesis argued that if by `legal transplant' is meant 
the attempt to use laws and legal institutions to reproduce identical meaning and effects in 
different cultures, then it is obviously impossible, but Watson did not mean that. As stated by 
Watson legal transplants just happen and they happen all the time irrespective of whether they 
have any broad socio-economic or other `fit' with the suggested society or in which they are 
adopted. The insertion of an alien rule into another system may cause it to perform in a fresh way. 
It means that `1. .J the whole context of the rule or concept 
has to be studied to understand the 
extent of the transformation'. For reading on Watson's legal transplants, see Watson, Legal 
Transplants, Georgia press, 1993, pp. 116. For Nelken's comments see Nelken, Comparatists and 
transferability, as published in Comparative Legal Studies: Traditions and Transitions, edited by 
Legrand and Munday, Cambridge university press, 2003, pp. 442-449. 
174 Each note (as legal institution or rule) is sung (otherwise used or introduced) at the same place 
in the scale of the new key (of the recipient) as it did in the original key (of the model); the 
`transposition' occurring to suit the particular voice-range (socio-legal culture and needs) of the 
singer (as the recipient country). For further reading, see Örücü, `Law as Transposition', 2002,51 
International Comparative Law Quarterly, 205. 
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that Örücü's suggested `legal transposition' is better suited to describe the 
migration of laws' process in the Baltic countries, or in the CEECs as in a broader 
context. Referring to legal systems in transition, or transposition from the western 
legal traditions to the eastern and central European legal systems, Örücü places 
importance on socio-cultural and legal-cultural, as they are the most serious 
causes of mismatch175. With regards to the thesis, the transposition in the Baltic 
countries has taken place not only by transposing one legal institution with the EC 
Merger Regulation, but these countries have also faced changes in an economic, 
political, social and cultural climate. Considering that the notion of legal 
transplant refers to the transplanted element of a particular legal institution, 
assuming the other economic, social and political factors remain unchanged in 
both jurisdictions: from which the legal institution originated and where it was 
transplanted, the concept `transposition' is better suited to define the phenomenon 
in the Baltic countries in this study. The term `transposition' has also been applied 
in other similar studies. For instance, Geradin and Henry (2005) discussed 
`transposition' of EC competition rules in the new Member States, including the 
Baltic countries. Along similar lines, Sengayen (2004) in her thesis also concludes 
that transposition has been taken place in CEECs while harmonising the product 
liability laws with the EU. In general, the scholars in their more recent studies 
favour more multi-level theories of `transposition', `tuning', or `law importation' 
(Örücü, 2003). 
2.1.5. Techniques of comparative law 
2.1.5.1. Macro- or micro-comparison? 
In order to construct a comparative law method, there is a need to describe 
comparative techniques used in the research. The comparatists compare the legal 
systems of different nations at a larger or smaller scale (Zweigert and Koetz, 
1998: 4-5). Macro-comparison involves a larger scale comparison, as from the 
175 When elements from two different communities combine, for instance, one drawing its 
understanding from culture and the other from law, they may mesh bringing `cultural 
conversation' into a broader narrative. This is the `fit', and `transpositions' and `tuning' at the time 
of transplant are vital for this `fit'. For further discussion, see 
Örücü, Unde Venit, Quo Tendit 
Comparative Law?, 2003, pp. 16-17. 
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spirit and style of different legal systems to the methods of thoughts and 
procedures they use. Meanwhile, micro-comparison has to do with a specific legal 
institution or problem where the rules are used to solve the actual problems or 
particular conflicts of interests176. The line dividing macro-comparison and micro- 
comparison is flexible. Sometimes both must be analysed at the same time, for 
instance, the procedures, by which rules are applied, have to be studied in order to 
understand why a foreign system solves a particular problem in the way it does. 
This study undertakes a micro-comparison, as only a part of the competition law - 
merger control mechanism (precisely, the substantial issues of merger control 
rules) will be compared in this thesis. However, broader economic, socio-political 
and legal aspects (referring to macro-comparison) will also be examined where it 
is necessary to explain the rationale behind the rule. 
2.1.5.2. Convergence or divergence? 
There are two basic beliefs of the comparatists, as with the emphasis on 
similarities or differences. On the one hand, a comparison of similar or convergent 
systems can benefit from each other. Thus, the attempt is to enlarge the `catch 
area' of systems covered by the new ius commune within the context of a wider 
Europe. On the other hand, the differences must be stressed for their value in 
enhancing the understanding of law in society, as it observes only differences 
from which the lessons can be learnt (Örticü, 2003: 8). Legrand (2003), for 
instance, places exaggerated stress on the study of difference rather than 
similarity. If harmonisation is on the political agenda, it may `[ .] secure the 
allegiance of the various constituencies only by retreating from the imperialist 
drive to openness and by doing justice to the profound diversity of legal 
experience across jurisdictions'. Legrand further argues that because of these and 
other reasons, comparative legal studies must accept the duty to acknowledge, 
appreciate and obviously respect alterity. 
Comparison means that sometimes the similarities are observed and 
explained at other times the stress is on differences. For instance, Schlesinger 
(1995) distinguishes periods of comparisons as of `contractive' or `contrastive' 
176 For further discussion, Zweigert and Koetz, A introduction to Comparative law, 3`d ed., Oxford 
university press, 1998, pp. 4-5. 
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and of `integrative', where the former focuses on differences and the latter on 
similarities. He emphasises that the future belongs to integrative comparative law. 
In contrast to Schlesinger, Bogdan (1994: 18) referred that while comparing 
closely related systems, it is more rewarding to explain differences, where cases 
are entirely unrelated - the benefits are enhanced by explaining the similarities. 
Hence, whether or not it is better to concentrate on finding the existence of 
differences rather than similarities depends on the context and purpose of 
comparison (Nelken, 2003: 442). Considering, first, that the emphasis on this 
thesis on micro-comparison - the Merger Control regime, which takes form as a 
regulation177; there is no room for negotiation on the principle of the acceptance 
of a rule or even the technique of how it is accepted. Second, the globalisation 
process and `europeanisation' of legal systems has gained significant pace 
recently, as laws of various countries are becoming in many respects similar 
(Zimmermann, 1998: 6-8). Third, bearing in mind the Baltic countries committed 
themselves to employ and apply concepts in competition law in a manner 
consistent with the EC approach, the more rewarding emphasis of the thesis is on 
the differences in approaches adopted by the Baltic countries towards merger 
control regime from the EC. The purpose of this thesis's comparison is to disclose 
to what extent the approaches towards merger control regime taken in each Baltic 
country is different from its counter-part the EC. 
2.1.5.3. Three step plan 
For a comparison study there is a need to have a plan of comparison, 
outlining possible methods of comparison. Although other scholars have tried to 
explain what a proper comparative method should consist of, only Kamba has 
actually suggested some `objective' practical comparative techniques, assuming 
no ideology, culture or political persuasion is involved (De Cruz, 1999: 233). 
Kamba (1974) distinguishes three main phases in the process of comparison. They 
are the descriptive stage, the identification stage and the explanatory stage. The 
descriptive phase takes place in describing the norms, concepts or institutions of 
the legal systems concerned. Alternatively, this stage examines the socio- 
177 Regulations are binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States' under 
EC law. 
78 
economic or legal problems and the legal solutions provided by the systems in 
question. The identification stage therefore identifies differences and similarities 
of the systems compared. Meanwhile, in the explanatory stage an attempt is made 
to account for the resemblances and dissimilarities between systems, concepts and 
institutions. Referring to the thesis, the study describes the laws regulating merger 
control regime at the two levels: firstly at supra-national level - the EC, and 
secondly at national level - in the Baltic countries. An attempt of the descriptive 
stage of this research is to be able to define what approach has been taken towards 
merger control rules at the European and the national levels, namely in Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania. In order to define the approaches, the law as well as the case 
law have been analysed in all jurisdictions and its development over time. Two 
periods have been involved in the study. As regards the jurisdiction of the EU, 
these are: (i) from the forming of the ECMR until its reforms and (ii) after its 
reforms when it was issued on 1 May 2004. Alternatively, in the Baltic countries 
the intervals analysed are the period before joining the EU and after the juridical 
membership day on 1 May 2004. Contemplating that the dates of issuing the 
reformed ECMR and joining the EU membership day of the Baltic countries 
coincided, the periods analysed were the same for the jurisdictions at the supra- 
national level and at the national level. 
During the identification stage the differences and similarities in the 
approaches taken in all jurisdictions have been identified. The research revealed 
that the approach taken by the EC towards merger control regime has shifted from 
the focus on structural issues towards the emphasis on the effects on competition 
(otherwise, towards a more economic based approach). Meanwhile, the Baltic 
countries are left behind by applying the former EC model. Despite the fact that 
the reforms in the Baltic countries have attempted to modernise their laws in 
accordance with the EC model (or is in a process of modernising like in the 
Estonian case), the researcher argues that the differences in the approaches at both 
levels can be exhibited. In the last stage the researcher has adopted the modified 
version of the model suggested by Kamba. First of all, the research has grasped its 
unique style referring to the specific features of the legal institution concerned. 
Contemplating that the merger transactions may have controversial effects, as 
they might enhance or decrease competition, merger control regime is a predictive 
exercise for the professionals of Competition Authorities. Hence, the study is 
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based on two opposite poles: mergers with efficiency stimulus and therefore, 
which enhance competition and merger transactions with the `hidden' motive to 
increase market power and consequently lessen competition. These two extremes 
will be recurring throughout the thesis. They will be checked from the economic 
(discussed in chapter 4, to a lesser extent in chapter 3) as well as legal (chapter 6) 
perspectives. Hence, the magnitude of the legal analysis of the study has been 
extended to embrace the inter-disciplinary approach, involving the economic 
models. The following sections will explain the inter-disciplinary methods applied 
in the study. 
2.2. Inter-disciplinary approach 
2.2.1. Introductory remarks 
Apart from the comparative law method, the thesis also employs the inter- 
disciplinary approach, as between two disciplines law and economics. Both 
disciplines have different approaches to a problem. For instance, Mason (1937: 34- 
49) argued that economists and lawyers use words `monopoly' and `competition' 
in distinctly different ways. Lawyers use the term `monopoly' as `a standard of 
evaluation', by designating that a situation is not in the public interest, as a 
monopoly means a restriction of the freedom of business to engage in legitimate 
economic activities. Competition, in contrast, designates for lawyers situations in 
the public interest. Meanwhile, to economists the distinction between monopoly 
and pure competition describes the differing ways in which market transactions 
occur and resources are allocated. Considering that firm's output decisions are 
made relying on the potential effect on price, a monopolist (or oligopolist) is able 
to influence the market price. A competitor in a competitive market cannot affect 
the market price and seeks to maximise profits by producing until marginal cost 
equals price. The difference in approaches in same notions as presented by the 
illustration above may raise the question how these two distinctive disciplines can 
benefit from each other? Hirsh (1988) argues that as legal scholars look outside 
the law they discovered that economics had developed paradigms that seem to 
provide a powerful analytic framework for the study of the law. 
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Despite being a relatively new subject, comparative law and economics 
are considered by scholars as well-established legal specialties, which can benefit 
from each other. According to Mattei et al (1999), both disciplines comparative 
law and economics combine the instruments and methodologies in order to better 
understand the reasons of existing legal rules and institutions and of their 
evolution. Moreover, by focusing on the study of the phenomena of legal 
divergence and convergence, it uses a dynamic approach to law. These 
phenomena can take place within a single legal system or among different legal 
systems, as is the case in this study. With regards to economic analysis of law, it 
provides further analytical tools that assist measuring the level and entity of 
analogy or divergence. Bearing in mind the nature of competition policy, where 
economics is the raison d'etre of competition law, the study has involved the 
economic analysis in order to explain the rationale behind merger control rules. 
According to Frazer (1992: xi) competition policy `[. ] inhabits something of a no- 
man's land between the territories of economics and law'. Prof. Whish (2003: 1) 
has also defined that competition law is about economics and economic 
behaviour, and it is essential to have some knowledge of the economic concepts 
concerned. 
The idea of applying economic concepts is to gain a better understanding 
of law. For instance, lawyers-economists must distil a straightforward method for 
applying the economic analysis of law to given legal institutions (Mackaay, 
1999: 93). As will be seen in this thesis (Chapter 4), it is not always an easy task 
and sometimes economists cannot give a straightforward answer as required by 
lawyers. Despite that, the importance of the economic analysis of law cannot be 
mitigated. 
First of all, comparative law and economics allow rather original insights 
on the research area. Secondly, due to the specification of the competition law, in 
particular merger control mechanism, both disciplines play a major role in 
building up the methodology of this thesis. By specification is meant that 
competition law by its nature is comparative'78 and there are no more disputes as 
regards competition law links to economics. The following sections will further 
explain how those two disciplines have been of assistance in writing the thesis. 
178 For further reading, see Gerber, 1998. 
81 
2.2.2. Inter-disciplinary approach transformed 
The importance of the economic analysis in explaining the competition 
law is not questioned any more by the competition lawyers. Competition law is 
the product of both disciplines: law and economics. The strengthening of the 
economic powers of the Competition DG by appointing the chief economists, the 
economists working on merger cases in the competition authorities, even 
workshops on competition law issues participated by both lawyers and economists 
are the examples of the undoubted ties between the two. The analysis on 
economic theories in this thesis is useful for two main reasons. First, a merger 
control mechanism contains a lot of the economic terminology, which can be 
explained through the economic theories. Second, for backing the hypothesis, the 
competition authorities should examine the rationale behind mergers in order to 
have `a full picture' of mergers' effects on competition and in turn be able to set 
up the appropriate merger control criteria. 
The research period has occurred in parallel with the modernisation of EC 
competition rules, which very soon led to the conclusion that the EC competition 
rules, including merger control mechanism, has shifted towards a more economic 
based approach with the emphasis on effects rather than structural issues of 
market. Meanwhile, the Baltic countries as argued by the researcher are left 
behind. Despite some modernisation of their competition laws (in the case of 
Latvia and Lithuania, Estonia is still in the process of modernisation179), the legal 
rules are designed to focus more on structural aspects rather than on the effects on 
competition. The research has further attempted to explain why the `effect' based 
approach or in general the economic based approach in merger control regime is 
essential for the Baltic countries, by providing and explaining the economic 
theories, including the theory applicable for small market economies. According 
to Van den Bergh (2002: 42), competition law, which includes merger control 
rules, is a very difficult field; without a proper understanding of the underlying 
economics no sound rules may be developed. The thesis has analysed and 
explored the economic theories in order to provide the rationale behind the law, 
179 The new modernised law in Estonia is due in June, 2006. 
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namely behind the merger control regime. Chapter 4 presents a variety of 
economic models in order to prove that a merger transaction is not always about 
the harm, as these transactions can be pro-competitive and therefore, even 
enhance competition. The specific implications were made to small market 
economies by incorporating Gal's theory, which emphasises the importance of 
attentiveness to national economic characteristics in designing the competition 
policy regime, including merger control mechanism. In particular, the theory 
provides that small size affects competition law from its goals to its rules of 
thumb and that the countries of small market economies have to tailor their 
competition law in accordance to their small size. However, a problem occurred 
during the research with regard the concept of what a `small market economy' is 
and its applicability to the Baltic countries, as in a context of Gal's theory. 
2.2.3. Small market economies: do the Baltic countries fall in to this 
category? 
First of all, the researcher would like to clarify that the thesis is not based 
entirely on Gal's theory. Gal's theory is applied here as one of the supportive 
evidences referring to specific implication of the small Baltic states' markets in 
enforcing merger control rules. The concern with regard to the applicability of 
Prof. Gal's theory to the Baltic countries occurred after the OECD discussion 
revealed that Gal's theory does not apply to Latvia. It was stated that for professor 
Gal's definition of a small economy, which focuses on high concentration levels 
and entry barriers, these factors are more important than `size' in a conventional 
sense. Forum participants referring to this interpretation further stated that 
according to Gal's definition `[.. ] China would be a 'small' economy but the same 
would not be true for Latvia 180. Specifically, Professor Gal in her book provides 
three main factors in delineating the characteristics of small market economies, 
which are population size, population dispersion and openness to trade (see 
2003: 1-2). Gal also defines that small market economies obtain two main features 
as high entry barriers and high concentration levels. Considering that Gal's 
research was made with reference to Israel and to a lesser extent to Canada, the 
180 For further discussion, see Competition Policy and Small Economies, OECD, 7 February 2003 
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author of the thesis had to contact the professor in order to determine whether her 
theory can be applied namely to the Baltic states. It has been suggested by the 
professor that the researcher should look at the level of foreign trade and also at 
the concentration ratios of the markets in the Baltic countries. Despite applying 
the liberal foreign trade policy and seeking the integration into the EU market, 
these countries cannot still be considered as economically integrated with the EU 
market, as, for instance in the case of Liechtenstein, Andorra or Monaco, whose 
markets are so integrated with larger neighbouring states that they can be 
economically regarded as part of their markets. Gal also stated that it might be 
that the Baltic countries are still considered small in an economic sense depending 
on the actual concentration levels of their industries. These economies are in 
transition - so most of their markets are highly concentrated and others are not. 
Gal in her book mentioned that for an economy to be considered small, not all of 
its industries need to be highly concentrated, for instance, industries such as retail 
services are highly competitive even in small economies (Gal, 2003: 2). 
Besides the contacts made to the Professor, the researcher also checked 
how the Baltic countries, namely Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania define themselves. 
The variety of researches reveals that the Baltic countries experience some 
difficulties due to their small markets. For instance, Estonia as a small country 
cannot rely on its domestic market and requires liberal policy towards foreign 
trade to compensate the small size of its economy (Ratso, 2005). Concerns were 
expressed in Latvia because of relatively high market concentration, what is a 
characteristic feature of the Latvian market. In this case, the growth of merger 
concentration in the relatively small market capacity can diminish the pressure of 
competition on prices and on amount of goods and services thereby reaching 
critical level for customers in short term period (OECD, February, 2002). Also, a 
board member of the Competition Council of Latvia mentioned that Latvia has a 
small economy and therefore national undertakings require reaching a minimum 
efficient scale by means of consolidation in order to compete internationally. 
Professor Geradin and Henry (2005) in their joint article also admitted that the 
majority of the new Member States are considered as having small transition 
economies. Hence, the researcher considers that Gal's theory is applicable, and 
therefore can be relied on as a supporting theory in this thesis. Chapter 4 of the 
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thesis will further explore the issues of variety of the term `small market 
economies', their features and applicability to the Baltic countries. 
2.3. Methodological tools used by the researcher 
For defining the approaches taken by the EC and by the Baltic countries 
towards merger control mechanism, a conducted empirical research completed by 
the researcher has been applied. Due to the specification of legal systems, one 
being supra-national and another - national, different methodological tools have 
been involved in gaining the information package to assist the research. The 
researcher has had a difficult task of depicting the development of a complex field 
of law with the economic ties from various sources. The data at the early stage on 
the competition policy of the EU and the Baltic countries as well as merger 
control mechanisms in these jurisdictions was obtained from books, journal 
articles, and newspapers, studies completed by the Enterprise-DG of the European 
Commission, the OECD, the IBA181, the BIICL182 and web-sites. The research has 
been made by focusing on two main directions: (i) competition policy and law 
(referring to merger control regime); and (ii) economic models in competition 
law. 
Apart from the secondary sources, the research involved the examination 
of the primary sources i. e. the Treaty of Rome 183, the European Community 
Merger Regulation, together with other documents of the European Communities 
on the merger control as well as the case law. The researcher also used other 
methods to gather the required information, in particular attending conferences, 
making contact with academics and practitioners on competition law and being 
consulted by them. The Annual Merger Control Conferences in 2003 and 2004, 
2005, the 5th Annual Trans-Atlantic Antitrust Dialogue on International and 
Comparative Law and other Competition Workshops organised by the British 
Institute of International and Comparative Law are the examples of the events 
attended, which also formed sources for the study. The comments on the 
particular issues by the Deputies Director-General of the European Commission 
181 International Bar Association. 
182 British Institute of International and Comparative Law. 
183 As amended. 
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contributed further knowledge to the research. For instance, Mr. D. Sjoeblom, 
Deputy Director-General, was consulted by the researcher on the approach taken 
by the EU to a market definition in the case of small market economies. 
2.3.1. Baltic states: methodological tools used 
Different sources have formed the basis for the research on the merger 
control mechanisms in the Baltic countries. Contemplating that competition law 
and policy is still considered a new phenomenon in the legal order of the Baltic 
countries, there are hardly any comprehensive scholarly writings. Hence, the 
researcher had to obtain a conducted empirical research. The research has applied 
two major stages in gathering the data for the research vis-a-vis the merger control 
rules in the Baltic countries. It has, first of all, involved examining the written 
laws on competition law in each jurisdiction. The annual reports on the 
competition policy of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania' 84, and other reports provided 
by the Government in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania containing competition 
policy as well as the speeches delivered by the professionals of Competition 
Authorities were also analysed. The data obtained from the Annual Reports of 
Competition Authorities in each Baltic state has been largely used in composing 
chapter 5 on competition policy. However, the researcher has experienced 
difficulties in attempting to identify `pure' competition policy from these reports 
as they provide a mainly one-sided approach as to the achievements in preparation 
for the membership into the EU185 and in harmonising the national laws in line 
with the EC law. 
The jurisprudence also has been analysed. The examination of merger 
cases has involved a variety of tasks: (i) to identify the motives for a merger in the 
Baltic jurisdictions; (ii) to understand the investigation process, the methods used 
by the Competition Authorities in the Baltic countries and in general the approach 
taken towards merger transactions while dealing with merger cases. In order to 
verify and broaden the information obtained from the first stage, a further step has 
involved the data gathering from the qualitative questionnaires and the critical 
184 Note: It also includes the annual reports submitted by the Baltic countries to the EU and the 
OECD. 
'85Before becoming the Member States on 1St May 2004. 
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interviews. A different strategy was obtained in each jurisdiction of the Baltic 
countries. This is because the researcher encountered problems trying to gain data 
on the Baltic countries. The difficulties occurred with the Estonian and Latvian 
jurisdictions, where the case law is only in Estonian and Latvian. Thus, with no- 
knowledge of Estonian and little knowledge of Latvian the researcher had to find 
ways of how to work out this problem. The researcher has used the comments on 
cases presented by the scholars in the articles. Also, enquiries have been made to 
the professionals of Competition Authorities by asking to provide comments on 
the particular cases. The lawyers from the leading law firm in Estonia kindly 
agreed to contribute their comments on Tallinna Piimatööstuse As / Meieri 
Tootmise AS case' 86 involving efficiencies issues. 
The materials on the fluctuations of the economic movement with 
transformational phenomenon in Lithuania were gathered by interviewing the 
former economic professor of the researcher Prof. Habil. Dr Z. Lydeka and Dr 
V. Pukeliene. The data for chapter 3 on merger motives has been obtained not only 
from articles, cases study but also from the examination of MBA (on motives and 
movements of merger transactions in Lithuania) and PhD dissertations in 
economics. 
2.3.1.1. Qualitative questionnaires 
After examining the secondary sources, the researcher has conducted 
empirical research to obtain primary sources. At the preliminary stage the 
questionnaires were sent to the Competition Authorities in Estonia and Latvia. 
The questionnaires were intended to achieve the following tasks. The first part of 
the questionnaire was to gain data on the historical development of the 
Competition Authorities, whilst the second part was to gain information about 
how professionals in the Competition Authorities work with merger cases in 
general, what methods do they use and how they understand the nature of merger 
control. The purpose of the second and the other continuing parts was to ascertain 
the problems the Authorities have while dealing with merger cases. This in turn 
was supposed to assist in setting up research questions on the problematic area, 
186 Otsus 06.09.2002. a. nr 55-KO. 
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which requires further examination. However, the questionnaires did not produce 
entirely satisfactory results: the responses merely were referred to the law 
verbatim, whilst some were left blank, especially of the open-ended questions, the 
questionnaire from Estonia was not return instead the questionnaire with answers 
submitted to the OECD was provided. The feedback was that the questionnaires 
require a lot of comments. Another problem, particularly in Latvia, was that the 
officials from the Division of External Relations 187 commented on the 
questionnaires. Meanwhile, the information asked by the researcher required the 
experts' opinion. Nevertheless, the data gathered from the questionnaires from 
Estonia and Latvia has provided adequate information for the analysis for chapter 
1. 
The questionnaire was not sent to Lithuania. Instead, two official visits' 88 
have been made to the Competition Council of Lithuania in order to obtain the 
data required for the research. 
2.3.1.2. Critical interviews 
To supplement the questionnaires, critical interviews were arranged. Four 
officials were interviewed at the Competition Council of Latvia, five professionals 
at the Competition Council of Lithuania and one - at the Competition Board of 
Estonia. Also, interviews from the competition lawyers of the leading competition 
law firms in Latvia and Lithuania were obtained. A different number of 
interviewees in each Baltic country occurred due to various problems, such as 
availability of professionals and language knowledge 189 and size of the 
Competition Authority (Estonia being the smallest one). Face-to-face interviews 
were held in Estonia' 90 , 
Latvia 191 and Lithuania 192. A problem that occurred 
187 Note: according to the policy of the Competition Council of Latvia, the Division of External 
Relations deals with any inquiries made from foreign countries. 
188 One visit is dated in October, 2004. More recent visit occurred in January, 2006. 
189 For instance, the head of Legal division in Estonia suggested interviewing the official M. Paddo 
referring that she can better speak English. 
190 Ms M. Paddo, an official who directly deals with merger cases in Estonia, was interviewed at 
the Competition Board of Estonia. 
191 In the Competition Council of Latvia the interviewed officials include Ms T. Jefremova, a 
Council member, Mr M. Stenders, a head of Division of External Relations, Ms I. Lasmane, a head 
of the first Analytical division (deals with merger cases in product markets) and Ms V. Ozere, a 
head of the second Analytical division (deals with merger cases in service markets). 
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during the interviews was a disclosure of confidential information. This is because 
the firms providing data to the Competition Authorities can restrict access to 
content to any outsiders. The Competition Authorities in the Baltic countries do 
not question whether data provided is confidential or not and as a result of this, all 
mergers cases contain the majority of information that cannot be disclosed. In 
some cases the motives behind a merger were considered as confidential 
information. More likely the inherited Soviet attitude of keeping information 
secret is to blame for a lack of the information available for public (including the 
researcher). This attitude and obviously the information restricted by the parties as 
discussed above may be the reason for the reluctance of the Baltic countries to 
explain their methods in merger assessment and therefore to discuss merger cases 
`openly'. All this has further been exacerbated by the limited information 
resources on the Baltic countries in the U. K. 
Nonetheless, personal contacts and experience at the Competition Council 
of Lithuania have helped obtain even confidential data (though it cannot be 
directly revealed in the thesis). In general, the data assembled from the interviews 
is valuable and highly assisted in writing the thesis. 
The information gained from the interviews can be critically evaluated due 
to the fact that the researcher also interviewed the other side of the frontline - the 
competition lawyers, who represent companies. Further materials on the Merger 
Regime in the Baltic countries were gained by interviewing Ms L. Harmane, a 
lawyer from Klavins & Slaidns, a leading law firm on competition in Latvia, and 
Mr A. Klimas, a former member of the Competition Council of Lithuania and a 
consultant from Lideika, Petrauskas, Valiunas jr partneriai, a leading law firm on 
competition in Lithuania 193. The information gained from these interviews 
provided some commentary on merger cases and the approaches of the 
Competition Authorities of the Baltic countries towards mergers. 
192 In the Competition Council of Lithuania the interviews during the first visit were held with S. 
Pajarskas, a head of administration and a former member of the Competition Board, A. Jakiunas, a 
head of Concentration Division, I. Kudzinskiene and R. Belaraziene, chief experts of Concentration 
Division and J. Soviene, a head of Law Division. During the second visit, the interviews were 
made by interviewing, A. Jakiunas, a head of Concentration Division and I. Kudzinskiene official 
of Concentration Division. The main task of the second visit was to up-date material on cases, as 
well as to clarify the misunderstanding with the Vesiga cases scenario. 
193 The researcher would like to express her sympathy to Klimas's family for his tragic death in a 
car accident in August 2005. 
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2.3.2. The analysis of the data obtained and problems occurred 
After gathering the data, the next step involved interpreting and analysing 
the data obtained and finally structuring it with the thesis's framework. Here, the 
researcher has had to deal with an inadequacy in the data obtained. Different 
information has been provided by two professionals at the Competition Council of 
Latvia. According to Lasmane (the official who deals with merger cases in the 
Competition Council of Latvia), once the creation or strengthening of dominance 
1 is found, any efficiency considerations are irrelevant94. However, T. Jefremova, a 
board member of the Competition Council in Latvia, mentioned'95 that despite the 
absence of an efficiency defence in Latvian law, the efficiency issues, 
nevertheless, can be considered in `borderline' cases, when there are concerns 
about the emergence of a dominant position by the merging parties, but it is not 
clear how the merger transaction will affect the competition and consumers. This 
and other problems of inadequacies dealt by the researcher and the solutions 
proposed will be further discussed in chapter 6. 
Dealing with different legal system (as well as with different languages) in 
this research, terminological problems have occurred. Legal terminology can be 
defined as fraught with linguistic traps and potential minefields of 
misunderstanding which vary from one country to another. Language is one of the 
most important mediums of communication for lawyers, and legal concepts have 
precise linguistic configurations and parameters (De Cruz, 1999: 214). Quite often 
any form of translation may cause a risk of overlooking conceptual differences 
between the languages. Two main problems can occur: (i) different terms in 
separate legal systems can mean similar legal concepts and have no significant 
difference apart from the term itself; or (ii) conversely, the same term can mean 
different things in separate legal systems. This latter terminological problem 
occurred during this research. The researcher had difficulties in trying to define 
the meaning of the term `consumer' in competition law in each Baltic country. It 
is not clear whether the Baltic states have the Chicagoan notion of a consumer as 
`society at large encompassing even every market player', or the EC's notion of 
consumer in competition law as `any intermediate or final consumer', as a 
194 The information obtained during the interview as discussed above. 
195 During the International Workshop on Competition Policy in Seoul in 2003. 
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`customer' or `user' who might be another market operator purchasing the 
product/service, or finally referring to consumers as the final user otherwise `the 
man from the street', as acting outside his/her business or profession. The 
researcher concluded that the Baltic countries are still in the process of developing 
their competition policy and some answers cannot be provided at this stage of the 
research. The following sections will explain the further terminology used in the 
research. Contemplating that the concepts were explicitly provided by law or 
explained through the case law, there have no problems occurred. 
2.4. Terminology used in the thesis explained 
The term `European Economic Community' (EEC) was changed to 
`European Community' (EC) by signing the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. The 
Amsterdam Treaty 1997 provides that the EC is itself part of the European Union 
(EU). The EU is based on three pillars: (i) the EC, including the European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC, which expired in 2002); (ii) the common foreign 
and security policy; and (iii) co-operation in the fields of justice and home affairs. 
In the research the term the `EU' will be used by having a broader meaning as 
general EU policy, as the EU does not actually make the law. The EC will be used 
to describe the law. Furthermore, as was mentioned above, analysis of the 
research is based only on the first pillar, particularly, on the Merger Regulation. 
2.4.1. The concept of concentration within the EC jurisdiction 
It is an essential element of any scheme of merger control mechanism to 
provide an exact definition of a transaction, which will fall under its jurisdiction 
(Goyder, 2003: 346). Like its predecessor Merger Regulation 4064/89, the 
Regulation 139/2004 employs the term `concentration' to describe all 
transactions, which in economic literature are separated into mergers, acquisitions, 
and take-overs etc. In particular, the EC Merger Regulation provides two basic 
groups in case of either of them are fulfilled a transaction would fall under the 
Community jurisdiction. The first group covers the transactions, where a change 
of control on a lasting basis occurs from `[.. ] the merger of two or more 
91 
previously independent undertakings or parts of undertakings 196 The second one 
refers to the situation, where a change of control on a lasting basis results from 
1.1 the acquisition, by one or more persons already controlling at least one 
undertaking, or by one or more undertakings, whether by purchase of securities 
or assets, by contract or by any other means, of direct or indirect control of the 
whole or parts of one or more other undertakings. 197. Within the meaning of the 
first group (article 3 (1) (a)) a merger may occur even in the absence of a legal 
merger, where the combining of the activities of previously independent 
undertakings results in the creation of a single economic unit de jure or de facto. 
This explanation was expressed in the RTZ / GRA case198. A pre-requisite for the 
determination of a single economic unit is the existence of a permanent single 
economic management. Other factors such as internal profit and loss 
compensation between the various undertakings within the group and their joint 
liability externally, or cross-shareholdings between the undertakings forming the 
economic unit may also be relevant'99. Another group involves the acquisition of 
control either by one undertaking or by two or more undertaking acting jointly. 
However, the internal restructuring within a group of companies does not 
constitute a concentration within the meaning of the ECMR. The creation of a 
joint venture, which performs on a lasting basis all the functions as an 
autonomous firm falls under the second group200 
The term `person' used in the Regulation extends to public bodies 
(including the State201), private entities and individuals. As regards control, the 
ECMR clearly defines control as the `possibility of exercising decisive influence' 
rather than the actual exercise of such influence. Moreover, the Regulation 
distinguishes two forms of control as sole control and joint control, which are 
defined in the Commission' Notice on the concept of concentration 202. Sole 
control normally means an acquisition of a majority of the voting rights of a 
196 Council Regulation (EEC) No 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, 
Article 3 (1) (a). 
197 Council Regulation (EEC) No 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, 
Article 3 (1) (b). 
198 Case No. IV/M660 (1995). 
199 See Commission Notice on the concept of concentration, OJ C66,02/03/1998. 
200 Council Regulation (EEC) No 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, 
Article 4. 
201 See case IV/M. 157 Air France v Sabena, 05/10/1992 in relation to the Belgian State. 
202 01 C66,02/03/1998. 
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company. Also, sole control may be acquired in the case of a `qualified minority', 
that can be established on a legal and/or de facto basis. For instance, in the case of 
Arjomari / Wiggins Teape203 the Commission considered that a 39% shareholding 
was enough to constitute sole control, due to the fact that other shares were widely 
dispersed. A concentration within the meaning of the ECMR may also occur 
where there is a change in the structure of control. This includes the change from 
joint control to sole control. However, a transaction involving the acquisition of 
joint control of one part of an undertaking and sole control of another part 
constitutes two separate concentrations 204. The acquisition of joint control, as in 
the case of sole control, can be established on a legal or de facto basis. The 
shareholders (the parent companies) must reach agreement on major decisions 
concerning the controlled undertaking (the joint venture) in order to constitute a 
joint control. Also, joint control exists where two or more persons have the 
possibility of exercising decisive influence over another person (undertaking). 
Decisive influence, therefore, in this sense means the power to block actions, 
which determine the strategic commercial behaviour of an undertaking205. It is 
rare in the Commission practice that a decisive influence existed by holding less 
than 25% of the share capital by one undertaking. However, it is not a rigid rule. 
For instance, in ME / GTE case206 a share of 19% was found to trigger control, 
as in this case all remaining shares were held by an investment bank and its 
approval was not necessary for significant decisions207. All relevant circumstances 
are relevant for determining whether there is a decisive influence208. 
With regard to the international element, according to company law, 
international merger transactions allude to the fact that the firms participating in a 
transaction operate in different countries and are subject to different company 
laws (Horn, 2001: 5). This means a definition of internationality is determined by 
the location of firms and the company law to which they are bound. However, in 
competition law the governing company law of the firms involved in the 
203 Case IV/M25,1990. 
204 within the meaning of the ECMR, see Commission's Notice. 
205 For a further reading, see Commission Notice on the concept of concentration, OJ C66, 
02/03/1998. 
206 OJ C225/14 1992. 
207 For comments on this case, see M. Furse, 1998, pp. 326. 
208 Like was confirmed, for instance, in Gensor Ltd/ Commission, case T- 102/96 [1999] 4CMLR 
971, paras 94-167. 
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transaction is irrelevant. The benchmark of competition law is on the cross-border 
effects of a merger transaction on a market. This means that a merger has an 
international dimension when it exerts a cross-border market influence, due to the 
fact, that a merger transaction may cross borders even when the merging firms are 
located within a national market and governed by the same national laws209 
2.4.2. Concept of concentration within the Baltic jurisdictions 
All Baltic countries, except Latvia, like the ECMR use the term 
`concentration' to define all transactions, which economists or other scholars 
would describe as mergers, acquisitions, or take-overs etc. The Competition Law 
in Lithuania has a very similar structure to the ECMR for defining the 
concentrations by separating them into main groups. According to article 3 (14), a 
concentration may occur as a result of (1) a merger `when one or more 
undertakings which terminate their activity as independent undertakings are 
joined to the undertaking which continues its operations, or when a new 
undertaking is established out of two or more undertakings which terminate their 
activity as independent undertakings; or (2) `acquisition of control, when one and 
the same natural person or persons already controlling one or more undertakings, 
or one or more undertakings, acting by contract, jointly set up a new undertaking 
or gain control over another undertaking by acquiring an enterprise or a part 
thereof, all or part of the assets of the undertaking, shares or other securities, 
voting rights, by contract or by any other means'. The Competition Law of 
Lithuania differs from the EC law 21 ° as it does not contain any further explicit 
explanations of these concepts. There is no separate provision for joint-ventures, 
nevertheless, they are covered by the second part of the definition. The 
jurisdiction of Latvia uses the term `a merger of market participants' to describe 
the concentration transactions. Section 15 of the Competition Law of Latvia 
provides that a merger of market participants is: i) merging if two or more 
independent market participants in order to become one market participant 
(consolidation); ii) joining of one market participant to another market 
participant (acquisition); iii) a situation where one or more natural persons who 
209 For a further reading, see Horn, 2001, pp. 5-16. 
210 For instance, the Commission's explanatory notices, guidelines etc. 
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already have a decisive influence over another market participant or other market 
participants, or one or more market participants acquire part or all of the fixed 
assets of another market participant or other market participants or the rights to 
utilise such, or a direct or indirect decisive influence over another market 
participant or other market participants211. The Competition Act of Estonia, 
therefore, provides a more detailed definition of the concentrations in comparison 
with the other Baltic states. Section 19 of the Competition Act of Estonia 
describes that a concentration within the meaning of this Act arises in the 
following situations: i) where previously independent undertakings merge within 
the meaning of the Commercial Code (i. e. (a) one undertaking (the undertaking 
being acquired) merges with another undertaking and the undertaking being 
acquired is dissolved; or (b) undertakings merge so that they form a new 
undertaking and both merging undertakings are dissolved212); ii) an undertaking 
acquires control of the whole or part of another undertaking; iii) undertakings 
jointly acquire control of the whole or part of a third undertaking; iv) a natural 
person already controlling at least one undertaking acquires control of the whole 
or part of another undertaking; v) several natural persons already controlling at 
least one undertaking jointly acquire control of the whole or part of another 
undertaking 213. 
211 Section 15, Competition Law of Latvia, 04/10/2001 as amended by 22/04/2004. 
212 As provided by Kalaus, M., Estonia in Merger Control, 2005, Global Competition Review. 
213 § 19, Competition Act of Estonia, RT' 12001,56,332, as amended in 28/06/2004. 
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Chapter 3. WHY DO FIRMS MERGE? 
`A merger is like a marriage in that it almost always takes at least two parties to 
agree. (. ) Marriages and mergers both may respond to a variety of individual 
motives and in aggregate be subject to cyclical and secular influences. ' (Steiner, 
1975: 1) 
This chapter is based on the commercial analysis. The question will be 
raised as to why firms merge? It has been argued that critical analysis of the 
impetus to merge is one of the high necessities for setting up the criteria for 
merger control. This is because the motives behind a merger may serve by finding 
possible effects of the transaction on competition. Hence, the examination of the 
motives to merge is a useful tool for the competition authorities in the 
investigation process of mergers. 
The following sections include the analysis on the reasons of the 
occurrence of the merger movements during different decades, followed by the 
impetuses to merge from the textbooks. Moreover, the practical emphasis of the 
theoretical motives will be checked within the context of the Baltic states, and to 
what extent these affect the reasons for mergers in the Baltic jurisdictions also has 
to be decided. Thus, the importance of this chapter lies in the question to what 
extent does these theoretical motives for mergers form impetuses to merge in the 
Baltic countries. 
3.1. General overview 
As far as the economists are concerned acquisitions and mergers are about 
growth. Usually, firms grow in two basic ways: internally (naturally) and 
externally. The relationship between these two depends `[ .] on which appears to 
be a more profitable course of action' (Penrose, 1972: 155)214. Natural growth can 
be slow; it can take many years for companies to reach any appreciable, optimal 
size for making profitability. For Lees (Lees, 2003: 3) if firms want to grow 
quickly, the growth - through -a mergers or acquisitions route offers the greatest 
possibilities. Historically mergers have been `[ .] one of the most powerful 
forces 
offsetting the tendency of an expanding economy to produce widening 
214 The author excludes any `empire-building' desires in this statement. 
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opportunities for smaller firms' (Penrose, 1972: 238). For instance, merger 
transactions not only inherit the potentialities for growth, but also tend to make 
available the possibility for the combined firms to pool unused productive 
services, which would not have been available for the independent firms 
(Penrose215,1972: 195). 
Merging or acquiring viable companies offers immediate access to their 
markets, technology, finance, management skills, customer relationships, trade 
connections and much more, that would normally take years for firms to develop 
through internal growth (Less, 2003: 3; Sanchez and Heene, 2004: 188). A merger 
or acquisition transaction is less risky than starting up a new business. It may also 
be a good solution for both parties: if an acquiring company is a successful firm 
with plenty of cash the investment into another company may put cash into use; 
meanwhile for the acquired company, especially if it is in distress, the injection of 
the surplus cash and the provision of better management may put the firm back on 
the road. Also, to acquire a company, which is in decline would be cheaper than 
starting a company from scratch (Stallworthy and Kharbanda, 1988: 72). Firms can 
diversify quickly through mergers or acquisitions and overcome easier entry 
barriers than companies setting up the business for the first time. This is because 
these diversified firms have usually larger resources upon which to draw and may 
be able to apply skills developed in the former activities, which in turn give them 
a competitive advantage (Morgan et al., 1980: 29). When a firm undertakes, for 
instance, the development of a new product or starts catering to a new market by 
internal means, this process gradually will proceed. Meanwhile, an acquisition 
transaction generally means the immediate exposure of plunging into a new 
product or a completely new market (Linowes, 1968: 44-58). Furthermore, 
mergers may offer more of the efficiencies compared with internal growth (Bork, 
1993). The growth through mergers is highly important for small markets where 
demand is limited (Gal, 2003). Despite the advantages that mergers can offer, the 
priority in the Baltic countries in the first years after they re-gained independence 
was given to natural growth over the growth through merger transactions. The 
215 The author continues the discussion by stating that the realisation of the unused resources 
provides a basis for the further growth of the combined entity, which might not have been possible 
before the transaction. For a further reading, see Penrose, Growth of the firm, Oxford, 1972, 
pp. 194-196 
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main reasons behind this were insufficient financial resources 216 and lack of 
management knowledge, as the main strategy in the Soviet system was organic 
growth. 
As regards the international context, foreign direct investment (thereafter 
FDI) may occur as a result of greenfield investments (by establishing a new 
company) or cross-border merger transactions. They both have socio-economic 
effects on the host countries (Kang and Johansson, 2000). First, both greenfield 
investments and cross-border mergers are about the accumulation of capital. 
However, cross-border mergers are more flexible as they may contribute only to 
intangible capital accumulation rather than merely physical capital. Secondly, 
both cross-border mergers and greenfield investments may have favourable 
influence on industrial innovative capacity by promoting the transfer of new 
technology, advanced management skills and as a result enhance competition by 
increased efficiencies. Thirdly, greenfield investments may increase competition 
by adding a new player in the host market; meanwhile, cross-border mergers may 
decrease or not alter the market structure, in the sense that no new firm will be 
introduced. However, cross-border mergers may still increase competition with 
the help of financial or management resources from parent companies or in the 
case where inefficient companies were acquired by foreign investors. Fourthly, 
both modes of FDI have a tendency to influence employment. Greenfield 
investments may create new jobs, while merger transactions often result in layoffs 
but may contribute to employment gains in the future, if the foreign owners 
expand their businesses217. 
A general rule suggests that it may be cheaper to expand externally when 
the market is growing rapidly. `Time' to market218 is critical and has a higher 
value in terms of sales lost, especially in high-tech industries, which form a large 
part of overall market capitalisation. This is due to the immediate availability of 
the necessary backup without a time lag waiting for engineering and construction 
and `no risk of time and cost overruns' (Stallworthy and Kharbanda, 1988: 72). In 
this case merger or acquisition transactions prevail over greenfield investments as 
216 The Baltic countries in the period 1990-1997 had experienced high inflation and bank crises. 
217 Note: for further reading, see Kang and Johansson, Cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions: 
Their role in Industrial Globalisation, OECD 2000. 
218 For further discussion see Newbould's comments on `time' element in his book, Management 
and merger activity, Guthstead Ltd., 1970, pp. 117-119. 
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what would normally take a year to build can be bought in one week (Black, 
2000; Newbould, 1970: 117). Thus, a merger or an acquisition enable firms to 
quickly realise market opportunities and establish a critical mass. Also, the 
companies prefer merger or acquisition transactions rather than greenfield 
investments because acquired local firms give an in-depth knowledge of local 
customs and regulations, established distribution network or access to consumers 
(Kang and Johansson, 2000). This is why the majority of international firms 
decided to get access to local, the unexplored Baltic states' markets through 
merger transactions. 
With the possibility of quick access and start up in the foreign market and 
other advantages as discussed above, firms would rather buy and sell assets and 
diversify operations and activities than invest in `greenfield plants'. For instance, 
the value of cross-border mergers in relation to world FDI inflows rose from 
53.7% in 1991 to 85.3% in 1997 (Kang and Johansson, 2000). 
An overall surge in merger and acquisition transactions at both domestic and 
international levels is due to their inherent advantages over the other forms of 
investment such as organic growth or greenfield investments. For instance, in the 
pharmaceuticals sector all of the largest companies worldwide have grown 
through mergers, rather than through `organic' means (UNCTAD, World 
Investment Report 2000). 
3.2. Two basic forces for mergers 
There are two basic forces that drive the increase in merger transactions. 
They can be distinguished by external and internal factors. 
First of all, the external factors - such as the globalisation process within 
liberalisation, falling tariff barriers, new technological advancements, 
improvements in communication and information and the opening of borders to 
the international market can all be stimulus for firms to merge. Cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions, including the purchase by foreign investors of local 
privatised state-owned enterprises, are new records in the foreign investment 
volumes. The external factors can be loosely divided into groups such as 
macroeconomic factors, technological factors, social factors, governmental factors 
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and the influence of the international and/or regional organisations, such as the 
EU. Other authors as Kang and Johansson separate industry related factors; 
however, this research does not contain the analysis of the sectored trends219. 
The economic growth, a macroeconomic factor, influences the demand 
and supply for cross-border mergers. Economic expansion increases earnings and 
equity prices and as a result the capital availability to invest abroad, this is so call 
outward transactions. Inward mergers occur through the sale of domestic 
companies to foreign investors. Inward transactions have incurred in the countries 
with falling asset prices, changes in business practices and the environment, 
which is favourable to foreign acquisitions 220. Furthermore, other macroeconomic 
factors such as GDP, exchange rate, market capitalisation, stock prices or bond 
yields may also influence the cross-border merger activities. The scholars have 
studied the effects of the macroeconomic variables on the trends of the cross- 
border merger transactions between the US and European countries. For instance, 
the results suggest that foreign acquisitions appear more frequently when bond 
yields in the home country are higher than those from the host country 
(Vasconcellos and Kish, 1998). According to Cosh and Guest, the merger 
transactions in 1990s were caused by rising stock prices and low interest rates 
(Cosh and Guest, 2004). 
The technological factors have had the following effects in stimulating the 
occurrence in mergers' activity. On one hand, falling transportation costs and the 
improvements in communication and information have favoured international 
firms to exploit their activities. Technological breaks through have eased the way 
in which goods and services can be moved over large distances. On the other 
hand, the increased costs in R&D together with uncertainties in the changes in 
technology, have forced companies to merge in order to fund research 
expenditures for new products. Furthermore, technological changes may shorten a 
product's life and promote new entrants with advanced technology (Kang and 
Johansson, 2000). Merger transactions in turn can be a response reaction to this 
situation, as they can offer quick access and start up in the market. 
219 This is because the analysis is based on overall substantive issues of merger control regime in 
the Baltic countries rather than focusing on particular sectors. 
220 Note: for further reading see Kang and Johansson, 2000. 
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As regards social factors, the empirical studies showed that a high 
proportion of takeovers occur in the new economies of technology and 
communication, especially where labour unions are weak (in this case they will 
not be able to protect the employees with regards to the redundancies). In the 
growing industry, the unemployment rate will not increase much, as the growth is 
strong and redundancies are small (Kang and Johansson, 2000). 
Mergers are also influenced by political climate: easing of regulations 
allows better access to the markets of other countries (Cartwright & Cooper, 
1996: 19-20). Trade liberalisation and privatisation policy have led to changes in 
the nature of trading system by contributing the increased numbers of targets for 
merger and acquisition transactions (i. e. mainly in telecommunications, financial 
services and energy sectors). The government policy of opening up borders and 
signing up to the international or regional organisations are further steps towards 
the occurrence of cross-border transaction' activities. However, there are two 
different effects of this. On one hand, by opening up the borders, new 
opportunities for national firms to expand internationally have increased, and on 
the other hand, national companies suddenly have had to face new competitors. 
This is because firms try to improve their competitive position by capitalising on 
advantages of scale and exploit the cost benefit savings, which leads to an excess 
of capacity (Sleuwaegen, 1998). In turn companies have to find a niche in which 
to widen export markets in order to realise the over-capacity. Furthermore, the 
falling tariff barriers also make it easier for firms to cross the borders. 
As regards the influence of the international and/or regional organisations, 
the co-operation among different countries of the world provides an additional 
impetus to the process of internationalisation. Changing market conditions have 
opened up unexpected global markets for many companies. The EU with the 
creation of the Single Market in Europe is the most far-reaching initiative for 
firms to merge among the Members States. This is due to the creation of a more 
homogeneous environment with common regulations, standards and fiscal 
measures (Sleuwaegen, 1998: 1082). The creation of the Single European Market 
has also stimulated foreign countries to establish an operational basis in Europe, 
because of restrictive legislation; this was accomplished by merger and 
acquisition transactions (Cartwright and Cooper, 1996: 18). The enlargement of 
the European Union in 2004 has offered more companies for sales, as companies 
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in Eastern Europe have generated `willing partners' (Cartwright and Cooper, 
1996: 19). Furthermore, the EU's single currency `the Euro' has increased 
competition by contributing to greater price transparency, by exerting more 
pressure on firms to restructure and consolidate their operations (WIR2000 as 
quoted in the UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2000 221). In general, the 
regional integration in Europe and the co-operation with the international 
organisations have had a strong impact on trade flows. 
Second, internal factors are inner needs of companies in order to keep 
them `alive', i. e. to have a specific competitive advantage against its competitors. 
The example of internal factors might be managerial ambitions to build an empire. 
The widely known WorldCom case perfectly illustrates the scenario of the 
personal ambition of a director to build an empire. Mr. B. Ebbers, a senior 
executive of WorldCom, transformed through no fewer than 65 merger 
transactions 222 an obscure long-distance phone company into one of the country's 
fastest growing corporations and at its peak the fourth largest telecommunication 
company in the world (Eichenwald, 2002). Mr. Ebbers together with other 
executives were making acquisitions to survive and to cover their personal 
loans223. Another example of internal factors might be a willingness to achieve 
efficiencies of scale or scope economies from the mergers. This may be the case 
where a firm does not posses sufficient asset to be competitive and the growth 
through a merger transaction can solve this problem. 
Both external and internal factors may drive both domestic and cross- 
border mergers to increase. No question arises that globalisation process leads to 
the augmentation of cross-border mergers. However, this may also be truthful 
with regard to domestic mergers. Here might be the situation where domestic 
firms merge in order to be able to compete with global companies, for instance, 
like a scenario in the Baltic countries. 
221 Available at htt: //www. unctad. org 
222 See, for instance, WorldCom / MCI (II) case No. M. 1069 (conditional clearance by the 
Commission), WorldCom /MCI case No. M. 1038, MCI / WorldCom / Sprint case M. 1741 
(prohibited decision by the Commission). 
223 For further reading on this case, see K. Eichenwald, For WorldCom, Acquisition were behind its 
rise and fall, The New York Times, August 8,2002; also see Another cowboy bites the dust, The 
Economist, June 27,2002; D. Moberg and E. Romar, WorldCom, Santa Clara University, 2003 
available at web-site: http: //www. scu. edu/ethics/dialogue/candc/cases/worldcom. html 
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3.3. Merger movements 
3.3.1. Merger movements within a context of the single country or region 
The merger movements and their motives have been highly investigated 
by a number of researchers of various countries during different decades. For 
instance, Blair (1972), Steiner (1975), Vasconcellos and Kish (1998) and many 
others examined the emergence of merger transactions in the United States and 
their expansion outside the borders. Apart from globalisation process and capital 
mobility, the evolution of the single European market encouraged American firms 
to establish a presence through merger transactions before the entry barriers 
intensified and to find factors of production in order to achieve competitive 
advantages. Many American companies presumed that the only way to participate 
in a unified Europe was to become an `insiders' (Vasconcellos and Kish, 
1998: 448). 
The merger waves in the United Kingdom were investigated by Hannah 
(1976), Newbound (1970), who studied the 1967-1968 merger boom, discovered 
that fashion, defence and pressure of competition were the reasons for that boom. 
Despite some common motives to merge as a result of the globalisation process 
(i. e. with overcapacity, a sluggish market and due to intense foreign competition, 
firms have to restructure in order to survive), there have been specific 
implications within a context of a single country. The following sections will 
include a brief analysis on the impetuses of firms to merge within different 
countries or regions. The question will be raised as to what motives or forces have 
led European firms and the firms in the Baltic jurisdictions to merge. 
3.3.1.1. Merger movements in Europe 
The studies proved that the increase in international trade, capital 
movements from the US and government policy have had an important influence 
on merger activity in the peak of the merger wave in 1960s in Europe (Hughes 
and Singh, 1980: 8-11). This might be explained through the auspices of economic 
assumptions. For instance, if there is an oligopolistic equilibrium by meaning that 
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stable market shares of the largest companies exist within the national economy, 
then increased imports or entry by big foreign companies would lead to dis- 
equilibrium. This may cause national firms to merge in order to be able to face 
increased competition (Hughes and Singh, 1980: 9). 
Apart from the economic reasons for mergers, a political policy laid the 
auspicious environment for the occurrence of mergers in Europe. In contrast to 
American Antitrust law, the merger control in the European Communities only 
came into force in 1989224. Sutherland, the former commissioner responsible for 
Competition policy in 1986, remarked that the difference in competitiveness 
between European and American firms in 1960s could be attributed to size, as 
European firms were just too small to take advantage of an expanded common 
market and to react to international competition. 225 Similar political policy was led 
in Europe within single states. In the United Kingdom, for instance, the 
government established the Industrial Reorganisation Corporate in order to 
promote mergers, by admitting that British firms in many industries are not big 
enough and through a merger they can become large enough (McCelland, 1972). 
The policy of the government in the UK at that time was also in favour of 
mergers. Notwithstanding the fact that big mergers could be prohibited under the 
Monopolies and Mergers Act (1965)226, this had hardly happened (Hughes and 
Singh, 1980: 10). A similar attitude was taken towards mergers in other European 
countries such as France, Sweden, Italy and elsewhere (Hughes and Singh, 
1980: 11). 
At the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21St centuries there was a 
further layout for the occurrence of the merger and acquisition transactions. The 
adoption of a true single market with a single Euro-zone currency fuelled 
consolidation through mergers within Europe across a broad range of industries. 
The enlargement of the European Union with enlarged opportunity to extend a 
single market is other factor for the merger transactions. 
224 Except steel and coal mergers, which were included in the ECSC Treaty. 
225 The speech by P. Sutherland was addressed to international Bar Association Committee on 
Antitrust Law in New York, on the 17th of September 1986. Mergers and Joint Ventures: New 
trends in European Community Competition policy, Commission press release, IP/86/430, 
17/09/1986. 
226 Note: being in use at the time. 
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3.3.1.2. Merger movements in the Baltic countries 
During the last decade the number of transactions in mergers and 
acquisitions has increased in all three Baltic countries. The activities of mergers in 
the Baltic states follow the path of stable growth which can be determined by a 
number of factors. 
Before the early 1990s the private sector and foreign investments or any 
trade relations with Western Europe and other countries apart from the Soviet 
bloc, were virtually non existent in the Baltic states. However, trade barriers have 
been easing since free trade and pre-accession arrangements. The integration of 
the Baltic countries into the world trade system by joining the WTO and the EU 
has put in place steps towards the emergence of merger transactions. This is due 
to the economic impact of the EU accession for the economies of the Baltic 
countries, which might be characterised by the increasing competition and 
adjustment to the higher regulatory standards. The requirements for the EU 
involve the removal of barriers to the exchange of goods, services and factors of 
production between the EU's Member States; the adoption of the common policy 
principles and norms of behaviour; the existence of a functioning market economy 
which is developing in such a way that it can sustain the competitive pressure 
from and in the Single Market and the Economic and Monetary Union (widely 
known as the Copenhagen criteria). The trends towards the creation of a more 
homogeneous environment with common regulations in the Baltic states like in 
the rest of Europe, have increased the interest of the foreign firms to enter the 
markets of these countries. 
The government policy to privatise former state-owned companies and 
generally liberalisation processes has also put in place steps towards opening up 
markets for international competition. The gradual process of the integration into 
the EU started when the first agreements on liberalisation of trade were signed. 
The Baltic states signed the free trade agreements with the EU in July 1994, 
which came into force in 1995. On the basis of these agreements, the Baltic 
countries have become open economies to all Member States with Estonia 
applying no import duties, Latvia having a four years transition period and 
Lithuania applying a six years period, during which the import duties were 
gradually removed. As a result, more than 70% of FDI in the Baltic countries 
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originates from the EU, in particular from the Scandinavian countries 
(Vilpisauskas, 15/05/2002). The activity of merger and acquisition transactions in 
Lithuania until 2002 was lower in comparison with other CEECs or even other 
Baltic countries Estonia and Latvia. This can be explained by problems occurring 
in the privatisation process. Nonetheless, after the introduction of the Privatisation 
Act in 1998 in Lithuania and the establishment of the public body responsible for 
privatisation enforcement the State Property Fund, merger transactions in 
Lithuania have been increasing. 
The achievements in the stabilisation of the economy and the applicability 
for full membership into the EU have been determining factors in the growing 
interest in the Baltic states by foreign firms. All three Baltic countries are 
considered by European investors as new and unconquered markets for their 
investments (Lisauskas and Tamasauskaite 227 , 
IFLR, 2003). For instance, in 
Estonia since October 1998, mergers have mostly concerned foreign undertakings 
acquiring decisive influence over local undertakings both directly and through 
subsidiaries, the biggest acquirers being from the Nordic countries, from the 
Netherlands and to a less extent from the USA (Contribution from Estonia 228 il 
OECD, 2001). The removal of the barriers to trade, on the other hand, has also 
resulted in increased access for the local Baltic companies to the new markets and 
the new opportunities to expand their activities beyond the national market. 
However, the local Baltic companies have not yet been able to use this 
opportunity entirely. For instance, the unknown trade marks of the Lithuanian 
production to foreign consumers has been highlighted by the Lithuanian producers 
as the major problem for the expansion of the businesses into foreign markets, 
especially into Western European markets (BNS, 15/11/2004). Furthermore, the 
research of the `Economist Intelligence Unit' showed that the small and medium 
companies of Eastern and Central Europe are concerned with the increased 
competition from Western European firms. These concerns are not without a 
reason as 35% of British firms consider Eastern and Central Europe as a new 
market for their extension (ELTA, as quoted in DELFI 
229 26/05/2004). 
Considering that competition was virtually not necessary under central planning 
227Available at web-site http: //www. legalmediagroup. corn/IFLR 
228 Available at web-site http: //www. oecd. org 
229 Available at web-site http: //www. delfi. It 
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(as there was no market and companies usually had to meet the quantitative 
objectives with set allocations of resources), the increased competition has been a 
big challenge for the local Baltic firms. 
The Baltic countries with their prudent conduct of macroeconomic 
policies, low labour costs (i. e. social aspect) and corporate income tax rate are 
attractive for foreign investors (World Bank EU-8,2005). The growth of the 
Baltic market is another stimulus for foreign firms to expand their businesses. For 
instance, the real GDP growth in these countries during the period 1996-2003 was 
51 % for Estonia, 59% for Latvia and 52% for Lithuania230. The accession into the 
EU and market operation under a set of uniform rules and principles is expected to 
reduce further the investment risks and interest rates (Vilpisauskas231,2003 No. 3). 
Furthermore, corporate governance has proven to be a significant factor in the 
FDI flows associated with merger and acquisition transactions, as most Eastern 
European Countries, including the Baltic states, are still relatively weak in 
protecting minority shareholders (World bank232, Newsletter 1999). 
In general, foreign investors are active in the Baltic states and acquisitions 
of the local Baltic firms by foreign companies have been increasing because of the 
intensive privatisation programme and a good economic situation favourable for 
foreign investment. 
3.3.2. Different forms of mergers 
There are three main types of mergers: horizontal, vertical and 
conglomerate. A conglomerate merger can be further divided into a pure 
conglomerate merger, a conglomerate merger with market extension or with 
product extension. 
A horizontal merger involves combinations of two or more similar 
organisations, which are active in the same industry and at the same stage of 
production or distribution cycle. In horizontal mergers, involved parties undertake 
directly competing activities and this produces two basic consequences: first, by 
230 Note: for a further reading see World Bank EU-8, Special Topic: The Baltic Growth 
Acceleration - Is it sustainable?, Quarterly Economic Report, January 2005, part III. 
231 Available at web-site http: //www. freema. org 
232 Available at web-site: www. worldbank. org 
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reducing the number of firms present on the relevant market and second, by 
increasing the post-merger market share of merged entity. 
A vertical merger is a merger between firms at different levels of the 
market. Vertical transaction takes two basic forms: downward integration, by 
which a firm buys a customer (such as distribution network), and upward 
integration, by which the firm acquires a supplier. Vertical mergers do not reduce 
a number of direct competitors as is the case in a horizontal merger, but it may 
still change a pattern of industry behaviour at both levels. 
According to the Department of Justice (FDJ) Guidelines, conglomerate 
mergers are `[ .] mergers that are neither horizontal nor vertical as those terms 
are defined'. Thus, everything that is left not covered under horizontal or vertical 
mergers may refer to conglomerate mergers. So, conglomerate mergers are 
mergers between firms that have no existing or potential competitive relationship 
either as competitors or as supplier and customer. There are three main types of 
conglomerate mergers. Each of them will be defined separately. A conglomerate 
merger with product extensions refers to a situation where one firm, by acquiring 
another, adds related items to its existing products. For instance, a product 
extension merger may expand the product range of the merged firm, thus enabling 
it to offer a combination of products which downstream agents may be more 
willing to buy together than separately from the independent firms, before the 
merger. This may be the case where the combined products are technical 
complements (for example, when one can not function without the other, such as a 
computer operating system and a software, internet browser etc. ), economic 
complements (for example, products which are consumed together like coffee and 
milk or produced together like petrol and diesel oil), commercial complements 
(for example, when they form part of a range which downstream agents, such as 
multiple retailers, need to carry, such as spirits, soft drinks, etc). A conglomerate 
merger with market extensions is when the merged firms previously sold products 
the same products market extends to different geographical markets. A pure 
conglomerate is between firms with no functional link whatsoever between them. 
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3.3.2.1. Waves with different types of mergers 
There is a tendency that in different decades different types of merger with 
various motives based on economic thinking and/or economic situation prevail. 
The first decade of the 20th century refers to horizontal mergers, about 1920-1930 
- the vertical mergers wave. After the dominant pattern of horizontal and vertical 
expansion, the major wave of merger activity in the 1960- 1980s was one of the 
conglomerate types. Each wave has different characteristics. Strategic thinking 
right across the period before 1960s was heavily influenced by mainstream 
economics theory. Competitive advantage was seen as coming predominantly 
from greater size in a particular industry. For instance, before 1960s there was 
domination of horizontal mergers because managers believed that a combination 
of increased market power and efficiencies of greater size would deliver higher 
profitability and give a sustained competitive edge (Lees, 2003). Also, this wave 
was highly influenced by industry revolution; the emergence of heavy industry 
opened the opportunity for the firms to achieve the efficiencies through horizontal 
merger transactions. The Sherman Act as well as the Clayton Act was issued in 
the US as a consequence of this wave of transactions in order to prevent large 
mergers. Due to restrictions on horizontal mergers, in the period of 1920-1930s 
vertical mergers were more prevalent. 
Weston and Mansinghka, who examined the 1960s conglomerate 
mergers, found out that the transactions of unrelated diversification was driven by 
defensive business reasons, in particular: to avoid sales and profit instability; 
adverse growth developments; adverse competitive shifts; technological 
obsolescence and increased uncertainties associated with their industries (Weston 
and Mansinghka, 1971: 928). Another reason for the occurrence of the 
conglomerate mergers in 1960s was the political one. In contrast to horizontal and 
vertical mergers, conglomerate mergers were not considered by the Antitrust 
Authorities as a threat to competition. Conglomerate mergers were ignored 
because a product and market oriented theory of firms behaviour found a 
conglomeration as an uncomfortable phenomenon, i. e. not being able to explain it 
because of the absence of compelling natural advantages (Steiner, 1975: 15). The 
situation had changed during the recession in the early 1980s where the major 
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motive for merger was to reduce capacity and become more prevalent (Cooke, 
1986: 27). 
Apart from these three phases, two more recent waves can be 
distinguished. 1984-1990 is defined as mega-merger time, which was highly 
influential in Europe. This is because European firms wanted to prepare for the 
creation of the Single European Market and tried to form national champions that 
can be later transformed into European or even International champions. 
Challenging economic and political changes in the world such as 
liberalisation, falling tariff barriers, technological advancements, improvements in 
communication and many other factors have led towards globalisation by 
accelerating cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Thus, the fifth wave, which is 
still on-going, can be defined as a cross-border merger233 epoch. Decreasing 
communication and transportation costs, regulatory reforms and trade 
liberalisation have prompted firms to adopt global strategies. Globalisation 
process leads to the expansion of market; sequentially, firms tend to augment in 
sizes. Thus, many firms have intended to consolidate world-wide and achieve 
world scale and become global not just national. The growing similarity in 
availability of infrastructure, distribution channels, marketing approaches, large 
flow of funds, and the ease of communication and data transfer between firms of 
different countries are forces for driving towards cross-border transactions (Porter, 
1998: 2). This is the wave that the Baltic countries joined. 
3.3.2.2. Different types of mergers in the Baltic countries 
Considering that the Baltic states enrolled into the international arena 
during the fifth wave, it is hardly possible (if not impossible) to define the 
different types of mergers, which prevail over the years in Estonia, Latvia or 
Lithuania. Merger transactions are a `new' phenomenon for the Baltic countries in 
comparison with the rest of Western Europe or American countries. Mergers have 
occurred in the Baltic countries after re-gaining their independence from 1991 
onwards. As a result of being a part of the Soviet Union, growth through internal 
233 Cross-border mergers refer to the situation where two or more firms from different national 
markets merge or where a merger between two or more domestic firms has spill-over effects into 
other market (-s). Whereas, a domestic merger is a merger between two or more domestic or 
national firms with no spill-over effects on the other market (-s). 
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resources was the main strategy of the firms of the Baltic countries to extend 
capacity. Thus, the growth through merger transactions is still a relatively new 
business strategy in the Baltic states. 
All three forms of mergers can be identified in all Baltic countries. 
However, according to the Annual Reports of the Competition Authorities of the 
Baltic countries horizontal mergers prevail. Horizontal overlaps were considered 
in a number of cases by the Competition Authorities of the Baltic states. For 
instance, in the Estonian market horizontal overlaps in soft drinks, bottled water, 
long drink and cider were analysed in the AS A. Le Coq / OU Finelin case234, in 
the Narvesen Baltija / Preses Apvieniba case235 in Latvia horizontal concerns 
were raised because both companies were involved in newspapers and periodicals 
retail distribution businesses. In the UAB Mineraliniai vandenys / AB Stumbras 
acquisition case 236 in Lithuania horizontal overlaps occurred because both 
companies were active in the alcoholic beverages market. Vertical links occurred 
in the AB Achema / AB Klaipedos juru kroviniu kompanija case in Lithuania, 
where the company Achema, active in the production of fertilizers acquired the 
sea cargo company Klaipedos juru kroviniu kompanija, in order to get access to 
the canal to distribute its production worldwide. The conglomerate effects on 
competition were examined by the Competition Council of Lithuania in the UAB 
Rubikon apskaitos sistemos / UAB Vienituras case237 or UAB Achemos grupe / 
UAB Baltijos TV case238 with widely spread portfolio starting from the production 
of fertilizers and finishing with the TV channel. 
With regard to cross-border merger effects, there have been two basic 
trends in the Baltic countries. First of all, cross-mergers have occurred in all 
Baltic countries as a result of foreign firms with significant market power 
acquiring local companies. For instance, the Norwegian company AB Orkla 
acquired a Latvian leading firm in sauces market SIA Spilva239; in Lithuania the 
major cases involved Norddeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale (NORD/LB) 
234 For a further comment see The Annual Report, 2003, available at web-site: 
hltp: //www. konk-Lirentsiamet. ee/eng / (available in English) 
235 See http: //www. competition. ly 
236 Decision No. 1S- 107,02/10/2003, available at web-site http: //www. konkuren. lt 
237 Decision No. 1S - 173,16/12/2004, available at web-site http: //www. konkuren. lt 
238 Decision No. IS - 126,26/08/2004, available at web-site http: //www. konkuren. lt 
239 Decision issued in 30/06/2004, available at web-site http: //www. competition. ly 
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acquiring of AB Lietuvos Zemes Ukio bankas 240 (Bank); Eolian Trading Ltd 
acquiring AB Lifosa241; ICA Baltic AB acquiring UAB Ekovalda242; Rurgas AG 
and E. ON Energie consortium acquiring AB Lietuvos dujos243 (Lithuanian Gas)244 
etc. Second, there have been the cases where a transaction involved foreign 
companies with spill-over effects on the markets of the Baltic countries. For 
instance, the merger in 2002 between Swedish company Telia Aktiebolag 
(thereafter Telia) and Finish firm Sonera Corporation (thereafter Sonera) had 
spill-over effects in Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian markets through 
subsidiaries of these parents' companies active in the Baltic markets. The 
influence on the Baltic market through the subsidiaries 245, in particular the merger 
between the subsidiary AS Eesti Statoil and Shell Eesti AS case in Estonia, in 
Latvia - Latvia Statoil / Shell Latvia, and the UAB Lietuva Statoil / UAB Shell 
Lietuva in Lithuania also occurred after the merger transaction of the foreign 
parents companies, Norwegian Statoil ASA and the Dutch Shell in 2002. 
The latest transaction, with spill-over effects on the Baltic countries, which 
was referred and approved by the European Commission, involved the Finnish 
company Kesko Food Ltd and the Swedish company ICA Baltic A. B. Both parties 
combined their retailing activities in the Baltic countries by establishing a joint 
venture. Considering the fact that both companies already had subsidiaries active 
in these markets, this transaction caused some competitive concerns especially in 
the Latvian market and to a lesser extent in the Estonian and Lithuanian 
markets246 
3.4. The internal motives to merge 
The following sections involve a critical analysis based on the internal 
forces, which lead undertakings to merge. The examination of the internal factors 
240 Decision No. 37,28/03/2002, available at web-site http: //www. konkuren. lt 
241 Decision No. 50,16/05/2002, available at web-site http: //www. konkuren. lt 
242 Decision No. 73,04/07/2002, available at web-site http: //www. konkuren. lt 
243 Decision No. 66,20/06/2002, available at web-site http: //www. konkuren. lt 
244 For further comments see the Annual report on Competition Policy Developments in Lithuania, 
2002, available at web-site http: //www. oecd. org 
245 AS Eesti Statoil / Shell Eesti AS case (2002) in Estonia, Latvia Statoil / Shell Latvia case 
(2003) in Latvia, UAB Lietuva Statoil / UAB Shell Lietuva (2002) in Lithuania, available at web- 
sites http: //www. konkurentsiamet. ee/; 
http: //www. competition. ly; http: //www. konkuren. lt 
246 Case No. COMP/M 3464, available at web-site 
http: //europa. eu. int/comm/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m3464_en. pdf 
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is required due to the enforcement policy of the competition authorities. The 
authorities use a case - by - case analysis and investigate every merger 
transaction individually, which falls under their jurisdiction. In this case the 
internal factors play the major role during the merger investigation process, as the 
motives behind the merger may help to predict possible anti-competitive effects 
on competition. This is the main task of all competition authorities. 
3.4.1. Two basic categories 
Basically, the root of most economic studies on mergers' motives is based 
on the economic rationality assumption, i. e. companies will behave in such a way 
what seem to them to be appropriate in order to further their own economic 
interests (Goldberg, 1983: 9). The traditional criterion for firms to merge in the 
Industrial Organisation is when the profit of the merged entity is higher than the 
combined profits of the merging firms before the merger transaction (Horn and 
Persson, 2001). Firms acquire assets in the activities in which they are good at and 
sell assets related to activities in which their competitive position is weak. 
Furthermore, firms extend their geographical sphere of operation by buying up 
firms in other Member States in their core business (Jacquemin, 1990: 19). 
However, some authors such as Cartwright and Cooper think that apart from 
rational economic and financial grounds for merge, there might be un-expressed 
psychological motives behind a merger decision (Cartwright and Cooper, 1996: 
21). Therefore, for those who admit irrationality and speculative moods within the 
economic system, Jong answered by citing Shakespeare `there is reason in 
madness' (Jong, 1990: 51). Others state that there are explicit and implicit 
motives: explicit being such as synergies, or diversification, which mainly are 
given by the management of companies, there implicit motives are as a manager 
hubris, which can be only suspected as they usually are not confirmed by 
managers and are extremely difficult to evaluate (Larsson and Wallenberg, 2002). 
There are a number of reasons why firms merge and very often firms may 
have more than one motive. Yet, the grouping into basic categories is useful. First 
of all, two basic groups can be distinguished, i. e. economic motives and socio- 
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Political motives 247. Economic motives, which can be further separated into 
efficiencies, market power and others, play a major role in the merger 
investigation process, due to their impact on competition. Apart from economic 
motives, mergers may impose socio-political aspects and they may provide a 
further contribution towards social welfare. Both aspects of motives to a merger 
will be discussed in the following sections. 
3.4.2. Economic motives for merger248 
3.4.2.1. Efficiencies249 
3.4.2.1.1. General overview 
Gaughan (1991) states that synergy is probably the most common motive 
for entering into a merger according to theorists at large. The basis of synergy is 
that operating economies of scale may be achieved because existing firms in the 
industry are operating at a level below optimum and lower unit cost may be 
achieved at a higher level of capacity (Cooke, 1986: 26). The synergy effect is 
known as the formula `2+2=5' by meaning that economies of scale arise when the 
cost of producing two products is lower than the sum of costs of producing them 
as separate entities (Chiplin and Wright, 1987: 23). Costs savings, revenue 
enhancements, process involvements, financial engineering and tax benefits refer 
to the sources of synergy (Eccles, Lanes and Wilson, 1999). In general, the 
synergy is about increasing competitiveness. 
Economists distinguish short-run and long-run economies of scale. 
Through merger short-run economies of scale may be achieved from the 
elimination of a duplication of fixed costs, for instance, administrative and 
operational costs such as purchasing materials or even duplication in departments 
247 These two are very general groups. The researcher does not state that a merger transaction 
always has either of them two. The idea is to show that apart economic aspects, merger 
transactions may also have socio-political aspects. For instance, firms may have not only 
economic motives behind the merger, but also political one, as to gain a political power. 
248 Since, domestic and cross-border mergers may share the same motives, it will be not necessary 
to distinguish them, unless stated otherwise. 
249 The terms `synergy' and `efficiency' are used interchangeably in this paper, as some 
economists refer to synergy others to efficiency for defining the same thing. 
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(i. e. accounts, law or personnel). Mergers can also gain efficiencies by increasing 
the bargaining power of the merging firms. This is the case when tariffs 
discriminate between large and small users and the merged entity may obtain 
quantity discounts as a result of merger (Ilzkovitz and Meiklejohn, 2001: 7). 
Economies of scale may also be achieved by `rationalisation' - reallocating 
production between plants, this means, from shifting output from one plant with a 
high marginal cost of production to another lower-cost plant, without changing the 
firms' production possibilities limits (Roeller et al., 2001). The economies of scale 
cannot only be a plant specific, but also product specific, resulting from longer 
production runs of a specific product and producing higher output from existing 
facilities (Weinberg, Blank and Greystoke, 1979: 35). Specialization of people and 
machines may also lead to economies of scale through learning effects. The 
phenomenon of learning effects associated with increasing experience of 
production of a good or providing a service. In this case, the cost of producing 
each extra unit decreases as the cumulative output increases. The occurrence of 
these improvements is a result of simple repetition of tasks and not of changes in 
the scale of technology (Weinberg, Blank and Greystoke, 1979: 36). 
Long-run economies of scale may be realised through a merger in 
production, for instance, energy requirements for a large machine may be 
proportionally lower than those of a small machine. Furthermore, in research and 
development, for instance as the production of the firm increases, it becomes 
worthwhile to invest more in sophisticated technologies and/or in marketing 
activities, such as a single brand name being created to reduce advertising 
expenditures (Roeller, Stennek, Verboven, 2001: 9). The merger may also enhance 
technological progress by increasing the incentives for R&D activities among the 
merging firms as they may have a capacity to engage in research and innovation. 
A firm with good ideas and entrepreneurial managers but no money can combine 
with a firm with a lot of financial resources but no ideas. Replacing poor 
management with good management through a merger can also increase 
management efficiency. Economies of scope may arise from the joint production 
or provision of complementary products. For instance, the same indivisibility can 
be used at once in the production or distribution of several goods, also by 
extending its range of products, a firm can thereby reduce its unit costs 
(Jacquemin, 1990: 8-9). Sometimes, economies of scope and economies of scale 
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are used interchangeably. However, even the two are closely related but the 
economies of scope refer to the capacity of a company to make use of one set of 
input to offer a larger collection of products/services. 
In general, mergers can yield efficiency gains in various ways such as a 
better exploitation of economies of scale, economies of scope and learning effects, 
by enhancing technological progress, by improving the efficiency of management 
and others. Depending on the case, the efficiencies from mergers can reduce costs, 
intensify competition, facilitate entry, expand existing markets and/or create 
markets for new products and services. 
3.4.2.1.2. Efficiencies of different forms of mergers 
With regard to different forms of mergers, horizontal mergers offer good 
opportunities for achieving synergies by reducing the costs through combining the 
operations horizontally and sharing information, knowledge and other resources to 
gain economies of scale and scope. 
Referring to vertical mergers, Sanchez and Heene stated that the minimum 
efficient scale of production in most industries increases as one goes upstream 
from the bottom to the top of the vertical structure of an industry (Sanchez and 
Heene, 2004: 175). With regard to downstream vertical integration, the synergies 
may be created in four different ways: (1) by avoiding market failures because of 
overcoming the free-rider problem in distribution, retailing, or service and support 
activities; (2) by gaining access to distribution that may not be available otherwise 
as through established channels; (3) by improving service, image and personal 
interaction value in a product offer; and (4) by gaining a better understanding of 
market preferences by establishing direct contacts with final consumers (Sanchez 
and Heene, 2004: 176-177). Through a vertical integration the economies of 
information exchange may be gained. This is because common training, 
experience and the Code of behaviour within the firm facilitate communication 
among employees (Williamson, 1987: 27). Furthermore, a greater sensitivity of 
control instruments may be achieved through a vertical merger in comparison 
with inter-firm activities (Williamson, 1987: 26). In general, vertical integration 
can also reduce production costs when production processes require closely 
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integrated steps in the production chain or by getting closer to the consumers in 
downward streams or to the suppliers in upward streams. 
For Cooke, financial synergy is more likely to be achieved by 
conglomerates, since transaction costs, as a proportion of a new share issue, 
decrease as the sum raised increases, thereby conferring an advantage to firms 
raising large sums of money on the capital markets (Cooke, 1986: 27). 
Conglomerate mergers may also give opportunities for firms to reduce capital 
costs and achieve efficiencies. Conversely, other authors expressed that a merger 
in wholly separate markets, producing different products, using different 
technologies have less potential to benefit in terms of efficiencies because 
economies of scale in production and distribution are less likely (Steiner, 1975: 
51). 
Firms may expand geographically in order to achieve efficiencies on a 
global basis through cross-border mergers. Cross-border mergers may lead to 
global economy-wide efficiency gains achieved through economies of scale and 
scope. Furthermore, cross-border mergers may enhance innovation capabilities 
and give synergy effects in R&D for both host and home countries through 
global knowledge exchange. Cross-border mergers are considered as channels for 
complementary technological resources especially in high-technological 
sectors250. Leaning effects may raise social welfare at a global level by equalising 
knowledge worldwide (Sim and Yunus, 1998 as quoted in OECD, 2001). 
3.4.2.1.3. Efficiency motives in the Baltic countries 
Efficiency as a basic motive for merger has been claimed in the Baltic 
countries in a number of merger cases with or without an international element, as 
a merger transaction between foreign subsidiaries, foreign and local firms or 
between the local companies. Various aspects of efficiencies motivated firms to 
merge in the following cases. 
In the Estonian jurisdiction, the efficiencies, as a motive was claimed by 
the parties of two foreign subsidiaries in the AS Tootsi Turvas /AS Puhatu Turvas 
250 For further reading see OECD, New Patterns of Industrial Globalisation: Cross-border Mergers 
and Acquisitions and Strategic Alliances, 2001. 
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(2003) case 251. The AS Tootsi Turvas (since 2002 belonging to the Finish group 
Vapo Oy after the previous acquisition) acquired 66.7 % of the shares of AS 
Puhatu Turvas, which is a high potential peat mining company with peat fields. 
AS Tootsi Turvas, meanwhile, is the largest peat mining and processing 
undertaking in Estonia with two production units and its own peat briquette 
factory. Thus, the impetus for this merger was to achieve efficiencies from peat 
production. 
In the Latvian jurisdiction, in the case Latvia Statoil / Shell Latvia252, one 
fuel company `Latvia Statoil Ltd' would acquire decisive influence over `Shell 
Latvia Ltd' on the basis of partnership by acquiring 100 % of the shares. In this 
horizontal merger case the parties of two subsidiaries of the foreign companies 
pointed out that the objective of the transaction is to improve quality of the 
services offered as well as decreasing expenses for services provided by the third 
persons, maintenance of petrol station indexes network and common and 
administrative expenses. The motives for the merger transaction were defined as 
the creation of one effective petrol station network instead of two networks, 
improvement of fuel quality, the ability to offer fuel for competitive prices, as 
well as the introduction of more services and programmes, such as fast food, 
internet kiosks and other services. 
In the Lithuanian jurisdiction, the parties in UAB ZIPS / UAB Vesiga253 
case claimed the achievement of efficiencies through the merger. Lithuania's 
joining of the EU and the growth of international competition, changes of 
consumers' priorities and tastes are factors that force companies to invest into 
technology and to improve products' quality and to extend the production range. 
In this case the parties mentioned that by combining their industrial and financial 
facilities and intellectual property, they will be able to increase industrial capacity 
and as a result decrease the costs of production which will give a possibility for 
the parties to invest in the improvement of the products' quality and advertise the 
trade marks. 
251 See the Annual Report of 2003, available at web-site http: //www. konkurentsiamet. ee/ 
252 Latvia Statoil /Shell Latvia, 2003. 
253 UAB ZIP3 / UAB Vesiga, No 1S - 112,15/07/2004, available at web-site: http: // 
www. konkuren. lt 
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In the horizontal merger case AB Alita / AB Anyksciu Vynas254 the parties 
of two local companies, active in the alcohol business claimed that AB Alita 
acquires 100 % of AB Anyksciu Vynas in order to achieve efficiencies by finding a 
new niche and extending production capacities in the Lithuanian market with an 
intention in the near future to reach international markets. The parties also pointed 
out that this transaction is necessary in order to be able to compete, first of all, 
with increased competition in the Lithuanian Alcohol market and secondly to face 
foreign competitors. Competition in the Lithuanian Alcohol market has increased 
as a result of amendments made to the Alcohol Control law. On 1 January 2004 
the exclusive rights of the state monopoly to produce alcohol was annulled by 
opening up the market for the firms to enter after gaining the licence. As a result 
of joining the EU and the disappearance of the tariff barriers for alcohol imports, 
local producer will face competition from foreign countries. Through this 
transaction, the firms (both active in the alcohol market) by combining their 
capacities will be able to achieve efficiencies and face competitors 255 
In the UAB Hronas / UAB Labradoras jr Ko / UAB Baltaura / AB Pagiriu 
siltnamiai case256 the parties claimed that the motive of the acquisition of the joint 
control of the 100% shareholding of the AB Pagiriu siltnamiai was to achieve 
efficiencies through management rationalisation and the optimisation of 
production alongside the expansion of the range of production processing by 
canning, drying and freezing. 
The necessity for investment and to expand the production trends in order 
to reach broad classes of consumers due to the increased competition from foreign 
entities were mentioned as motives in the UAB MG Baltic Investment / AB Levuo 
merger257 case in the Lithuanian jurisdiction. 
254 Decision No. 1S- 80,27/05/2004, available at web-site: http: // www. konkuren. lt 
255 The motives provided by the parties involved in the transaction. The information was obtained 
from the file submitted to the Competition Council of Lithuania. 
256 Decision No. 1S- 39,07/04/2005, available at web-site http: //www. konkuren. lt 
257 Decision No. 1S- 151 21/10/2004 available at web-site: www. konkuren. lt 
119 
3.4.2.2. Market power 
Firms by bringing economies of scale and scope may be equally attracted 
by the market power and protection from competition that may accompany such 
benefits (Bishop, 1993: 295-296). Thus, mergers can have antitrust concerns and 
may pose competitive hazards. Mueller and other scholars state that a merger may 
increase market power of the firm either by affecting the elasticity of demand for 
the firm's products or by raising barriers to entry (Hughes, Mueller and Singh, 
1980: 29). It will allow firms to earn higher profits either by raising their limit 
price by changing their effective elasticity of demand or by allowing them to earn 
profits at their present price for a longer period of time. A potential entrant may be 
discouraged from entering the market if it knows that the merged entity's (which 
has a single dominance in the market) costs are lower and that the `dominant' firm 
would be better able to engage in a competitive price war than the potential 
competitor itself. 
3.4.2.2.1. Market power of different types of mergers 
Horizontal mergers of direct rivals may yield single market power or by 
reducing the number of market players in a concentrated industry may lead to the 
likelihood that the remaining firms will expressly or tacitly coordinate price and 
output. Hence, mergers may have unilateral or co-ordinated effects. Unilateral 
effects arise where the merged entity is able to profitably increase the price by 
reducing the outcome as well as reducing choice and innovation through its own 
acts without the need for a co-operative response from competitors. The merger 
which gives rise to unilateral effects is call to give rise to a situation of single firm 
dominance. The difference between the unilateral effects and the co-ordinated 
effect is that co-ordinated effects rely on other firms as well as the merged entity 
modifying their behaviour following the merger. Such a situation is known as 
oligopolistic dominance or collective dominance. 
As was described above, vertical mergers do not reduce the number of 
economic entities operating at horizontal level of the market, but it may change 
the pattern of industry behaviour at both levels as the newly acquired firm may 
decide to deal only with the acquiring firm, thereby altering competition in three 
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markets: among the acquiring firm's suppliers, customers or competitors. The 
adjustment toward greater reliance on internal transfers is unremarkable; if 
efficiencies can be gained from internalisation, one would expect the newly 
integrated firm to resort more for internal transfers and rely less on open market 
transactions. In this case, suppliers may lose a market for their goods, retail outlets 
may be deprived of supplies, and competitors may find that both supplies and 
outlets are blocked. There is a possibility of creating a situation for collusive 
behaviour or to foreclose outlets or sources of supply to competitors at both 
upward and downward levels258. A vertical merger may enhance a monopoly 
power at either an upward or downward market level where the vertical 
integration raises entry barriers to non-integrated firms. For instance, vertical 
integration may force other firms to integrate vertically in order to compete; this 
may delay entry and increase the risk premium for the capital, which such entrants 
need. However, Bishop and Walker (1999: 158-159) stated that anti-competitive 
effects in vertical restraints are likely to occur only if there is horizontal market 
power at one or more of the vertical levels. In this case firms with market power 
can use that power to foreclose market access and raise competitors' costs or even 
dampen competition. 
Conglomerate mergers between firms in different markets, although not 
directly affecting the market horizontally or vertically, involve the risk of cross- 
subsidisation within the conglomerate firm, which facilitates predatory pricing 
campaigns against smaller competitors (Frazer, 1992: 68). Also, under certain 
circumstances, in the case of a product extension merger the combination of such 
products may give the merged firm the ability and the economic incentive to 
change its commercial conduct thus altering the structure of the markets 
concerned. In particular, when a merging firm enjoys market power in one or 
more of the complementary products, a change in its conduct may be expected to 
result in the leveraging of its existing market power into one or more of the 
products that constitute the combined product range. This is known as a `portfolio 
power' with the rationale: when the market power deriving from a portfolio of 
brands exceeds the sum of its parts. The Commission in Guinness / Grand 
Metropolitan case stated that the holder of a portfolio may enjoy a number of 
258 This theory of harm will be further explored in chapter 4. 
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advantages as `[ .] 
he will have greater flexibility to structure his prices, 
promotions and discounts, he will have greater potential for tying, and he will be 
able to realise economies of scale and scope. Finally the implicit (or explicit) 
threat of a refusal to supply is more potent '259. This case was highly criticised by 
economists due to lack of a sound economic basis260. For instance, Bork (1978) 
stated that it is impossible to raise more than one monopoly profit each time261. 
Moreover, some economists further argue that conglomerate mergers, i. e. a 
merger between firms supplying a range of complementary or substitutable 
products might enable a firm that is dominant in one market to use its market 
power to leverage it into another, only when competition in both markets is 
imperfect (Gal, 2003: 198-199). 
3.4.2.2.2. Cross-border mergers 
Cross-border mergers through horizontal, vertical or conglomerate links 
may also produce anti-competitive effects on competition in a global market by 
creating global giants, which may block entry into the market for other companies 
or engage in other anti-competitive practice. In this case consumers of more than 
one country might be injured. For instance, if a monopolist exercises a market 
power in a multinational market, the consumers in all markets of different 
countries where the monopolist holds its power will suffer due to higher prices 
(resulted from reduced output) (Mitchell, 2001). Mega-mergers have resulted in 
the world economy with consolidation of significant shares of the world market, 
for instance, the Dasa / Aerospatiale (1999) resulted in the third largest air and 
space enterprise in the world; the Warner / AOL merger (January, 2000) in the 
largest combined media and internet access service; the Vodafone / Mannesmann 
(March, 2000) in the largest world-wide telecommunication enterprise and the 
fourth largest enterprise in the world (Horn, 2001: 3). 
Furthermore, a cross-border merger may have spill-over effects. This 
means that a merger between domestic companies may create a company that may 
exercise market power in foreign countries, especially in small ones (Mitchell, 
259 Guinness v Grand Metropolitan, case No. IV/M. 938, para 40. 
260 See, for instance, Bishop and Walker, 1999, pp. 158-160. 
261 A further discussion on market power will be analysed in the chapter 4. 
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2001). The problem with anti-competitive practice of cross-border mergers is an 
applicable jurisdiction, meaning that competition laws traditionally focus on 
keeping competitive market structures `within the borders' and cross-border 
mergers extend beyond the limits; as a result the competition authority of affected 
market can do little from opposing such a merger. However, it is not entirely true 
as the principle of extraterritoriality with `effect test' is applied. In this case, the 
competition authority of the affected market by the merger may still question and 
block the merger between foreign firms operating in foreign markets but having 
anti-competitive effects on the domestic market. For instance, the EC Merger 
Regulation is implicated when the European market is affected; the US Antitrust 
law when the American market is affected and other national competition laws are 
applicable when the merger has anti-competitive effects on those national 
markets. This was the case when the EU had questioned the Boeing / McDonell 
Douglas262 merger between two American companies or the US Federal Trade 
Commission investigated the Ciba-Geigy Ltd / Sandoz263 merger between Swiss 
companies (Horn, 2001: 16). 
However, other problems may arise while dealing with cross-border 
mergers such as gathering evidence in the foreign forum, multinational filings and 
reporting or protection of the markets in the countries, which do not have 
competition law. There has been an ongoing process of debates whether bilateral 
or multilateral agreements can solve all the problems or one international 
competition authority should be introduced. Furthermore, the international 
organisations such as the WTO, the ICN, the OECD, the UNSTAD and others 
consider whether or not there should be international rules on competition 
applicable to all signed countries, and if yes, which one international organisation 
is the most suitable and what role should it play in order to enforce the principles 
of international competition. Despite these debates, the scholars agree that the 
time is not suitable yet to realise such an idea and there is a long way for such an 
authority264 to be built. 
262 48 Case IV-M. 877 (1997) O. J. C. 136/3 
263 (CC4) 24,182 (FTC 1997) 
264 The researcher will not continue a further analysis whether there is a need for the international 
competition authority; or bilateral or multilateral agreements can solve all problems raised by 
cross-border mergers. For further reading on this topic, see Woolcock S., International 
Competition Policy and the World Trade Organisation, the paper prepared for the Commonwealth 
Trade Forum, July 7t"-8t" 2003; Mitchell, A., Broadening the Vision of Trade Liberalisation, 
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3.4.2.2.3. Market power - the Baltic countries context 
Merger control is a predictive exercise of two players in opposite front- 
lines: firms with the aim to merge and competition authorities to prevent anti- 
competitive mergers. These two countervailing forces have different approaches 
to the effects of merger on competition. Firms attempt to present pro-competitive 
effects achievable through a merger transaction. Meanwhile, the competition 
authorities are aimed at preventing any anti-competitive effects of a merger on 
competition. 
Considering that all Baltic countries apply either a `dominance test' or a 
modified version of a dominance test in response to the modernisation of the 
ECMR, the Competition Authorities in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are 
empowered to block mergers, which might increase market power and/or 
otherwise impede competition. Thus, firms do not disclose market power as a 
motive for merger. Nevertheless, firms are sometimes open to the press and like to 
boast that as a result of a merger transaction they will obtain market power. 
Usually, a press release is one of the sources under which the Competition 
Authorities may initiate the case. However, the before doing that officials of the 
Competition Authorities check the reliability of the information obtained from the 
press. 
In the Baltic countries' jurisdictions a presumption of a market power 
arises if after a merger transaction the merging parties would gain at least 40% in 
the relevant market. In addition, under the Competition Law of Lithuania each of 
a group of three or a smaller number of undertakings with the largest shares of the 
relevant market, jointly holding 70% or more of the relevant market shall be 
considered to enjoy a collective dominant position. A presumption of both single 
dominance and collective dominance as motives for merger have been examined 
by the Competition Authorities of the Baltic states in several cases. 
A single dominance was examined by the Competition Council of 
Lithuania in UAB Vitoma / AB Antrimeta / UAB Ikrova / UAB Metalo lauzas / 
International Competition Law and the WTO, World Competition 24(3), 2001, pp343-365; 
Schoneveld, Cartel Sanctions and International Competition policy: Cross-Border Cooperation and 
Appropriate Forums for Cooperation, World Competition, 26(3), 2003, pp. 433-471 and 
P. Marsden, Antitrust at the WTO, 13/1 Antitrust 78 (Autumn 1998). 
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UAB Antriniai metalai265 case. In this transaction the UAB Vitoma intended to 
acquire 70.09% of shares of the AB Antrimeta, 70% of shares of the UAB Ikrova, 
70% of shares of the UAB Metalo lauzas and 70% of shares of the UAB Antriniai 
metalai. The concentration was considered to be horizontal with the overlaps in 
the Lithuanian ferrous scrap metal purchase and processing market. Despite the 
motivation behind this transaction claimed by the party to be the economies of 
scale, the Competition Council of Lithuania refused to grant permission to 
implement this transaction because of the fact that the merged entity would hold 
around 48% of the relevant market. The elements of economies of scale, 
advantageous price policy, limited volumes of purchased scrap metal, high cost of 
acquisition of new technologies, long-term export contracts with a single foreign 
buyer were considered as the conditions to restrict competition in the Lithuanian 
ferrous scrap metal purchase and processing market. This transaction was 
approved by the Competition Authority only after repeated notification by the 
party with major changes to the former transaction. 
Collective dominance by the Competition Council of Lithuania was 
investigated in A/S Carlberg / AB Kalnapilis / UAB Utenos Alus / UAB Jungtinis 
Alaus Centras case266, where A/S Carlberg intended to acquire the controlling 
interest of some Lithuanian beer producers. The Competition Council of Lithuania 
projected that the proposed horizontal transaction in the beer market in Lithuania 
would be intensified by vertical concentration due to the activity of the UAB 
Jungtinis Alaus Centras and would lead all market participants to gain a collective 
dominance through having possession of over 80% of the beer market. The 
acquisition transaction was approved subject to the conditions and the obligations, 
defined by the Competition Council of Lithuania. 
Apart from achieving efficiencies and market power through a merger, firms may 
have other impetuses to merge. 
265 See Annual Report of Lithuania, 2000-2001, available at web-site: http: //www. oecd. org 
266 Annual Report of Lithuania, 2000-2001, available at web-site: http: //www. oecd. org 
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3.4.2.3. Other motives 
3.4.2.3.1. The way to enter 
A transaction through merger and acquisition is one of the quickest and 
simplest ways to enter into a new market that confers strategic advantage while 
time in business is really important. Acquiring or merging with existing 
companies is often a cheaper and faster means of entering the market than 
establishing subsidiaries from scratch (Ansoff and others, 1971). Merging with an 
existing business usually offers the advantage of speed in gaining a market 
position, technology, new products, customer relationships or contracts with 
suppliers or other resources that would normally take years for non-merged firms 
to develop through natural growth. In some cases, especially when the market is 
already `saturated' with incumbent firms, it is simply not economically plausible 
to enter a market through a start-up and merger is the only option for entering the 
market. A merger/acquisition might be a way to circumvent barriers to enter into 
an industry, especially in markets where the requirement of a particular licence is 
essential. With regard to cross-border mergers, a merger or an acquisition is often 
the easiest and the simplest way to get into another country's market especially in 
an unknown market. It is a way to `localise' quicker than through establishment. 
To enter a foreign market in order to internationalise the operations further might 
be another reason to merge. 
3.4.2.3.1.1. The Baltic countries context 
As previously mentioned, foreign companies have been using the merger 
transactions as a means to enter unknown Baltic countries' markets. The entry has 
involved the foreign firms acquiring the local companies or subsidiaries of the 
other foreign parents' companies. For instance, in the If Skadeförsäkring Holding 
AB / AS Sampo Eesti Varakindlustus (2001) case267, the Swedish company If 
Skadeförsäkring Holding is active in property and casualty insurance markets in 
Nordic countries and acquired the sole control over the Estonian subsidiary AS 
267 For a further comments see the Annual Report of 2001, Estonia, available at web-site 
http: //www. konkurentsiamet. ee/eng/index. html? ld=916 
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Sampo Eesti Varakindlustus that provides property and casualty insurance 
services in Estonia in order to get access to the market. The motive of the Dutch 
company DFDS268 was to enter the Lithuanian marine market through the 
acquisition of the active firm in this market AB Lisco Baltic Service. Instead of 
establishing a new company, which would cost a lot of time and money, this 
company chose a cheaper and quicker mode to enter the market. Another example 
illustrates that a foreign company may acquire a local firm in all Baltic countries 
in order to enter their markets. For instance, 93% of shares of A/S Rigas Fondu 
birza were passed to Finnish firm HEX Plc., which already owns a stock 
exchange firm in Estonia and is planning to acquire the stock exchange of 
269 Lithuania. 
Depending on the sector, there might be only one way to enter the Baltic 
market by acquiring an existing company in order to circumnavigate barriers of 
entry, especially in the markets where the requirement of a particular licence is 
essential. For instance, there are a limited number of licences to provide mobile 
connection services in Lithuania. 
3.4.2.3.2. Acquiring assets at a discount 
Companies may acquire other companies because they can get them `at a 
discount', meaning less than their real value, with the intention to sell off some of 
the assets at a profit in the future or to invest funds somewhere else (Morgan, 
1980: 40). The basis for this is that the acquirer knows better than the acquired the 
real value of assets and/or how to exploit it (Jervis, 1971: 29). The theory of 
takeovers also suggests that if the stock market value of a company falls below the 
value of the outsider firms, the firm will more likely be taken over270. Many 
scholars expressed various situations in which the control of the assets of firms 
was obtained at a discount. Penrose (1972: 160) reported that there might be the 
situation of undervaluation of publicly traded stock of a company either because 
of a lack of confidence in its management or a discounting of the marketable 
268 AB Lisco Baltic Service /DFDS (2001). 
269 For further comment see the Annual Report 2003of the Competition Council of Latvia, 
available at web-site: http: //www. competition. ly 
270 For instance see Marris's model, in Marris, The Economic Theory of `Managerial' Capitalism, 
Macmillan, 1964. 
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stocks for lack of liquidity271. Weinberg, Blank and Greystoke (1979) explained 
that undervaluation may occur in the situations: when directors of a firm are 
unaware of the true value of its assets; or because of an inefficient capital 
structure; or where its shares have a poor market rating; or even because the 
directors of a firm have failed, generally because of poor management, to put the 
assets of the firm to its most efficient uses. The latter was the case after WWII, 
when new industries increased in importance as a result of the rapidly changing 
economy, while old industries decreased, and the managers of the declining 
industries were unaware or unable to adjust to the changes272. A similar situation 
occurred in the Baltic countries during the transformation period; where directors 
of the old style system could not adapt their management and make it fit under a 
new environment. This resulted in the declining value of the companies (Lydeka, 
2001: 232-236). These companies have become the targets for acquisition. The 
majority of foreign investors in Lithuania have chosen to buy firms formed after 
1990 as they were estimated at a lower value in comparison with former giant 
state monopolies with higher assets base. 
The example of `acquiring assets at a discount' might be the acquisition by 
the consortium UAB Hermisfondu valdymas273 of two in-effective companies AB 
Snaige and AB Vilniaus vingis. In a short period UAB Hermisfondu valdymas has 
managed to raise the profitability of these companies and as a result the stock 
prices of AB Snaige and AB Vingis have increased. 
3.4.2.3.3. Fear to be acquired /a merger to survive 
A motive for a merger might be the reaction to a changed environment or 
due to opportunity, as an appearance of new technology, a fluctuation in 
competitors' policy and the fear not to be acquired. Fear to be taken over, may 
encourage managers to take steps to increase efficiencies (Chiplin and Wright, 
1987: 27). Theoretically, there are scenarios when market conditions change from 
segmentation to integration. In this case firms, which are active in the segmented 
271 Such kind of the merger promotion was highly important in the past in the United States. As 
Butters, Lintner and Cary (as quoted in Penrose, 1972), stated in their report that `[.. ] the market 
prices of the stock of so many companies were substantially below their book values, and even 
more so below the replacement values of the underlying assets'. 
272 Note: for further reading see Weinberg, Blank and Greystoke, 1979, pp. 24-32. 
273 UAB Hermis Valdymas /AB Snaige /AB Vilniaus Vingis (2002). 
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markets, may not survive in a completely integrated market due to the lower price 
level. As a consequence, the firms have the incentive to merge in order to survive 
by reducing the competitive pressure in the integrated market and by exploiting 
economies of scale and saving costs (Ganslandt and Persson, 2003). Moreover, 
firms believe that the more their market shares are larger, the more control of the 
environment they have and this can be secured through a merger transaction. In 
this case, if the firm's market position has reduced in comparison to the 
competitors, who are merging, the best defence is to follow the competitors' 
strategy to merge (Newbould, 1970: 140). 
Due to the globalisation process, domestic markets are more exposed to 
international competition. Thus, domestic companies might have a desire to 
protect their market. Mergers may play an important role in such a protective 
strategy, as it may prevent foreign undertakings from entering into domestic 
markets (known as a `perceived potential competition') or from acquiring 
domestic firms, i. e. `pre-emptive mergers' (Ganslandt and Persson, 2003). In the 
theoretical industrial organisation literature has proven that domestic companies 
may prevent such foreign entry by acquiring the domestic targets themselves 
(Horn and Persson, 2001). 
This motive has indirectly dominated in the local firms of the Baltic 
countries' merger transactions. For instance, in the case AB Alita / AB Anyksciu 
Vynas274 (as discussed above) as a motive for merger, the parties pointed out the 
changes of the environment in the Lithuanian market and a threat from foreign 
competitors. 
3.4.2.3.4. Ensuring raw materials and sales 
In some industries the availability of adequate supplies is crucial, 
especially of raw materials, such as natural resources. In this case, a manufacturer 
may decide to integrate vertically through upward or downward integration in 
order to secure a source of raw materials (Jervis, 1971: 29). For instance, a paper 
company requires a continuing supply of timber. Thus, it is common that a paper 
manufacturer would acquire large timber stands in order to be assured of a supply 
274 Decision No. IS - 80,27/05/2004, available at web-site: http: // www. konkuren. lt 
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of these materials in the future. This also works in downward integration, where 
manufacturers acquire chains of retail outlets to provide themselves with captive 
customers (Linower, 1968: 52). 
As regards the Baltic context, similar cases have occurred in these 
countries; there one firm acquired another in order to assure the raw materials. For 
instance, the company AB Achema275 active in the production of fertilizers in 
Lithuania acquired the sea cargo company AB Klaipedos juru kroviniu 
kompanija, in order to get access to the canal to distribute its production 
worldwide. This transaction has secured to the AB Achema the distribution 
channel. 
3.4.2.3.5. National champion 
It may be a policy of a state and the government may allow or encourage 
merger transactions between local companies that have adverse effects on 
domestic consumers with the aim of promoting internationally competitive 
companies276. Thus, merger transactions may enable two or more local companies 
that are performing poorly apart to build a critical mass and to form a `national 
champion' able to compete internationally. According to this point, the 
competition authorities should not block such mergers even if there is a possibility 
that competition will be reduced as a result of the transaction. However, the 
European Commission and the Antirust Authorities of the US have different 
position from that stated above. According to Pitofsky, a former FTC chairman, 
the `national champion' argument is not allowed neither in the US courts, nor in 
the Competition Authorities to influence the decision on a merger transaction 
(Pitofsky, October 15,1999 277 , as quoted 
in Ganslandt and Persson, 2003). 
Similarly the European commissioner, Monti (2001) stated that `[.. ] consumers 
deserve a high degree of protection from dominant suppliers irrespective of the 
275 AB Achema /AB Klaipedos Juru kroviniu kompanya (1999) 
276 Such consideration has been important in several countries, especially in Sweden and France. 
277 Note: for further reading, see Chairman R. Pitofsky, Federal Trade Commission, The Effect of 
Global Trade on United States Competition Law and Enforcement Policies, Fordham Corporate 
Law Institute, 26'x' Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy, New York City, 
October 15,1999. 
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size of the country' 278. The priority is on the definition of product and 
geographical markets despite any consideration whether there is a small or big 
market. Considering that the Baltic countries accepted the EC competition policy, 
a similar position is held in all the Competition Authorities of the Baltic countries. 
Economists tend to disagree on this argument, as there are different 
opinions expressed. Some theoretical and empirical evidence suggest that 
competition is important if not necessary for efficiency and cannot be evaded even 
for building a `national champion' (Holmstrom and others, 1989: 61-133, as 
quoted in Ganslandt and Persson, 2003). Along similar lines, Porter's study 
proves that companies succeed in international trade, if they compete vigorously 
against domestic opponents (Porter, 1990: 662-664). This is because a domestic 
competition rather than dominance gives impetus for efficiency and innovation, 
which are very important for successful export279. Size is not a prerequisite for 
competing internationally, as an export is not only the prerogative of big firms. 
However, Gal's study (on small market economies) proves that in the small 
market economies, a market may support only one (or a few, depending on market 
specification and industry) efficient firm (Gal, 2003). This means that efficient 
size is necessary to enhance export opportunities. According to Gal size may not 
only affect production and dynamic efficiency but also the relative cost of the 
accumulation and analysis of the market information. In this situation, small 
economies have to `[.. J balance the benefits from increased international 
competitiveness against the costs of the proposed merger in the domestic market' 
(Gal, 2003: 202). 
With regard to examples in the Baltic countries, the `national champions' 
in these countries are the former state monopolies (a heritage from the Soviet 
Union). However, unlike the meaning of `national champions' in the theory, these 
monopolies in the Baltic countries have had specific implications due to their 
inefficiencies, which were covered by State subsidies. As a consequence of the 
liberalisation and privatisation processes in the Baltic countries, these State 
monopolies have been disappearing from the markets. For instance, all 
telecommunication service markets in Latvia are open for competition in 
278 For further reading, see the speech delivered by the Competition Commissioner Mario Monti, 
Market definition as a cornerstone of EU Competition Policy, Workshop on Market Definition, 
Helsinki Fair Centre, Helsinki, 5 October 2001. 
279 For a further reading see M. E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations, 1990. 
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accordance with the requirements of the Law on Telecommunications (Economic 
Reform of Product and Capital Markets, Latvia, 2004). Despite expressing some 
concerns that national firms require to reach a minimum size to compete beyond 
national borders, the Baltic countries do not have the promotional policy to create 
national champions. Nonetheless, there have been cases, where the companies 
tried to achieve a critical mass through merger and acquisition transactions. For 
instance, the main strategy to gain a critical mass through 2001-2002 acquisitions 
of small competitors was of the information technology companies AB Alna and 
UAB Sonex in Lithuania. 
3.4.2.3.6. Rescue merger 
A rescue merger can be defined as a transaction where one or more 
companies acquire another business entity, which will leave the market in the near 
future anyway due to financial difficulties. Such a type of merger (acquisition) 
may serve as an investment purpose in order to keep a `dying' company viable. 
Thus, in this case merger and acquisition transactions can be seen as one of the 
possible ways to recover when companies are in financial distress. Despite the 
fact that merging a company in distress with another healthy firm may rescue the 
former, it is not always the case in practice as a strong rescue strategy is required 
(Stallworthy and Kharbanda, 1988: 38). There are a variety of reasons why a 
`healthy' firm would acquire a company in financial trouble. For instance, the 
transaction can strengthen the position of an acquiring company where it has an 
established product line, especially if the acquired firm has the useful resources; 
alternatively, there might be a wish by the acquiring firm to diversify into related 
or unrelated areas and the transaction can fulfil such a desire or even a `healthy' 
company may wish to enjoy the prospect of turning around a `sick' company. 
Firms may stay viable by acquiring an attractive business. This is because `[.. ] 
someone's trash can be someone else's gold mine: this is a basic principle in the 
recycling of waste and when this happens everyone gains' (Stallworthy and 
Kharbanda, 1988: 55). Also, the company in financial trouble may be acquired at a 
`bargain price'. Furthermore, the losses of the acquired firm may be offset against 
the profits of a `healthy' company that would bring substantial tax savings. There 
is a policy in some countries where fiscal incentives may be offered for a 
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`healthy' firm for rescuing an ailing firm (Stallworthy and Kharbanda, 1988: 26- 
27,38-39). 
As regards the Baltic states' experience, some rescue mergers have 
occurred there. For instance, the Par SIA Massonyx Ltd / Latvija propane gaze 
transaction280 can be defined as a rescue merger. As a result of the acquisition 
over Lavija propane gaze by the Par SIA Massonyx Ltd, Riga Export a gas filling 
station / terminal is being used again for liquefied gas export and transit after 
several years of stand still. 
3.4.2.3.7. Avoidance uncertainty 
Through a vertical merger downstream or upstream links firms may 
resolve uncertainty. Vertical mergers may give managers enhanced control over 
the company's activities. This control may lessen the probability of foreclosure or 
price squeeze. The empirical tests proved that the avoidance of the uncertainty 
was the main motive for the vertical mergers in the period of 1948-1964. This 
motive forced conglomerate mergers to increase from 1965-1972 mainly through 
diversification (Goldberg, 1983: 52-65). 
Avoidance uncertainty may be defined as one of the motives in AS 
Tallinna Kille /AS Tallinna Soojus case281 in Estonia, where the AS Tallinna Küte 
active distance heating services acquired facilities from AS Tallinna Soojus 
necessary for production and distribution of heat by distance network. As a result 
of the transaction AS Tallinna Kille started to operate the production equipment 
and distance - heating network in the heat supply market. 
3.4.2.3.8. Diversification 
Diversification is generally defined as enabling firm to sell new products 
in new markets (Sudarsanam, 1995: 30). Thus, the diversification process occurs 
when a company extends `1.. ] its productive activities whenever, without entirely 
abandoning its old lines of product, it embarks upon the production of new 
280 For a further comments see the Annual Report of 2003, Latvia available at web-site 
http: //www. competition. Iv 
281 For a further comments see the Annual Report of 2001, Estonia available at 
http: //www. konkurentsiamet. ee/eng/index. html? ld=916 
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products, including intermediate products, which are sufficiently different from 
the other products it produces to imply some significant difference in the firm 's 
production or distribution programmes' (Penrose, 1972: 108-109). Here, the 
situation is very similar to a conglomerate merger, as discussed above. Some 
authors use the terms `diversification' and `conglomeration' interchangeab1Y282, 
others, as such Steiner states that `diversification' is mistakenly equalised with 
`conglomeration', and that `conglomeration' means something different from 
`diversification' (Steiner, 1975: 17-19). For Steiner `[.. ] diversified firms have well 
defined and similarly diversified competitors'. Therefore, conglomerate firms do 
not have natural limits as they do not have `[ .]a well 
defined interconnection 
among the products or services it provides that could be used to predict which 
products it might add to its line' (Steiner, 1975: 18)283. Moreover, some authors as 
such Morgan and others state that there are two basic types of diversification 
according to the extent to which new activities are related to existing ones. The 
`concentric' diversification, the first type, occurs when there is some relationship 
between the existing and new products through common marketing channels, 
material inputs or others. The second type is `conglomerate' diversification, which 
refers to moving into completely unrelated areas to the firm's existing activities 
(Morgan et al., 1980: 18-23). Furthermore, the authors admit that when firms 
diversify so far by including unrelated interests and cannot be referred to any 
particular activity, they may be classified as `conglomerates', however, the 
distinction is not always clear284. 
There is a theoretical possibility that companies through diversification, 
particularly, diversifying mergers, attempt to pool risk, transfer capital and/or may 
undertake such form of search for new investment opportunities (Cowling et al., 
1980: 303-317). A firm may diversify activity in order to obtain greater stability of 
earnings through spreading its business activities in different industries especially 
with different business cycles (Weinberg, Blank and Greystoke, 1979). There is a 
need for firms in the face of product and/or industrial life cycles to diversify their 
firm life cycles from those of existing activities (Cowling et al, 1980: 311). For 
282 The researcher will not try to distinguish `diversification' from the `conglomeration' and 
presumes in this thesis that the firms use the strategy to diversify through conglomerate mergers. 
283 Note: for further reading, see Steiner, Mergers: motives, effects, policies, University of 
Michigan Press, p. 17-19. 
284 For further reading, see Growth. Diversification and Mergers, prepared for the Course Team by 
E. J. Morgan, Open University Press, 1980. 
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instance, a demand in this case for particular products may be unstable, or may 
grow slow or even decline due to recession in general economic activity or the 
demand may be depressed because of successful competitors (Penrose, 1972: 138- 
142). Thus, for stability in the face of unfavourable fluctuations in demand or the 
risk of unexpected adverse conditions in the existing markets, diversification 
might be a solution to some of these problems as firms may spread their activities, 
which are expected to reach a peak at different times285. For instance, companies 
may find it profitable to produce other products, especially those are subject to 
seasonal fluctuations, `off season' using their existing resources and produce the 
main products during the peak season (Penrose, 1972: 139). A similar situation is 
with the introduction of a new product at a particular stage in order to achieve the 
maximum exploitation of the old product. A firm may introduce a new product 
while the old one is still `at peak' and by the time the new product will reach a 
peak, the old product declines. Spare resources, for instance, capital and/or 
management in stagnation or a dying industry may also cause diversification. 
There are opinions that diversification is a primary interest of managers, as 
shareholders can reduce risk more efficiently by dispersing their portfolio (Tichy, 
2001, Jervis, 1971). For Tichy, contrary to the 1960s this motive has lost its 
importance, as the acquisitions in closely related industries or markets are at the 
best performance 286. 
Diversification as a motive can be identified in several merger and 
acquisition transactions in the Baltic countries. For instance, the UAB Rubikon 
grupe (`Rubicon group) firm became a diversified firm (with 20 unified firms), 
more likely a `conglomerate' diversified type firm, in Lithuania though a number 
of acquisition transactions. The transactions involved acquiring 51% of the 
transport company UAB Katra287,100% of the metal-stone company AB Kazlu 
Rudos metalas288, the television channel UAB Vilniaus televizija and others. The 
motive of these acquisitions was to obtain greater earnings through spreading its 
285 Note: The product life cycle concept means that every product or line of business proceeds 
through development, growth, maturity and decline phrases (analysed by the Boston Consulting 
Group). When a new product is put on a market, there is a slow growth until consumers acquire 
knowledge and buy that product. The peak is at maturity phrase. After that the market becomes 
saturated and demand falls. 
286 Note: for further reading, see G. Tichy, What do we know about success and failure of mergers, 
ET NIpb, 2001. 
287 Decision No. 1S - 35,12/03/2004 available at web-site: http: //www. konkuren. lt 
288 Decision No. IS - 51,01/04/2004 available at web-site: http: //www. konkuren. lt 
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business activities in different industries, especially in perspective growing 
business sectors. 
3.4.3. Socio-political motives for merger 
3.4.3.1. Theoretical context 
Merger control is probably the most sensitive one in the competition 
policy field. This is mainly because mergers may lead to substantial new 
investments and national pride, massive lay-offs and so on (Broberg, 1998: 1). 
When companies make decisions about redundancies, they usually take into 
account the costs, which they will bear directly such as the costs of redundancy. 
Therefore, companies will not consider the costs imposed on society or the 
individuals concerned (Cowling et al., 1980: 239). Although, the EC merger 
control regime's major concern is to protect competition, social factors such as the 
impact of the deal on employees' jobs were considered by the Commission in a 
several cases, for instance, in Comite Central d'Entreprise de la Societe Generale 
des Grandes Sources289 case. Concern for the environment was a factor raised by 
the Commission in Philips / Osram case290, in which the Commission pointed out 
the existence of equipment to reduce emissions at the factory in which the joined 
entities was to operate291. 
3.4.3.1.1. Employment issues 
Theoretically, as regards employment policy, mergers may have two 
opposite effects. First of all, a merger may cause a decrease in job places, because 
one company will cease to exist in the market as a result of the merger. Second, a 
merger may lead to the creation of jobs in several situations: (i) where one 
company acquires another, which would leave a market any way, for instance, in a 
failing firm case; or (ii) it may contribute to employment gains in the future, if the 
owners expand their businesses (Kang and Johansson, 2000). 
289 Case No. T-96/92 
290 Case No. 5 CNLR 49 1994. 
291 For further comments on this issue, see Steiner and Woods, 2003, pp. 298. 
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Managers will generally benefit from the increase of a firm through a 
merger, as more and better jobs will be created. As a result of the increased work, 
it will be necessary to take on more assistants under the control of managers, in 
turn the wage of the managers will increase (generally, managers pay depends on 
the size of the department and number of people under their control) (Jervis, 
1971: 19). 
3.4.3.1.2. Employment and regional policy 
A merger may cause concern for a regional policy. For instance, a merger 
may lead to the rationalisation of existing firms with consequential effects on 
unemployment and regional vitality (Craig and Burca, 1998: 1036). This will be 
the case where the firm decides to close down one plant with a high marginal cost 
of production in the area, which has a high unemployment rate. As a result of the 
closure of the plant the unemployment rate will be even higher and will affect the 
society negatively. Further, this might cause people to leave the region and 
`follow the work'. 
3.4.3.1.3. Managerial / personal motives 
Firms expand because individuals want them to expand, either from 
personal ambition in order to promote their own self-interest or through a belief 
that there is some economic advantage in so doing (Jervis, 1971: 16). Through the 
merger managers may seek to increase market share, management prestige, reduce 
uncertainty and restore market confidence. For instance, managers may feel a 
prestige being a `vice-president' of a large company rather than a small one 
(Penrose, 1972: 163). Newbould (1970: 139) also found that a manager's motives 
for merger are often to increase the acquirer's dominant position in the market and 
to defend existing market positions. Managers may wish to expand their 
enterprises; since their salaries, perquisites and status often increase with size or 
sometimes managers have an ambition due to the prestige being in a large firm 
(this is largely known as the empire-building syndrome, which was the scenario in 
the WorldCom case discussed above). Furthermore, managers may have self- 
fulfilment motives such as willingness to deploy their currently underused 
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managerial talents and skills (Sudarsanam, 1995: 16)* The threat of being taking 
over and a secure job may be another incentive for managers to merge 
(Newbould, 1970: 184-185). The growth through a merger might be a defensive 
motive of avoiding becoming a takeover target; there is a presumption in a sound 
economic that it becomes less likely to take over a bigger efficiently operated firm 
than a small one. 
3.4.3.1.4. Political 
Issues of social justice may also be relevant in evaluating the effects of a 
merger, especially when this leads to a dominant position. For example, to allow 
for a single firm to dominate in an industry might be vital to national security, as 
it may grant the firm's owners more political power than is in society's interest 
(Hirsch, 1988: 7). In this case, the owners will seek to maximise their own interest 
without taking into account that it may be a detriment to the whole society's 
interest. 
In addition, a conglomerate merger may reduce the number of smaller 
firms at different levels and increase the merged firm's power. As a result, this 
power may be directed towards the financial strength into the political power and 
in turn through lobbying influence legislation or regulation to their benefits, 
thereby impairing the social and political goals of retaining independent decision 
making centres and harming the rest of society. 
3.4.3.2. Socio-political motives in the merger cases of the Baltic countries 
3.4.3.2.1. Employment issues 
Competition policy, in particular vis-a-vis merger control is not directly 
linked with the realisation of the employment policy. Rules of Latvian 
competition legislation do not allow setting up conditions on employment or 
considering other social issues during merger investigation processes (OECD 
report, 2002). A similar policy is applied in the Estonian and Lithuanian 
jurisdictions. However, the privatisation process has specific rules set up by the 
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government providing the obligations on employment realisation in a short period 
in privatisation transactions. 
Despite the general policy, some social issues were mentioned in several 
cases. For instance, in Latvia Statoil / Shell Latvia case (2003) with reference to 
the positive effects of the transaction it was stated that the merged entity would 
still remain a stable, secure and socially responsible employer and participant of 
the fuel market. In the Staburadze / NTBDC L Ltd / stock company `Laima' 
merger292 (2001) one of the negative aspects of the transaction was that there 
would be a decrease in the number of employees as a consequence of the 
operation. 
3.4.3.2.2. Political 
The policy of liberalisation process is to eliminate the influence of the 
government on business activity. However, it is important that it works vice versa, 
so that the business entities do not have an impact on the government policy 
and/or legislation process293. As aforementioned apart from the economic effects, 
merger transaction may also have political effects. The following example 
illustrates such a scenario, where a conglomerate firm (which has grown through 
merger/acquisition transactions) has had a political influence in Lithuania. 
Lithuanian law enforcement officials (i. e. the Special Investigations Service of 
Lithuania -a special branch of law enforcement with full investigatory and 
prosecutorial powers dealing with corruption in government) revealed that over 
292 For further comments on this case, see OECD Global Forum on Competition, Contribution 
from Latvia, 21/09/2001, CCNM/GF/COMP/WD(2001)3 available at web-site: 
http: //www. oecd. org 
293 An example in Lithuania illustrates such a scenario, which was the first of it's kind not only in 
the history of Lithuania but also within the European practice of the parliamentary powers. The 
president of the Republic of Lithuania Mr. R. Paksas was accused and sacked by the parliament 
after it was revealed that he had links to the Russian businessman Mr. Borisov, who has ties with 
Russian criminals. Mr. Borisov contributed the equivalent of £217,000 to Paksas's election fund 
for the 2002-2003 presidential election campaign and as a payback was required to arrange 
Lithuanian citizenship and a post as a social advisor of the president. Furthermore, a parliamentary 
investigation claimed that a firm `Almax', which also funded the election campaign of the former 
president Mr. Paksas, was a front of Russian intelligence and was also trying to `influence political 
processes in Lithuania' (Guardian, April 7,2004). As regards the violation of presidential duties, 
Mr. Paksas also illegally pressured private individuals to sell their shares of the road building firm 
`Zemaitijos keliai' to persons close to Paksas's inner circle for a significantly lower price than one 
determined by the market (Girdzijauskas, April 7,2004). As a result the former president of 
Lithuania Mr. Paksas was accused of six charges, including endangering national security, leaking 
state secrets and failing to prevent the abuse of power. 
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one year executives from the Rubicon group (one of the biggest company groups 
in Lithuania) gave politicians about one million litas (£1=5.0089 LTL294): a part 
of the money was paid to the political parties legally as official contributions, 
however, another part was paid in cash directly to certain politicians for the 
enforcement of favourable laws to the company. Law enforcement officials 
believe that some Lithuanian parliamentarians, in particular Mr. V. Andriukaitis, 
Mr. V. Kvietkauskas, Mr. A. Vidziunas and others, were on the Rubicon's secret 
payroll to introduce two laws: one on centralized heating and another one on the 
taxation of petroleum and natural gas resources, which were successfully pushed 
through parliamentary committees and adopted by the parliament. Furthermore, 
the mayor of Vilnius, the capital of Lithuania, A. Zuoka has also been involved 
with the Rubicon group. There have been constant reports over a year on the 
corruption involving the firm `Rubicon group' and the Vilnius municipality, 
mayor's office and the parliament295. The Rubicon group together with over 20 
companies belonging to the group is one of the biggest company groups in 
Lithuania that develops and invests into prospective business fields and offers 
new solutions and services for the Lithuanian market. In general, the companies 
belonging to `Rubicon group' are engaged in the fields of industry, utilities, real 
estate and entertainment. By 2004, sales of the company expanded by 48%, as a 
result of the acquisition of six new companies296. One of the companies belonging 
to the Rubicon group is UAB `Rubikon apskaitos sistemos' (now `Rubicon city 
service 297 ), whose several acquisition transactions were notified to the 
Competition Council of Lithuania for approval. These include the acquisitions of 
51% of shares of UAB `Livesta serviso centras' 298,51% of shares of the UAB 
`Katra '299,100% shares of the AB `Kazl Rüdos metalas 300 and 100% shares of 
the UAB `Vienituras' 301 in 2004. All these acquisition transactions were 
294 At the exchange rate dated 31/03/2005 by the Bank of Lithuania. 
295 Note: for further information, see web-site http: //www. laisvaslaikrastis. lt (available in English), 
dated on the 29th of June 2004. See also www. DELFI. It (15/07/2004,18/07/2004), ELTA 
`Lietuvos Zimos' 28/07/2004 etc. The latest news revealed that A. Zuoka, a mayor of Vilnius 
municipality, passed a land worth millions litas to the Rubicon group. The investigation continues. 
296 For further reading on the Rubicon group, see web-site: www. rubicongroup. lt 
297 The title was change as stated in the press release of the company's web-site: 
www. rubicongroup. lt dated 22/12/2004 
298 Decision No. 1S- 25,19/02/2004, available at web-site: www. konkuren. lt 
299 Decision No. 1S- 35,12/03/2004, available at web-site: www. konkuren. lt 
300 Decision No. 1S - 51,01/04/2004, available at web-site: www. konkuren. lt 
301 Decision No. 1S - 173,16/12/2004, available at web-site: www. konkuren. lt 
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considered as conglomerate and were approved without any conditions by the 
Competition Council of the Republic of Lithuania as having no significant impact 
on competition. However, as was stated above, mergers, especially conglomerate 
mergers with their ability to accumulate big financial power may be a threat to the 
political impartiality. As the illustration in Lithuania shows big conglomerate 
companies such as `Rubicon group' may influence legislation in their favour 
without any consideration of the society as a whole. The Competition Authorities 
in the Baltic states have no authority to prevent it as the consideration of any 
social or political issues falls out of their jurisdictions. Similar policy is applied in 
3o2 the Competition Authorities of Estonia and Latvia 
3.5. Merger motives trends in the Baltic countries 
Although the impetuses to merge in the Baltic countries are not entirely 
different from the theory, three trends of merger motives can be distinguished in 
the Baltic countries. As regards a domestic merger, the companies merge 
nationally in order to achieve efficiencies and as a result of it being able to 
compete internationally, for instance, AB Alita / AB Anyksciu Vynas. As regards 
cross-border mergers, foreign companies acquire or merge the national Baltic 
firms for an easy and quick way to enter in the unknown market. For instance, 
ICA Baltic AB acquiring local company in Lithuania UAB Ekovalda; Rurgas AG 
and E. ON Energie consortium acquiring the Lithuanian firm AB Lietuvos dujos 
(Lithuanian Gas) etc. Another international trend is the spill-over effects on the 
Baltic countries' markets as a result of the merger or acquisition transactions 
between parents companies, where the transactions involved had impact on three 
Baltic markets (i. e. Statoil / Shell; Kesko / ICA; or Telia Aktiebolag / Sonera 
Corporation) or on one market of the Baltic countries. Furthermore, as a case in 
Lithuania it shows merger transactions in the Baltic countries may have some 
social and/or political impact, however, these aspects fall outside the jurisdiction 
302 Although the researcher acknowledges possible socio-political effects of a merger transaction, 
especially in conglomerate merger cases, the research does not aim to prove whether these aspects 
should be (or not) taken into account by the competition authorities in merger analysis and this 
issue will not be further explored. 
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of the Competition Authorities of the Baltic states and will not be further 
examined. 
It is not the task of this thesis to find out all possible motives as to why firms 
merge. The focus of the thesis is to examine the rationale behind the mergers in 
order to understand their effects on competition. This chapter examined the 
impetuses for firms to merge in the Baltic countries. Also, it checked whether 
these motives have specific implications within the Baltic states in comparison 
with theory. Although the impetuses to merge in these countries are not entirely 
different from the theory, three main trends can be distinguished, as discussed 
above. The chapter also revealed socio-political aspects of merger effects in the 
context of the Baltic states. However, despite some socio-political effects of 
merger transactions, especially of conglomerate mergers, the research is not aimed 
at proving that these aspects should be considered in merger analysis. 
The following chapter will provide a further analysis on two main motives 
depicted from this chapter due to their controversial effects on competition. They 
are efficiency gain motive with so called `positive' effects on competition and 
market power with `negative' effects on competition. 
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Chapter 4. ECONOMIC APPROACH TOWARDS MERGERS 
`A lawyer who has not studied economics f. ] is very apt to become a public 
enemy' (Justice Brandeis, 1916 as quoted in Bishop and Walker, 1999: 9) 
The importance of economics in merger analysis cannot be challenged, as 
the merger control rules are heavily reliant on economics. Industrial economics is 
the area of economics that is most important for competition law, as this branch of 
the science exercises micro-economic tools, such as an individual's preferences 
for apples over pears and to wider market situations (Furse, 1998: para 1.4.2). 
This chapter involves the analysis of the economic theories of a merger 
transaction's effects on competition. According to an economic standpoint, 
mergers have immediate effects on the market's structure. First of all, they are 
about growth and/or may offer the immediate freedom from the nuisance of 
having to compete with each other, and may provide a `lazy' way to the creation 
or strengthening of market power. In this case merger transactions may make 
market structure more concentrated. Competition authorities have a task to 
prohibit potentially anti-competitive merger transactions in order to prevent the 
creation of market power or the significant impediment of effective competition. 
Secondly, mergers are not always about the harm on competition. These 
transactions may help to realise efficiencies, for instance, they may present the 
chance to re-combine assets in more efficient ways and/or to re-place poor 
management whose performance is inadequate or they can provide other 
allocative, productive and dynamic efficiencies, which will be further discussed in 
this chapter. Thus, mergers may help to realise efficiencies and make market more 
competitive. 
The previous chapter explained that one of the motive trends for merger in 
the Baltic countries is to achieve efficiencies. However, there is no statutory 
provision as regards merger-specific efficiency gains in the competition laws of 
each Baltic state. Taking into account the economic theories including one with 
specific implications on small economies (what is applicable for the Baltic 
countries), the researcher argues that not enough support is given by the 
Competition Authorities of the Baltic states to the merger's motive to achieve 
efficiencies. This chapter aspires to prove that merger-specific efficiencies play a 
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tremendous role in merger analysis due to their ability to offset market power. The 
researcher considers that further analysis is required on two countervailing 
motives discussed in the previous chapter with opposed effects on competition, 
because there is a trade off between them. They are efficiencies with a positive 
impact and market power with a negative impact on competition. The theory of 
harm of horizontal, vertical and conglomerate mergers will be discussed 
separately, as they might cause slightly different anti-competitive concerns. The 
aim of this chapter is to demonstrate that analysis of efficiencies is a necessary 
tool in the investigation of merger cases, because for economic theories the 
merger-specific efficiencies may offset market power. Furthermore, in the case of 
small economies, for instance in the Baltic countries case, market power may be a 
necessary evil that leads to a form of economic efficiency (Bork, 1978, Gal, 
2003). 
4.1. Efficiencies from an economic perspective 
4.1.1. Types of efficiencies 
Efficiency may be simply defined as getting maximum output from the 
resources available to the economy (Agnew, 1997: 135). There are three basic 
types of efficiencies usually distinguished in economic theory: allocative 
efficiency, productive efficiency and dynamic efficiency. Additionally, 
transaction efficiency is listed as a distinct type of efficiency by some scholars 
(see for instance, Kolasky and Dick 2002, Ross 2004), which will be further 
discussed. 
Allocative efficiency is achieved when the existing amount of goods and 
productive output are allocated through the price system precisely to buyers' 
wishes, as to those buyers who value them most, in terms of willingness to pay or 
willingness to forego other consumption. In this situation, market prices are equal 
to real the resource cost of producing and supplying the products at an efficient 
outcome. This means that producers cannot affect the market price and set their 
output at the point where marginal costs and marginal revenue coincide. 
Sometimes allocative efficiencies are referred to as Pareto efficiency, because in 
perfect competition economic resources are allocated in such a way that it is 
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impossible for anyone to be better off without making someone worse off (Whish, 
1998: 3). 
Productive303 efficiency is achieved when goods by a particular firm or 
industry are produced using the most cost-effective combination of productive 
resources available under existing technology, as products are produced at the 
lowest possible cost. Thus, productive efficiency is achieved when output is 
produced in plants of optimal scale (or a plant's minimum efficient scale, 
thereafter MES - this is the smallest output produced to minimise the long run 
average costs) given the relative prices of production inputs. According to Gal, a 
productive efficiency in small economies usually implies a situation, where less 
MES firms compare with large economies can be supported by the market 
because of a limited demand in small markets (Gal, 2003: Ch. 6)304 In general, the 
goal of productive efficiency implies the situation, where more efficient 
companies should not be prevented from taking business away from less efficient 
ones (Van den Bergh and Camesasca, 2001: 5). Allocative and productive 
efficiencies may also be achieved through cross-border merger transactions, by 
reallocating static resources. For instance, cross-border mergers may free up 
unproductive resources for more effective use elsewhere, i. e. in another country 
(OECD, 2001). If each country produces the particular goods or services in which 
it has a comparative advantage (the relative costs of production of the country is 
lower compare with the other countries), the global output of goods and services 
will increase (Mitchell, 2001: 344). Both allocative and productive efficiencies are 
of a static nature, where the technology is fixed and costs are related to a certain 
level (Jones and Sufrin, 2004: 11, Hildebrand, 2002: 8-9). There is also no time 
dimension in a static analysis as it checks only the equilibrium situation. 
However, in reality markets are rarely static. Many markets are dynamic, which 
evolve over time due to the introduction of new and improved products/services 
and new technologies. 
Dynamic efficiency is achieved over time through the invention, 
development, and diffusion of new products and production processes that 
increase social welfare. Thus, dynamic or innovative efficiency is related to the 
303 Or technical efficiency, as defined in other sources. See, for instance, Van den Bergh and 
Camesasca, 2001, pp. 5. 
304 In this case, the presumption is that the export is limited. 
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ability of a firm, industry or economy to exploit its potential to innovate, develop 
new technologies and expand its production possibility frontier. As was 
mentioned above, cross-border mergers may also have dynamic long-term 
benefits through technology and knowledge exchange and building up global R& 
D networks etc. In general, dynamic efficiency provides consumers with new 
and/or developed products in order to win the consumer battle. In this case, 
competition may have the desirable effects of stimulating technological R&D 
(Whish, 1998: 4). Thus, innovation generates welfare gains because of the 
realisation of dynamic efficiencies. 
Finally, transactional efficiency acknowledges that firms spend resources 
in order to define and protect property rights and mergers, for instance, they can 
mitigate the costs necessary to do this. Ross (2004) provides an example to 
illustrate this transactional efficiency. A firm which is about to issue a new 
product usually needs additional services, such as marketing or distribution in 
order to bring its product to market successfully. It may seek these services to be 
provided from specialist `partners'. However, there is a risk for the firm to lose 
profits to former partners who may copy its ideas and use for themselves, after it 
was revealed in the course of the partnership. Consequently, the innovating firm 
may undertake less innovative activity or it may spend inordinate sums to protect 
its ideas, or it may decide not to tell its partners all it should. Therefore merger in 
this case between these partners could create efficiencies by keeping all these 
services `in-house' and reducing any concerns about such `opportunistic 
behaviour' 305 
The problem is that allocative, productive and dynamic efficiencies cannot 
be simultaneously realised. As a result of this, competition authorities face a 
complex trade-off of expected static and dynamic efficiencies against expected 
anti-competitive effects. Thus, a proper welfare analysis of market power has to 
take into consideration both static and dynamic efficiency gains and also any 
trade-off between them (Hildebrand, 2002: 8-7). Before analysing the trade-off, 
possible anti-competitive effects caused by merger transactions ought to be 
discussed. 
305 The transaction efficiencies will not be further explored as the researcher considers that they 
can be covered under the other types of efficiencies. 
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4.2. Market power and the theory of harm 
A merger transaction may cause concerns because of the possibility to 
enhance market power, which in turn may lead to a decrease in social welfare. In 
perfectly competitive markets, a firm selling homogeneous products cannot affect 
the price (in a way that the price never exceeds marginal costs). This is because 
any attempts to increase price would result in loosing its customers. On the 
contrary, a firm in a domain of market power is able to raise the prices above the 
competitive level without loosing its consumers. Thus, mergers may have anti- 
competitive effects if it results in a significant increase in market power leading to 
price hikes (with the assumption that there are no offsetting efficiency gains) and 
a decline in output at the expense of consumer welfare. This is the scenario when 
the merged entity acts in a less competitive way than two or more pre-merger 
firms would have acted. The term `market power' in this case refers to `[.. ] the 
ability of a firm or group of firms to raise price, through the restriction of output, 
above the level that would prevail under competitive conditions and thereby to 
enjoy increased profits from the action' (Bishop and Walker, 2002: para 3.04). 
Hence, is recognised that market power for competition policy purposes matters in 
the situations where a firm or firms is able to maintain prices noteworthy above 
the competitive level for a sustained period of time and thereby earning significant 
profits (Camesasca, 2000: 60). 
Merger transactions may give fears about increased market power because 
of two main effects on market structure: (i) by increasing market concentration (as 
post-merger market share is larger than the pre-merger) these transactions may 
increase market power to a degree that varies according to the amount of price co- 
ordination already presented between firms; (ii) by reducing the number of 
effective players (competitors) in a market these transactions may make price co- 
ordination easier to achieve (Neven, Nuttall and Seabright, 1993: 25-26, 
Camesasca, 2000: 60-61). Market power matters because it may lead to allocative 
inefficiency and because it may worsen productive efficiencies. With regard to 
allocative inefficiency, a monopolist adjusts price or quantity to achieve the 
maximum profit. Since A. Smith (1723-1790) and D. Richardo (1772-1823), who 
described for the first time the price mechanism and which was further developed 
by other scholars, it has been known that if prices are raised above the competitive 
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price, some customers who would normally buy the product if it was available at 
competitive price, will not pay a higher price and as a result will spend money 
buying something else (here allocative inefficiency occurs). Furthermore, a 
dominant firm, which will raise prices, will have to produce less than it would 
otherwise have done. Thus, the monopolist expands output up to the point where 
the marginal cost of one extra unit is just equal to the marginal revenue, which 
that extra unit brings3o6 The monopolist's marginal revenue is below the market 
price; it means that the quantity of products to supply will be less than if it would 
be provided on a competitive market and thereby prices are higher than those in a 
competitive market (Jones and Sufrin, 2004: 9). 
The outcome set by monopolist above the competitive level is electively 
inefficient since there still remains opportunities for profitable trade, as there are 
still buyers willing to pay more for an extra unit of output than it costs to produce 
(Enterprise paper No. 11,2002: 11). If no firm in the market has a market power, 
firms are forced by competitive pressure to minimise costs and if they do not 
minimise costs, they may be forced to leave the business. In contrast, if a firm has 
a market power and its owner (-s) are not subject to external competitive pressures 
(e. g. from rivals, potential entrants or customers), they can relax and will not put 
effort into trying to minimise costs and to maximise profits in order to survive in a 
market, and, as a result, X-inefficiency 307 or organisational slack can occur 
(Martin, 2002: 392-399)308. This will lead to productive inefficiency. According to 
Posner (1976: ch. 1), the more important concern over high price is the waste of 
resources spent on acquiring and maintaining a market power, as these resources 
can be better spent on producing more goods and providing more services to 
consumers. There is a possibility recognised by economists that dominant firms 
may spend anything up to the value of their monopoly profits on, for instance, 
excess advertising, investment in excess capacity, brand proliferation, lobbying, 
or R&D. Some expenditure might be entirely unproductive, such as lobbying, 
306 Note: In economic terminology, profit is maximised at the point where marginal cost equals 
marginal revenue. Both competitive and monopolist firms maximise profit the same, one 
difference is that they face a different demand curve. The competitive firm is a price taker, as it 
cannot affect the price by changing its output. Meanwhile, a monopolist firm can affect it. 
307 Or `X-efficiency', as defined by Leibenstein, who described international inefficiencies and 
rising costs, because of high wages, excessive perks etc. See Leibenstein, 1966, pp. 392-415. 
308 For further reading of X-inefficiency, also see Martin, Advanced Industrial Economics, 2nd ed., 
Blackwell, 2002, pp. 392-399. 
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but other expenditure such as R&D might benefit consumers (Enterprise papers 
No. 11,2002: 12-13). However, the market power on R&D otherwise on 
innovation remains controversial. The next paragraph explains this. 
There are different opinions on the impact of market power on innovation. 
Schumpeter (1942,1977), who was the champion for the notion that market 
power is basically good for innovation, claimed that monopoly power is much 
more important than static price competition providing the climate under which 
innovation occurs. Furthermore, a monopolist may be more willing to bear the 
costs and risks of new investment. New products/services or improved 
products/services will not be introduced unless it appears profitable to do so. 
Firms have incentive to innovate, if they expect to increase their profits. Even in 
competitive markets firms invest in new projects, if the net present value of future 
returns comes along with the investment outlay and initial losses. Furthermore, 
new or improved products occur only, if firms earn more than just enough to 
offset their investment (Hildebrand, 2002: 8-9). According to Hildebrand, firms 
also try to make some profits from investments, where such profit means `[.. ] 
pricing above short run minimal average total costs either because there are 
barriers to entry or because the innovating firm has market power' (Hildebrand, 
2002: 8-9). Moreover, if the market functions well, then the creation of a temporal 
dominant position and the profits of a dominant firm attract other competitors, 
which bids away the excessive profit resulting in the marginal investment being 
just offset by the present value of future normal profit. This is because other firms 
will imitate new products and will take rewards from innovation. Only a firm, 
which can attain temporary market power, and delays the imitation of 
competitors, may make innovation attractive3o9 IPR310 in this case can play a role, 
as the grant of exclusive right can offer investor to exploit the invention for a 
limited period of time in order to reduce the risk of devaluation of the investment 
in R&D by free raiders and therefore provide an opportunity for the IPR owner 
to recoup investments at a higher level than would have been the case in a fully 
competitive market (Anderman311,1998: 5-6). 
309 For further discussion, see Hildebrand, 2002. Also see, For the customer's sake: The 
competitive effects in European merger control, Enterprise Papers No., 2002 pp. 13-14. 
310 Referring to Intellectual Property Rights. 
311 Professor Anderman in his book discusses the relationship between intellectual property rights 
and the EC competition law with emphasis 
being placed on articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty. 
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As regards mergers, some authors consider that the incentives to invest in 
R&D may increase because a merger transaction may help to secure sufficient 
rents to make it profitable to invest in innovation. This is because of monopoly 
gains, which provide a strong incentive for the competitors to imitate and capture 
a piece from the monopoly gains. The innovation, investment and other dynamic 
changes are the means for a monopolist to have a competitive advantage 312 
(Chiplin and Wright, 1987: 78). However, a recent study (Cohen and Levin 1989, 
Scherer 1992 and Cohen 1995) proved that there is little support for the claim that 
large firm size or high concentration is strongly associated with a higher level of 
innovation. R&D is taken strategically in response to the actions of competitors. 
Considering that R&D involves a high risk, a dominant firm would rather enjoy 
the current monopoly rent than invest in R&D (Ilzkovitz and Meiklejohn, 
2001: 5). Thus, recent empirical studies suggest that neither monopolists nor fierce 
competitors would definitely lead to increase in dynamic efficiency gains. The 
researcher agrees at this point with Prof. Whish that the presumption, which states 
that only monopolists can innovate, is incorrect (Whish, 1998: 4). 
Since different forms of merger may have distinctive anti-competitive 
concerns, a further analysis involves discussion of each of them. 
4.2.1. Horizontal mergers 
In assessing horizontal mergers, two principal categories of competitive 
harm may occur: unilateral or co-ordinated effects. The legal concept of a single 
firm dominance has often been equated with unilateral effects whilst co-ordinated 
effects have been matched with the concept of oligopolistic (or collective) 
dominance313. Unilateral effects are analysed in the `one-shot game' framework 
by meaning that `[.. ] firms do not take into account how their own actions of 
Although the researcher acknowledges the relevance of IPR in merger cases, the thesis is not 
aimed to cover this specific issue. 
312 Presuming that there are no entry barriers. 
313 Oligopoly in a sound economy is a market structure, which lies between perfect competition 
and monopoly on the spectrum. Oligopoly is defined as an industry with a few firms and many 
buyers, where the number of firms should be small for there to be `conscious interdependence' as 
each firm is aware that its future prospects depends not only on its own policy, but also on those of 
its rivals. See Griffiths & Wall, 1995, pp. 115. 
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today will affect competitors' behaviour of tomorrow' (Hofer, 7-8 October 2004). 
According to the theories of the co-ordinated effects, mergers may lead to `regime 
shift' where competitors adopt a `live - and - let - live' strategy 
314 The 
distinction between unilateral and co-ordinated effects hinges on the reactions of 
firms initiating price increases. A firm with unilateral effects does not depend on 
the reaction of its rivals to the pricing policies. Meanwhile, co-ordinated effects 
arise in a situation where firms are concerned about the reaction of their 
competitors (Geroski, 2005: 73). The importance of this distinction lies within two 
main questions, which need to be answered to explore the merger's effects: (i) 
will a merger transaction result in unilateral effects? if not, then (ii) will it lead to 
the more conducive market structure with the exercise of co-ordinated effects? 
(Geroski, 2005: 74). Since the distinction between unilateral and co-ordinated 
effects has been drawn, the following sections involve the analysis of each of 
them separately. 
4.2.1.1. Unilateral effects 
A firm is supposed to have single firm dominance, when it has unilateral 
effects, meaning that such a firm may increase prices profitably without relying 
on contra-responses from the remaining competitors. Two Cournot and Bertrand 
classical static models can help to explain the unilateral effects. Cournot's model 
assumes that firms compete by setting output to maximise profits assuming that 
the output of other companies is constant31s By contrast, Bertrand's model of 
pricing assumes that firms choose price but not quantity to maximise profits316. 
The price competition is often called strategic complements, due to the fact that 
the price increase of the merged entity would lead competing firms to increase 
their prices (probably to a lesser extent). This positive response from the 
314 For further reading, see speech of Hofer, Use of economics in merger control, delivered during 
the conference organised by the European Institute of Public Administration (EIPA), Maastricht, 
7-8 October 2004. 
315 Explanation: first, firm decides the quantity, as how much output to put into market and then 
the interaction of demand and supply curves determines the market-clearing price. For further 
comments, see P. Hofer and M. Williams, Horizontal merger assessment in Europe, The European 
Antitrust Review, 2005. 
316 Explanation: first, firm decides the charge for its products and then supplies the quantity, which 
is demanded at that price, which accordingly depends on the price set by its competitors. For 
further comments, see P. Hofer and M. Willaims, 2005. 
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competitors, will in turn lead to further price increase of the merged entity. 
Quantity competition, which is called strategic substitutes, refers to a situation 
where a reduction in the output of the merged entity, would lead the competing 
firms to expand their own output, although not up to the initial output level 
(Ivaldi, et al., European Commission, November 2003: 23-24). Both models 
demonstrate that the merging parties will have an incentive to raise the price 
above the pre-merger level, because of the reluctance of their rivals to undercut 
the price rise as they will be happy to follow any increases in price (Hofer and 
Williams, 2005). As a result, theoretically the models predict that all horizontal 
mergers will lead to price increases and if taken literally all mergers would deem 
to be prohibited. However, the economists suggest that these models provide only 
`a schematic representation of a particular mode of competition' and it would be 
a mistake to assume that all firms compete only on output or price in reality 
(Ridyar, Bishop and Baker, January 2003). 
The economic literature recognises two theories of unilateral effects, as 
they may arise in two basic markets: (i) with differentiated products (each product 
is not a perfect substitute for another); and (ii) with relatively homogeneous 
products (near perfect substitutes). In the first market, where goods/services are 
differentiated, a unilateral price increase may result depending on the `closeness' 
of the merging firms to each other. The closer substitutes products/services 
produced by merging firms are, the more likely a merger will result in a price 
increase (Ivaldi, et al., November 2003; Bishop and Walker, 1999). This is 
because if buyers see the products of the merging entities as very close substitutes, 
for instance, their first and second choices, it may be profitable for the merged 
firm to raise the price of one product, as its closely competing substitute will 
capture a significant run-off from the price increase. Another relevant factor is the 
number of firms, which are close competitors to the merging entities. For 
instance, if there are a number of firms that are close competitors, then the merger 
between two of them will not raise prices significantly. However, if there are only 
two close competitors, then the merger between them may lead to increase price 
significantly (Bishop and Walker, 1999: 146-147). For instance, the EC 
Commission in the case Volvo / Scania317 was concerned by the high degree of 
317 Case IV/M. 1672, [2001] OJ L143/74. 
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substitutability of products produced by both merging companies. Further 
concerns of the unilateral effects of the proposed transaction were also based on 
the fact that Volvo and Scania were main competitors in the Swedish heavy truck 
market. 
With regard to the second market, where products are relatively 
homogeneous, unilateral effects should not generally arise. This is because of 
intense competition: if one firm raises its price, it loses a tremendous amount of 
business to other competitors (with lower price) (Vistnes, 2005: 88). However, 
unilateral effects may still arise if the capacity of other firms is constrained and 
they will not be able to increase output. As a result consumers will be unable to 
switch off from the merged entity to the rest of the firms318. Thus, the competition 
authorities have the hypothetical question whether limitations on competing firms 
to serve the market would enable the merged entity to retain sufficient diverted 
sales to make the price increase profitable. While assessing whether a firm will 
have unilateral effects, many factors should be taken into consideration, such as 
the relationships between: the merging entities, the merged entity and the rest of 
the competitors and the customers of merging entities. For instance, if competitors 
are capable of repositioning their differentiated products or otherwise competing 
with the merged entity, or if there is a sufficient number of consumers, which are 
able to find economic alternatives for the products of the merged entity, then the 
anti-competitive effects of merger transaction should be mitigated. 
4.2.1.2. Co-ordinated effects 
If there are several big players in the market, unilateral effects are less 
likely (although not impossible) as oligopolistic dominance with co-ordinated 
effects are more likely to occur. By its nature, where firms know each other's 
identity and are affected by each other's decision on output and pricing, 
oligopolistic or collective dominance319 refers to the situation where the structural 
changes of the market caused by the merger raise the competing firms' ability to 
318 For further reading, see Bishop and Walker, The Economics of EC Competition Law, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1999, pp. 145-149. 
319 Collective, joint or oligopolistic dominance will be used interchangeably in this research. See, 
for instance, Whish, R., Collective dominance, as published in O'Keefe D., Andenas M., Liber 
Amicorum for Lord Slynn, Kluwer, 2000. 
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co-ordinate or to tacitly collude 320 their behaviour. Thus, such collusion not 
necessarily amounts to an express co-ordination, which would be prohibited by 
the cartel provisions but rather tacit collusion. However, economists recognise 
that a merger's impact on the scope for collusion is delicate to evaluate. This is 
due to controversial effects: as some merger transactions may facilitate collusion 
and in contrast, some mergers may make it difficult to achieve (Ivaldi, et al., 
November 2003). On one hand, a merger transaction may make firms more 
asymmetric, making it harder for firms to reach a consensus on the behaviour 
required as well as to discipline one another from the deviation of such 
behaviour 321. On the other hand, by reducing a number of players in the market, a 
merger transaction may make tacit collusion easier to plan 322. According to 
Geroski, the hallmark of tacit collusion is a common interest, which encourages 
companies to override the short run gain available to them by undercutting 
competitors through increased prices (Geroski, 2005: 72). In this case, tacit 
collusion contains monopoly elements, as the competing firms will determine 
their actions interdependently by concurring their strategy (i. e. to set up the higher 
price as near to monopoly levels323) with the firms involved324 (Camesasca, 2000: 
62-63). Meanwhile, in competitive markets the firms would be constrained from 
being involved in this strategy due to the presence of competitors, which would 
loose sales for the firm that increases prices. However, a problem occurs, when 
the best strategy for the post-merger firms is to keep higher prices but not to 
compete. In this case, such co-ordinated effects would result in a loss of consumer 
welfare, as consumers would be forced to either pay a higher price or the same 
320The term `tacit collusion' does not require involvement in any kind of `collusion' in a legal 
sense, as there is no need to involve any communication between the parties. See Ivaldi, Jullien, 
Rey, Seabright and Tirole, Interim Report for DG Competition, European Commission, November 
2003. 
321 For instance, firms may engage in Bertrand price competition with equilibrium being such that 
each firm cannot increase its own profits by changing its prices given the competitors' prices - this 
is so called Nash-equilibrium or the Prisoners' dilemma. This Prisoners' dilemma model shows 
despite the fact that both firms prefer a situation in which both firms charge a higher price, the 
incentive for one firm to charge a low price while its rival charges a high price will result in both 
firms charging a low price (Nash, 1951, as quoted in Bishop and Walker, 1999: 23). 
322 For further discussion, see Ivaldi, et al. Interim Report for DG Competition, European 
Commission, November 2003. 
323 Some scholars (i. e. Gal (2003), Lindsay (2003), ICN Merger Working group (2005) etc. ) also 
refer to decrease in quality, leaving the price unchanged. 
324 The assumption exists that there are significant entry barriers; otherwise, tacit collusion would 
be pointless since it would be undermined by new entrants. See Ivaldi, et al. Interim Report for DG 
Competition, European Commission, November 2003. 
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price but for reduced quality. The occurrence of co-ordinated effects depends on 
the firms' ability and incentives to act interdependently. The economic literature 
has produced various economic models of oligopoly in order to explain, why this 
occurs and what problems they can cause to competition 325. Identifying the 
factors, which would likely lead to co-ordination are the controversial task for the 
competition authorities. The ICN Merger Working Group (2005) suggests three 
main conditions for `the successful co-ordination': (i) the market's participants 
must be in a position to bring into line their behaviour either by co-ordinating on 
price, or quality, or output; (ii) it must be costly for the firms to avoid the co- 
ordination, as it will be a common interest for everybody to go along; and (iii) any 
competitive constraints (i. e. possible market entrants) must be weak. 
Economists agree that there is a correlation between the number of firms 
in a market, the size and the likelihood of collusion. For instance, the greater the 
level of concentration after the merger and the greater degree of equality between 
the shares of the larger firms, the more likely that those firms will tacitly collude 
their behaviour (Sleuwaegen, 1986, as quoted in Bishop and Walker, 1999: 151). 
Apart from the level of concentration, the following factors should be taken into 
consideration in order to indicate the likelihood of the co-ordinated effects. These 
are: 
i) inelastic market demand (when market demand is inelastic, then 
demand will not increase much even if firms lower the price); 
ii) information of the market conditions (the more transparent the 
market, the easier to spot the collusion); 
iii) homogeneity of firms and products (the more homogeneous 
firms and products are, the easier to agree among them); 
iv) the presence of maverick firms; 
v) the buyers power; 
vi) excess capacity (i. e. if firms have excess capacity, that gives 
them more desire to raise output and undercut the price); 
vii) the ease of entry; 
325 For discussion, see, for instance, Jones and Sufrin, 2004, Oxford University press, Ch. 11.; 
Bishop and Walker, 1999. 
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viii) size and frequency of the transactions (if transactions are large 
and rare, then collusion is harder to sustain than small and 
frequent transactions) (Bishop and Walker, 1999: 151-152). 
Also, the role of innovation should be added, as there is little scope of collusion in 
innovation-driven markets. The variety of economic models shows that an 
increase in concentration does not per se mean an increase in the ability to achieve 
higher prices through tacit collusion. The ability and incentive of a merged entity 
to be involved in tacit collusion has to be evaluated carefully by taking into 
consideration all the factors discussed above. 
Difficulties of assessing co-ordinated effects, which are recognised in the 
EC competition law, have occurred in several cases. One of the first 
Commission's cases with the analysis of co-ordinated effects was Nestle / 
Perrier326, where Nestle had made a bid for 100% of the shares of Perrier, the 
major French bottled water company. In this case the Commission argued that as a 
result of the transaction, the merged entity together with BSN, the second main 
supplier of French bottled water, would be jointly dominant, as the remainder of 
the market was shared by a number of much smaller competitors. By this case, the 
Commission proved that it is ready to prevent the creation or strengthening of a 
dominant position not only by a single firm but also of a dominant position held 
jointly by a number of firms, in this case Nestle-Perrier and BSN. Another highly 
cited case for co-ordinated effects is Kali and Salz / MdK / Treuhand327, where the 
transaction was prohibited by the Commission because of the concern that the 
merged entity and SCPA, a French potash producer would have about 80% of 
total Community production. The Commission's decision was annulled because of 
the alleged existence of structural links between Kali and Salz (thereafter K+ S) 
and SCPA, which is not a sufficient condition for the existence of oligopolistic 
dominance. In its judgement the Court stated that the Commission is under an 
obligation to assess whether the transaction `[.. ] because of correlative factors 
which exist between them' will create the necessary conditions for firms to co- 
328 ordinate their behaviour successfully . Following further annulments of the 
326 Case [1992] OJ L356/1. 
327 Case IV/M. 308 [1994] OJ L186/30; appeal C-68/94 and C-30/95. 
328 See paras 221 and 222. 
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Commission's decisions, i. e. France / Commission 329, Gencor / Commission330, 
and Airtours, plc / Commission cases331 due to a series of errors in the assessment 
of whether a collective dominant position might be created, three criteria were set 
out for finding a collective dominance. The first one states that there must be 
sufficient market transparency to enable each firm of the dominant oligopoly to be 
able to know how the other members are behaving and to monitor whether or not 
they are adopting a common policy. The second, the situation of tacit co- 
ordination must be sustainable over time, as the existence of deterrents to ensure 
that there is a long-term incentive not to withdraw from the common policy. The 
third, it must be established that the foreseeable reaction of present and future 
competitors and consumers would not jeopardise the common policy (Jones and 
Sufrin, 2004: 939-940). 
These errors in assessment of the cases discussed above have raised 
various opinions with regard to the substantive criteria of the ECMR to catch co- 
ordinated effects. Some authors expressed the view that the old ECMR was broad 
enough to catch mergers, which would create incentives and ability for the firms 
to sustain tacitly collusive agreements. Other authors in contrast stated that it was 
not broad enough to cover the creation or strengthening of collective 
dominance332. Nevertheless, the new ECMR and Guidelines of Horizontal Merger 
clarified the notion, that merger transactions in oligopolistic markets, which 
reduce the competitive constraints of the firms involved in the merger together 
with a reduction of competitive pressure on the remaining competitors may, even 
without likelihood of the firms of the oligopoly co-ordinating their behaviour, 
result in a significant impediment to effective competition 333. 
4.2.2. Non-horizontal mergers 
Vertical and conglomerate mergers are sometimes referred to in the 
category of non-horizontal mergers. However, they do not simply exist as a 
miscellaneous group of non-horizontal theories of competition harm (Priddis, 
329 Cases C-68/94, C-30/95; see also SCPA /Commission [1998] ECR I-1375, [1998] 4 CMLR 
829. 
330 Case T-102/96, [1999] ECR II-753, [1999] 4 CMLR 971. 
331 Case T-342/99, [2002] ECR II-2585, [2002] 5 CMLR 317. 
332 Further discussion on these issues is provided in chapter 6. 
333 See ECMR, recital 25 and Guidelines para 25. For further discussion, see chapter 6. 
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2005: 222). Like horizontal mergers, non-horizontal mergers may cause anti- 
competitive concerns due to the fact that they can increase a market power in 
different levels. Also, as in the case of horizontal mergers, non-horizontal merger 
transactions may create or strengthen market power because of unilateral or co- 
ordinated effects. Unilateral effects may occur if the products of the competitors 
after a merger transaction become less attractive substitutes as to how they were 
before the merger due to the higher prices, lower quality and/or the restrictions of 
entry. This leads to the creation or increase of market power of the merging firms. 
Co-ordinated effects, meanwhile, might appear if after the transaction it is easier 
for the remaining firms to enhance co-ordination and the collective exercise of 
market power. It means that by acting collectively firms will exercise more 
market power than acting on their own. (Church, September 2004). The co- 
ordinated effects depend on two main factors, which are: (i) there must be 
repeated interaction between the firms (they must compete over prices or 
quantities more than once); and (ii) firms must value future profits. Economists 
suggest that information of repeated interaction and the ability to react tomorrow 
to a rival's choice today provides an opportunity for firms to adopt history- 
contingent strategies in dynamic settings and that in turn may permit greater co- 
ordination and facilitate the exercise of collective market power334. 
The anti-competitive rationale of unilateral effects is based on identifying 
the ability and incentive of the merging companies to enhance their market power 
after the transaction. Meanwhile, in the context of co-ordinated effects the 
question arises whether such a transaction makes it easier for the remaining firms 
to co-ordinate their behaviour and it enhances the exercise of market power or in 
general, whether after the transaction the remaining firms will have the ability and 
incentive to collectively exercise market power. 
The presumed competitive harm of each category will be discussed in the 
following sections, as the researcher considers that the distinction between 
vertical and conglomerate mergers is necessary and should be discussed 
separately. 
334 For further discussion, see Church, 2004. 
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4.2.2.1. Vertical mergers. Theory of harm 
4.2.2.1.1. Unilateral effects 
The anti-competitive effects of vertical mergers on competition are widely 
disputed. According to Bork `[ .] in the absence of a most unlikely proved 
predatory power and purpose, antitrust should never object to verticality of any 
merger' (Bork, 1978: 245). Further to his finding, `[.. ] all so-called vertical 
merger cases should be handled through the application of horizontal merger 
standards' (Bork, 1978: 238). Froeb (Bureau of Economics, FTC, 2004) 
mentioned that vertical mergers may soften horizontal competition. The 
traditional concern is that vertical mergers may deny horizontal competitors 
access to the vertically related good or allow access but on terms which 
marginalise the horizontal competitors (Lofaro, 2004). Some authors believe that 
vertical integration through a merger causes firms to behave differently as it 
would in the absence of transaction. However, Bork proves such a presumption to 
be wrong, by stating that `[.. ] vertical integration does not affect the firm 's 
pricing and output policies' (Bork, 1993: 228). If a firm operates at both the 
manufacturing and retailing levels as a result of a merger, it maximises overall by 
setting the output at each level where the units were independent from each other. 
It is not economically profitable for the firm to sell to its own retail subsidiary for 
less than it sells to outsiders, unless the efficiencies of integration lower the cost 
of selling to its own retail unit. The reason behind it is a real cost of unit, which is 
the opportunity forgone. For instance, a firm will not sell to itself for less than it 
sells to outside firms, because the real cost of any transfer from the manufacturing 
to the retailing unit includes the return that could have been made on a sale to an 
outsider335. As a result, the artificially low price would force increased output at 
higher costs and the vertically integrated firm would pay more for the retailing 
function than it would if real costs were recognised and operated at a smaller scale 
on the retail level (Bork, 1993: 228). For this reason Bork and Chicago School in 
general supported the view that vertically related monopolies can take only one 
monopoly profit, notwithstanding that a vertically integrated firm has monopoly 
335 Thus, Bork emphasised to focus on opportunity cost rather than on book values. 
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positions in both manufacturing and retailing industries. If each level tries to 
maximise profit by restricting output, the result will be a price higher than the 
monopoly price and an output smaller, the result being less than a full monopoly 
return. Even if there is a monopoly in both manufacturing and retailing sectors, 
the monopolist will still face the same consumer demand and the same costs at 
both levels. This is because the new retail subsidiary will not be permitted to act 
independently and further restrict output since that would result in an output lower 
and a price higher than the maximising level. In this case it is not profitable to 
gain a second monopoly vertically integrated to the first one as there is no 
additional profit to be taken (Bork, 1993: 229). In the view of Chicago School 
theorists, vertical mergers do not create or increase the firm's power to restrict 
output and generally enhance welfare. However, the Chicago School's `one 
monopoly profit' story has been criticised because of over-simplicity. This single 
monopoly profit model is based on restrictive assumptions, i. e. fixed proportions 
of production, homogenous uses downward and the absence of price regulation. 
Recent modern theories of anti-competitive effects of a vertical merger 
assume imperfect competition up and downward before the transaction and are 
able to address the effects of the merger on competition (Church, 2004). The two 
basic theories are determined by either raising the costs or reducing the revenue of 
rivals, which involve customer foreclosure. The increase of rivals' costs involves 
input foreclosure. Input foreclosure occurs when the vertically integrated 
company after the merger either stops supplying competing downward firms (so 
called complete foreclosure) or supplies at a higher price (partial foreclosure), in 
both cases resulting in an increase in the price of the upward input and raising the 
costs of competing firms downward, thereby significantly impeding competition 
in the downward market. Customer foreclosure occurs when after the merger 
transaction the integrated firm downward stops sourcing supply from the 
independent upward firms. Both input and customer foreclosure were analysed in 
Skanska / Scancem case 336 , where the 
Commission concluded that given 
Scancem's current dominant position, there would be significant scope for the 
merged entity to raise the costs of its competitors. Also, the merged entity may 
affect the sales of competing producers by reducing purchases from them. In 
336 Case IV/M. 1157, [1999] OJ L183/10. 
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contrast to the Chicago school theory, the input foreclosure hypothesis assumes 
that the integrated firm after the transaction has an incentive to change its 
behaviour, because it will internalise the effect on downward prices when setting 
its optimal price in the market for the input337. For instance, the Commission in 
Boeing / Hughes case338 identified six potential effects of the transaction and 
further examined whether the merged group would have an incentive and ability 
to engage in upward foreclosure. The Commission in this case raised the 
questions whether the merged entity would engage in upward foreclosure in order 
to maximise the profit and if so whether it would be practicable to implement such 
strategy. In particular, as regards this context, the Commission stated that `[.. ] it is 
necessary to examine whether the merged entity would gain more through 
additional launch service contracts than it would lose through lost satellite 
contracts, if it were to engage in such behaviour'339 . 
In general, the strategy of upward foreclosure may be profitable because of 
the following factors. First, it may force downward competitors to leave the 
market this in turn reduces the competitive constraints on the merged entity in the 
downward market and enables it to exercise market power in its own right by 
profitably raising prices. Second, it may raise the cost of marginal industry 
production, which in turn may force downward rivals to reduce their output and 
increase their prices, enabling the merged entity to gain downward market share 
by undercutting its competitors. Also, it can profitably augment its prices at a 
downward level in the `shadow' of its downward competitors' price increases. 
Third, it may deprive competitors at the downward level from the economies of 
scale by increasing their marginal costs (Lindsay, 2003: 368-369). 
However, the economists admit that if the merged entity lacks substantial 
market power in the upward market, then in this case any attempt of the merged 
entity to engage in upward foreclosure will be overwhelmed by, for instance, 
switching of consumers to suppliers who have a spare capacity and can supply at 
the pre-merger price34o Bearing in mind this theory, Lindsay (2003: 375) argued 
337 The assumption is that there is an additional benefit from the increase in input price, which is 
higher downward profit from the increase in prices and also market power downward. 
338 Case Boeing / Hughes, COMP/M. 1879. 
339 Comp/M. 1879, Para 83. 
340 See Bishop and Walker, 1999, pp. 157-158; Lindsay, 2003, pp. 373, Viscusi, Vernon and 
Harrington, 2000, pp. 223-229. 
161 
the Commission's reasoning in the Vivendi / Canal +/ Seagram case341 at this 
point is not clear `[.. ] why downstream competitors of Canal + in the supply of 
pay-TV services could not simply obtain content from one or more of the other six 
major studios', if as proved by the Commission the merged entity did not hold a 
dominant position in the upward market342. 
The second part of the theory of harm by vertical merger transactions is 
the reduction of rivals' revenues, which involves customer foreclosure. It may 
lead to a reduction in sales volume and this reduction in turn may cause an 
increase in the marginal (or average) costs of the rivals upward depriving them 
from achieving economies of scale. As a result the integrated firm will gain 
greater market power upward and higher input prices due to the reduction of the 
competitive constraint on the integrated firm. The higher input prices may result 
in input foreclosure downward. This input foreclosure gives the vertically 
integrated company a further cost advantage downward and increases its market 
share. By contrast, the increase of the market share of the integrated firm reduces 
the demand for its competitors upward343. The difference between the input and 
customer foreclosures is that under the input foreclosure the vertically integrated 
firm stops supplying downward firms thereby creating market power for its 
competitors upwards, which leads to the increase in its market power downward. 
Meanwhile, the task of the customer foreclosure is to create the market power 
upward; therefore, an increase in prices downward may also occur. In both cases 
of input and customer foreclosure, the traditional anti-competitive concern is that 
a vertically integrated firm with market power in one market after the transaction 
may leverage that power into a separate market. Bishop and Walker (1999) also 
support the view that vertical mergers may raise competition concerns only if one 
or more than one party involved in a merger possess a market power at the 
horizontal level344 
341 Case COMP/M. 2050. 
342 See para 43, where the Commission referred that a refusal to supply by upward operator 
(without dominant position) can strengthen a dominant position held by the merged entity in a 
downward market. 
343 For further analysis, see Church, September 2004. 
344 This is because vertical integration involves complementary products and with complementary 
products each firm wants the other to lower the price of its product, for further reading see Bishop 
and Walker, pp. 8 6-101. 
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A vertical transaction may create barriers to enter if there is a need to enter 
two markets instead of one. This might be a severe problem when economies of 
scale are significantly different in two levels (Areeda and Hovenkamp, 2002: para 
755c as quoted in Lindsay, 2003: 387). This theory was applied in the EC practice 
in the Nordic Satellite Distribution case 345 The Commission prohibited the 
transaction because the vertical transaction would enable the merging parties to be 
able to foreclosure the Nordic Satellite TV market for its competitors and also 
obtain a gate-keeper function for the Nordic market for satellite TV broadcasting. 
To date there are no Guidelines from the EC with regard to vertical and/or 
conglomerate merger transactions 346. The US Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
provide that three conditions must be satisfied for a vertical transaction to create 
barriers to entry. The first condition is that there is a necessity for a new entrant 
wishing to enter the primary market to enter the secondary market simultaneously. 
The second condition is that the need of entry at the secondary market must make 
entry at the primary market significantly more difficult and less likely to occur. 
The last condition is that the structure and other characteristics of the primary 
market are otherwise conducive to non-competitive performance that the 
augmented difficulties of entry are likely to affect its performance 347. 
Economists admit that to date they still have an incomplete understanding 
of the motivations and effects of vertical merger transactions, and there is no over- 
arching principle to identify specific circumstances where a vertical foreclosure is 
rational and thereby is likely to occur (Caffarra, 2005: 224-225, Tirole, 1998: 193). 
4.2.2.1.2. Co-ordinated effects 
Economists suggest that unlike unilateral effects, co-ordinated effects from 
a vertical merger are small and recent. The economic literature recognises the 
following co-ordinated effects of vertical merger: (i) a vertical merger transaction 
may eliminate a disruptive buyer and enhance incentive to co-ordinate; (ii) it may 
put steps towards upward firms' ability to monitor each other's pricing and 
identify deviations from co-ordinated outcomes; and also (iii) a vertical 
aas Case IV/M. 490. 
346 There is a promise from the Commission to issue such Guidelines in the near future. 
347 See The US Non- horizontal merger guidelines, available at web-site: 
www. usdoj. gov/atr/public/guidelmes/2614. htm 
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transaction may increase transparency by creating a conduit (i. e. the downward 
subsidiary) for the exchange of information between upward firms (Church, 
2004: 241-242). Vertical merger transactions may eliminate disruptive buyers (a 
buyer which is able to obtain lower prices from its supplier before the transaction) 
and it will likely have an incentive to co-operate with the other upward firms to 
raise input prices upward rather than push it down for lower prices in the input 
market providing with a competitive advantage downward, which is the behaviour 
of the disruptive buyer348. Co-ordination at the upward level may be difficult if 
prices are not transparent. Therefore, vertical integration may provide a firm with 
information on the costs of retailing, allowing more information to be obtained 
about wholesale prices from retail prices. 349 As regards the last factor, a vertical 
merger may create a more transparent environment for the exchange of 
information regarding prices and other information. For instance, presuming the 
downward subsidiary after the transaction continues to purchase from the rivals 
upward of the vertically integrated entity, there is the potential for the downward 
firms to transfer information regarding the prices and offers of those rivals to its 
upward division. Moreover, Riordan and Salop (1995: 558-560) state that there are 
certain conditions for information exchange under these circumstances in order to 
facilitate co-ordination. These conditions are that the information has to be 
project-able, unique and the input market must be conducive to co-ordination 350 
However, economists further argue that there is another side to the story. 
A vertical merger in a relatively un-integrated vertical structure can destabilise 
and reduce the extent of co-ordination upward. This is due to the fact that the 
vertically integrated firm creates a maverick by forming asymmetries between 
upward firms 351 A vertical merger can be pro-competitive, if it has an incentive 
and ability to expand its sales secretly through its downward subsidiary. Also, the 
incentive to increase sales arises if the vertical merger eliminates double 
marginalisation3sz 
The most recent studies of vertically co-ordinated effects are presented by 
Nocke and White (2004). They identified two reasons why co-ordination is more 
348 For further discussion, see Church, 2004, pp. 247-249. 
3a9 For further discussion, see Church, 2004, pp. 249-250. 
"0 For further discussion, see Church, 2004, pp. 250-252. 
351 Situation is similar as discussed about horizontal mergers. 
352 The US Antitrust authorities take into account this theory, see the US Merger Guidelines, 
Section 2.1.2. 
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likely due to integration. The first one is outlet effect, where an un-integrated rival 
finds deviation from the co-ordination less profitable if there is a vertically 
integrated rival. This is because it cannot replicate the monopoly profit when it 
deviates because it is not able to sell to 353 In this case foreclosure from the 
vertically integrated firm's downward division makes deviation less profitable. 
The second reason is the so called reaction effect, because the vertically integrated 
firm can react to the deviation in the same period in which it cheats. Thus, the 
deviating firms can be punished as the integrated firm can expand output in the 
cheating period thereby reducing the incentives for cheating. Also, Nocke and 
White were able to show that the outlet and reaction effect always exceed the 
3s4 punishment effect and vertical integration makes co-ordination easier 
4.2.2.2. Conglomerate mergers. Theory of harm 
4.2.2.2.1. Unilateral effects 
Conglomerate mergers, like vertical mergers also raise different opinions 
between scholars with regard to their effects on competition. The Chicago School 
scholars suggest that unlike horizontal mergers, conglomerate mergers do not 
conventionally raise competition concerns. Similar to vertical mergers, 
conglomerate mergers do not put together rivals and do not restrict output through 
an increase in market share and therefore, do not threaten competition (Bork, 
1978: 248). Also, the Chicago School theorists supported the view, that there is no 
incentive for a conglomerate merger to be involved in tying or bundling because 
of `one monopoly profit'. However, this may be true in only some 
circumstances 355 
As regards recent theories, there are two different opinions on the practice 
of bundling. In the US the current opinion advocates a `laissez faire' approach 
towards bundling practice. Ahlbom, Evans and Padilla (2003) suggested a so 
353 For further discussion, see Church, 2004, pp. 252-253, as Nocke and White based their theory 
in the existence of certain conditions. 
354 See Church, 2004, pp. 254. However, they admitted that there is not clear how the result will 
generalise if there is more than one vertically integrated entity. 
ass Lindsay (2003) gives an example, when one monopoly profit is true. For instance, a situation 
where an attempt to tie from a monopoly market to a competitive market with constant return to 
scale. For further comments see pp. 399. 
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called modified `per se legality' rule of bundling on the basis that the efficiency 
gains of bundling are ubiquitous, meanwhile, the anti-competitive effects of 
bundling are highly non-robust. Another group of economists admit possible anti- 
competitive effects of conglomerate merger transactions, which may have 
unilateral or co-ordinated effects. The researcher does not support the view that 
the `laissez faire' approach towards bundling should be taken. In contrast, taking 
into account the current state of economic literature, the author tries to present the 
situations when anti-competitive effects as a result of conglomerate merger 
transactions may occur and further if they can be offset by efficiency gains. 
There are three types of anti-competitive activity in which a conglomerate 
firm may be involved; these include tying, bundling, or foreclosure356 (Church, 
2004). Tying357 occurs in the acquisition of complements. For instance, when 
purchases of product A (the tying product) also requires buying product B (the 
tied product) now and in the future. Tying is most profitable in the situation where 
consumer valuations of the two products are positively correlated, as where the 
consumers giving the greatest value on product A also place the greatest value on 
product B (Lindsay, 2003: 397). There are two types of bundling. Pure bundling 
arises when products cannot be sold individually but are required to be bought 
collectively as a group of products. Pure bundling is the most profitable in a case 
where consumer valuations of the two goods are correlated and negatively and if 
the marginal costs of production are low. If marginal costs are low then the 
producer has an incentive to increase output through the sale of the bundled 
product (OECD, (2002)5: 35). In a mixed bundling situation358 consumers may 
purchase individual products separately, or pay in total a lower price but only if 
the products are purchased as a bundle. Mixed bundling as the key element was 
356 There are other theories of leverage with a similar effect to tying or bundling, such as full-line 
forcing, exclusive dealing, cross-subsidisation, predatory pricing, and control of information. 
These theories will be not discussed in this thesis due to their similarities with the effects of tying 
and bundling in the sense that they may eliminate or marginalise competitors. See Lindsay, 2003, 
pp. 408-409. 
357 Traditionally, in the literature tying and bundling are used interchangeably, as there is an 
assumption that consumers demand a single unit each of two products A and B and in this case 
make a tie indistinguishable from a bundle. However, Church (September, 2004: xx) states that 
there is a difference between a tie and a bundle, because the former is more likely to involve 
divisibility. For example, a tie, which requires a purchase of two units of B with every unit of A is 
not the same as offering to sell a package of four units of B and two units of A. 
358 An example of mixed bundling as presented by Lindsay (2003) pp. 398, is an offer of a 
restaurant to customers to buy a set and an a la carte menu. 
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analysed by the EC Commission in GE / Honeywell case3s9 The Commission 
claimed that the merged firm would have incentives to bundle its avionics, for 
instance, aircraft communication and navigation equipment, and non-avionics 
products, such as wheels, lights and other parts, with engines, at a discount to 
single product purchases, which competitors would be unable to offer. This in turn 
would mean competitors being unable to cover their fixed costs due to deprivation 
of revenues and as a result it would affect their spending destined for R&D on the 
next generation of products, meaning that they will not be able to compete 
effectively with respect to future platforms. In general terms, the Commission in 
this case feared that the strength of the combined positions of the merging entities 
would allow GE to engage in exclusionary product bundling with the ultimate 
effect of a foreclosing market for single product line competitors, namely Rolls 
Royce in aircraft engines and Rockwell Collins in aerospace components (Grant 
and Neven, 2005: 595-633360) 
Foreclosure occurs when after a transaction, a firm has a greater variety of 
products, providing the opportunity to foreclose by not making its products 
compatible with the products of its rivals. In this case, the firm will have a 
portfolio advantage (Church, September 2004). The main concern of the 
`portfolio' doctrine is that a firm acquiring different brands competing in separate 
markets may acquire a market power in excess of the sum of its parts. 
Conglomerate mergers by uniting complementary products in which at 
least one enjoy significant market power (the `tying' market) may leverage its 
power into another market (the `tied' market). As a result a sufficient number of 
competitors may be forced to leave a market. Thus, there is a possibility that the 
forced tying and pure bundling may have negative effects on welfare, especially in 
the long term. A scenario very similar to this is portfolio power. The merged 
entity with a wider portfolio of products than its rivals, can force them to leave the 
market as a result of lost business, if the competitors cannot match the merged 
entity's portfolio and customers are likely to switch to the merged entity's 
portfolio because they prefer it. As a consequence of this, customers will be worse 
359 Case COMP/M. 2220,05 February 2001. The Commission also placed some emphasis in this 
case on pure bundling as theoretical future behaviour of the merged entities in relation to new 
generations of aircraft. 
360 This case was highly criticised by a number of scholars for not sufficiently robust theories and 
evidences that the Commission relied on. See, for instance, Grant and Neven, 2005, pp. 595-633. 
Also, see Pflanz M. and Caffarra C., The Economics of GE/Honeywell, 23 ECLR 115,2002. 
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off because the merged entity will be able to profitably raise prices or otherwise 
harm consumer welfare due to weakened competitive constraints (with a 
presumption that rivals have left the market) (Lindsay, 2003: 413). The concept of 
portfolio power, as mentioned in chapter 3, was defined by the Commission in 
Guinness / Grand Metrolopolitan case 361 However, the Commission's decision 
has been highly criticised by some authors not for definition of portfolio power, 
but for failing to support the notion, why it is wrong for a firm to gain a wider 
portfolio (Jones and Sufrin, 2004: 963). 
The probability of reduction of welfare is higher depending on the 
following elements: 
i) market power (the higher the degree of a market power in the 
`tying' product); 
ii) the weaker the efficiencies; 
iii) rivals' costs (the greater increase in competitors' cost resulted 
from the merged entity's tying strategy); 
iv) buyer power (the larger number of buyers interested in 
purchasing only the tied product); 
v) reaction of rivals (the more rivals find it impossible or 
unprofitable to match the tying or bundling behaviour of the 
tying firm); 
vi) increase in price (the more certain that the price will eventually 
rise above pre-merger levels due to foreclosure effects, i. e. 
buyers will be unable to prevent such a price rise, companies 
will be unable to profitably enter the market after prices have 
risen above pre-merger levels, and the tying firm will have an 
incentive to raise prices above pre-merger levels); 
vii) the more the expected long period price increases above pre- 
merger levels will be sufficiently large, quickly realised and 
durable that the tying firm will be able to re-coup any 
opportunity losses due to reducing its rivals' sales. 
361 Case IV/M. 938, [1998] OJ L228/24. 
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As a result of these factors buyers will suffer a net loss in the long-term despite 
any initial post-merger drop in prices 362 However, the problem that the 
regulatory authorities have to deal with is that foreclosure in conglomerate 
mergers may have much more indirect effects even than in a vertical merger case. 
Moreover, Kuhn, Stillman and Caffarra (September, 2004) suggest three 
elements rule for competition authorities in determining when intervention against 
bundling is justifiable as a matter of economics. The first element is a `safe haven' 
rules when intervention should be avoided. The intervention should take place 
only if the following conditions are met: (i) the firm in question has a dominant 
position in one market which is affected by bundling, (ii) the bundled products are 
complements, and (iii) it is significant and costly to overcome asymmetry in the 
product lines of the dominant firm and its competitors 363. The second element 
refers to the cases, which fall outside the `safe haven'. During this stage the anti- 
competitive effects should be determined. Lindsay (2003) suggests using the 
three-step analysis for the investigation of conglomerate mergers, which can be 
applied in this stage. First, the merged entity has to have the incentive and ability 
for leveraging. Second, this leveraging has to have a significant effect through 
elimination or marginalisation of the competitors (i. e. the exclusion issue). Third, 
there must be a causal link between the merger transaction and the adverse effects 
identified in the first and the second steps364. The third and final element of the 
whole analysis of conglomerate mergers is the evaluation of potential efficiency 
benefits arising from a conglomerate transaction. 
The Commission also considered possible anti-competitive effects 
imposed by conglomerate mergers in the Tetra Laval / Sidel case36s In this case 
the Commission argued that as a result of the transaction, the merged entity would 
be able to exploit its dominant position on the carton markets by leveraging into 
the market for PET packaging equipment in order to dominate it. However, the 
Commission's decision was annulled by the ECJ on the basis that the Commission 
362 For further reading see OECD, Portfolio Effects in Conglomerate Mergers, 
DAFFF/COMP(2002)5. 
363 Note: Kuhn, Stillman and Caffarra state that the more homogenous the components are, the 
fiercer price competition becomes component by component and as a result the benefits of a 
bundling strategy become minimal. Products are `complements' when an increase in the price of 
one decreases the demand for the other. 
364 This approach was used by the Commission in T-5/02 Tetra Laval BV case. 
365Case T-5/02, [2002] ECR II-4381, [2002] 5 CMLR 1182. 
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had failed to establish foreseeable conglomerate effects to the requisite legal 
standard. Also, the Court distinguished mergers where the conglomerate effects 
would be structural, as arising directly from the created economic structure and 
mergers, where the conglomerate effects might be behavioural, as arising only in a 
case if the new entity engages in certain commercial practices366, to which the 
Tetra Laval case referred, where future conduct was in question rather than 
market's structure. It was necessary for the Commission to prove that the merged 
entity's ability and incentive to leverage and the consequences of this must be 
plausible and occur in the near future, as competition will be significantly 
impeded in the near future367. Moreover, the Advocate General stated that while 
evaluating the Commission's assessment of the likelihood of the merged entity 
involvement in anti-competitive behaviour, `[.. ] the Commission had assessed the 
economic incentives for engaging in such conduct, so it ought to have taken into 
consideration the possible disincentives in that respect of the unlawful nature of 
the conduct in question' (Opinion, 25 May 2004: para 123). 
4.2.2.2.2. Co-ordinated effects 
The theorists recognise that a conglomerate merger will introduce a multi- 
market contact368, which in turn will enhance co-ordination and augment the 
scope of punishment. The empirical studies presented by Greve and Baum 
(2001: 6) define the importance of multi-market contact for `[.. ] higher prices, 
lower production volumes, higher profits, and lower failure rates for incumbent 
firms'. There have been a number of studies done by several scholars, which 
demonstrated that multi-market eases co-ordination. For instance, Scott (1993, 
2001) states that multi-market contact facilitates to reach a tacit agreement or to 
identify the co-ordinated outcome in the market. Matsushima (2001) shows that 
multi-market contact competition facilitates the detection of deviations when 
monitoring is not perfect otherwise prices are not observable. Bernheim and 
Whinston (1990) have examined the effect of multi-market contact on the scope 
366 See para 147. 
367 See para 153, as a second part of the substantive test of old ECMR. 
368 Note: multi-market contact occurs in the situation where firms compete against each other in 
multiple markets, i. e. either by competing in different product markets or different geographic 
markets. 
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for punishment and hence sustainability. In general, multi-market contact as 
presented by a number of scholars makes co-ordination easier, i. e. by reaching an 
agreement easier or making enforcement more effective, in the presence of certain 
369 circumstances 
4.2.3. Constraints on market power 
Despite negative effects of market power on competition, a firm in a 
domain of market power cannot vegetate, as there are the factors that may 
constrain its market power. A dominant firm will not be profitable unless there are 
barriers to entry on the supply side of the market and no adequate substitutes for 
the product supplied on the demand side. As regards the demand side, customers 
may be sensitive to price increase, for instance, if the price of meat increases, 
customers may choose to buy fish instead. From the supply side, if, for instance, 
there is one successful firm that profitably produces some products or provides 
services, its profits may be noticed or guessed at by other firms, which are 
encouraged to enter the market and to produce or provide something similar 
(Lane, 2000: 9). 
Thus, the theory suggests that not only the present competitors in the 
market may discipline dominant firms in their market behaviour, but also the 
potential competitors, especially in a situation where sunk costs of production in a 
market are very low. Moreover, a merger, which increases market power and may 
lead to a rise in price and reduction in output, may be offset by any cost 
reductions associated with the merger transaction. 
4.3. The trade-off between efficiency and the choice of welfare standard 
The comparison of the length to which mergers extend market power 
against gaining efficiencies has been recognised as a highly complex and 
controversial subject. Even the impact of mergers on all three types of efficiencies 
is unlikely to be in the same direction or magnitude (Mano, 2002: 14). Hence, the 
competition authorities face complex trade-offs. 
369 For further discussion, see Church, 2004. 
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Economists recognise two basic types of efficiency trade-offs: (i) 
allocative versus productive efficiencies; (ii) static versus dynamic efficiencies. 
Firstly, a static perspective refers to the statement that mergers often lead to both 
reductions in allocative efficiency and increases in productive efficiency. 
Secondly, mergers can have both static and dynamic efficiencies that may work in 
opposite directions: a merger can lead to immediate overall anti-competitive 
effects and at the same time enhance consumer welfare in the long run (Mano, 
2002: 14). 
The trade-off between allocative and productive efficiencies is considered 
in a widely recognised model developed by Oliver Williamson (1968: 18). On 
Williamson's view for the net allocative effects to be negative `[.. ] a merger 
which yields non-trivial economies, must produce substantial market power and 
result in relatively large price increases' (Williamson, 1987: 8). This model would 
permit a merger that increases `total surplus' 370 notwithstanding an increase in 
prices above the competitive level. The cost savings resulting from efficiency 
gains generated by the merger must exceed the `dead-weight loss' caused by the 
price increase. For Marshall (1966: ch. 3 and 4) `dead weight' refers to the 
situation, where consumers lose and this loss is not gained by the other group of 
society. It means that society is worse off as a whole, because those who continue 
to buy the product at a higher price have less money to buy other products 
compared to the pre-merger situation and those, who no longer buy the product 
after the price increase spend their money on less valued products. The size of the 
`dead weight loss' is a function of the elasticity of demand for the relevant 
product and the anticipated price increase. The model typically requires 
calculations over a range of possibilities, because those values cannot be precisely 
known. 
In general, Williamson's Naive trade-off model 371 hypothesises that 
horizontal mergers are generally beneficial, because the loss suffered by 
consumers resulting from an increase in price is more than outweighed by gains to 
370 Total surplus is the sum of producers' surplus and consumers' surplus. Producer surplus is the 
variance between the price in the market that producers collectively receive for their products and 
the sum of those producers' respective marginal costs at each level of output. Meanwhile, 
consumer surplus is the difference between what a consumer is willing to pay for a good and what 
the consumer actually pays when buying it. 
371 For further reading see Williamson, 0., Antitrust Economics: Mergers, Contracting, and 
Strategic Behaviour, Basil Blackwell, 1987, pp. 1-23 
172 
producers; otherwise, the gainers gain more than the losers loose. According to his 
consideration `[ 
.]a relatively 
large percentage increase in price is usually 
required to offset the benefits that result from a5 to 10 per sent reduction in 
average costs372' (Williamson, 1987: 23). This model welcomes efficiencies, as 
the realisation of efficiencies through a merger may increase total economic 
welfare. It is unnecessary to pass on efficiency gains directly to consumers as the 
aggregate social welfare is already augmented by achieving efficiencies within the 
flrm373. Williamson's total welfare model requires relatively large price augments 
for the net allocative effects to become negative. 
However, Williamson's model has been criticised by other authors. Given 
the simplicity of Williamson's model, the application of the theory in practice 
requires a more complex analysis by taking into account various other factors 
such as pre-existing market power, differing demand assumptions and other firms' 
competitive reaction to increased market power. Considering a wealth transfer 
from consumers to producers, it is not clear, to what extent a merger, which 
results in a price increase, should be permitted under Williamson's model, 
provided the resulting efficiencies are potentially sufficient to compensate 
consumers for any harm caused (Mano, 2002: 16). As mentioned above, 
Williamson's model has only a static approach and it does not take into account 
the dynamic nature of competition, for instance, consideration of the effects of a 
merger on technological progress: the model also does not have any concern in 
practice, which lies with the future development of the market. Economists 
recognise that in a dynamic economy competition in product or process 
innovation may have a more significant effect on welfare whether positive or 
negative, at least in the long run, than does any likely variation in price (Mano, 
2002: 17). Even if dynamic efficiencies benefit consumers no less than productive 
efficiencies, they are inherently more difficult to measure, thereby making their 
use more problematic in the trade-off analysis implicit in the defence (OECD, 
1996). Therefore, Williamson's model can be called `naive' because 
demonstrating that a merger is likely to bring about greater efficiencies that the 
372 Note: this conclusion is absolute: a variety of qualifications such as timing, incipiency, income 
distribution, political considerations, technological progress and managerial discretion, and others 
may upset this in any particular case. 
373 For further reading, see Camesasca, 2000, pp. 42-46. This model does not distinguish which 
one society member will gain more. 
173 
dead-weight loss believed to result from the merger will be more difficult than 
suggested by his model. Nonetheless, Williamson's model served the purpose that 
the potential benefits resulting from merger transactions should be recognised in 
addition to their costs (Gal, 2003: 200). 
The analysis above shows the trade-off between the allocative and 
productive efficiencies, but does not explain what kind of mergers would be 
socially desirable. Williamson's model evaluates the efficiencies from unit cost 
savings over the total industry output, in the assumption that all firms in the 
industry participate in the merger, though in practice this is rarely the case 
(Roeller, Stennek and Verbove, December 2000: 32). Farrell and Shapiro (1990) 
proposed a methodology to evaluate externality created by a merger transaction 
without a need to rely on internal efficiency claims. Farrell and Shapiro (1990) in 
their model assumed a merger to be privately profitable and showed that it is a 
sufficient condition for a merger to be socially desirable, if its net external effect 
is positive. The external effect in this case is referred to as the sum of the change 
in consumer surplus (which is usually negative) and the change in competitors' 
profit (which is usually positive). According to Farrell and Shapiro's analysis, 
privately profitable but price-increasing merger will also be profitable socially as 
far as the initial joint market share of the merging parties does not exceed some 
upper limit. (This upper limit is a weighted sum of the market shares of 
competitors, where the weights are the expected changes in competitors' output as 
a response to the merger. If the competitors expand their output in response to the 
merger transaction, then a significant welfare gain can be provided374). In this 
case, a positive external effect signifies an increase in social welfare. Thus, if 
externality is positive, then the merger transaction must also increase total welfare 
since the proposed transaction may be expected to be profitable (Roeller, Stennek 
and Verbove, December 2000: 32). However, Neven, Nuttall and Seabright (1993) 
in commenting about this model raised the question as to whether and how a 
negative external impact of a merger should be evaluated against any potential 
efficiency gains to the merging entities375. Moreover, substantial empirical studies 
374 Note: Farrell and Shapiro proved that the more concentrated level among remaining firms, the 
more it is likely that the merger transaction will enhance welfare externally. 
375 Note: considering the restriction of the analysis that the only gains which can be traded off 
against a loss of consumers surplus are increases in competitors' profits excluding any private 
gains to merging parties. 
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have presented doubts on this assumption that only mergers, which can be 
expected to be privately profitable, will be undertaken (Neven, Nuttall and 
Seabright, 1993: 35-36). Nevertheless, Roeller, Stennek and Verboven (2000) 
suggest not underestimating Farrell and Shapiro's contribution because they 
pinpointed the importance of the effect of a re-allocation of output to competitors, 
which was traditionally ignored. They also showed that due to this effect merger 
transactions may even be beneficial when no internal efficiencies are achieved. 
4.3.1. Total welfare standard 
Total welfare standard as already described above corresponds to 
Williamson's model. According to this model, the main objective of antitrust law 
is to increase total welfare by allocating resources through the price system to 
those users (either producers or customers) who value them most (Brodley, 
1987: 1020, as quoted in Camesasca, 2000: 43). In this case, even mergers, which 
lead to higher prices, should be approved by the competition authorities if the 
efficiency gains achieved by producers outweigh the losses experienced by 
consumers. For this standard both producer and consumer welfares have the same 
value to society as a whole. Some economists. recognise that intolerance to re- 
distributive effects of mergers has good reasons. First of all, it is difficult to 
determine the ultimate rate of wealth re-distribution as a result of a merger. 
Secondly, bearing in mind, that winners and losers can be identified, there is no 
basis which one group deserves more. An example to support this standard, is that 
very often many consumers are also indirect shareholders, for instance, through 
pension funds (Mano, 2002: 18-19). 
4.3.2. Consumer welfare standard 
An alternative to the total surplus standard is the consumer welfare 
standard. The consumer welfare standard states that the goal of competition policy 
is to prevent increases in consumer prices, because of the exercise of market 
power of a dominant firm. According to the consumer welfare standard a merger 
ought to be authorised, if the gains in productive or dynamic efficiency are so 
substantial as to ensure that the price will not increase and that the merger will not 
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result in a wealth transfer from consumers to producers. Thus, unlike the total 
welfare standard, the consumer welfare model considers the re-distribution of 
welfare from consumers to producers harmful rather than neutral. This can be 
explained by the Pareto optimum, where it is impossible to change so as to make 
at least one person better off without making another one worse off (Camesasca, 
2000: 42). 
As regards efficiencies, this model is more critical of efficiency claims 
than the total welfare model due to the fact that efficiency gains must be passed 
on to consumers, for instance, in the reduction of prices. In other words, the test 
under the consumer welfare standard is whether, after accounting for cost savings 
and other efficiency gains the post-merger profit maximising price376 is not higher 
than the pre-merger price. As stated by Mano (2002) the producers will not 
increase prices above the pre-merger price, because the new efficiencies are so 
large as to cause their profit maximising price to be no higher than the pre-merger 
price. This is because the extra production becomes smaller due to efficiencies; 
the total net effect becomes positive, because the added revenue from the price 
decrease exceeds the added production cost. Thus, producers can still increase 
profits by reducing the price, causing marginal revenue and marginal cost to be 
equal at a higher level of output (Mano, 2002: 19). 
In general, there are three components of consumer welfare (Lindsay, 
2003). As mentioned above, the first component is value for money. Consumer 
welfare enhances if the price of goods/services is reduced or the quality of those 
goods is increased whilst the price is not changed. Price and quality are connected 
where a price means the sum payable for a good/service of a particular quality. 
However, a consumer is not interested in the quality of a good/service, unless the 
consumer also knows its price (Lindsay, 2003: 3). Quality is important because if 
prices in a market reach marginal costs, this may lead to a switch from higher 
quality to lower quality goods/services; indeed, this situation depends on the 
consumers and their sensitivity to price. The second component is consumer 
choice. For instance, if consumers have different tastes, then consumer welfare 
may increase if they can choose from a wider variation of products. The last 
component is innovation. Consumers may benefit and consumer welfare may 
376 Note: in economic terminology profit is maximised at the point at which marginal revenue 
equals marginal cost. 
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increase, if new products are developed, on the basis that there is actual or 
potential demand for the new products (Lindsay, 2003). 
4.3.3. Balancing weights standard 
As well as the total and consumer welfare models, there is also a balancing 
weights approach. In contrast to the total welfare standard, the balancing weights 
standard is based on distributional issues. The idea of the balancing weights 
model is that it takes both consumer and total welfare into consideration, but 
places greater value on losses of consumer welfare than on gains in producer 
welfare. Theoretically, a merger according to this model should be approved if the 
weighed sum (reduction in consumer welfare and increase in producer gains) is 
greater than zero. This model was applied in the Canadian jurisdiction in the case 
Superior Propane377. In this case the Court in overturning the Tribunal's decision, 
which was based on the total welfare test, stated that this standard was too narrow 
and advised using a balancing weights test; and this test take into account a 
deadweight welfare loss and give a value to the re-distributive effects of the 
merger transaction. The biggest shortage of this model is that the EC competition 
policy is not equipped to address such distributional concerns (Mano, 2002: 23). 
4.3.4. The trade-off of efficiency of vertical and conglomerate mergers378 
4.3.4.1. Vertical mergers 
Economists agree that like horizontal mergers, vertical mergers may also 
increase efficiencies. There are opinions that the motivation for non-horizontal 
mergers is to realise efficiencies but not to enhance market power (Sunshine, 
1995, Riordan and Salop, 1995). Vertical mergers may enhance efficiencies and 
thereby benefit consumers, because of the following factors, which can be 
distinguished into three main groups: (i) production efficiencies and savings; (ii) 
internalisation of vertical externalities and alignment of incentives; and (iii) 
377 The Commissioner of Competition I Superior Propane Inc., April 2002 
378 According to Williamson, vertical and conglomerate mergers may be treated under the general 
framework as horizontal by applying the same formula as in the Williamson's Naive model 
(Williamson, 0., 1987: 22-23,24-38). 
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transaction cost savings 379. The scholars point out a number of different 
production efficiencies and cost savings, which arise because of the enhanced co- 
ordination380 as a result of transaction. Vertical merger may eliminate inefficient 
input substitution, which results in lower costs (Church, 2004: 17-23). For 
instance, if there are two inputs (monopolistic and competitive) and these two 
inputs are substitutes for each other and can therefore be used in variable 
proportions, then an upward monopoly firm has an incentive to integrate 
vertically. This is because the upward monopolist's intention to increase prices 
will result in switching to the alternative input supplier at the downward level. 
Vertical merger transaction will result in increased efficiency in input choices in 
this situation; however, economists admit that the implications of it for consumer 
welfare are ambiguous (Lindsay, 2003: 364). Furthermore, Riordan and Salop 
(1995: 523-524 as quoted in Church, 2004) stated that efficiency gains achieved 
from co-ordination in both the design and production of vertical mergers involve 
lower costs, increase quality, make shorter lead times, improve quality control, 
reduce cost of inventory and optimise production runs etc. 
As regards vertical externalities 381 and exclusivity, advantages from 
enhanced co-ordination from exclusivity may arise from the alignment of 
incentives with the vertical level, prevention of free-riding, quality certification 
and creation and maintenance. For instance, due to integration, producers can 
share information regarding market conditions and their promotional plans with 
their retailer and be less concerned of leaking information to competing 
producers. Exclusivity may also eliminate any incentive of a retailer to lower its 
costs and thereby increase its profits by substituting lower quality products. In 
general, a vertical merger aligns more closely the welfare of a downward firm 
with the upward. In the absence of vertical merger, the producer's incentive to 
invest in the retailer and/or its products is reduced because of free-riding382 of 
383 other producers 
379 This grouping is presented by Church. Others like Lindsay distinguish three main sections: 
transaction costs, double marginalisation and variable proportions. 
380 Note: here, the referral is on common ownership but not on co-ordination that gives co- 
ordinated effects concern. 
38' Externalities in this context mean that the actions of one entity have direct affects on the 
welfare of another entity. 
382 Free riding here means benefits attained by other firms without putting any efforts or bearing 
any costs. 
383 For further discussion, see Church, 2004, pp. 284-285. 
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Through a vertical merger, transactional efficiencies may be attained in a 
case of purchasing an upward monopoly supplier to avoid or mitigate its 
opportunistic behaviour. Transaction costs tend to be high when opportunistic 
behaviour is likely, for instance, if a firm is dependent on a monopoly supplier of 
an essential input. Also, transaction costs may be high when there is substantial 
uncertainty or when extensive co-ordination is required, for instance, in 
combining R&D activities (Lindsay, 2003: 360-362). In general, according to 
Lindsay (2003) transactional efficiencies facilitate for firms to achieve allocative, 
productive and dynamic efficiencies. 
Moreover, vertical mergers may lower price because of internalisation of a 
vertical pricing externality, otherwise, double marginalisation. Double 
marginalisation occurs when downward firms mark up over their marginal costs, 
because of a market power upward exceeding the marginal cost of the upward 
producer. This means that there is a mark up on a mark up or otherwise, double 
marginalisation. In this situation a vertical merger would eliminate the wholesale 
market transaction and one mark up, thereby reducing the marginal cost 
downward, resulting in both a lower price downward and increased profits 
(Church, 2004: iv). 
This section has showed that vertical mergers may increase efficiencies. 
The proposed framework introduced by Church (2004), who discussed the most 
recent theories on vertical and conglomerate mergers, pointed out that non- 
horizontal mergers require, after the indication of anti-competitive effects, to give 
an opportunity to the parties involved in a transaction to demonstrate that the 
possibility of the efficiencies gained from the transaction to offset the harm 
associated with market power. 
4.3.4.2. Conglomerate mergers 
As with other types of mergers transactions, conglomerate mergers may 
also have potential anti-competitive and/or pro-competitive effects on 
competition. After discussing anti-competitive effects of conglomerate 
transactions, this section involves the analysis on pro-competitive effects. 
Conglomerate mergers may provide benefits by revitalising ailing companies and 
industries, improving management efficiencies, transferring technical and/or 
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marketing know-how across traditional industry lines and/or simply by providing 
financial support for firms, that need it the most. Economists distinguish two main 
categories of benefits achieved through the efficiencies arising from the 
production side, and from the consumption (Kuhn, Stillman and Caffarra, 
September 2004). The production side efficiencies may arise only, if consumers 
have an interest to buy products together. There might be a case when there are 
economies of scope in the assembly of complementary parts of a product. For 
instance, it would be cheaper for manufacturer to assemble a car rather than for an 
individual customer buying the parts separately and assembling it by him/herself. 
The economies of scope in consumption arise when there are advantages for 
consumers to buy complementary products from the same firm rather than from 
two or more separate suppliers. The motivation behind this is transaction cost 
savings. For instance, a consumer may benefit from shopping costs, for example 
buying various types of goods at department stores or supermarkets (so called 
`one-shop-shopping') rather than shopping in several different shops. 
Hence, conglomerate mergers may achieve economies of scope or 
transaction economies and as a result reduce prices or provide other advantages 
for buyers. Despite that, the concerns of the authorities are that efficiencies gained 
by conglomerate mergers will be used to induce competitors to leave the market. 
New entrants will be unable to enter the market because of the cost level and the 
strategy of the tying firm, buyers will not have countervailing powers to lower 
prices and as a result the merged entity will be able to raise prices above the pre- 
merger level. In this case the competition authorities will be forced to balance 
short term gains against long term losses of buyers (OECD, (2002)5: 7-11). 
However, some scholars are of the opinion that these theoretical assumptions 
hardly work in practice. For Bork, conglomerate mergers do not create the ability 
to restrict output (Bork, 1993: 249). Furthermore, economic theory does not define 
that tying always or nearly always will lead to anti-competitive effects. The 
arguments that monopoly power through tying 384 can be extended from one 
market to another have also been discredited (Bishop and Walker, 1999: 158-160). 
384 tying and bundling here are applied interchangeably. 
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4.4. Implications on small market economies 
There are a number of criteria to define a market's size. Population or 
GDP are normally the most common criteria to define a market size or one of the 
relevant measures of smallness in a conventional sense. The meeting of the OECD 
Global Forum on Competition in 2003385 raised a variety of definitions of small 
markets and divided the substantive issues into three categories, which are: (i) 
based on economic factors; (ii) based on `political' considerations; and (iii) based 
on special enforcement issues. 
The first category attributes to the tendency of small economies to have 
high levels of concentration and domestic firms operating at less than minimum 
efficient scale. This definition may need to include measures of concentration and 
entry barriers, and even some measures of smallness such as population or GDP. 
Furthermore, this tendency may mean that competition rules in these economies 
should be more tolerant to mergers, which may increase efficiency. 
The second group according to the OECD relates to the competition law 
enforcement implications of small size in the conventional sense such as 
population or GDP. The issues, which may arise from this aspect of smallness, 
relate to enforcement problems, such as the scarcity of qualified staff, the costs of 
an enforcement agency, evidence gathering problems and so on. 
The last category addresses the implications of the legal, institutional, and 
economic issues, and is common for developing or transition economies. In 
contrast to developed countries, competition culture and competition law and 
policy of developing or transition countries is still in its infancy. 
On one hand, the Baltic countries are defined by scholars as belonging to 
small market economies (Venesaar, Hachey, 1995; Haavisto, 1997). On the other 
hand, the Baltic countries have been analysed as economies in transition. The 
Baltic countries can be defined by all features found the three groups as described 
above. They have high concentration levels in some industries, i. e. the dairy 
industry, small population and that they still belong to transition economies. Gal 
(2003) argues that there is no need for all industries to be highly concentrated for 
an economy to be considered small, as some industries in small market economies 
385 See CCNM/GF/COMP(2003)5. 
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may be competitive, as for instance, retail services. In general, a small economy is 
an independent sovereign economy and can support only a small number of 
competitors in most of its industries (Gal, 2003: 1). According to Gal (2003,1-2) 
market size can be influenced by many factors such as population size, population 
dispersion, openness to trade being the main factors, and others such as 
consumption patterns, taste preferences, income levels and the availability of 
technology being supportive factors. As regards the Baltic countries, they have a 
small population, which in Estonia is only 1.3701 million, in Latvia 2.3774 
million and in Lithuania 3.484 million (2000 round of population, 2000/2001 
statistics). The Baltic states do not have population dispersion over a large 
geographic area and in this case it does not create several small local markets 
within a geographically large jurisdiction. Furthermore, the size of an economy is 
also influenced by other factors, i. e. geographic, economic, technological, legal, 
cultural and political, which may create market borders. The Baltic countries are 
not geographically isolated markets, unlike, for instance, Malta, Jersey or New 
Zealand. However, the political situation has played a significant role in isolating 
the Baltic countries, as a part of the USSR, from Europe and the rest of the world 
by closing certain passages to trade and by preventing trade between adjacent 
jurisdictions. Thus, until 1991 foreign trade was nonexistent in these countries as 
they were a part of the Soviet Union. The Baltic countries are not integrated to 
each other, as the heaviest ties were with the Soviet Union/Moscow and regard 
themselves more as competitors than partners in the world economy (Lainela and 
Sutela, 1994: 119). After re-gaining their independence the Baltic states had to 
build their entire foreign trade systems from scratch. The Baltic states expressed 
the desire to integrate their economies with the rest of the world, therefore the 
governments in these countries started to dismantle the restrictive and inefficient 
trade regimes inherited from the Soviet Empire. All Baltic states apply a liberal 
foreign trade system in order to attract foreign investors, Estonia being the leader 
with no import licensing and import tariffs since signing the free Trade 
agreements with the EU in 1994. These countries have turned foreign trade from 
the East to the West. However, it has been a difficult task for local producers to 
break through the ice to Western markets due to unknown brand names and 
unknown trade-marks. As regards entry barriers, there was an exclusive 
prerogative of the State in Lithuania to produce alcohol until 1 April 2004 (the 
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new law had changed it). Furthermore, national markets can still be defined due to 
differences in cultural aspects or taste, despite the integration policy of the EU's 
Single Market and markets becoming more international. The researcher does not 
consider that the Baltic markets are already highly integrated within the EU, as the 
integration is still an on-going process and domestic markets can still be 
distinguished in the Baltic states. For instance, different taste in the Baltic 386 
countries and cultural preferences may also slightly affect trade levels. 
The main difference from large economies is that small economies with 
small population size limits demand and reduces the number of firms that can 
serve the market efficiently. The next section involves analysis of efficiency gains 
in small market economies. 
4.4.1. Efficiencies in small market economies 
Merger control is an important mechanism for small market economies 
because of two main reasons. First of all, merger transactions increase 
concentration in a market structure. For small market economies, which are 
usually defined as having concentrated markets, mergers may lead to a further 
concentration, simply because these transactions reduce the number of market 
players and increase market shares of merging entities. Also, merger transactions 
may facilitate tacit collusion or co-operative behaviour. Second, merger 
transactions may enhance efficiencies, which were not attainable in the pre- 
merger situation. The technology of production may be such that average costs 
decrease over the entire range that encompasses the market demand and as a result 
the lowest unit costs are achieved only when one seller serves the market (Kwoka, 
Lawrence and White, 1999: 13-14). For instance, mergers may allow firms to 
overcome insufficient size to achieve the efficiencies, which may arise in 
oligopolistic structures of small market economies. In some markets the MES of 
operation can be achieved by one or two firms with approximately 50% of market 
share, where the situation is close to natural monopoly. According to economists, 
a natural monopoly occurs when given the current technology of the industry the 
demand conditions allow no more than one firm to cover its costs (Lipsey and 
386 The geographical market definitions in the majority of merger cases have been defined as 
national ones. 
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Chrystal, 2004: 186). Furthermore, in a natural monopoly case there is no price at 
which two firms can both sell enough products or provide services to cover their 
total costs. For instance, suppose there is an industry's technology where a firm's 
minimum achievable average cost is £10, which is reached at an output of 10,000 
units per week. Assume that at this price (£10) the total quantity demand is 
110,000 units per week. In these circumstances only one firm can operate at or 
near its minimum costs387. Whish (1998: 8) further suggests that where natural 
monopoly situations exist, it is inappropriate to attempt to achieve a level of 
competition and as a result to destroy the efficiency, which the merger transaction 
entails. 
Moreover, Gal (2003) also stated that smallness has adverse effects for 
domestic market structure and performance. In some industries size really matters, 
particularly where limited demand constrains the development of a critical mass 
of domestic productive activities, what is necessary to achieve the lowest costs of 
production. However, in small market economies even when productive 
efficiency is achieved, these economies still cannot support more than a few 
market players in most of their industries. In this case concentrated market 
structure may need to become further concentrated in order to achieve minimum 
efficient scales. Even a merger to monopoly can lead to reduction in prices. 
Bearing in mind that competition policy's concerns are to prevent creating anti- 
competitive market structures, as in monopoly or oligopoly situations, which may 
lead to an adverse impact on prices and output, finding the balance between 
productive efficiency gains and competitive conditions in small market economies 
is challenging (Gal, 2003: 4-5, Ch. 6). 
Furthermore, rigid policy toward mergers may prevent desirable 
efficiency-enhancing merger transactions in small market economies to take place 
and instead entrench inefficient market structures. This rigid merger control 
policy is especially undesirable when economies become increasingly exposed to 
international competition 388. According to Gal (2003) there is a need for firms to 
merge in order to increase their international competitiveness. Merger policy in 
this case should not prevent local firms in small market economies from 
387 For further reading, see Lipsey and Chrystal, Economics, 10th ed., Oxford university press, 
2004. 
388 See Gal, 2003, Ch. 6 for further comments. 
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overcoming competitive disadvantage, which results from limited domestic 
demand. As is the case in the Baltic states, after re-gaining their independence and 
after joining the EU, local firms in these countries have faced international 
competition. This in turn leads to the assumption that merger transactions between 
domestic firms are the best response for the Baltic countries to meet their foreign 
rivals. Thus, a merger of domestic firms should be treated favourably even if they 
increase the level of concentration within the market (Gal, 2003: 2001). The 
protection of competition in this case may prevent local companies achieving the 
minimum efficient scale necessary to face competition with foreign firms. 
The earlier approach towards merger control in the EC, which prohibited 
concentrated market structures that may have anti-competitive effects without 
taking into consideration offsetting efficiencies, has changed. The modernisation 
of the ECMR has explicitly introduced the relevancy of efficiency issues in 
merger investigation 389. Apparently, this approach is still applied in the 
Competition Authorities of the Baltic states, as there is no explicit efficiency 
defence in these countries. There are some thoughts that for large economies the 
efficiencies may still be created as most of their industries include a large number 
of companies which have already realised their economies in scope and scale. 
Meanwhile, for small market economies the adoption of such a policy would 
result in the prevention of many beneficial mergers (Gal, 2003: 196). 
4.4.2. Welfare standard for small market economies 
As discussed above there are two basic welfare standards applied in 
competition policy. They are total welfare and consumer welfare standards. A 
balancing welfare standard can also be added, which has a part of each total and 
consumer welfare tests. Gal (2003) suggests that the total welfare standard should 
be in favour in small market economies for several reasons. Firstly, considering 
that most markets in small economies are concentrated, it will mean that a high 
standard of consumer welfare390 may lead to market stagnation of oligopolistic 
structures that not only charge supra-competitive prices, but also do not achieve 
389 Further discussion will continue in chapter 6. 
390 Note: high standard in this case means that consumer welfare standard requires benefits passed 
on to consumers unlike total welfare standard. 
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productive efficiency. The total welfare standard, meanwhile, will reduce 
productive and dynamic inefficiency. Secondly, the consumer welfare standard 
may conflict with the other goals, such as increasing the international 
competitiveness of domestic firms. Furthermore, the consumer welfare test may 
not achieve distributional goals, in the sense that for the consumer welfare 
standard test there is equal treatment between the loss to each consumer and the 
benefit to each shareholder. 
However, the total welfare standard also has its limitations. Bearing in 
mind globalisation processes and the increase in cross - border transactions, the 
total welfare standard might reduce rather than increase domestic total welfare. It 
may be the case, where the merging parties of one or both of them being foreign 
owned or is in the general control of foreign shareholders or production facilities 
are located outside national jurisdictions, then the total welfare approach, which 
ignores the nationality element of owner or shareholders, may increase the total 
welfare but rather international than domestic, as the cost savings and profits from 
the merger transaction may accumulate elsewhere outside the national 
jurisdiction. In this case, the wealth will go from domestic consumers on to 
foreign producers (owners/shareholders) and as a result international total welfare 
will be maximised rather than total domestic welfare. This problem can be partly 
overcome as suggested by Gal (2003: 204), if local economies create incentives for 
foreign producers to invest locally and these foreign producers re-invest their 
wealth in the domestic jurisdiction. Alternatively, this total welfare standard may 
be applied in such a way, where only efficiencies receivable for domestic firms or 
consumers are taken into account in merger investigation. Australia has applied 
this qualified total welfare approach in its jurisdiction, where welfare benefits 
receivable to foreign producers are not taken into account in recognising the 
merger's benefits. However, this solution cannot be applied in the Baltic 
countries' jurisdictions. This is because the different treatment of domestic and 
foreign producers will contradict the policy of the EU. Moreover, as regards 
domestic producers, there is no certainty that domestic producers will re-invest 
their wealth gained as a result of the merger transaction in the domestic economy 
and thereby there is no certainty that the total welfare will actually be maximised. 
Despite some shortages of the total welfare test, Gal (2003) suggests that this 
standard is more suitable to small market economies than the consumer welfare 
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standard, because it is more favourable and most consistent with promoting 
efficiency gains in contrast to the consumer welfare standard, which is stricter 
towards efficiency gains (due to its condition that efficiency must be passed on to 
consumers) and may preclude many enhancing domestic efficiency gains 
mergers 391 Despite the advantages offered by total welfare test, the Baltic 
countries committed to the application of the EC policy, which employs consumer 
welfare rather than total welfare. 
4.4.3. Approaches towards merger control with regard to efficiencies in small 
market economies 
There are three basic approaches towards merger control vis-ä-vis 
efficiency gains. The first one is the absolute value approach. According to this 
approach, all merger transactions that are likely to reduce competition are 
prohibited without consideration of efficiency gains that a merger may create. The 
second one is the balancing approach. According to this approach, the anti- 
competitive effects of a merger transaction are balanced against the efficiency 
gains created by the merger. The third one is the so-called invisible hand 
approach, where merger control is left to the market. This approach is barely used 
nowadays in any jurisdictions, as the importance of competition policy and law 
has augmented, including merger control regime. This invisible hand approach 
was used in Estonia until 2001, when the new Competition Act empowered the 
Competition Board of Estonia to challenge anti-competitive transactions. Before 
2001 larger merger transactions 392 only had an obligation to notify the 
Competition Board about the proposed transaction without having concerns to be 
prohibited or otherwise restricted. The idea behind this policy held in Estonia was 
to understand the Estonian markets and prepare for the future work. The 
researcher agrees with the OECD's opinion that such a policy held in Estonia was 
a useful tool to gain information about its markets in transition for the time being. 
However, the Estonian Competition Board can be congratulated for changing its 
policy in 2001, as the researcher considers that a merger control policy is a useful 
391 For further discussion, see Gal, 2003, pp. 202-205. 
392 The thresholds set were quite low at the time. See chapter 1 for further discussion. 
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and a necessary means in the regulation of markets and thereby cannot be left 
without intervention. 
The absolute value approach places decisive concern on the reduction of 
actual and potential competition, which might result from the creation or 
strengthening of a dominant position. This approach is based on the paradigm that 
the more concentrated markets are, the poorer industrial performance is, as it is 
profitable for firms to be involved in monopolistic or oligopolistic behaviour. 
Efficiency gains play a small role in merger analysis or do not play a part at all. 
The consideration of efficiency might be involved in setting the thresholds for 
illegality and in predicting the post-merger situation rather than counter-balancing 
anti-competitive effects. Any efficiency effects gained from merger transactions 
are taken into account to the extent if it influences the ability and incentive for 
firms to compete in the relevant markets. Unless efficiencies create incentives for 
new or existing competitors to increase competition, any efficiency gains even, if 
they increase consumer or total welfare, will be prohibited as they might create or 
strengthen market power of the merging parties. This is because the merged entity 
will have costs advantages and it can limit its competitors to achieve similar 
advantages. This approach was applied in the US, the EU and other large 
jurisdictions. The assumption that there is no need for a high concentration level 
in order to achieve efficiencies, and such concentrations should be prohibited, 
might be true in large jurisdictions, however, according to Gal (2003) it may be an 
erroneous assessment in small economies. The introduction of the absolute value 
approach in small market economies `[ .] would necessarily produce 
harmful 
results, given that its inflexibility does not allow competition agencies and courts 
to screen only non-efficient mergers' (Gal, 2003: 214). As a result of this 
approach, many mergers with possible anti-competitive effects, and at the same 
time with merger-specific efficiency gains, would not be approved. Furthermore, 
Gal suggests three basic reasons why the absolute value approach is inappropriate 
for small market economies. The first is high concentration levels, which are the 
feature of small market economies, that may be necessary to realise scale and 
scope economies. Secondly, internal growth as an option for mergers may be 
prevented in small market economies in oligopolistic markets by co-operative 
profit maximisation. Some potential efficiency gains in small market economies 
might be achieved through merger transactions with anti-competitive effects, 
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which lead with higher market concentration. Thirdly, in some markets, with a 
positive atmosphere for co-operative conduct, there would be no big difference in 
consumer welfare between one or three competitors because of strong mutual 
tolerance 393 However, this absolute value approach as recognised by Gal (2003) 
can be mitigated by wide safety zones. For instance, the Federal Act on Cartels 
and Other Restraints of Competition of Switzerland394 does not have an efficiency 
defence, but instead applies an extremely high threshold for dominance, which as 
a result captured only large merger transactions. A similar policy was applied in 
the Latvian jurisdiction, where the Competition Law of Latvia caught only very 
large mergers, as one of the threshold conditions was possession of a market 
power by one of the merging parties. However, this notion of a safety zone can 
only partly solve a problem, as industry specific market characteristics and 
efficiency gains that affect market power may differ significantly from case to 
case (Gal, 2003: 215-216). The balancing approach is considered to be the most 
suitable for small market economies. 
The Balancing approach is the most suitable for small market economies, 
because it recognises an efficiency defence as any merger transactions should be 
permitted, if the efficiency gains achieved through the merger are great enough to 
offset any anti-competitive effects. According to this approach, the regulator of 
competition authorities is empowered to balance in each merger case the anti- 
competitive effects against the efficiency gains resulting from the merger 
transaction. Moreover, the efficiency gains cannot be estimated apart from the 
anti-competitive effects as each affects the likely magnitude of the other (Gal, 
2003: 216). This approach is applied in the current US jurisdiction, Canada and the 
EU after 2004, when new Merger Regulation came into force. 
At present all Baltic countries apply the absolute value approach, as none 
of them have a statutory efficiency defence, as any efficiency gains are assumed 
for merger transactions up to a limit of dominance, which was the policy of the 
EU until at least 2001. 
393 For further discussion, see Gal, 2003, pp. 214-216. 
394 AS 1996 546. 
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4.4.4. Approaches towards the assessment of the merger-specific efficiency 
gains 
Theoretically, three approaches towards the evaluation of efficiency gains 
through a merger can be distinguished (see Camesasca, 1999, Roeller, Stennek 
and Verboven, 2000, Ilzkovitz and Meiklejohn, 2001). The first one is a case - by 
- case approach, which explicitly analyses the magnitude and effects of merger- 
specific efficiencies in every single merger case. The problem with this approach 
is that it contains high information costs in measuring efficiency gains and their 
effects. The second is a general presumption approach, which uses general 
structural indicators such as market shares or a concentration index together with 
an implicit recognition of the existence of average efficiency gains in merger 
transactions. The potential problem of the general presumption approach is that 
there is a lot of uncertainty concerning efficiency gains from a merger transaction 
and also that the structural indicators are not perfect tools to predict the net 
benefits from mergers. Bearing in mind the problems of these two approaches, the 
third, so called `sequential' approach is designed to combine the extremes of 
both of those approaches. It includes two steps, first of all for the initial decision 
structural indicators as market shares or concentration index are used and then a 
more detailed investigation of an efficiency defence steps in. 
The case - by -case approach explicitly recognises the efficiencies, 
assesses them and market power individually in very single case, and then 
balances efficiency gains against anti-competitive effects. In this case efficiency 
gains achievable through a merger transaction has a fully integrated way of 
analysis. As mentioned above the problem with this approach is that it is difficult 
to implement as it involves very high information costs and may raise other 
methodological and practical problems39s As regards the information costs, there 
is a need to gather two types of information: these are the information concerning 
market power effects and efficiency effects on competition. First of all, it is 
necessary to quantify the effects of market power as a result of the merger. 
Second, there is a necessity to identify and measure efficiency gains associated 
395 For further discussion on methodological and practical problems, see section 3 of European 
Merger Control: Do we need an efficiency defence? the paper prepared by F. Ilzkovitz and 
R. Meiklejohn for the 5`h Annual EUNIP Conference, 29 November -1 December, 2001. 
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with a merger transaction. Roeller, Stennek and Verboven (2000) warned that the 
gathering of both types of information may encompass significant costs as there is 
a lot of uncertainty associated to future effects and in this case the merging 
entities are likely to be in a better position than the competition authorities to 
assess aspects of the merger effects 396 Regardless of these shortages, this model is 
applied in the jurisdictions of the US and Canada. Scholars admit that from the 
theoretical perspective, this approach is better founded than the general 
presumption approach due to its quantification of the market power and 
efficiencies effects, which involve uncertainties. 
The general presumption approach relies on general presumptions about 
potential efficiencies' effects realised through a merger transaction. It makes a 
merger approval contingent on some indicators, which are based on past 
experience regarding the magnitude and the effects of the merger-specific 
efficiency gains. This approach implicitly considers that below a certain threshold 
for structural indicators, efficiencies are always sufficient to outweigh the anti- 
competitive effects resulting from the merger transaction. In this case, the 
structural indicator may determine the upper limit for the acceptance of merger 
transactions on the assumption that up to this limit mergers are efficiency- 
enhancing or at least neutral. This approach eliminates the drawback of the case - 
by - case approach, which are high information costs of the assessment of 
efficiency effects on a single case basis. However, this approach is based on the 
assumption that the set of structural indicators contain information (which might 
be imperfect) about the likely net effects of mergers, where the problems might 
occur for the structural indicators in indicating the `right' level of assessment. For 
instance, if the threshold is fixed at a low level, it will respond to strict merger 
policy, as efficiencies will have a low average. On the other hand, if the threshold 
is fixed at a high level, this implies that the competition authority believes that 
efficiency gains have a high average and moreover, that they can dominate up to 
the high level of market concentration. According to Ilzkovitz and Meiklejohn 
(2001: 22), the former EU model (as before an explicit efficiency defence came 
into force) wrongly belonged to this approach. This is because the EC merger 
396 For further analysis, see sections 1.2 and 1.3, Working paper No. 543,2000, Efficiency Gains 
from Mergers, by Roeller, Stennek and Verboven, The Research Institute of Industrial Economcs. 
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regime without having the explicit efficiency defence before 2004, had a 
relatively high threshold for structural indicators, which theoretically means that 
merger transactions usually generate large efficiency gains. 
The third sequential approach is an intermediate approach, which as 
mentioned above combines both approaches. The idea is to limit the number of 
cases of efficiency defence and identify those cases, which require an in-depth 
efficiency investigation. First of all, like the general presumption model, this 
approach also has structural indicators, therefore two rather than one. These are 
the structural indicators with a low and a high threshold. A low threshold 
determines to what level efficiency gains are more important than anti- 
competitive effects. In this case, merger transactions, which do not exceed a low 
threshold, are automatically accepted without a further investigation. The high 
level shows above which level anti-competitive effects dominate and mergers are 
always rejected, for instance, a competition authority will never allow a merger to 
a monopoly or close to a monopoly position. It means only the intermediate level 
allows the assessment of efficiency defence. However, this is not entirely true as 
even when the high threshold is exceeded, the merging parties are not excluded 
from invoking the efficiency defence. The danger with this is that the competition 
authorities would consider the efficiency gains achievable through merger 
insufficient to counterweight the anti-competitive effects and as a result it would 
put a high burden of proof on the merging parties. Furthermore, when low and 
high thresholds move close to each other, then the scope for an efficiency defence 
becomes more limited, or disappears at all if both thresholds equalise. In this case 
a general presumption approach is applied. In the other extreme scenario, where 
low threshold is very small and upper threshold is very large, almost all merger 
transactions will require efficiency considerations. Roeller, Stennek and Verboven 
(2000) stated that this two-sided efficiency defence of the sequential approach 
would reflect the belief of the competition authorities that the structural indicators 
operate well, except in borderline cases. 
Many scholars based their research on the sequential model. For instance, 
Mano (2002) in the methodology for the evaluation of efficiency claims, relied on 
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the sequential approach of the efficiency appraisa1397. According to Ilzkovitz and 
Meiklejohn (2001: 23), the sequential approach has advantage as it can balance the 
degree of uncertainty of structural indicators against the magnitude of information 
costs. This approach has an efficiency defence with not significant information 
costs as an in-depth analysis in a case - by - case basis is carried out only in 
`problematic' cases, presuming that this is particularly relevant. In this case, the 
approach works as a filter, where the first stage acts as a screening test to identify 
the `borderline cases', which require a further investigation of the efficiency 
gains. In this case, high information costs are saved, as only a limited number of 
merger cases require an in-depth analysis. This is why Ilzkovitz and Meiklejohn 
(2001: 24) supported the idea that an explicit efficiency defence should be 
analysed under a sequential rather than case - by - case model. Meanwhile, 
Roeller, Stennek and Verboven (December, 2000) suggested a case - by - case 
approach, in particular modified a case - by - case approach with the construction 
of an information - economising framework for evaluating merger transactions. It 
contains two stages. The first stage is where the evaluation of notified merger 
transactions are assessed with modest information requirements, without an 
efficiency defence. Meanwhile, in the second stage mergers, which did not pass 
the first stage, will be further investigated, and this time an efficiency defence will 
be included. 
Moreover, Ilzkovitz and Meiklej ohn (2001) referring to the sequential 
approach suggested three stages: the screening tests, the qualitative analysis of 
efficiency gains and the quantitative cost-benefit analysis, which according to the 
authors still possess some unresolved problems. The aim of the screening tests is 
to minimise the errors of selection and economising the information costs. Both 
scholars admitted that the potential problem with this approach, as similar to the 
general presumption approach, is to define adequately the criteria for the 
screening test in the first stage. The criteria must be set up in such a way that leads 
to the minimisation of the two basic errors by the competition authorities. These 
are the acceptance of merger transactions having net harmful effects and the 
rejection of mergers with net beneficial effects. The first stage does not contain 
explicit analysis of efficiency and structural criteria are used to identify merger 
397 See for further reading Mano, For the customer's sake: The competitive effects of efficiencies 
in European Merger control, Enterprise Papers, No. 11,2002, pp. 40-53. 
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cases, which will go to a further stage. It is because there is no need to have an in- 
depth analysis, if a merger transaction does not cause anti-competitive effects. 
Furthermore, criteria such as market share or concentration index cannot be 
considered alone as providing a reliable evidence of the existence of market 
power. Thus, other indicators such as entry barriers, existence of sunk costs, in- 
elasticity of demand, the degree of differentiation of products, indicating a risk of 
market power or the likelihood of efficiency gains should also be considered. For 
instance, in a market with rapid technological development the market share of 
firms offering new or improved products may be high due to the fact that there are 
no other competitors on the market. 
The next stage is the qualitative analysis of efficiency gains. In this stage 
the parties have to prove that the efficiencies through a merger transaction are 
sufficient to counter-balance the anti-competitive effects. Both authors point out 
the importance of the rationale behind the merger transaction by analysis of the 
motives for the merger and as to whether the merger takes place because of the 
realisation of efficiencies or to extract market power. Here, a notice or guidelines 
should be provided to the merging parties by explaining how efficiencies are 
handled by the competition authorities. Thus, for the sake of transparency, the 
competition authorities should define the information they require for proving the 
efficiency gains and also name the approach they are going to take to assess the 
case. 
The final stage is the complex quantitative cost-benefit analysis, which 
quantifies the net beneficial effects of the merger transaction on competition by 
comparing the anti-competitive effects due to the increase of the market power of 
the merging parties and pro-competitive effects as a result of the realisation of 
efficiency gains. Roeller, Stennek and Verboven (1999,2000) suggested the 
analysis of two components at this stage. These are the calculation of the 
minimum efficiencies required to compensate the anti-competitive effects; and the 
measurement and verification of actual efficiency gains. This efficiency 
investigation should balance these two components in a way as transparently as 
possible (Roeller, Stennek and Verboven, 2000: 92). In order to define the 
minimum required efficiencies it is necessary to check the effect of a merger on 
price, which can be distinguished into three components. The first component is 
about the price increase stemming from an increase in market power, leaving the 
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cost of the merging parties constant. The second, there is a possibility of price 
reduction arising from the cost savings due to the merger transaction. The last 
component is about the degree of pass-on of cost savings through mergers into 
consumer price. The minimum cost savings, which are necessary to outweigh the 
anti-competitive effects of the merger transaction, is represented by the per cent 
price increase divided by the pass-on elasticity. Ilzkovitz and Meiklejohn 
(2001: 26) provide an example, if 50% of the cost savings are passed on to 
consumers, then a merger transaction decreases price only, if the realised cost 
savings are larger than twice the price effects occurred from the increased market 
power. Apart from this model, different methods can be used to calculate the 
minimum required efficiencies. After the quantification of the minimum required 
efficiencies, they have to be compared with the potential efficiency gains realised 
by the merger398. Here, the information of the expected efficiencies is based on the 
data provided by the merging parties at the previous stage. According to Ilzkovitz 
and Meiklejohn (2001: 27), the competition authorities could give different 
weights to the efficiency claims depending on the source that certifies the validity 
of the information. 
4.4.5. Appropriate approach towards the evaluation of efficiency gains for 
the Baltic countries 
At present the Baltic countries can be referred to as having a general 
presumption approach, as the Competition Laws of these countries do not contain 
any explicit provisions on efficiency defence. Any efficiency gains achievable 
through a merger transaction are up to the limit of dominance. It means that the 
structural indicator determines the upper limit, which is the creation or 
strengthening of a dominant position in this case, for acceptance of merger 
transactions on the assumption that up to this limit mergers are efficiency- 
enhancing or neutral. The market shares are usually used as general structural 
indicators in the Baltic jurisdictions. However, in the Lithuanian jurisdiction the 
concentration index was also used in the Carlsberg case (2000). 
398 For further reading, see European Merger Control: Do we need an efficiency defence?, 
prepared by Ilzkovitz and Meiklejohn, November 29- December 1,2001, pp. 26-27. 
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However, it can be argued that a general presumption approach towards 
merger-specific efficiency gains is not suitable for the Baltic states. This approach 
has been highly criticised by other scholars as aforementioned for its reliance on 
the set of structural indicators, which quite often contain imperfect information. A 
case - by - case approach will not be the most suitable approach for the Baltic 
countries due to its high information costs. Considering that the Baltic countries 
are still `young' and inexperienced in applying the merger control rules and lack 
resources as well as having some difficulties in obtaining the necessary 
information for the evaluation of mergers, a case - by - case approach would 
place an unnecessary burden on these countries. Furthermore, the researcher 
disagrees with Gal's theory (2003) on this point that the efficiency issues in small 
market economies should be analysed from the beginning of the merger analysis. 
Neither the policy expressed by some economists, for instance with Lofaro (RRB, 
2004) that the efficiency gains achievable through a merger should be evaluated 
together with an overall competitive assessment due to their ability to offset anti- 
competitive effects should be applied in the Baltic jurisdictions. Bearing in mind 
there is little experience and knowledge of the Baltic Competition Authorities, the 
researcher supports Kuhn, Stillman and Caffarra's (September, 2004) idea that 
efficiency gains should be taken into consideration at the very last stage, when 
anti-competitive effects of a transaction have been found in order to avoid an 
unnecessary burden of proof on the merging parties and on the competition 
authorities. It brings to a conclusion that a sequential approach is the most suitable 
for the Baltic countries, particularly a modified version of a sequential model. 
This model contains two main stages. The first stage works as a filter: 
larger merger transactions, which meet the thresholds set by the Competition 
Authorities of the Baltic countries, are examined by the regulators by using 
structural indicators, which do not require high information costs and do not 
consider any efficiency issues. Efficiency issues at this stage are presumed as 
neutral or sufficient enough to outset any anti-competitive effects; thus, mergers 
are approved. Only those merger transactions which cross the upper threshold set 
up in the first stage, go for a further examination into the second stage. Here, the 
efficiency gains are examined. However, the upper threshold in the second stage 
can be introduced, but without a strict policy, where crossing the upper line would 
mean that a merger is automatically rejected, for instance a merger that creates a 
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monopoly or close to a monopoly position. This condition should be rejected due 
to the specification of small market economies, where merger transactions quite 
often involve a merger close to a dominant position, because of a limited number 
of market players. A merger that creates a monopoly or close to a monopoly 
situation should not be automatically rejected but nevertheless a higher burden 
would be placed on the merging parties to prove efficiency gains, which will 
offset the anti-competitive effects. 
In conclusion, the modified sequential approach is the most suitable for the 
Baltic countries. On one hand, it will limit a number of cases, which require in- 
depth analysis though as a result will save high information costs. On the other 
hand, this approach also allows an in-depth analysis for some `problematic' 
merger transactions, which might have high concerns of sufficiently realising 
efficiency gains to offset the anti-competitive effects. 
Unlike cartels, merger transactions may have both positive and negative effects on 
competition. On one hand, mergers may lead to markets becoming more 
concentrated. On the other hand, these transactions may make markets more 
competitive. This chapter proved that any efficiency gains achieved through all 
types of mergers play an important role in merger analysis and cannot be ignored. 
The economic theories discussed above show that under certain circumstances 
efficiencies might offset any anti-competitive effects. 
Furthermore, horizontal, vertical and conglomerate mergers have to be analysed 
separately as they might place different anti-competitive problems. However, like 
in horizontal mergers case, vertical and conglomerate mergers may also enhance 
efficiencies, which cannot be isolated from the merger analysis. 
Moreover, this chapter also presented specific implications of small market 
economies based on Gal's theory. The limited measures in small market 
economies augment the need for optimal merger control. Efficiency 
considerations in small market economies must play an important role, 
considering the fact that merger transactions may help the realisation of potential 
efficiency gains, for instance, in oligopolistic markets, which would otherwise 
remain unexploited due to lack of their optimal size. 
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The conclusion in this chapter is made that the balancing approach should be 
introduced in the jurisdictions of the Baltic countries together with a possibility 
for merger-specific efficiency gains to outweigh any anti-competitive effects 
imposed by merger. With regard to the assessment of the merger-specific 
efficiency gains, it was stated that the sequential approach offers the most 
advantages for the Baltic countries. 
Since the competition policy determines which mergers might be considered 
harmful and which ones beneficial, the next chapter is based on competition 
policy and its goals vis-a-vis merger control. 
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Chapter 5. COMPETITION POLICY 
`Competition assumes the freedom of economic actors; freedom from constraint is 
the source of its strength. But laws constrain conduct and reduce freedom, and 
thus they appear inconsistent with the dynamics of competition' (D. Gerber, 
1998: 9) 
Competition law exists to protect the process of competition in a free 
market economy. In economic terms, a free market economy is relatively free 
from control by the central authorities and in such an economy the allocation of 
resources is determined by supply and demand. The basis of a free market refers 
to the situation where there is competition between firms, which helps to deliver 
efficiency, low prices and innovation and as a result brings the greatest benefits to 
society. There is a paradox here - competition law seeks to control and interfere 
with the freedom of conduct of firms in the cause of promoting the free play of 
competitive forces in the market. For instance, on one hand, the European 
Communities promote the freedom of movement of capital and, on the other, 
blocks mergers (form of the investment or movement of capital), which may 
significantly impede competition, for instance, by the creation or strengthening of 
a dominant position. 
In order to understand the rationale behind the Merger Regulation of the 
EC, it is necessary to define the policy and law of competition with reference to a 
merger control. Bearing in mind, that merger control policy is a part of the 
competition policy, this chapter's attempt is to identify the objective or objectives 
of the EC's competition policy and the competition policy of the Baltic states and 
what these jurisdictions are trying to achieve. The Baltic countries' experience has 
been to follow dictation from above: as regards the EC competition policy 
(especially the merger regime), the Baltic countries have attempted to apply and 
explore those rules without questioning whether and to what extent those rules 
reflect the interests of the Baltic countries. 
This chapter is structured as follows. In order to understand the 
competition policy, it is useful to be aware of its economic background. Thus, the 
first part of this chapter involves analysis of the traditional economic theories on 
competition, including the Classical theory, the Neo-classical theory, the Harvard 
School, and the Chicago School, which provide useful information for 
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competition policy. The second part will be based on the development of the 
European School as regards competition policy. Further emphasis will be based 
on comparative analysis of the objectives of the EC competition policy and the 
competition policy of the Baltic states, as to what extent the objectives of the 
Baltic countries are in conformity with the objectives of the EC competition 
policy and to what extent they underline the interest of these countries. 
5.1. Economic thoughts towards competition policy 
5.1.1. Classical theory 
The roots of the concept of competition can be found as early as in the 
classical theory. The main classical theorists A. Smith (1723-1790) and D. 
Richardo (1772-1823) described for the first time the price mechanism, where the 
concept of competition was based on a concept of freedom. The freedom of 
competition and the freedom of consumers of being able to choose the alternatives 
offered by the market are considered as natural freedoms of a human being. The 
freedom of competition entitles every economic entity to get what it deserves 
(Hildebrand, 2002: 110). Furthermore, A. Smith suggested that the forces of 
competition, so called the `invisible hand', could reconcile private, self-interested 
behaviour with a general social goal. In this context, the `invisible hand' produces 
harmony of all interests. By contrast, state intervention could only intrude this 
harmony (Schmidt, 1993: 3). According to the 'laissez-faire' principle introduced 
by the classical economists, a competitive economy will achieve efficiency 
without government intervention. However, it does not mean that the State does 
not have any function at all. On the contrary, the State provides the appropriate 
framework for facilitating the functioning of the markets, for instance, by 
reducing monopolistic behaviour. A. Smith, the leading representative of classical 
theory, argued against monopolies, which narrows competition and is always 
against the interest of public and serves only the dealers399 by enabling them to 
raise their profits. According to A. Smith `[ .] the price of monopoly is upon every 
occasion the highest which can be got. The natural price, or the price of free 
399 The term used by Smith, which can be referred to broader term in our days, as sellers. 
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competition, on the contrary, is the lowest which can be taken, not upon every 
occasion indeed, but for any considerable time together' (Smith, 1776, as quoted 
in Scherer, 1993: 12). However, Smith distinguished between permanent and 
temporarily limited monopolies. He opposed permanent monopolies because they 
limit the `natural' freedom of individuals which results in a decrease in welfare. 
On the contrary, Smith supported temporary limited monopolies due to the fact 
that they are caused by building up trade relations with foreign countries. In a 
situation where `[ .]a company of merchants undertake, at their own risk and 
expense, to establish a new trade with some remote and barbarous nation, it may 
not be unreasonable to incorporate them into a joint stock company, and to grant 
them, in case of their success, a monopoly of the trade for a certain number of 
years. It is the easiest and most natural way in which the state can recompense 
them for hazarding a dangerous and expensive experiment, of which the public is 
afterwards to reap the benefit' (Smith, 1776 as quoted in Scherer, 1993). 
5.1.2. Neo-classical economics 
Quite often economists place a high value on the economic models: 
beginning with assumptions and then working through these assumptions to finish 
with conclusions. The neo-classical economists, Walras (1874) and Marshall 
(1890)400 focus on two polarised models of market structure: the model of perfect 
competition and pure monopoly. According to the model of perfect competition 
there is an infinite number of independent equal strength producers (as none can 
influence price by changing output), they supply identical products to consumers, 
all players have complete and perfect market information, also there is a 
presumption that all firms are trying to maximise profits and there is no entry into 
industry restrictions. In this environment the economic efficiency will be achieved 
automatically, as the prices are set equal to the marginal cost of producing the 
optimal quantity and consumers would pay the real resource cost of producing the 
good and no business entity would have profits above the competitive rate of 
return. This means that in the perfect competition model under certain conditions 
(such as the absence of external effects and increasing returns of scale) a general 
400 They both are the founders of the `general equilibrium' and `partial equilibrium' variants of 
neo-classical economics. 
201 
equilibrium of all markets will be associated with a `Pareto-optimal allocation of 
resources', where no person will be better off without simultaneously making 
another worse off (Burton, 1994: 5, Rodger and MacMulloch, 2001: 9-10). 
In contrast to the perfect competition model, there is the pure monopoly 
model. According to the monopoly model there is only one producer in a market 
and there are entry restrictions. Partial equilibrium analysis of perfect competition 
and pure monopoly establishes that perfect competition is good and monopoly is 
bad by contrasting the price-output outcome under both cases (Burton, 1994: 6). 
This is because the monopolist can raise its price by restricting the output without 
loosing its profit. Thus, the monopolist will always charge a higher price than the 
competitive price if demand at the competitive price is inelastic. It will depend on 
the intensity of consumer preference for the monopolised product in relation to its 
costs (Posner, 1976: 8-9). Meanwhile, under the perfect competition model price is 
equal to marginal cost. This means there is an overall loss of welfare to consumers 
and society due to prices exceeding marginal costs in the monopolist situation. 
Both static perfect competition and pure monopoly models were proved 
that they cannot depict real life, mainly because they are restricted by the 
assumptions such as there is no competitive rivals at all in the perfect competition 
model, also technology is taken as a `given' and other factors, which do exist in 
real life. However, despite these shortages, the scholars admit that the theory of 
perfect competition and pure monopoly is not designed to describe real situations, 
but nevertheless provides useful information in explaining the economic 
behaviour and consequences of changes in the different variables contained in the 
model (Hildebrand, 2002: 113). Moreover, the perfect competition model has had 
a profound background influence upon the formation and the enforcement of 
competition policy in North America, Western Europe and the United Kingdom 
(Burton, 1994: 4)401 
In general, both models of perfect competition and monopoly can be used 
as a tool in providing the understanding of markets operating in certain 
conditions. The theory is a useful starting point in identifying the main concerns 
of competition policy. A theoretical monopoly situation is hardly likely to occur 
in real life, whereas competition policy has tended to use the principles of theory, 
401 To some extent, this model is applied in the Baltic countries as well. It will be discussed in the 
later sections. 
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for instance, in relation to a high degree of concentration in a particular market. A 
firm with a high market share in a market may behave similarly to a monopolist 
described by the model. Thus, competition policy can prevent such behaviour. 
5.1.3. The Chicago school 
This school is named under the University of Chicago's Department of 
Economics and its Law school, which adheres strictly to Neo-classical price 
theory in its economic analysis, `free market' libertarianism in much of its works 
and shows antipathy to government interference. According to the Chicago 
school, competition in industrial markets even with a high concentration ratio 
function is good because of the self-regulation powers of uninfluenced industrial 
markets with the condition that there are no barriers to entry. Different 
concentration ratios are the result of different cost structures, particularly the 
economies of scale (Kantzenbach and Kalifass, 1981: 119, as quoted in 
Hildebrand, 2002: 144)402 
For the Chicago school the ultimate goal of competition policy is 
consumer welfare, which is expressed by efficiency. It has been commented that 
antitrust should be guided solely by the economic efficiency consequences of 
structural changes and the conduct of firms. For instance, R. Bork and other 
members of the Chicago School equate maximisation of economic benefit to 
consumers and economic efficiency 403 According to the Chicago school, 
economic efficiency is the primary cause of concentration and sees concentration 
as absolutely necessary to achieve economic efficiency (Hildebrand, 2002: 146). 
Basically, Bork in his book `Antitrust paradox' (1993) emphasised that the central 
goal of the anti-trust policy is the promotion of consumer welfare, better known as 
efficiency. Further, Bork contended that protecting small business is not a goal of 
anti-trust policy and therefore some forms of anti-competitive behaviour may in 
fact be consistent with competition law (Greaves, 2003). 
402 Note: Thus, it shows that the Chicago school presented the reverse causation argument of the 
Harvard school's the structure - conduct - performance paradigm, by stating that business 
performance may have effects on market structure. The Harvard school will be discussed in the 
next section. 
403 See, for instance, Bork, Antitrust paradox, 1978, pp. 51,90-91 
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The Chicago school also has an assumption that competition among a few 
firms may be just as effective as competition among many firms (Baldwin, 
1987: 320). As regards merger transactions, the Chicago school supported the view 
that mergers are almost always pro-competitive as the cost savings more typically 
flow from mergers and outweigh price effects (Kwoka, Lawrence and White, 
1999: 8). The Chicago theorists admitted that mainly horizontal mergers may have 
some anti-competitive concerns therefore vertical and conglomerate mergers do 
not cause such problems. 
5.1.4. The Harvard school 
The Harvard School puts emphasis on markets: market structures, market 
conduct or behaviour and market performance. Thus, the economists of this 
school, firstly E. Mason (1939), gave rise to the structure - conduct - performance 
paradigm, i. e. the structuralist approach to industrial economy. The main idea is 
that there is a causal link between the structure of the market in which companies 
operate, the conduct as behaviour of the companies in that market and 
performance in terms of profit, efficiency, and the satisfaction of consumer desire 
(Burton, 1994: 9). Mason stated that structure exerts a major influence on business 
conduct and described the structural conditions under which the impact on 
conduct would be the greatest404 Furthermore, the concentration doctrine was 
developed by the economists of the Harvard school, which have emphasised 
industrial concentration as the primary determinant of economic performance and 
have examined the relationship between the concentration and profits. 
Concentration with the numbers and relative sizes of buyers and sellers is one 
aspect of structure, however this is crucial in oligopoly theory, since control of a 
large share of a market by a small number of market players is necessary but not 
sufficient to sustain prices above costs and restrict output. Other factors of 
structure such as barriers to entry, degree of product differentiation and economies 
of scale are also associated with concentration. In this case, for the concentration 
doctrine theorists a concentration index often serves as a proxy for a set of 
limiting exercise of market power (Hildebrand, 2002: 132-133). Bain (1956), the 
404 For further reading, see Mason, 1939, pp. 69; also comments on his theory by Sheperd, 1986, 
Baldwin, 1987, Hildebrand, 2002 
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other Harvard school theorist, studied the measurement of entry barriers to 
industry. According to his reasoning, industry profitability, otherwise a measure 
of performance was positively and significantly correlated with the seller 
concentration ratio and subjectively estimated the height of barriers to new entry 
(Scherer, 1986: 6). Meanwhile, the Chicago school opposed it by stating that there 
are no indications that concentration is the reason for oligopolistic restraints on 
competition and competition leads to the success of the efficient firms on the 
market that in turn leads to concentration. In contrast to the Chicago school, the 
Harvard school requires state intervention. This approach on anti-trust policy 
involves prohibitions or strict scrutiny of all arrangements and practices, including 
vertical and conglomerate mergers (Hildebrand, 2002: 134). 
Both the Chicago and Harvard schools have provided their completely different 
lines of thought, there the former believe that concentration may be the result of a 
positive competitive process, i. e. efficiencies, meanwhile, the latter sees 
concentration as the ability of powerful firms to acquire and use painful and costly 
monopoly power. Despite `extreme' Chicago and Harvard positions their 
empirical work 405 has had a profound influence for the development of 
competition policy, which firstly was highly influential in the US Antitrust law, 
but also to some extent impact has been seen at the European level as well. For 
instance, the Chicago school approach was adopted by the US Government in 
1980 to curtail the Government's role in business (Rodger and MacCulloch, 
2001: 16). Also, the US Supreme Court since the early 1970s has increasingly 
taken more of an economic and efficiency-based approach to anti-trust law 406 In 
contrast to the EU competition policy, which is known for its multi-goal approach, 
the US has quite often been defined as having the `singular' objective of 
405 It was not an aim of the researcher to discuss all schools. For instance, the researcher also 
acknowledges the importance of the post-Chicago school in the development of the competition 
policy, for instance, by bringing game theory. 
406 Bork in his book `Antitrust Paradox' (1978), which is considered as the most influential 
antitrust book in the last 30 years, argued that the main goal of the Sherman Act is the promotion 
of consumer welfare known as efficiency. R. Pitofsky (from 1979 onwards) and L. Schwartz 
(1979) sharply criticised the historical context of Bork's book referring that the Sherman Act grew 
out of significant concern as regards the rise of large trusts (powerful business organisations) and 
combinations, and there were clear political goals by the Congress. However, Greaves (2003) 
concluded that although Bork got the history wrong, he nonetheless won the ideological war. For 
further discussion see Greaves R., Competition Law, Ashgate, 2003. 
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economic efficiency407. However, the other scholars disagree at this point, by 
stating that the US antitrust law has never had one goal408, or it had before, but not 
at present. As was expressed by Foer (2005) 409 `why not to admit that there are 
multiple goals? '. 410 
In contrast to the earlier schools, new industrial economics, which is in a domain 
now, does not stream from a basic competition policy assumption like the market 
power thesis of the Harvard school or the efficiency thesis of the Chicago school. 
The common ground of new industrial economics is the use of the same 
methodology and economic welfare as the objective (Christiansen, 2005). There is 
no exact economic theory of competition and there is unlikely to be one in the 
future either; `[.. ] there are good reason for sustaining the plurality' 
(Christiansen, 2005: 12). 
5.1.5. The European school 
The idea to develop a general law to protect competition in Europe started 
in the 1890s in Austria as `[.. ] a product of Vienna 's extraordinarily creative 
intellectual life' (Gerber, 1998: 6). The task of the competition law proposals was 
to protect the competitive process from political and ideological onslaughts and 
they relied on bureaucratic application of a `public interest' standard. Despite the 
political events in Austria, which blocked further development of the competition 
law ideas, the inspiration to form the competition law was debated in Germany. 
Here, the Freiburg school and its ordoliberal concept of competition had played a 
major role in the evolution of German thought about economy and society. 
According to the Freiburg School the only way to achieve economic performance 
407See, for instance, Veljanovski, EC Merger Policy after GE/Honeywell and Airtours, Antirust 
Bulletin, 2003. See also, Gerber, Fairness in Competition Law: European and U. S. Experience, 
speech delivered during the conference March 5,2004, in Kyoto, Japan. 
408 See the speech delivered by Debra A. Valentine, Federal Trade Commission, the Goals of 
Competition Law, during PECC conference on Trade and Competition Policy, May 13-14,1997, 
Canada. 
409 Foer, The Goals of Antirust: Choosing the Definition of Consumer Welfare in the U. S., AAI, 
the speech delivered during the Trans-Atlantic Antitrust Research Chapter Author's Symposium, 
11 May 2005 (participated by the researcher). During the debates there it was clearly stated that 
the US like the EU does not rely on a singular competition goal. 
410 Considering that the thesis does not aim to analyse the convergence and divergence between the 
EU and US, the following sections will focus on the EC competition policy and its development. 
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and stability was through an economic order based on competition. Eucken and 
the Freiburg School introduced a new concept of an economic order - this is `die 
Wettbewerbsordnung' meaning `the order of competition'. In this order the state 
has to provide the structures in which the economic process works, and the state 
also has to establish and sustain the conditions for competition (Oswalt-Eucken, 
1994: 38-45). The scholars of the Freiburg School supported the conceptions of 
liberalism in considering a competitive economic system to be necessary for free 
and equitable society, with the condition that such a society could develop only 
where the market was embedded in a constitutional framework. Thus, the 
ordoliberal thought added a new legal dimension to liberal tradition, which 
requires law to protect the market from the destructive influences of political and 
economic power (Hildebrand, 2001: 158-161). It means that market could not be 
allowed to functions without any control (Gerber, 1994: 25). 
German ordoliberal thoughts of the Freiberg School extended beyond Germany 
and had direct and obvious influence in forming the EC competition law. 
Economic analysis is necessary to supply rules for the market to function 
effectively. Economic analysis provides the standards for most economic policy 
decisions; meanwhile, legal orders serve to assure that the government translates 
this economic model into reality. For instance, in ordoliberal language, economic 
policy decisions are dictated not by powerful institutions but rather by general 
principles chosen by the Community and designed to integrate the market into 
society (Gerber, 1994: 67, see also Hildebrand, 2001: 161). Despite the influence of 
ordoliberalism in the drafting of the EC Competition law, the Commission took 
the initiative itself and developed a conceptual framework of competition policy. 
5.2. The EC's Competition policy 
In the post-war years, Europe was rebuilding after depression and war. 
There was a need to develop economies and to control state monopolies. Thus, the 
EU's institutions were created in the context of state intervention through 
ownership and control over trade and prices. The designer of the new post-war 
political economy framework in Europe, stated that competition policy would be a 
necessary element of the new structure in order to expand and integrate markets 
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and sustain development (OECD, 2005). The European Commission with support 
by the ECJ and CFI has developed the framework for competition policy in 
Europe, by building on a conceptual and legal foundation of promoting market 
opening and strengthening the institutions of the Community. 
Competition policy is important, because it cuts prices, raises quality and 
expands customer choice. Also, competition allows technological innovation to 
flourish 411 However, competition policy alone cannot ensure overall economic 
growth, stability and competitiveness, and cannot solve all social problems. This 
is why the European competition policy is quite often viewed in the overall 
objectives of the European Community. The aims of the European Community's 
competition policy can be described as economic, political and social (Van Miert, 
May 5 1993). Furthermore, according to Van Miert (1995) competition policy can 
be seen as one instrument among others, which fosters the achievements of the 
basic objectives of the European Community. It must also take into account its 
effects on other areas such as industrial, regional, social and environmental 
policies. Thus, in turn it means that competition policy plays a role in the 
preparation and introduction of other policies (as quoted in Hildebrand, 2002: 11). 
For instance, the EC Merger Regulation412 is important in coping with different 
objectives, such as encouragement of open market economy with free competition 
and the further development of the internal market413 , promotion of 
dynamic 
competition and the competitiveness of European industry, by improving the 
conditions of growth and raising the standard of living in the Community 
414 
5 
protecting the interests of the intermediate and ultimate consumers415, the issues 
of technical and economic development416 and consideration of efficiencies 
achievable through merger transactions 417. 
411 See http: //europa. eu. int/pol/comp/overview_en. htm 
412 No. 139/2004. 
413 See Recital 2,3, he ECMR No. 139/2004. 
414 Recital 4. 
415 Art. 21 (b). 
416 See art. 21 (b). 
417 Recital 29, see also Guidelines on Horizontal mergers (2004/C 31/03). 
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5.2.1. Political objectives 
It is obvious that the EU competition policy comprises of a number of 
objectives. The European Community's refusal to adopt the Chicago school 
approach with sole basis on efficiency can be linked with the broad objectives 
applied in the EC competition policy (Rodger and MacCulloch, 2004). The key 
role of the EC's competition policy in the construction of a single market is to 
guarantee a fair level field for firms operating in Europe. The promotion of an 
open market has been acknowledged already from the foundation of the European 
Communities. The founding Member States saw the integration as, inter alia, 
engendering rapid economic growth in order to recover after the damage caused 
by WWII (Gerber, 1994). The competition rules418 were included in the EC Treaty 
as a means to achieve economic integration. The EC Treaty embedded a set of 
wider policy goals orientated towards the objective of European economic 
integration. For instance, the Preamble to the Treaty refers to the need to 
guarantee `[.. ] steady expansion, balanced trade and fair competition419. Also, 
article 3 (1) (g) of the Treaty states that a system has to ensure `[ .] that 
competition in the internal market is not distorted'. Article 4 (1) provides that the 
activities of the Member States and the Community are to be conducted in 
accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free competition. 
However, in accordance with the principles of subsidiary and proportionality 
(Article 5), the Community by setting out the rules must not go beyond what is 
necessary in order to achieve the objective of ensuring that competition in the 
common market is not distorted. 
The multi approach has also been expressed by the Commission in its 
IIXX Report on Competition policy by stating that firstly the competition policy 
must enable `[.. ] to perform its traditional role in helping to improve the 
allocation of resources, increase businessmen 's capacities for adjustment and 
418 Within the exception of merger control rules. The merger control rules were not introduced in 
the EC Treaty, because of political reasons. The idea was to create suitably sized firms that could 
operate on world markets, especially to counter the strong American firms. The ECSC Treaty was 
an exception. 
419 Korah (2004) argues that the term of `fair competition' is not clear. As should small companies 
be helped in order to compete against supermarkets, even if they are less efficient or if one firm 
has invested in promotion for a benefit of a brand as a whole, is it fair to let other firms to take 
advantage of this investment for free? See further discussion, Korah V., An Introductory guide to 
EC Competition Law and Practice, Oxford - Portland Oregon, 2004, pp. 12. 
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better satisfy the requirements of consumers; secondly, it must reinforce the unity 
of the Community market by eliminating obstacles to trade between the Member 
States' 420. It means that the EC competition policy not only deals with the 
competitive issues, such as the prevention of the restriction of production to raise 
prices, for instance, but also it has a broader objective to encourage the integration 
of the market. According to Gerber (1998: 334), the Community's competition 
policy has been understood primarily as a means to achieve the specific goal of 
unifying the European market and then to obtain the generic benefits associated 
with competition, such as lower prices, better quality products to consumers and 
technological progress. Also, Wilks and McGowan (1996: 238) mentioned that the 
goal of provoking the creation of competition policy within the EU is multiple, 
and includes the control of big business, the promotion of free market, the pursuit 
of competitiveness and the protection of consumers through priority is given to 
integration. 
Likewise, integration as the primary goal can be found in the Court's and 
Commission's practice. For instance, in the Continental Can case the Court, by 
extending the scope of the article 82 to stop further acquisitions by a dominant 
firm, stated that both articles 81 and 82 should be interpreted in a manner with 
conformity to the aims set out in articles 2 and 3 (g)421 of the Treaty and not to 
jeopardize the proper functioning of the Common market. Hence, the promotion 
of integration into one unified and open common market can be considered as a 
primary aim and the most original feature of the EU Treaty, which has also 
become an important objective of the Community's competition policy. 
Competition policy is an essential feature of a single market due to the fact 
that it provides a `fair level playing-field' to prevent restrictive practise, abuse of a 
dominant power, anti-competitive mergers and nationally granted subsidies. The 
goal of market integration can be defined as the elimination of economic borders 
between the economies, where neither the Member States, nor private enterprises 
can engage in practices that are in conflict with the unification of the common 
market (Van den Bergh and Camesasca, 2001: 2). Moreover, the role of the EC 
competition policy as an instrument of single market integration is absolutely 
essential in order to understand the competition law (Jones and Sufrin, 2004: 36). 
420 IIXX Report on Competition policy, pp. 12. 
421 3 (f) at that time. 
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As stated by the Commission, competition policy is crucial not only because of 
the idea that competition and competitive markets are the principal way to serve 
the economic aims of the Treaty, but also the establishment of the Internal Market 
may have unsatisfactory results if restrictive business practices or merger 
transactions could form barriers against competition from the other Member 
States (European Commission, 1993: 69). On one hand, the internal market is an 
essential condition for the development of a competitive and effective industry. 
On the other hand, competition policy is an important tool to achieve the goal of, 
and maintain, an internal market, in particular via the enforcement of rules, which 
ensure that the regulatory barriers to trade that have been removed are not 
replaced by private or other public restrictions having the same effect 
(Competition Report, 1995). It means that the EC competition policy serves two 
masters: one being `competition' and the other - the imperative of single market 
integration (Jones and Sufrin, 2004: 36). The second goal can sometimes even spur 
the development of entire law, as in the case of vertical restraints422, or the reform 
of law, as in respect to the EC Merger Regulation423. 
After 40 years of signing the Treaty, this objective is still important, as the 
expansion of the EU is still in progress. The last enlargement of the EU was on 1 
May 2004, when ten new countries joined the Union, including former socialist 
countries Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. As a result of the expansion, the 
European Union not only increased its surface area and its population, but it put 
an end to the split in our continent - the rift that, from 1945 onwards, separated 
the free world from the Communist world. Hence, the last enlargement of the 
EU has a political and moral dimension. Bearing in mind that implementation of 
competition rules is a pre-condition for the membership into the EU, these rules 
play an important role in order to achieve economic integration. The 
Commission on many occasions has expressed that the consolidation and the 
extension of competition policy enforcement throughout Central and Eastern 
422 For further discussion, see Jones A., Sufrin B., EC Competition Law, 2d ed., Oxford university 
press, ch. 9. 
423 According to Gonzales-Diaz F. E. G, former Head of Unit Merger Task Force (European 
Commission), the reform of the EC merger control regime was initially aimed to equip the 
enlarged EU with a modern and more flexible legislation in order to ensure effective, efficient, fair 
and transparent merger control at the most appropriate level. For further discussion, see Gonzales- 
Diaz, The Reform of European Merger Control: Quid Novi Sub Sole?, 2004, World Competition 
27(2), pp. 177-199. 
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Europe, is its significant achievement. The enlarged EU will expand even further 
in 2007, when Bulgaria and Romania join. Negotiations with Croatia and Turkey 
also continue424. 
5.2.2. Economic objectives 
The basic economic principles entrench that competition and merger 
control policy is one part of the general economic policy of the Community. The 
regulation of the agreements and behaviour of firms is an interference with the 
free market in an economic context (Singleton, 1992: 3). However, in a 
competition context such regulatory rules are necessary to deal with market 
imperfections, bearing in mind that a perfect market is like a textbooks' model, 
but not real life. If firms are left alone to determine their own conduct, they are 
likely to combine, collude or enter into other anti-competitive behaviour, which 
are profitable to those firms, but might be detrimental for consumers or consumer 
welfare as a whole. As result of collusion, for instance, one `leader' or a few 
(known as an oligopoly situation) companies can emerge, which can force their 
competitors to leave a market. A dominant firm can increase prices substantially, 
knowing that its competitors are eliminated and especially if there are high 
barriers to entry. In this situation it is necessary to restrain the dominating firm's 
behaviour (Jones and Sufrin, 2004: 2). 
Although not defined in the Treaty, the objective of `workable 
competition' is generally taken to refer to a degree of competition in the EC 
(Anderman, 1998: 17-18). Since workable competition assumes that the pricing 
mechanism must be in good working order, the EC competition policy is aimed at 
preventing any firm or group of firms from controlling output and prices by co- 
ordinating their activities by establishing cartels or other restrictive agreements, 
also stopping abuses of market power by dominant firms, or by preventing 
mergers, which will result in a market structure that is too concentrated to allow 
workable competition to exist. The Commission, through its merger control 
regime prevents the transactions that would likely deprive consumers of the 
benefits, such as low prices, high quality products, a wide selection of goods and 
424 See web-site: http: //europa. eu. int/abc/12lessons/index3_en. htm 
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services, and innovation by significantly increasing the market power of the 
merged firms42s 
Referring to article 3, which ensures that competition in the internal 
market is not distorted, the treaty makes competition a principle goal. Also, article 
4 of the Treaty adopts a co-ordinated economic policy between the Community 
and the Member States based on an open market economy with free competition. 
Thus, these articles of the Treaty set out the objective of free and undistorted 
competition for the Community's internal market. In general, the EC competition 
policy has an aim to promote and maintain a process of effective competition in 
order to achieve a more efficient allocation of resources. 
5.2.3. Other objectives of the EU's Competition policy 
5.2.3.1. Industrial policy, competitiveness and efficiencies 
Theoretically, the relationship between competitiveness and competition is 
controversial. On the one hand, the neo-classical theory of competition as 
demonstrated by Bork suggests that competition is an essential pre-requisite for 
competitiveness. On the other hand, competition policy is seldom regarded as a 
direct instrument for the promotion of competitiveness. Nevertheless, industrial 
policy-makers have regarded competition policy as a positive instrument to 
increase the competitiveness of European firms. 
There is also a legal basis to this link between the competition and 
industrial policies as set forth in article 157 (1) of the EU Treaty 426. This 
relationship, inter alia can be found in the Commission's Annual Report on 
Competition Policy (XXIII, 1993), where competition policy was referred to as 
central to the Community's industrial policy (the priority in the White papers was 
given to the completion of a genuine internal market and an effective industrial 
policy). The report further reviews the ways in which competition policy may be 
adapted to meet the new Community priorities, which includes industrial policy 
and the environment. Also, in the same Competition Report it was stated that far 
425 Guidelines on Horizontal mergers, (2004/C 31/03), at the para 8. 
426 Article 157 paragraph 1 states that `the Community and the Member States shall ensure that the 
conditions for the competitiveness of the Community's industry exist'. 
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from being the direct opposite of industrial policy, competition policy is 
nevertheless an essential instrument and both policies complement each other. In 
another insight into the Commission's views, namely in the XXVth Report on 
Competition Policy in 1995 it was stated that `[ .] competition policy 
has a key 
role to play in ensuring that EU industry remains competitive'. Furthermore, the 
competition commissioner Monti in his speech of 2000 expressed that competition 
policy serves an instrument to encourage industrial efficiency, in particular with 
the optimal allocation of resources, technical progress and the flexibility to adjust 
to a changing environment 427. 
The complementary position between these two policies is illustrated by 
the fresh emphasis being placed in reforming the merger control regime. There the 
approach towards the effects of the merger transactions on competition has 
changed since 2001, when the proposal in the Green papers invited a discussion 
on whether efficiency issues should be introduced in the merger control rules. 
Different from the earlier policy, the Commission highlighted the potential for an 
increased role of efficiency issues. For instance, in the XXXIInd Report on 
Competition Policy (2002: 4) it was stated that `[ .]a 
further objective of the [. ] 
proposal is to take greater account of the efficiencies that can result from 
mergers . 
More recent evolution presents competition policy as a tool to foster 
structural reform and to promote the Lisbon agenda strategy to make the EU the 
most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world by 2010. 
The Commission Communication on pro-active competition can be considered a 
first step to rendering the role of competition policy more visible and as a main 
instrument to strengthen the competitiveness of European industry (Monti, 28 
October 2004). 
5.2.3.2. Protection of small and medium-sized firms 
Protection of small and medium-sized firms (small and medium sized 
enterprises - thereafter SMEs) is another goal defined in the EC competition 
policy. It is because the integration may bring the risk that SMEs, as before 
427 See XXIXth Report on Competition policy, 1999, para 2. 
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protected from imports by national customs, duties and quotas, may find it 
difficult to compete with larger firms operating from the other Member States. In 
order to mitigate that risk the Commission has encouraged collaboration between 
them (Korah, 2004: 12). Also, the Commission's objective to promote the 
protection of SMEs according to Rodger and MacCulloch (2002: 14) is a belief 
that such enterprises may start to compete across national frontiers and, hence, 
may support the policy of market integration. Another popular view for the 
protection of SMEs is that `small is beautiful'. However, as practice shows small 
businesses quite often encounter difficulties in entering or expanding into a 
market due to a lack of capital, lack of human resource and managerial 
experience. Furthermore, Korah (2004: 12) argues that if the concern of 
competition law is to protect SMEs, then market power will be observed far more 
pervasively than having the sole concern of efficiency, and this may account for 
the view of the Commission that any exclusive rights are highly suspect. 
Theoretically, the protection of small businesses might be treated as a 
component of a healthy competitive environment, like a preservation of `equal 
opportunities' (Van den Bergh and Camesasca, 2001: 3). This is because 
maintaining a competitive structure conflicts with the practices of dominant firms, 
which tend to strengthen their power to the detriment of their smaller competitors. 
However, it does not necessarily mean that the protection of SMEs constitutes an 
objective of competition rules in itself. According to Waelbroeck and Frignani 
(1999: 18-19), an excessive protection of small business may hinder the 
adaptations necessary to changes due to the widening of the market and removal 
of any restrictions for exchange, it is necessary for firms to increase in size as they 
can take advantage of the possibilities to realise the economies of scale. Referring 
to small economies, Gal (2003: 47-51) emphasised that the main goal of these 
economies should be to achieve economic efficiency rather than scarifying it for 
broader policy objectives, such as ensuring that SMEs can operate in the market. 
Furthermore, the protection of small firms by giving them fair and equal chances 
to compete with larger rivals are better addressed by other policies, such as tax 
policy rather than competition policy (Van den Bergh and Camesasca, 2001: 6). 
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5.2.3.3. Promotion of consumer welfare 
One of the main objectives of the EC Competition policy is to promote the 
interests of consumers and to ensure that consumers benefit from the wealth 
generated by the European economy. The consumers' interest comes first in all 
aspects of the competition policy, including abuse of a dominant position, anti- 
competitive agreements and concerted practices and also anti-competitive merger 
transactions 428. Consumer protection can find its place in competition law in 
article 153 (2), which states that `[ .] consumer protection requirements shall be 
taken into account in defining and implementing other Community policies and 
activities '. 
Moreover, the former commissioner Monti (2004) mentioned that the 
Commission shall not only ensure that the market functions in a way that 
maximises benefits for consumers, but it also gives an opportunity in the fight 
against violation of the competition rules through the presentation of complaints 
that give way to an opening of proceedings or by taking part in reforming 
competition law429. For instance, it can be reflected through the Guidelines on 
horizontal mergers, where consumers demonstrated a legitimate interest by taking 
part in the examination process and presenting observations on the effects of the 
operation. 
Generally, merger control mechanism assists in improving efficiency and 
safeguarding consumer interests by preventing the creation of undertakings 
through merger, acquisition or other structural combination that will have the 
incentive and ability to exercise market power and will result in a detriment to 
consumers. It is because market power may give firms the ability to restrict output 
and consequently charge a higher price to consumers in comparison to its pre- 
merger situation 430 . 
Specifically, the wording of EC Merger Regulation and speeches delivered 
by the competition commissioners does not allow balancing efficiency gains and 
furthermore, the EC competition law is not designed to check distributional 
428 For further reading, see XXXIInd Report on Competition policy, 2002, pp. 2. Also see M. 
Monti's speech `Proactive competition policy and the role of the consumer', Dublin, 29 April 
2004. 
429For further discussion, see M. Monti's speech `Proactive competition policy and the role of the 
consumer', Dublin, 29 April 2004. 
430 For further discussion, see ch. 4. 
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effects. For instance, Mario Monti, the commissioner has stressed: `1.. ] The goal 
of competition policy, in all its aspects, is to protect consumer welfare by 
maintaining a high degree of competition in the common market. Competition 
should lead to lower prices, a wider choice of goods, and technological 
innovation, all in the interest of the consumer'. 431 It means that consumer welfare 
rather than total welfare plays a leading role in the EC competition law. 
According to Van den Bergh and Camesasca (2001: 3) this view does not perfectly 
match the definition of allocative efficiency. Gal's theory stresses that total, rather 
than consumer welfare, should be encompassed in the law of small market 
economies. However, the speech delivered by the competition commissioner 
Mario Monti at the Competition Day in Dublin on 29th April 2004 shows that the 
new Member States, including the Baltic states, ought to follow the competition 
policy of the EC. Monti stated that `[ .] 
Competition policy is currently going 
through important times of change. This is essential to make the competition rules 
more effective in a European Union of 25 States fully integrated in a globalised 
economy. [. ] Competition authorities will intervene only in cases which affect 
consumers negatively'. [.. ] The competitive performance of industry should not 
deflect from the positive impact of competition policy on consumer welfare' 
(Monti, 2004 as quoted in Competition Policy Newsletter, Summer 2004). 
The recent reform of the EC merger regime has expressed consolidated 
consumer interest as a central goal. For instance, according to the Guidelines on 
Horizontal concentrations, appropriate efficiencies may countervail anti- 
competitive merger transactions if they ultimately benefit consumers. This shows 
that the approach towards efficiencies achievable through merger transactions that 
benefit consumers has changed. As before, the Commission has been criticised for 
protecting competitors rather consumers. For instance, the GE / Honeywell case432 
was blocked by the Commission inter alia because it could have led to mixed 
bundling, as lowering prices by eliminating pricing in-efficiencies can make 
consumers better off but it in the long run it would have driven out competitors 
not efficient enough to match such pricing. This EC policy has changed ever 
431 Mario Monti, The Future for Competition Policy, speech of July 9,2001, Merchant Taylor's 
Hall, London, also available at the web-site: 
www. europa. eu. int/comm/competition/speeches/index - 
200 I. html 
432 Case COMP/M 2220,2001. For the comments on this case, see Pflanz M. and Caffarra C., The 
Economics of GE / Honeywell, 23 ECLR 115,2002. 
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since. The newly appointed competition commissioner N. Kroes (2005) expressed 
that she prefers aggressive competition, including by dominant companies as long 
as it ultimately benefits consumers without having concerns whether it may hurt 
competitors. Hence, the EC policy protects consumers rather than competitors. 
5.2.3.4. Policy towards small market economies 
Disputes on national champions in the European Union Institutions were 
caused by the controversy aroused in the Nordic countries by prohibiting the 
Volvo / Scania merger433 on the grounds that it would create a dominant position 
in several national markets. In this case the Commission distinguished five 
national markets that could be affected by the transaction, these included 
Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Ireland, and concluded that the proposed 
transaction would eliminate Volvo's only significant competitor and as a result 
would create a dominant position in several countries. Meanwhile, the parties of 
the transaction claimed a wider market definition, i. e. European rather than 
national. This Volvo/Scania prohibition as well as other merger transactions' 
prohibitions434 from Nordic countries has raised fierce debates in Europe, as to 
what extent the imbalance inherent in the EC merger policy affect large firms 
from small Member States. According to Prof. Bernitz and Gutu (2003), who 
delivered a critical analysis of the relevant case-law and the positions of parties to 
this debate, the disadvantage occurs for the small markets in the Community 
market, which is not yet fully integrated and the relevant geographic market for 
certain products/services is still national in scope. This is because, what is 
substantial dominance in small Member State like Sweden or any Baltic country, 
might not raise any `dominance' concerns in Germany or the UK. 
There have been different opinions expressed from the EU institutions 
with regards to specificity of small market economies. For instance, the 
supportive view towards small market economies was enunciated in the European 
Parliament. Consideration of taking the efficiencies and competitiveness into 
433 Volvo / Scania, case No. COMP/M. 1672, March 15,2000. For the comments on this case, see, 
for instance, Wu, Hofer and Williams, The increasing use of empirical methods in European 
Merger enforcement: lessons from the past and a look ahead, Antitrust insights, NERA, Spring 
2004. 
434 For instance, SCA /Metsa Tissue case No. IV/M. 2097. 
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account especially in small markets was discussed during the debates in the 
European Parliament435 where the Parliament stated that `1.. ] large companies 
based in small Member States must not be categorically excluded from merging in 
order to be competitive throughout Europe and globally. ' It was also mentioned 
that large firms from small Member States seem to decline in their 
competitiveness in comparison with the other firms in the world due to the 
unfinished completion of the internal market. However, an opposite view was 
expressed by the Commission and the Competition commissioners. For instance, 
Monti is his speech 436 mentioned that in order for the Community to be 
competitive worldwide, there is a need to have a competitive home market. 
Furthermore, he mentioned that the emphasis is on market definition in individual 
cases, without distinguishing large and small market economies. Another 
competition commissioner Lowe (2003) also stated that the focus is on market 
definition and factors such as national preferences for national brands, culture, and 
life style and obviously barriers to entry are all relevant. Referring to the Volvo 
case, Lowe mentioned that the most important barriers for Irish consumers might 
be the impact of transport costs and transport restrictions arising from legislation 
or from the nature of the relevant products. Moreover, if national firms do not face 
serious competitive constraints from abroad, they can only be national in scope. 
Merger control is about protecting the competitive process in the market and aims 
to ensure that consumers can obtain a variety of goods at competitive prices in all 
countries regardless of a country's size437. Hence, the conclusion can be drawn 
that country's size is not the issue in this case, as the emphasis of the EC policy is 
on the market definition. 
aas Minutes of 24 October 2000 (A5-0290/2000), para 18. 
436 As published in XXIXth Report on Competition policy, 1999, para 2. 
437 For further discussion, see the speech `The interaction between the Commission and Small 
Member States in Merger Review' delivered by P. Lowe during the Competition Authority Merger 
Review Day, in Dublin, 10/10/2003. D. Sjoeblom, a Deputy Director-General, also confirmed the 
EC Commission's position by placing focus on market definition regardless of a country's size 
(the data obtained from the e-mail addressed to the researcher). 
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5.2.3.5. Social aspects in the Competition policy of the EU 
It has been suggested that the Commission and the Court by elevating the 
single market principle should take into account other Community's objectives 
relevant to the application of competition law such as regional or structural 
imbalances, safeguarding employment and the environment (Steiner and Woods, 
2003: 398). On several occasions the Commission has recognised social and/or 
environmental repercussions on the competition rules. In the statement issued in 
1993, the Commission pointed out the need `[.. ] to ensure that the natural and 
logical linkages between the Community's competition, research, environmental 
and social policies are fully taken into account in the Commission 's approach to 
competition policy' (ISEC B21/93 as quoted in Steiner and Woods). In the XV 
Report on Competition Policy it was also stated that competition policy is seen as 
a tool, which can create an environment for the growth of the European industry 
in an efficient manner and at the same time taking into account social goals438 
Environmental issues were stressed by the Commission in the XXIIIrd Report on 
Competition Policy by stating that environmental protection programmes may be 
used in order to disguise anti-competitive practice. 
Despite the fact that social issues, for instance, social effects of a particular 
concentration can play a role in the consideration of merger approval, the 
439 emphasis of competition matters is the dominant criterion. 
5.2.4. The evolution of priorities over time within the EC jurisdiction 
Competition policy priorities in the EC have changed over time. 
According to Prof. R. Whish, competition policy does not exist in a vacuum, it is 
merely an expression of the current aims and values of society and `[.. ] is as 
susceptible to change as political thinking generally' (Whish, 1998: 16). The fast 
changing economic environment entitles the EC Competition policy to follow 
these changes. The various EC Annual Reports on Competition Policy and the 
speeches made by the competition commissioners further support the multi-goal 
438 See also the ECMR No. 139/2004, recital 4. 
439Though the Commission might consider social issues in a failing firm defence scenario. 
For further discussion, see Banks, D., Non-Competition Factors and their Future Relevance under 
European Merger Law, 1997 3 ECLR, pp. 182-184. 
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task of the Competition policy of the EU and its changes over time. For instance, 
the XV Annual Report of Competition policy in 1985 expressed the concept of 
`effective competition' 440 by stating that effective competition `[. J preserves the 
freedom and right initiative of the individual economic operators and it fosters the 
spirit of enterprise. It creates an environment within which European industry can 
grow and develop in the most efficient manner and at the same time take account 
of social goals'. Meanwhile, the XXIXth Report on Competition Policy in 1999 
made the point that `competition policy serves as an instrument to encourage 
industrial efficiency, the optimal allocation of resources, technical progress and 
the f exibility to adjust to a changing environment. In order for the Community to 
be competitive on worldwide markets, it needs a competitive home market. 441 
The competition policy objective of promoting market integration was 
highly important when the common market was still being established, when 
industries were traditionally national and the challenge was to get them to 
transcend those boundaries. However, with progress toward the realisation of the 
internal market, relative importance of the market integration, as the main goal of 
competition, has declined (OECD report prepared by Wise, 2005). 
The Policy now stresses efficiency, consumer welfare and competitiveness 
of the European economy. The present competition policy has shifted towards a 
new approach -a more economic based approach. In one of the recent speeches 
`A reformed competition policy: achievements and challenges for the future' 
Monti expressed that the main achievements over the last five years were 
characterised by the reforms and the modernisation of European competition 
policy and concluded that competition policy is now clearly grounded in sound 
micro-economics (Speech/04/477,28 October 2004). The major trend has been to 
ensure that competition policy is fully compatible with economic learning. For 
instance, the modernisation of the EC merger control regime has started with 
issuing Green papers in 2001 with an invitation to provide comments in order to 
reform the merger control rules. As a result of the reforms, the new ECMR issued 
in 2004 has shifted towards a more economic based approach. The emphasis is not 
on market structures but rather on the effects of merger transactions in the market 
440 The term `effective competition' is enshrined in the substantive test of the ECMR, as the 
ground to prohibit a merger that would `significantly impede effective competition'. 
441 XXIXth Report on Competition Policy 1999, para 2. 
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in question. The introduction of new substantive tests, HHI assessments, 
efficiencies achievable through mergers and other aspects are the examples of a 
new EC competition policy approach with reliance on sound economics442. These 
Guidelines also detail the benefits to consumers: of lower prices, higher quality 
and a wider selection of goods and innovation. Improvement of competitiveness is 
not explicitly mentioned, but nevertheless, in the 2004's annual report on 
competition policy while highlighting the notion of improving efficiency, the 
Lisbon agenda was also mentioned to promote European competitiveness. `[.. ] 
Competition policy is not an end in itself, but one essential tool to achieve 
efficient market outcomes'. 
5.3. The competition policy of the Baltic countries 
5.3.1. Overview 
While other European countries, such as Germany, Sweden and the UK 
had developed competition law traditions, the Soviet `reorientation' of Eastern 
Europe, including the Baltic countries, after the Second World War precluded any 
such influence that the experience of the Baltic countries there might otherwise 
have had (Gerber, 1998: 163). Hence, the competition law legal tradition has not 
been developed like in other western European countries over time, but was 
transposed from the EU. The competition law and policy appeared in the legal 
system of the Baltic states as a part of acquis. As a part of the law harmonisation 
program in line with the EC law, the Baltic countries adopted the EC competition 
policy, including merger control regime. These rules were adopted without 
questioning to what extent they can serve the interest of the Baltic countries. 
Despite some attempts of the European Parliament to favour small Member 
States, the Commission made it clear that in order for the Community to be 
competitive worldwide, there is a need to have a competitive home market. The 
emphasis is on market definition in individual cases, without distinguishing large 
and small market economies443. However, scholars disagree at this point. The 
442 For further discussion, see chapter 6. 
'' Similar position was expressed by the commentators from both sides of Atlantic during debates 
of the Trans-Atlantic Antitrust Research Chapter Author's Symposium, 11 May 2005, after the 
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firms, which do not perform well and which survived only due to national 
protections, are condemned now to disappear, thereby allowing firms better 
prepared to face competition to realise economies of scale and increase their 
production that benefit the entire `collectivity'. The market integration and 
increase of competition at the Community level forces firms, which had acquired 
near monopoly position or even a monopoly in order to achieve economies of 
scale at a national level to compete with each other. Moreover, the expansion of 
trade gives go-ahead to the Community's economy to benefit from the advantages 
of mass production without suffering from the drawbacks of monopoly or near 
monopoly situation (Albors-Llorens, 2002: 7). Professor Gal (2003) also 
emphasised the necessity of attentiveness of national economic characteristics in 
designing competition policy, including merger control regime. Sometimes 
problems may arise when the competition laws of economies in transition are 
modelled too closely upon off-the-rack variations of statutes or institutions as 
developed in older market economies (OECD, 2004(30)). While transposition of 
the EC competition policy in the new Member States, including the Baltic 
countries, has many benefits, nonetheless, a one-size-fits-a11444 application of such 
rules is less affordable for small market economies. Professor Geradin and Henry 
(2005) suggested a differentiated approach (depending on the market structures) 
should be taken into account in designing competition policy in these countries. 
The following sections will discuss the objectives of the competition 
policy in the Baltic countries and to what extent they are in conformity with the 
objectives of the EC competition policy and whether they reflect the interest of 
the Baltic states. 
5.3.2. Political objectives 
In order to identify the competition policy in the Baltic countries, the 
researcher has analysed the Annual Reports of each Baltic state, the speeches 
delivered and publications published by the officials of the Competition 
Authorities, including the reports submitted to the other governmental institutions 
researcher addressed a question whether the national authorities, especially with small market 
economies, should have a different competition policy, which is designed to fit their markets. 
444 This term applied in Gal's book, 2003. 
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and international organisations, as well as primary and secondary sources of the 
Competition Laws. The analysis revealed that the main task of the competition 
policy in all Baltic states was based not on `pure' competition but the priority was 
given to the integration into the EU. Most of the Annual Reports in these 
countries addressed that the harmonisation of competition law and policy in the 
light of EC competition policy, which is a pre-condition for the membership, has 
been the major task of the Competition Authorities445The priority in all Baltic 
states has been given to the implementation of the requirements of the EC 
competition policy. According to R. Stanikunas, a chairman of the Competition 
Council of Lithuania, the main emphasis in the competition policy in 2003 was to 
ensure sufficient preparedness for the application of the EU competition rules and 
operation in the EU legal environment upon accession of Lithuania into the 
European Union (Annual Report of Competition policy in Lithuania, 2003). 
Particularly, these priorities include the tasks to ensure the further harmonisation 
of the Lithuanian competition legislation taking due regard of the forthcoming 
changes in the EU legislation, to establish the procedures for cooperation with the 
European Commission and the national competition authorities of other Member 
States, to ensure the efficient application of competition rules and enhance the 
awareness in issues of competition law and application thereof. The 
harmonisation with EC law is one of the main goals incorporated into the Law on 
Competition in Lithuania. Article 1 (3) states that the law `[ .] seeks 
for the 
harmonisation of the Lithuanian and the European Union law regulating 
competition relations'. 
A similar position has been expressed in various Annual Reports of 
competition policy in the Estonian and the Latvian jurisdictions. In the Estonian 
Annual Report of 1999 it was stated that `[.. ] at present the main goal of the 
Competition Board [ 
.J is to introduce the necessary amendments which are 
due 
to the development of court practice and of the relevant EC rules'. The main task 
for the Competition Board of Estonia in 2003 was on preparations to accede to the 
aas See, for instance, the Annual Report of Estonia 1998, where it was referred to the importance of 
approximation of the Estonian legislation with the Community legislation. See also Annual Report 
of Estonia from 1999 to 2004, which are available in English from web-site: 
http: //www. konkurentsiamet. ee/eng/index. html? id=765. As regards Latvian jurisdiction, see 
Annual Report of Latvia 2003, available at web-site: 
http: //www. competition. lv/uploaded files/ENG/Gads2003-En lgOl. pdf. For Lithuanian Annual 
Reports dated from 1999 to 2004, see web-site: http: //www. konkuren. lt/english/index. htm. 
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EU (Annual Report of Competition policy in Estonia, 2003). Harmonisation of 
competition law and policy with the EC and preparation for the membership in the 
EU has also been expressed in the Latvian jurisdiction (see Annual Report of 
Competition policy in Latvia, 2003446) 
The insightful look at the Annual Reports of the Baltic countries proves 
that the priority of the competition policy has been given to the preparation to the 
membership into the EU. This is because competition policy implemented in the 
candidate countries447 played a central role in the evaluation of accession. 
5.3.3. Economic objectives of the competition policy in the Baltic 
countries 
Likewise the Commission is a guardian of competition policy within the 
Community, so is the Competition Council of Lithuania, the Competition Board 
of Estonia and the Competition Council of Latvia the bodies responsible for 
enforcing the competition policy in national markets448. One of the tasks of the 
Competition Board of Estonia is to analyse the situation of competition in 
different markets for goods and services and make recommendations to improve 
the situation of competition 449 The main aim of the Competition Council of 
Latvia is to ensure that it is possible for every market participant to perform his 
economic activities in a free and fair competitive environment and also promote 
competition development in all sectors of the national economy for the benefit of 
all society 450 
As in the EC competition policy, which can be viewed as having a multi- 
objectives competition policy, the Baltic countries have also set out more than one 
task in their competition policy. The main objectives of competition policy in the 
Lithuanian legal system are summarised in the Law on Competition of the 
Republic of Lithuania (thereafter Competition law of Lithuania) and in the 
Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania 451 (thereafter the Lithuanian 
446 Also see the report of Economic Development of Latvia, June 2004, which contains the 
competition policy. 
447 Referring to the Baltic countries before their accession on 1 May 2004. 
448 See chapter 1 for further discussion about the Competition Authorities in the Baltic states. 
aa9 Available at web-site: http: //www. konkurentsiamet. ee/eng/. See also OECD 04 October 2001. 
450 Available at web-site: http: //www. competition. ly 
451 Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, 1992. 
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Constitution), which is a supreme law in the Lithuanian Republic. Article 46 of 
the Lithuanian Constitution provides: 
`[.. ] Lithuania 's economy shall be based on the right to private ownership, 
freedom of individual economic activity and initiative. The State shall support 
economic efforts and initiative, which are useful to the community. The State shall 
regulate economic activity so that it serves the general welfare of the people. The 
law shall prohibit monopolisation of production and the market, and shall protect 
freedom of fair competition. The State shall defend the interests of the consumers'. 
The Constitution's article incorporates a variety of objectives. The first principle 
of the Lithuanian Constitution encompasses a freedom of individual economic 
activity. However, such freedom is not without limits as the State can impose 
restrictions on the economic activity if such activity is harmful to the community 
and does not serve the general welfare of the whole society. This is because as 
interpreted by the Competition Council of Lithuania individual behaviour might 
fail to preserve socially desirable features such as the improvement of welfare for 
the whole society. It is in the public interest to rely on competition for the efficient 
allocation of resources and the improvement of welfare. This in turn means that 
the state has an obligation to ensure that certain economic behaviour, such as anti- 
competitive agreements, abuse of a dominant position, and creation or 
strengthening of a dominant position by means of merger transactions is not 
allowed. Also, no one, including the state, is allowed to introduce a monopoly. In 
general the Constitution seeks a reasonable balance between the interests of an 
individual and those of society and such a balance is supposed to be achieved by 
protecting freedom of fair competition 452. The constitutional principle of 
`protecting freedom of fair competition' was also incorporated into the Law on 
Competition of Lithuania 453 However, the law does not provide a definition of 
`fair competition'. Nevertheless, the law on Competition does not preclude the 
Competition Council of Lithuania to refer to the mainstream economic theory, 
which equates competition with the absence of market power (OECD, 2003454) 
452 Note: the interpretation provided by the Competition Council of Lithuania for the Lithuanian 
contribution to OECD, 2003. Available at web-site: 
http: //www. korilcuiren. It/english/intemational/oecd. htm 
453 Art. (1) of the Law on Competition of Lithuania, as amended by 15 April 2004 No. IX-2126. 
454 As interpreted by the Competition Council of Lithuania in papers submitted to the OECD, 
DAFFE/COMP(2003)5. 
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Unlike Lithuania, both Latvia and Estonia do not have enshrined 
competition principles in their constitutions. Nevertheless, the competition policy 
is encompassed in the primary and secondary sources of the Competition 
Authorities in both countries. For instance, in Estonia the purpose of the 
Competition Act is the safeguarding of competition in the interests of free 
enterprise upon the extraction of natural resources, manufacture of goods, 
provision of services and sale, and purchase of products/services, and the 
preclusion and elimination of the prevention, limitation or restriction of 
competition in other economic activities 455 In particular, merger control in 
Estonia is required because there is a need `[ .] to maintain and develop 
competition, taking into account the structure of goods markets and the actual 
and potential competition in the goods market'456 
The purpose of Latvian Competition Law is `[.. ] to protect, maintain and 
develop free, honest and equal competition in the interests of the public in all 
economic sectors, to restrict market concentration, impose as an obligation the 
termination of activities which are prohibited by the regulatory enactments 
regaling competition' 457. Instead of explaining the meaning of the term `honest 
and equal competition', the Chairman of the Competition Council of Latvia 
defines a competition policy as an instrument of commercial activity, that ensures 
the possibility for any individual to offer the products/services in the market and 
to compete for market share by offering constantly improved products/services on 
one hand. On the other hand, competition policy also ensures the possibility for 
consumers to choose products/services, which best meets consumers' 
requirements. Furthermore, by making daily decisions on buying 
products/services consumers provide signals for market participants relating to 
their competitiveness and generating income and profit and providing a basis for 
the development of new products/services for motivation to invest and create new 
jobs (Annual Report of Latvia, 2003). 
The general consensus of the competition policy in the Baltic countries is 
very similar. These countries have incorporated the basic objective of competition 
policy to ensure that competition is not distorted. However, some individual 
455 See §1 (1) of the Competition Act of Estonia, RT1 12001,56,332, consolidated text July 2004. 
456 22 (1), Competition Act, 5 June 2001. 
457 Section 2, Competition Law. 
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features can be distinguished, for instance, Lithuania refers to `freedom of fair 
competition' and Estonia to the `interest of free-enterprise'. Latvia alludes to 
`honest and equal competition' that cannot be found in the EC competition policy. 
With priority given to the political objective - i. e. the integration into the EU, the 
Baltic states have not explored their `pure' competition policy. Thus, it is not clear 
whether, for instance, the Latvian `honest' competition has meant (or not) the 
notion of honest trade and ethical conduct similar to the ideas found in the origins 
of the German Act Against Unfair Competition458 or in the Paris Convention of 
1883, where unfair competition was defined as `[ .] any act of competition 
contrary to honest practices in industrial or commercial matters'459 
5.3.4. Industrial policy, competitiveness and efficiencies 
Besides the harmonisation of the competition law and policy with the EC, 
the Baltic countries had to meet another Copenhagen criterion for the access to the 
EU. It is the existence of a functioning market economy, developing in such a way 
that it can sustain the competitive pressure from and in the Single Market and the 
Economic and Monetary Union. Generally, the creation of the Single Market with 
no restriction of movements of goods/services and capital increases competition. 
As a result of the increased competition, firms are forced to search for ways to 
lower cost and to achieve efficiencies. This is also applicable for the firms in the 
Baltic countries. Economist Vilpisauskas (2003) projected that the integration into 
the EU will force Lithuanian firms to increase competitiveness, as they will have 
to look for new strategies to achieve efficiencies in order to remain in market. 
In order to achieve the desire to integrate their economies with the rest of 
the world, the governments of the Baltic countries started to dismantle the 
restrictive and inefficient trade regimes inherited from the Soviet Empire. This 
involved removing quantitative restrictions and phasing out export and import 
tariffs. All Baltic states apply liberal foreign trade systems in order to attract 
foreign investors, Estonia being the leader with no import licensing and import 
tariffs since signing the free Trade agreements with the EU in 1994. The 
458 For the reading as regards the German Act, see Ullrich H., Anti-Unfair Competition Law and 
Anti-Trust Law: A Continental Conundrum?, EUI Working Paper Law No. 2005/01. 
as9 As quoted in A. Jacquemin, Theories of Industrial Organisation and Competition Policy: What 
are the Links?, Working paper, 2000. 
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Competition Authorities of the Baltic states have also expressed their role in the 
formulation and implementation of other policies apart from the competition 
policy, such as trade and industrial policies. The competition policy in these 
countries is engaged in competition protection development and promotion 
spheres. This competition policy includes opening monopoly sectors for 
competition, the reduction of restrictions and abolishing administrative barriers. It 
also ensures increasing competitiveness and efficiency growth of the national 
economy. For instance, the Competition policy of Latvia web-site provides an aim 
to ensure such legal and economic conditions that would not only attract foreign 
investments and business activities but also guarantee Latvia's ability to integrate 
efficiently into the European Union460. It has also been mentioned that the goal of 
Latvia's competition policy is to create legal and economic conditions for free and 
fair competition, which in the long run promote competitiveness of the whole 
society and growth of welfare. Long-term goals are related to the promotion of 
competition in the national economic sectors, which still experience restrictions to 
entrepreneurial activity and which do not match the interests of society (Economic 
Development of Latvia Report, December, 2003). 
As stated above, firms can increase their competitiveness if they become 
more efficient. One way of becoming more efficient is through merger 
transactions. Mergers generally constitute a means of restructuring, allowing a 
more efficient allocation of resources in any industry. This can enhance the 
competitiveness of the merging entities and improve competitiveness of the 
industry as a whole. Due to globalisation process and the integration into the 
European market, firms, especially in small market economies, require reaching 
minimum efficient scales in order to compete internationally. Despite the fact that 
efficiencies in scale and scope achieved through merger transactions 461 can 
increase competitiveness, the current Competition Laws of the Baltic countries do 
not contain any provisions on the merger-specific efficiencies. It is worth 
mentioning that despite not explicitly identifying the objectives of the competition 
policy, the old Competition Law of Lithuania 462 included enhancement of 
production efficiency and competitiveness among the goals of merger control. At 
460 Available at web-site: http: //www. competition. ly/? 1=2 
461 For further discussion, see ch. 4. 
462 The law was in force from 1992 to 1999. See ch. l. 
229 
present the Competition Laws in all Baltic countries do not take into account any 
other goals, for instance, industrial goal in merger cases. The practice proves that 
efficiencies have been considered even as an `offence' rather than a `defence'. In 
the UAB Vitoma case463 in the jurisdiction of Lithuania the elements, including 
economies of scale, advantageous price policy were considered as the conditions 
to restrict competition in the Lithuanian ferrous scrap metal purchase and 
processing market. 
Although efficiency issues are not provided by law, the interviews held in 
the Baltic countries showed that the considerations of efficiency gains can be 
taken into account but only up to the level of dominance464 This position was 
stressed by all the professionals in the Baltic states dealing directly with merger 
cases. However, inadequacy as regards efficiency policy occurred in Latvia, 
where Jefremova, a board member of the Competition Council, expressed a 
different opinion from one stated by an official dealing directly with merger cases. 
Jefremova declared that efficiency consideration can be taken into account in 
`borderline' cases, where there are concerns of the emergence of a dominant 
position, but it is not sufficiently clear how a merger transaction will affect the 
competition and consumer. Furthermore, `[ .] efficiency 
defence could mitigate a 
finding of dominance', if the entities involved in the transaction could prove the 
efficiency gains from the merger and it will be passed on to consumers. These two 
different opinions show that there is no clear position held with regard to merger- 
specific efficiencies in the jurisdiction of Latvia. 
It can be concluded that there is not a clear approach on the possible 
efficiency gains achievable through merger transactions in the Baltic countries. 
These countries have set out an objective to increase competitiveness; however, 
they have not explored all the means to achieve it. 
463 See Annual Report of Lithuania, 2000-2001, available at web-site http: //www. oecd. org 
464 Interviews held at the Competition Authorities in the Baltic countries during September- 
October, 2004. 
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5.3.5. Protection of consumers or competitors? 
The scholars agree that the focus in the Soviet regime was on producer 
welfare rather than on consumer welfare465 The Baltic countries being a part of the 
Soviet empire had a strong centralised system, where the State had control over 
prices, quality and variety of products/services and consumers did not play a role. 
This is why after re-gaining their independence the Baltic states have encountered 
difficulties in introducing consumer protection. For instance, the registered 
consumer complaints vis-a-vis Major Commodity Groups and Services in 1998- 
1999 period in Lithuania revealed that in many cases consumers lack knowledge 
about their rights. The Competition Council of Lithuania has often requested to 
protect the rights of consumers even in areas of activities that fall under the 
competence of other institutions. In contrast to the EC policy where consumers 
are more active and have their say, for instance, by giving comments on reforming 
the ECMR, consumers in the Baltic countries are passive466. At present they 
hardly play any role in forming competition policy. Anti-competitive concerns of 
proposed merger transactions are usually expressed by the competitors rather than 
consumers. Also, in the opinion of Klimas467, a former board member of the 
Competition Council of Lithuania, consumers in Lithuania are not `matured' and 
lack knowledge of competition policy. According to Klimas, the opinion of 
consumers is too emotional in the context that they might use their right to claim 
that a firm has been involved in anti-competitive behaviour in order to retaliate for 
some personal things468. The researcher agrees that the consumers in the Baltic 
countries still lack knowledge of their rights. However, it is not a reason to 
exclude them from the activity of competition policy. 
Protection of consumers is not explicitly mentioned in the Competition 
Laws of the Baltic countries as a goal of competition policy. The Competition 
Laws in the Baltic countries provide either definition of undertaking (in the cases 
of Estonia and Lithuania) or definition of market participant (in the case of 
465 See for instance, Eörsi G., Harmathy A., Law and Economic Reform in Socialist Countries, 
Akademiai Kiado, Budapest, 1971, pp. 103. 
466 The information was obtained from the questionnaires to the Competition Authorities of the 
Baltic states. 
467 The information was obtained during the interview on 5 September 2004. 
468 Note: Some cultural aspects of the Baltic countries are that they sometimes are called as 
`country of relatives' in the sense that everybody knows each other. 
231 
Latvia) but do not determine the definition of consumer. It is not clear whether the 
Baltic states have the Chicagoan notion of consumer as society at large 
encompassing even every market player, or the EC's notion of consumer in 
competition law as any intermediate or final consumer, as a `customer' or `user' 
who might be another market operator purchasing the product/service, or finally 
referring to consumers as the final user otherwise the `man from street', as acting 
outside his/her business or profession. § 22 of the Estonian Competition Act states 
that in appraisal of a concentration other factors will be taken into account, 
including '[.. ] the interests of the buyers, sellers and ultimate consumers'. This 
provision shows that Estonia has a different approach from the EC policy as it has 
a broader approach and protects total welfare rather than consumer welfare. Also, 
is not clear whether priority is given to the interest of producers or consumers in 
the existence of conflict. The ambiguity of the objectives of the Competition Act 
in Estonia as regards protection of consumers' rights can be illustrated by the 
following case, where the courts of different instances provided a different 
interpretation. AS Elion Ettevotted469 (former AS Eesti Telefon) was charged for 
unfair pricing conditions by the Competition Board of Estonia. On appeal, the 
administrative court and the circuit court supported AS Elion Ettevotted's position 
that without establishment of the fact of prejudice to other undertakings or 
excluding other undertakings from the market, § 14 (1) (undertaking with special 
or exclusive rights) does not apply. However, the Supreme Court, which is the 
highest court in Estonia, supported the position of the Competition Board by 
stating that application of unfair pricing conditions by abusing the dominant 
position is prohibited irrespective whether other undertakings are prejudice or not. 
Furthermore, AS Elion Ettevotted argued that the aim of the Competition Act was 
only to protect other undertakings from distortions of competition rather than 
consumers. However, the Supreme Court disagreed with this approach and stated 
that the aim of the Competition Act is also to protect persons not involved in 
business and public interests470. This case illustrates that the Competition Board of 
Estonia, with support of the Supreme Court, is willing to protect the interest of 
consumers. 
469 Case AS Elion Ettevotted v Competition Board, case no. 3-3-1-66-02, judgement of the 
Supreme Court of 18 December 2002. 
470 As commented in the Annual Report of Estonia, 2004. Available at web-site: 
http: //www. konkurentsiamet. ee/eng/index. html? ld=765 
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As regards the Latvian jurisdiction, the Latvian Competition Law has 
declared that undistorted competition in all sectors is the main objective of the 
competition policy. However, according to Jefremova, a board member of the 
Competition Council of Latvia, the Competition Council often stresses the benefit 
of society as a main goal of competition policy. Furthermore, the Latvian 
competition policy is not about `[ .] the pursuit of competition for its own sake - 
the interests of economic efficiency which are closely related to the consumer 
welfare are taken into account as well' (Jefremova, 2003471). However, she did 
not explore further. Thus, it is not clear whether consumer welfare needs to be 
looked at in a broader context like that expressed by the Chicagoan notion or 
narrower. 
As aforementioned, the safeguarding of consumers is not incorporated in 
the Competition Law of Lithuania. Despite that, consumer protection can be 
found in several Annual Reports. For instance, in the Annual Report of 2001, 
chairman Stanikunas stated that while developing competition culture in the 
country, the activity of the Council has been to improve the economy and 
promotion of investment by protecting legitimate interests of undertakings and 
consumers. The report does not explain further what position will be supported if 
the interests of undertakings and consumers are in conflict, which is usually the 
case. In the Annual Report of 2003 it was also stated that the main purpose of the 
Competition Council is to enforce the provision of the Competition Law in a way 
that best serves the progress of the society472. The definition of society is not 
provided, which gives a presumption that like in Estonia, the jurisdiction of 
Lithuania also is willing to take a boarder approach and protect total welfare 
rather than consumer welfare. 
The examples illustrated above suggest that the protection of consumers in 
competition policy is ambiguous in the Baltic countries. In order to avoid 
ambiguity, the Competition Authorities in the Baltic states should consider 
471 Speech delivered during the `International Workshop on Competition Policy' in Seoul, 
29/04/2003-03/05/2003. 
472 All Annual Reports are available at web-site: http: //www. konkuren. lt/english/index. htm 
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explicitly expressing their position as regards their support either of total welfare 
473 or consumer welfare 
5.3.6. The evolution of priorities in competition policy within the 
jurisdiction of the Baltic countries 
One of the main objectives of the competition policy in the Baltic 
countries, especially before membership into the EU has been a political one - as 
to harmonise their legislation in the field of competition with the EC law and 
prepare for the EU accession. In contrast to the EC, where the competition law has 
been developed gradually, the Baltic countries had legal transposition. It in turn 
means that the Baltic countries have had an educational task: to inform and teach 
society of the competition principles by providing knowledge about the 
competition rules and raising the competition culture. This has taken place in the 
form of seminars, issuing special publications and explanatory materials publicly 
accessible on the homepages of the Competition Authorities of the Baltic 
countries. Quite often a breach of the competition rules has occurred in the Baltic 
states due to the unfamiliarity of these rules. Thus, the Baltic states have had a 
unique objective to teach staff completely new law and inform society of the 
principles of competition and its importance. 
Bearing in mind that these countries were a part of the Soviet system and 
as a result inherited giant companies, which as a rule were too big for the small 
Baltic markets and were surviving on State subsidizes, the Baltic countries came 
with the idea that `big is bad'. For instance, the Competition Board of Estonia in 
its Annual Report (2000) stated that it has spent the first years tearing down the 
old thinking of `the bigger the better'. Ineffective massive former Soviet 
companies, which had images of `the bigger - the more powerful', can fall to the 
category of `big is bad'. However, it does not necessary mean that all big 
companies are `bad' and should be stopped from growing, especially for small 
market economies. According to Gal's theory, in small market economies only a 
limited number of players can be supported by the market. 
473 During the interviews held at the Competition Authorities of the Baltic countries, the 
interviewees stated in all three countries that they safeguard the interest of consumers. However, 
the law does not express such a position. 
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Later, the policy has changed realising that small players can no longer 
operate alone in the market due to the fact that the Baltic countries have become a 
part of the world economy and as a result the firms there have faced international 
competition. This in turn means that small players are forced to make decisions on 
whether to merge, find new niches in the market or leave the market. However, 
this position is not clearly incorporated in the Competition Laws in the Baltic 
countries. As aforementioned after the modernisation of the EC competition law, 
the EC competition policy has shifted toward a new approach -a more economic 
based approach. The emphasis is not on market structures anymore but rather on 
the effects of merger transactions for instance, in the market in question. 
Meanwhile, the Baltic countries put emphasis on market structures rather than on 
the effects. Despite, some reforms in the competition policy area, these countries 
are still required to modernise their competition rules474. 
Since the explicit aim of the Baltic countries has been to bring their competition 
law and policy in line with the EC competition policy, it is no surprise that these 
countries have implemented competition law and policy virtually identical to the 
EC competition policy. Likewise incorporated in the Treaty, all Baltic countries 
refer to undistorted competition as a main objective of competition policy. 
However, with the priority given to the political objective - i. e. the integration 
into the EU, the Baltic states have not explored their `pure' competition policy. 
The Baltic countries are still required to improve their competition policy in order 
to keep in line with the modernised EC competition policy. Since the EC 
competition policy has moved towards a more economic based approach, the 
Baltic states have been left behind. There is a need to introduce more economic 
reasoning in their competition policy. Also, a clear position of the efficiency gains 
achievable through merger transactions in order to increase competitiveness and 
the safeguarding of the consumer interest should be explicitly expressed. 
474 Further discussion will be provided in chapter 6. 
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Chapter 6. LEGAL APPROACH TOWARDS MERGERS 
Unlike an abuse of a dominant position or prohibition of cartels, which are 
enforced only when allegation occurs (otherwise ex post procedure is applied), a 
merger control is based on an ex-ante system, which is designed to prevent 
undesirable effects on competition in the future475. Hence, the merger control for 
the competition authorities is as a predictive exercise. Since, as discussed in 
chapter 4, horizontal, vertical and conglomerate merger transactions have both 
positive and negative consequences for society welfare, the question raised in this 
chapter will be how the merger control rules of the EC and in parallel the Baltic 
countries assess these effects. As regards detrimental effects, mergers may create 
or strengthen substantial market power, enabling the merging parties to raise 
prices unilaterally by restricting output and/or otherwise have a significant impact 
on market conditions. Also, by increasing market concentration, merger 
transactions may enable the firms participating in the market to collude the pricing 
and output decisions. As regards advantageous effects, merger transactions may 
enable the merging firms to achieve efficiency gains in terms of the process of 
innovation or production, or other forms, which will lead to lower costs and a 
decrease in prices; as a result consumers will be better off compared with a pre- 
merger situation. Moreover, the specific implications in chapter 4 were made on 
small market economies. Merger transactions in small market economies must be 
looked at from a different angle: highly concentrated small market economies' 
markets may require further concentration in order to achieve efficiencies. 
Chapter 5 analysed the objectives of competition law of the EC and the 
Baltic countries and what goals the ECMR and the merger control regimes in the 
Baltic states are trying to achieve. Since the policy goals determine which mergers 
are counted as beneficial or harmful, chapter 5 provided data, which will be 
further analysed in this chapter. Chapter 4 discussed two countervailing merger 
effects on competition, namely market power and efficiency gains from the 
economic perspective, meanwhile, this chapter will focus on these two effects 
from a legal perspective. Bearing in mind that a merger control regime is an 
important tool to prevent anti-competitive effects and keep markets competitive, 
als This policy is applied because it can be difficult and costly to disentangle a merger, which has 
already taken place. 
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the questions raised in chapter 6 will be to what extent do the motives476 affect 
and influence the regulatory authorities of the Baltic states and to what extent the 
approach taken by the Baltic countries is different from the EC vis-a-vis merger 
control rules. The EC merger control mechanism encounters both positive and 
negative approaches477. In contrast to the EC approach, the Baltic countries adopt 
a negative approach towards the appraisal of merger transactions. This negative 
approach may mean that the Baltic countries are reluctant to admit pro- 
competitive effects of merger transactions on competition. 
As chapter 4, this chapter also contains two main focus areas. These are 
the efficiencies achievable through mergers and the market power that merger 
transactions can lead to, at both - the EC and national levels - the Baltic countries. 
6.1. Efficiency gains from a legal perspective 
6.1.1. The historical background of efficiency considerations in merger cases 
The efficiencies achievable through mergers have been highly discussed 
by lawyers and economists in the US jurisdiction since the Brown Shoe / United 
States case478. The position of the court in this case was that a merger resulted in 
efficiencies should be prohibited as small rivals could be disadvantaged thereby. 
Hence, efficiencies were considered as an `offence' in the Brown Shoe case. This 
case and the merits of the Supreme Court's position on mergers were highly 
criticised by Bork in his book `The Antitrust paradox a policy at war with itself479 
for the lack of economic reasoning. 
The position towards efficiency-specific mergers has changed since the 
assessment of the economies has been progressively refined. In the case Federal 
Trade Commission / Procter & Gamble Co. 480, judge Harlan suggested that the 
efficiencies defence should be available for conglomerate mergers. Furthermore, 
the efficiencies defence has been extended towards horizontal and vertical 
476 which were analysed in chapter 3 and further developed in chapter 4. 
477 Referring to articles 2 (2) and 2 (3) as compatibility and incompatibility to a relevant market. 
478 370 US 294 (1962). 
479 For further reading see Bork, R., The Antitrust Paradox, a policy at war with itself, The Free 
Press: a division of Macmillan, Inc., New York, 1993. 
480 386 U. S. 568 (1967). 
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mergers. Ever since, there is an explicit indication of the efficiency consideration 
in the Anti-trust law of the US as regards merger cases. 
The merger-specific efficiency issues have also been analysed on the other 
side of the Atlantic. For instance, in response to the merger wave earlier in the 
decade and the European Commission's plan in 1972 to introduce a merger 
control regime (where the leading French officials stressed the idea to have 
domestic rather the Community level merger control481) France in its competition 
law legislation of 1977 included for the first time the provisions on merger 
control. According to the French Competition law of 1977, all potential anti- 
competitive mergers, which had more than a specified market share, were checked 
to determine whether such a transaction `[.. ] contributes to economic and social 
progress to a degree that compensates for its harm to competition' (Burst and 
Kovar, 1982: 309-325, as quoted in Gerber, 1998: 192). The German competition 
law of 1973 also contained some exceptions, when merger transactions could 
avoid prohibition. The Federal Cartel office (thereafter FCO), which is the 
Competition Authority of Germany, could approve a merger transaction, despite 
the creation or strengthening of a dominant position, if the merging parties were 
able to prove that the transaction would lead to improvements in the competitive 
situation and that these improvements would outweigh the likely harms caused by 
the merger (Gerber, 1998: 318). Furthermore, the merger control rules contained 
the provision, where the minister of economics could prevent any prohibition 
decided by the FCO in a case, where a merger transaction may benefit the whole 
economy and thereby outweigh the harms of any competitive restraints caused by 
the merger. A similar policy was applied in the jurisdiction of Lithuania by way of 
the 1992 Law on Competition, where the Government could override the merger 
prohibition decision made by the Competition Authority in cases, where such a 
transaction would lead to an increase of efficiency. 
When the merger control rules were introduced on the Community level, it 
did not contain any explicit provisions as regards efficiency gains. On several 
occasions the Commission expressed that there is no real legal possibility of 
justifying an efficiency defence under the wording of the Merger Regulation. 
481 Despite such early announcement, the Commission succeeded only in 1989 when the EC 
Merger Regulation was issued for the first time. It is mainly because of objections from some 
Member States, as France or Germany. 
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Efficiencies were assumed for all mergers up to the limit of dominance. This was 
known as the `concentration privilege'. Any efficiency issues were considered in 
the overall assessment to determine, whether dominance has been created or 
strengthened and not to justify or mitigate dominance in order to clear a 
482 concentration, which would otherwise be prohibited. 
The consideration of efficiency was not a formal part for the appraisal of 
merger transactions under the EC merger regime. Nevertheless, article 2 (1)(b) of 
old ECMR483 stated that the Commission in the appraisal of merger transactions 
takes into consideration other factors including '[ .] the 
development of technical 
and economic progress provided that it is to consumers' advantage and does not 
form an obstacle to competition. In this case, the Commission could consider 
efficiency claims in assessing the notion of the development of technical and 
economic progress, bearing in mind that two conditions set up in the provision 
had to be met. They are: i) the benefits should be passed on to consumers, and ii) 
the competition will not be impeded. This 2 (1)(b) provision of the 1989 ECMR 
was applied in several EC cases, where efficiency issues were analysed even 
before the 2004 Merger reform, when the efficiency `defence' was explicitly 
introduced. 
6.1.2. Efficiencies in the EC case law 
First of all, from the economists' standpoint the position of efficiencies in 
merger cases is clear: economists point to what the benefits the merged entities 
and thereafter consumers might gain as a result of merger synergies. This is a 
clear position of the efficiency `defence`. However, unlike the economists' view, 
the Commission did not have a clear position until 2001, as to whether 
efficiencies achievable through merger transaction should be treated as the 
`defence' or `offence'. This controversial Commission's position can be 
illustrated by the following cases of mergers (involving all types of mergers), 
where the efficiency issues were considered either positively or negatively. 
482 For full discussion, see OECD, 1996, pp. 53. 
483 Note: the old ECMR refers to the Regulation of 4064/89 with further the amendments of 
1310/97. Meanwhile, new ECMR refers to 139/2004 Regulation. 
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According to Camesasca (1999: 25), the landmark case on the role of 
efficiencies remains the case of Aerospatiale-Alenia / de Havilland 484 with 
horizontal overlaps. The parties in this case claimed that cost savings of the 
combined entity would arise from rationalising part procurement, marketing and 
product support as well as through better management of certain aspects of de 
Havilland's internal operations. The Commission considered that the claimed 
efficiencies of 0.5% of the total turnover of the proposed concentration would 
contribute to the development of technical and economic progress within the 
meaning of article 2 (1)(b) of the Merger Regulation 485 , 
but concluded that 
consumers would not benefit sufficiently from these gains and such progress 
would not be to the consumers' advantage, as this combination would reduce 
airline customers' choice. From de Havilland it can be stated that the Commission 
requires efficiencies to be substantial and thereby merger specific with the burden 
of proof resting on the merging parties (Camesasca, 1999: 25; Jones and Gonzales- 
Diaz, 1992: 158). 
In the MSG Media Service case486 vertical issues were analysed. The 
operation involved the creation of a joint venture between three German 
companies to handle the technical, business and administrative handling of digital 
pay TV services. In this case un-quantified efficiency gains from the merger were 
found to be irrelevant because even if the operation were to contribute to technical 
and economic progress, article 2 (1)(b) of the ECMR provides that technical and 
economic progress is relevant only if no obstacle is formed to competition. In 
conclusion, the Commission stated that the joint venture would be enable to 
dominate in the upstream market for supply of administrative and technical 
operators, which would enable the parents to create or strengthen a dominant 
position in the downstream market for digital pay TV services, which would 
hinder competition as new entrants would be dependent on the vertically 
integrated competitor for the supply of essential administrative and technical 
services. Because of the deterrent effect of the operation to future entrants into the 
market, the Commission concluded that the hindering of competition made the 
484 Case IV/M053, October 2,1991. 
485According to the Merger Regulation 4064/89, OJ No. L395,30.12.1989 at the time. 
486 MSG Media Service IV/M 469. 
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achievement of technical and economic progress questionable. Thus, efficiency 
gains are not counted if the transaction would have anti-competitive effects. 
A similar conclusion by the Commission was made in the Nordic Satellite 
Distribution case487, where the operation would have created a highly vertically 
integrated structure ranging from programme provision via satellite capacity to 
cable TV networks. The Commission recognised that the joint-venture could have 
long-term economic benefits and benefit consumers. Nevertheless, the 
Commission prohibited the operation since the transaction would have anti- 
competitive effects as NSD's joint Nordic encryption system would become 
dominant and third parties cannot get access to such a system. In conclusion, the 
Commission stated that the operation would lead to a reduction in the variety of 
television services in the Nordic countries and therefore the requirement of article 
2 (1) (b) of the Merger Regulation was not met. 
Despite the promotion of technical and economic progress by the parties in 
Bertelsmann / Kirch / Premiere488 the acquisition of joint control was prohibited 
by the Commission. It stated that a contribution from technical and economic 
progress is irrelevant under the Merger Regulation, because it might not be 
positive as the parties would ward off and control the future market in digital pay- 
TV and multimedia services and other digital pay-TV providers would be unable 
to develop freely and without restriction. Once again the efficiencies by the 
Commission were considered as an offence rather than a defence. 
The operation in Saint-Gobain / Wacker-Chemie / NOM489 involved the 
creation of a joint venture for the manufacture, processing, marketing and sale of 
silicon carbide. In this case the Commission did not dispute that some synergies 
are achievable from streamlining the production. However, the Commission 
concluded that the operation would be more harmful than beneficial. It is because 
the benefits of synergies from the operation are likely not to be passed on to the 
consumers. In this case, the Commission took `a price' as the main indicator, 
concluding that there is the possibility of a price increase of silicon carbide as a 
result of the operation and this will outweigh the potential synergies. 
487 Nordic Satellite Distribution IV/M 490(July 19,1995), OJL 53/20 (March 2,1996). 
488 Bertelsmann/Kirch/Premiere IV/M. 993 (1999/153/EC), pars 119-122. 
489 Saint-Gobain/Wacker-Chemie/NOM IV/M. 774, (97/610/EC), para 246. 
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In Gencor / Lonrho 490, as in the previous cases described above, the 
Commission found that even the synergies would occur as a result of the 
operation, but it would not lead to the advantage of the consumers since it `[.. ] 
will create a jointly dominant position in the platinum and rhodium markets and 
form an obstacle to competition in those markets'. The factor of `time' was taken 
into consideration. The Commission found that only substantial synergies can be 
in the processing and refining facilities and these can only be realised in several 
years time and the realisation of other synergies claimed by the parties is vague. 
This is because the Commission looked at the fact that overall synergies of the 
merger might be negative due to `[.. ] very different organisational cultures of the 
two companies, which will make integration difficult and probably costly'. 
Despite the `offensive' view vis-a-vis efficiencies in the merger cases as 
discussed above, the cases such as Alcatel / Telettra491, Mannesmann / Valourec / 
Ilva492, ABB / Daimler-Benz493 Mercedes-Benz / Kassbohrer494 and to a lesser 
extent Agfa-Gevaert / DuPont 495 showed that the Commission may rely on 
efficiencies in order to clear a transaction. 
In summarising the EC case studies, the Commission whilst analysing efficiencies 
delivered from mergers took into consideration various factors. From de 
Havilland as discussed above, it can be concluded that the Commission requires 
efficiencies to be substantial and merger-specific, with the burden of proof resting 
on the parties. In this case the question whether these cost savings should be 
passed on to consumers was left open. Subsequently, in the following case Saint- 
490 Gencor/Lonrho IV/M. 619, para 212-214. 
491 Case IV/M. 042, [1991], OJ L122/48. 
492 Case IV/M. 315, [1994] OJ L102/15 (the consideration of that the transaction would reduce 
overcapacity and would help to achieve plant capacity was taken into account by the Commission). 
493 Case IV/M 580, [1997] OJ L 11/1. 
494 Case IV/M 477 [1995] OJ L21 1/1 (the Commission in this case supported that the merger will 
achieve synergies in relation to production, research and development, and administration). 
495 IV/M. 986. The parties claimed that post-transaction would solve the problem of unused 
capacity of both business entities in the market of negative printing plates and they will have a 
scale advantage both for production and sales, and the transaction will also be to offer a wider 
range of products. Despite those efficiencies, the Commission considered other negative aspects of 
the proposed transaction (an insufficient countervailing power on the demand side, the difficulty to 
switch suppliers due to package deals and exclusivity arrangements etc) and took the preliminary 
decision that the notified operation will lead to the creation of a dominant position on the common 
market in one relevant product market, in particular a market for negative offset printing plates, as 
a result of which effective competition would be significantly impeded. This transaction was 
approved after submitting the commitments by the parties and removing the competition concern. 
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Globain the Commission explicitly mentioned that the requirement of the 
efficiencies resulting from the merger should be passed on to the consumers. 
In addition, from the case studies, it can be concluded that the Commission 
will take into consideration efficiencies under certain conditions. First, if 
efficiency can be gained only from a merger and not otherwise. Second, the 
efficiencies must be passed on to consumers. Third, the `time' factor can play a 
role, as efficiencies must be time consuming and therefore substantial. And 
finally, even if through a merger efficiencies may be gained, the merger may not 
justify the creation or strengthening of a dominant position as a result of which 
effective competition would be significantly impeded496. 
These controversial aspects as regards merger-specific efficiency issues have put 
the Commission under attack. Pressure has mounted for the Commission to 
consider efficiencies more positively, especially after concerns arose in a number 
of cases that merger-specific efficiencies were insufficiently appreciated. For 
instance, the Commission's rejection of the GE-Honeywell merger497 was highly 
discussed on both sides of the Atlantic. The Commission was criticised for not 
taking positively efficiency issues into account in this case. Due to the pressure 
placed on the Commission, it decided to begin a major review of the ECMR by 
issuing a Green Paper in December 2001 outlining possible reforms. The Green 
Paper invited views to consider, how efficiencies achievable through merger 
transactions could be incorporated without suggesting an approach itself. Hence, 
the beginning of the reforms ended one episode of the relatively short history of 
the EC merger control regime. 
6.1.3. Substantive tests 
The illegality test plays a big role in the merger analysis as it defines 
criteria that must be followed while deciding what merger transactions should be 
prevented and what mergers can be approved. Two major tests or the combination 
of them are in a domain of merger control regimes worldwide. They are widely 
496 Article 2 (3), The EC Merger Regulation 4064/89. 
497 GE /Honeywell, M. 2220,05 February 2001. 
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known as the dominance test and the substantial lessening of competition 
(thereafter SLC) test. There is also the Public Interest test, which was applied in 
the UK before being replaced by the SLC, following the enforcement of the new 
Enterprise Act 2002. This test is the broadest in range in comparison with the 
dominance or the SLC test, which will be further discussed. It is because the 
Public Interest test apart from competition issues includes non-competition issues 
such as industrial policy or employment considerations. In contrast to the Public 
Interest test, a dominance test prohibits merger transactions, which create or 
strengthen a dominant position in the market as a result of it competition will be 
impeded significantly. Meanwhile, the SLC test prevents mergers, which are 
likely to lessen competition in the market substantially. Here, the competition 
authority is concerned whether or not a merger transaction might substantially 
lessen competition in the market irrespective of whether a dominant position will 
be created or strengthened. Some jurisdictions, such as Germany or Estonia apply 
a dominance test. Other jurisdictions such as the US, Canada, and Australia apply 
the SLC test; the UK and Ireland have also lately adopted the SLC test. Latvia and 
Lithuania apply a modified test as a combination of the dominance and SLC tests. 
The opinions have been expressed in the Green Paper (2001) that the SLC 
test is more favourable in comparison to a dominance test for achieving efficiency 
gains through merger transactions. Moreover, according to Gal (2003) the SLC 
test is more suitable for small market economies. This is because in small market 
economies there are a larger number of merger transactions that would tend to 
create or strengthen a dominant position, which do not necessarily lessen 
competition. For instance, if a market is already highly concentrated and is 
characterised as an oligopoly that co-ordinates its conduct by reducing output and 
increasing prices. In this case, a merger transaction would not lessen competition 
due to the fact that competition does not exist. The merger instead may help to 
remedy such a situation, where firms are unable to realise the efficiency gains, and 
may also augment productive efficiency significantly. Furthermore, Gal (2003) 
also suggests that a merger transaction should be approved, it may even create a 
dominant position for the newly merged entity (especially where the dominance 
definition involves firms with market shares equal to or lower than 50%), if such a 
merger enables the merging parties to compete effectively with an incumbent 
monopoly or with foreign importers (Gal, 2003: 206-208). 
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6.1.3.1. Consistency of efficiency gains with the 1989 ECMR substantive 
test 
In the merger review, the Commission has established a presumption of 
compatibility or incompatibility with the common market. Article 2 (2) of the 
ECMR of 1989 provided that a concentration, `[.. ] which does not create or 
strengthen a dominant position as a result of which effective competition would be 
significantly impeded in the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be 
declared compatible with the common market. ' Meanwhile, article 2 (3) stated 
that a concentration, which `creates or strengthens a dominant position as a result 
of which effective competition would be significantly impeded in the common 
market or in a substantial part of it shall be declared incompatible with the 
common market'498. Furthermore, article 2 (2) and recital 15 of the old ECMR 
stated that `[.. ] concentrations which, by reason of the limited market share of the 
undertakings concerned, are not liable to impede effective competition may be 
presumed to be compatible with the common market; [.. J an indication to this 
effect exists, in particular, where the market share of the undertakings concerned 
does not exceed 25 %', was regarded as a safe harbour of efficiency enhancing 
merger transactions. However, despite a safe harbour for efficiency claims, Mano 
(2002) mentioned that lack of efficiency claims can be logically interpreted as a 
sign that the merger transactions is market power orientated rather than efficiency 
enhancing. As a result of this logic it might predispose the EC merger regulators 
to be cautions if not suspicious as regards merger's effects on competition (in 
Enterprise Papers, No. 11,2002). It has been expressed by some scholars and by 
the competition commissioners that the wording of the substantive test of the old 
ECMR implied up to some level of dominance. This logic, that merger 
transactions are more market orientated rather than efficiency enhancing, has been 
overtaken from the EU into the jurisdictions of the Baltic countries499, where the 
mergers are more likely to be seen as an easy way to create or strengthen a 
498 Article 2 (3), 4064/89 ECMR. 
499 The interviews held in September - October, 2004 at the Competition Board of Estonia, the 
Competition Council of Latvia and the Competition Council of Lithuania showed that the one of 
main tasks of these Competition Authorities is to keep hand in hand with the EC rules on 
competition, including merger control rules. All Baltic countries adopted a dominance test as a 
substantive for merger control, which will be further discussed in the following sections. 
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dominant position and as a threat to a market structure rather than a means to 
achieve efficiencies. 
Despite the fact that the substantive test delineates a two-tier test, where 
two conditions are implied, those are the creation or strengthening of a dominant 
position and a subsequent finding of significant impediment of competition. The 
decisive criterion was the creation or strengthening of a dominant position with 
little independent significance accorded to the second condition. Moreover, article 
2 (1)(b) was interpreted by the Commission and most commentators as allowing 
no practical scope for an efficiency defence, once the creation or strengthening of 
a dominant position was determined (Ilzkovitz and Meiklejohn, 2001: 13). For 
instance, in the Danish Crown / Vestjyske Slagterier case soo the Commission 
stated that `[.. ] the creation of a dominant position in the relevant markets [ . 
J, 
therefore, means that the efficiencies argument put forward by the parties cannot 
be taken into account in the assessment of the present merger'. This emphasis 
from the case proves that the Commission was reluctant to take any efficiency 
considerations into account once dominance was found. 
Although the former substantive test failed to specify the welfare standard, 
as to whether the consumer or producer should be applied, the EC practice 
showed that the central focus is on the consumer welfare standard rather than the 
producer welfare test. In this case the problem is likely to occur with a dominance 
test dealing with a situation, where a merger transaction leads to lower prices and 
as a result increases in consumer welfare but simultaneously leads to the creation 
or strengthening of a dominant position (Mano, 2002: para 2.2; Gal, 2003). 
According to Gal (2003), this problem is common in small market economies, 
where markets are highly concentrated and quite often mergers lead to the 
creation or strengthening of a dominant position, though this does not necessarily 
mean that a decrease in consumer welfare will occur. 
Theoretically, there are two legal options (not necessarily exclusive from 
each other), which could be taken into account for the treatment of efficiency 
issues. The first option is the so called `integrated approach', where efficiencies 
are to be taken into consideration in assessing whether or not the concentration 
would lead the creation or strengthening of a dominant position. However, this 
500 Decision No. 2000/42/EC, 9 March, 1999, OJ No. L20 25/01/2000. 
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approach had limited scope under the old substantive test, as it was conceptually 
difficult for merging entities to challenge that efficiency would stop them from 
having the ability to act on the market without being effectively constrained by 
others, or otherwise influence price, production or innovation, which was the main 
concern of the old substantive test (Lowe, October, 2002). The second option is 
known as the `efficiency defence', meaning that the finding of dominance can be 
`rebutted' by the efficiencies achievable through a merger transaction. In this case, 
there is a possibility for merger-specific efficiencies to outweigh or render any 
negative effect of a dominant position, which is to significantly impede 
competition. Thus, theoretically, efficiency issues could have been covered under 
the second part of the former substantive test, which refers to significant 
impediment of competition. This means, that despite having the ability to act as a 
dominant firm, the merging parties could prove that because of the efficiencies 
they have an incentive to act pro-competitively and as a result of it the 
competition would not be significantly impeded. In general, the first option leads 
to the conclusion that by taking efficiency claims into consideration, a dominant 
position would not be created or strengthened, as efficiency gains help to mitigate 
finding dominance. Another option concludes that efficiencies would outweigh 
any anti-competitive effects of a dominant position, which had to significantly 
impede competition. 
6.1.3.2. New Merger Regime of the EC 
Bearing in mind that through merger transactions efficiencies can be 
achieved, the question arises here, why there was no explicit analysis of efficiency 
issues in the past, i. e. before the 2004 EC merger reform (when the efficiency 
`defence' was finally introduced explicitly in the EC merger control regime). 
Lowe (2002), a competition commissioner, explained that the prospect of the 
Commission considering efficiencies more explicitly in the future than it has done 
in the past is `a natural development'. This is because the Commission is still 
considered a relative newcomer to merger control, counting from 1990. Also, in 
its early days the main concern of the Commission was on applying the 
competition test without further consideration of some broader industrial policy or 
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in general the public interest test. This policy explains why the Commission was 
so cautious or even reluctant to take into account explicitly efficiency claims. 
Now, according to Lowe, the Commission has sufficient experience and 
knowledge to make its merger review process more sophisticated and fine-tuned 
to merger specific efficiency casessol The development of the EC merger review 
process is in line with the Commission's endeavour to base its merger control 
analysis with economics. Central to the new merger control regime is the `more 
economic based approach'. This means that the stronger focus is on industrial 
models and quantitative methods of analysis in two different means: firstly, in 
case investigations and, secondly, in formulating legislation and defining the 
criteria that are set. This new approach reflects in the amended ECMR of 2004 
and the new Guidelines on horizontal mergers as well as on recent decision- 
making (Christiansen, 2005). So far there has been no prohibition on the basis of 
the new substantive test, nor has a merger been approved on the grounds of 
efficiency gains. Nonetheless, the evidence can be found of greater recourse to 
statistical and economic methods of analysis (Hofer et al., 2005b; Christiansen, 
2005). For instance, in the current Blackstone /Acetex case502 econometric studies 
were undertaken by the economists engaged by the firms as well as by the CET 
(Durand and Rabassa, 2005; Christiansen, 2005). 
6.1.3.2.1. Consistency of efficiency gains with the new ECMR substantive test 
The debates launched in Green Papers raised the question, whether there 
was a need to change a substantive test for the purpose of analysing efficiency 
gains. Some scholars argued that the efficiencies were incorporated into article 2 
(1)(b) of the ECMR of 1989, where the Commission shall take into account `[ .] 
development of technical and economic progress provided that it is to the 
consumers' advantage and does not form an obstacle to competition'. Others 
stated, that efficiencies were only applicable up to the limit of dominance. 
Nonetheless, the new wording of the present substantive test better expresses 
efficiency issues (Verouden, 2004). The focus is not any more on dominance. The 
creation or strengthening of a dominant position is no longer the main scenario to 
501 For further discussion, see P. Lowe speech delivered in New York, on the 30-31 October, 2002. 
502 Case No. COMP/M. 3625. OJ L 312,29/11/2005. 
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assess the compatibility of a merger transaction with the common market. Despite 
the fact that the legal framework can facilitate, but cannot guarantee high quality 
analysis of merger appraisal, nonetheless, the wording of the substantive test can 
influence the way analysis is conducted (Baker, 2003). The wording of the new 
substantive test shifts attention on the effects on competition in the post-merger 
market, which according to Colley leads naturally to an examination the extent to 
which efficiency gains can mitigate or disprove the incentives to raise prices 
(Colley, June 2004: 343). Furthermore, recital 29 of the ECMR highlights the 
importance of efficiency gains in assessing merger effects on competition, which 
can serve as a defence in otherwise problematic transactions. 
6.1.3.2.2. The EC Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers as regards 
efficiencies 
The Commission's guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers503 
(thereafter - guidelines) issued in 2004 have increased the transparency in the 
Commission's competition policy. The guidelines set out principles how the 
Commission assess horizontal concentrations evolving the experience with the 
appraisal of horizontal mergers under 4064/89 Regulation and the case law of the 
Commission, the ECJ and the CFI. One of the major contributions of the 
guidelines is the Commission's acknowledgement of the importance of efficiency 
issues in merger analysis. Although efficiencies were introduced, certain 
conditions were set out. The efficiencies achieved through a merger should be 
substantial and timely, and should in principle benefit consumers; they must also 
be merger specific and verifiable. The guidelines state that effective competition 
brings benefits to consumers and the Commission lists the benefits to consumers, 
such as low prices, high quality products, a wide selection of goods and services 
and innovation 504 Hence, benefits to consumers do not necessarily mean a 
decrease in prices, as other benefits may be counted, such as an increase in quality 
or improved or newly formed products/services, resulted from efficiency gains in 
503 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the 
control of concentrations between undertakings, (2004/C 31/03). 
504 Guidelines, para 8. 
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the sphere of R&D and innovation, or otherwise 505 As regards merger 
specificity, the Commission states that `[.. ] efficiencies are relevant to the 
competitive assessment when they are a direct consequence of the notified merger 
and cannot be achieved to a similar extent by less anticompetitive alternatives 506 
This condition is in line with the principle of proportionality, which was discussed 
in chapter 1, as it encompasses a safeguard approach to any unnecessary anti- 
competitive effects, where the benefits in question can be achieved through means 
posing less risk to competition than the merger (Lowe, October 2002). However, 
it is a burden on the parties to prove the efficiency gains resulting from the merger 
and that there are no less anti-competitive, realistic and attainable alternatives of a 
non-concentrative nature. The final condition is that efficiencies have to be 
verifiable. This means that they are likely to materialise and be substantial; as the 
benefits to consumers should be quantified and where the data for a precise 
quantitative analysis is impossible, a clearly identifiable positive impact on 
consumers must be proved. 
The EC horizontal merger guidelines, which is a positive step towards the 
transparency of the Commission's policy in merger cases, introduces a more 
structured and transparent approach as regards efficiency gains from merger 
transactions, by considering efficiencies as a counterbalance to anti-competitive 
effects. This step shows that the Commission admits positive effects of merger 
transactions and is ready to take efficiencies into account, while analysing merger 
transactions. The guidelines are a useful tool for new Member states507, including 
the Baltic states, where the competition law and policy are still considered a new 
phenomenon. The guidelines can play an educational role for the Competition 
Authorities of the Baltic states by guiding them on how to deal with merger cases. 
The researcher considers that the EC Commission's explicit view towards taking 
the efficiencies into account is a welcome development since efficiency gains play 
an important role in merger transactions according to sound economics. 
Furthermore, as an example of the EC merger policy showed that the Competition 
Authorities of the Baltic states should not underestimate the importance of 
efficiency consideration in merger reviews and introduce it in to their Competition 
505 Guidelines, para 79-81. 
506 Guidelines, para 85. 
507 In this research the new Member States refer for the States, which 
joined the EU on 1 May 
2004. 
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laws. The following sections will review any efficiency considerations in the 
Baltic countries. 
6.2. Approach towards efficiency issues in the Baltic countries 
6.2.1. Overview 
In the OECD (1999) report of the development of competition policy in 
the Baltic countries508, it was stated that these countries have made significant 
progress towards achieving fully functioning market economies since re-gaining 
their independence in 1991 and the development of competition policy. This 
report also stressed that the Competition Authorities of these three countries 
should evaluate the merger transactions presented to them according to current 
market conditions, especially by taking into account actual and potential 
competition. This is because the majority of merger transactions are not 
competitively harmful. As regards efficiency gains, it was mentioned that bearing 
in mind the inheritance from the Soviet Union, i. e. inefficient companies remained 
from the period of central planning, the efficiency considerations in merger 
transactions are of paramount important in the Baltic states. As was suggested by 
the OECD in 1999, in the absence of significant restraints on imports, mergers of 
domestic firms in the Baltic countries may be unlikely anti-competitive (Clark, 
1999). The following paragraph will examine to what extent this advice has been 
taken into consideration in the jurisdictions of the Baltic countries. 
Although the Baltic countries joined the EU simultaneously, a different 
approach towards the introduction of merger control was taken in each country. 
Estonia, for instance, as was stated above applied an `invisible hand' policy until 
2001. The Competition Law of 2001 empowered the Competition Board to 
prevent anti-competitive merger transactions. Thus, any efficiency issues were not 
applicable until 2001. In the Latvian jurisdiction, the Latvian Competition 
Authority applied very high thresholds for the challenging of merger transactions, 
where one of the pre-merger firms had to be in a domain of a dominant position. 
Thus, the Competition Council of Latvia had a jurisdiction over dominant firms 
508 This report was presented during the conference held in Paris and later published in the book 
OECD, Competition Law and Policy in the Baltic countries, 1999. 
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involved in a transaction. As a result of these high thresholds only about 4-5 cases 
per year were evaluated by the Council. Efficiency issues were not considered, but 
it can be asserted that there was a wide `safety zone' in Latvia, as only the 
mergers between very large firms were challenged. 
In contrast to Estonia and Latvia, the efficiency gains achievable through a 
merger transaction were recognised in the jurisdiction of Lithuania until 1999, 
however, not by the Competition Council of Lithuania but rather by the 
Lithuanian Government. Lietuvos cukrus509, known as the sugar case illustrates 
one of the first examples of efficiency considerations in the Lithuanian 
jurisdiction. The owner of a sugar factory located in Lithuania proposed to acquire 
another three local sugar factories. The sugar market was highly concentrated in 
Lithuania at the time and there were only a few importers due to the high tariffs. 
The Competition Council of Lithuania completely rejected this transaction, which 
would lead to the creation of a dominant position and therefore would further 
increase concentration in an already concentrated market. However, the decision 
was overturned by the Government on the ground that this transaction would 
provide modernisation and would otherwise increase efficiencies. The legal 
ground was based on article 11 of the 1992 Law on Competition, which allowed 
the Government to annul the decision of the Competition Council, if a merger 
transaction would realise the efficiency gains and that these benefits would not be 
achieved in other ways except through the proposed transaction. As a result of this 
transaction, the consumers were left worse-off in comparison with a pre-merger 
situation. The consumers were forced to pay a higher price for sugar, because of 
the policy of the Government, which placed tariffs on import. As was mentioned 
in the 1999 OECD report, a merger of domestic firms is nearly almost pro- 
competitive, if there are no barriers to entry. Consideration of efficiencies in 
merger cases was a welcome factor; however, the interference of the Government, 
which might have other aims apart from the competition issues, was a negative 
aspect51o This provision was annulled by the Law on Competition of 1999. 
509 1998. For the comments on this case, see Annual Report, 1998. 
510 In the White Paper it was expressed that a strong emphasis should be placed on the requirement 
that competition authorities are independent and enjoy sufficient levels of resources and expertise 
to deal with competition issues. This is because the links with government may have a detrimental 
impact on the business community's acceptance of decisions. Also, there is a need for 
independence from undue political influence to prevent corruption. 
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6.2.2. Reasons of the lack of efficiency considerations in the Baltic countries 
To date there is no statutory provision in the Competition Law in the 
Baltic countries, which would provide any consideration of efficiency gains in the 
appraisal of merger transactions. The question that might arise here is, why the 
Competition Authorities of the Baltic countries insofar have not introduced 
explicitly efficiency claims in their merger control regime. The researcher 
considers that the internal and external factors could have caused such a policy 
towards merger specific efficiency gains in the assessment of merger transactions 
in the Baltic countries. 
As regards internal factors, one reason might be a very similar situation to 
the earlier EC policy towards efficiency claims. All three Competition Authorities 
in the Baltic states are `young' institutions without sufficient experience and 
knowledge of how to deal with difficult future predictive analysis of a merger's 
effects on competition. This is because Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as being a 
part of the Soviet Empire were centralised economies with a policy to set and 
control prices. This policy to control prices had to change almost overnight into 
the protection of competitive processes. For instance, the Competition Board of 
Estonia was re-organised from the Price Control office (otherwise the Price 
Board). The regulators, who worked at the old system, had to change and adopt a 
new system. Proos, a Deputy Director General, described the situation in Estonia 
in 1991, when the legal acts relating to prices and competition issues were drawn 
up by officials exercising the supervision of the Price Act together with 
ministerial officials. All of the officials did not have knowledge of basic 
principles of market economy, as they possessed a degree in law or economics 
that was obtained at so called Soviet time (Proos, 2002). Nakrosis, who studied 
the governmental capabilities to manage the EU matters, mainly in the case of 
Lithuania511, also mentioned that the integration to the EU required huge reform 
efforts in the Baltic countries, including the establishment of new regulatory 
institutions and the development of new regulatory skills. The communist 
tradition as `[ .] everything that 
is not explicitly allowed is forbidden' had to be 
changed. 
s" Lithuania (and Latvia) failed to be invited in 1997 to the first round of the EU accession 
negotiations. 
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Other problems that the Competition Authorities in the Baltic states faced, 
especially in their early days, was a lack of resources. The implementation and 
enforcement of the European legislation, including the competition law and 
policy, frequently required significant human and budgetary resources; it was 
often more than applicant countries 512 could afford (Nakrosis, 2003: 111). The 
public sector was quite often incapable of recruiting and retaining qualified 
personnel. The best university graduates and officials from the civil service have 
had a preference of choosing better paid jobs in the private sector than lower paid 
jobs in public bodies 513 For instance, the lawyers' offices charged for 3 hours the 
same amount of money that a medium employee of a public body could have 
received as one month salary. Hence, top lawyers were not interested to work in a 
government agency with low money (Proos, 2002). 
Considering that examining efficiency gains is a rather difficult task and 
requires professional expertise, the Baltic countries presumably decided to 
exclude this provision due to the fact that they do not have sufficient knowledge 
and expertise in this area. 
Furthermore, it can be stated that external factors have also had an 
influence on the competition law and policy in the Baltic states. One external 
factor is the EU harmonisation process and the implementation of the acquis in 
the jurisdictions of the Baltic countries. The Baltic states were eager to harmonise 
their competition law and policy as close as possible with the competition law and 
policy held by the Commission for the successful membership into the EU. The 
policy applied by the EC Commission towards efficiency defence was 
controversial before introducing the guidelines on the assessment of horizontal 
mergers and changes made to the ECMR in 2004. There was no explicit efficiency 
defence in merger cases and furthermore, on several occasions the Commission 
pointed out that efficiency considerations can be taken into account up to the level 
of dominance, as once the creation or strengthening of dominance was found, any 
efficiency issues were out of the question. The Competition Authorities of the 
Baltic states have been influenced by the EC competition policy and introduced 
policy similar to the previous Commission's position to focus on dominance. By 
the focus on dominance the researcher means that the first limb, i. e. the creation or 
512 Now new Member States, which joined the EU in 2004. 
513 Referring also to Competition Authorities of the Baltic countries, which are public bodies. 
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strengthening of a dominant position, was in a domain of a former EC substantive 
test leaving little attention to a second limb - the significant impediment of 
competition. 
Apart from following the EC merger control policy, another reason for the 
focus on dominance might be the inheritance from the Soviet Empire of big 
ineffective dominant firms, which were controlled and subsidised by the State. 
The researcher presumes that this inheritance left the Baltic countries with the 
concern that `big is bad'. However, this statement can be applied only for 
inefficient former Soviet companies, but in general cannot be true about all big 
firms. Referring to sound economic theories, especially with the emphasis on 
small market economies, the researcher argues that such a position is detrimental 
for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. These countries cannot afford to focus on 
dominance, because in some markets only one firm can support the market 
efficiently. Furthermore, the market of the Baltic countries can be considered as 
growing markets, thus, any local dominant firm today might not be dominant 
tomorrow due to foreign or local competitors, if there are no restraints to enter the 
market (Pukeliene, 2006). 
The interviews held in the Competition Board of Estonia, the Competition 
Council of Latvia and the Competition Council of Lithuania showed that the 
regulators are familiar with the concept of `efficiency', however, so far it has not 
been applied in practice 514 In a few cases, the regulators of the Competition 
Authorities of the Baltic countries have defined the relevant market broader, 
instead of evaluating efficiency gains 515. Also, the researcher discovered that 
some regulators are sceptical towards merger transactions referring to them as 
`legalised cartels'516. This is because a merger implies the formal and complete 
integration of one firm into another, meanwhile, due to internal pressures cartels 
tend to disintegrate after a while. It could lead to the conclusion that since merger 
514 To some extent efficiencies were considered in one case in Estonia. It will be further discussed 
in the section 6.2.4. 
515 See, for instance, Vesiga case, where the parties claimed the realisation of efficiencies through 
the transaction. However, instead taking efficiencies into account, the Competition Council of 
Lithuania defined a broad product market definition and as a result approved the transaction. This 
case will be further discussed in the section 6.4.1. Also see Malinauskaite, 2006. 
516 This position was expressed by the former board member of the Competition Council of 
Lithuania T. Klimas during the interview held on 5 October 2004 at the leading law firm in 
competition issues of Lithuania, Lydeika, Valiunas it partneriai. 
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transactions are far more reaching, they should be prohibited per se sl' 
Nonetheless, economists Lindsay (2003), Van den Bergh and Camesasca (2001) 
and many others expressively stated that in contrast to cartels, merger transactions 
may carry advantageous results for social welfare, for instance, through the 
realisation of efficiency gains. The following section will analyse substantive tests 
in the Baltic states and to what extent the efficiency gains are consistent with the 
current substantive tests in these countries. 
6.2.3. Consistency of efficiency gains with the former substantive tests in the 
Baltic countries 
6.2.3.1. Estonia 
In order to reach a harmonisation with the EC policy, the Competition 
Authorities of the Baltic countries designed their substantive tests for the appraisal 
of concentration transactions on the EC substantive test. The wording of the 
substantive test introduced to these countries has been almost identical to the 
former EC substantive test. For instance, § 22 (2) of the Estonian Competition Act 
provides that a concentration shall be prohibited `[ .] if it may create or strengthen 
a dominant position as a result of which competition would be significantly 
restricted in the goods market'. The wording of the substantive test for the 
appraisal of merger transactions places focus on dominance rather than on a 
merger's effects on competition. Likewise, the former substantive test of the 
ECMR was criticised by scholars for not allowing a practical scope for an 
efficiency defence, once the creation or strengthening of a dominant position is 
determined, the same applies to the Estonian substantive test for the appraisal of 
merger transactions. 
Before the efficiencies were explicitly recognised in the EC jurisdiction, 
any efficiency considerations were examined under article 2 (1)(b), which stated 
that while examining concentrations other factors such as `the development of 
technical and economic progress' should be taken into account. In consistency 
with the EC, § 22 (1) of the Estonian Competition Act states that appraisal of a 
517 See Van den Bergh and Camesasca, 2001, pp. 307-308. 
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concentration shall be based on the need to maintain and develop competition, by 
taking into account the structure of goods markets and the actual and potential 
competition in the goods market518. The examples referred in this provision place 
emphasis mainly on static aspects rather than dynamic factors. This in turn may 
mean that unlike article 2 (1)(b) of the former ECMR, where efficiency issues 
s could have be covered 19 ,§ 22 (1) conceptually does not leave that room. 
6.2.3.2. Latvia 
The former substantive test in the Latvian jurisdiction provided that a 
merger transaction shall be prohibited if it `[ .] creates or strengthens a 
dominant 
position, which will significantly hinder, restrict, or distort competition in any 
relevant market 520. The wording of this substantive test emphasised a dominant 
position, which would automatically hinder, restrict or distort competition. 
However, the creation of a dominant position was hardly possible, as only firms in 
a domain of a dominant position could get through the first filter and be 
challenged by the Competition Council of Latvia521. Thus, it can be asserted that 
despite not having an explicit efficiency defence, the Competition Council of 
Latvia incorporated a wide safety zone, as only very large merger transactions fell 
under the jurisdiction of Latvia. 
6.2.3.3. Lithuania 
Merger control policy by its nature proposes only a limited choice of 
decisions to influence competition, which are either the acceptance of the merger, 
or the rejection, or a comprise - the acceptance but on certain conditions, as, for 
instance, divestment. Similar to the EC policy, the jurisdictions of the Baltic 
countries also may issue three types of decisions as regards merger transactions. 
518 The examples of it include: (i) the market position of the parties to the concentration and their 
economic and financial power, and opportunities for competitors to access the goods market; (ii) 
legal or other barriers to entry into the goods market; (iii) supply and demand trends for the 
relevant goods; (iv) the interests of the buyers, sellers and ultimate consumers. 
519 Though not always successfully as discussed above. 
520 Section 16 para 3 of the Competition Law of 1998. 
521 One of the requirements for the notification was that one of the firms involved in a transaction 
had to be in a domain of a dominant position. See ch. 1. 
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The Competition Authorities of the Baltic states can approve a merger, they can 
also approve a so called conditional merger, which means that a merger is 
approved only if certain conditions set up the Competition Authority are met, and 
they can completely reject a merger transaction. 
In contrast to the EC merger regime and the other Baltic countries, the 
substantive test in the Lithuanian jurisdiction is related to the three decisions of 
the Competition Council of Lithuania. Article 14 (1) provides that concentration 
may be approved without any conditions. The Competition Council of Lithuania 
may approve conditional concentration by imposing to its decision conditions and 
obligations for the parties involved `[ .] in order to prevent the creation or 
strengthening of a dominant position '522. Finally, article 14 (3) provided that the 
Council may refuse to grant a permission, `[ .] where concentration will establish 
or strengthen a dominant position and result in a substantial restriction of 
competition in a relevant market'. As it can be seen all provisions referred to the 
creation or strengthening of a dominant position. Hence, similar to Estonia and 
Latvia, the wording of the substantive test was not in favour of efficiency 
considerations and placed the focus on dominance. 
The emphasis on dominance of the substantive tests for a merger appraisal in the 
Baltic countries contradicts Gal's theory, which states that solely focusing on 
dominance is mistaken especially, for the small market economies, where there 
are a limited number of market players and quite often the market can support 
only a limited number of firms. According to Gal (2003), merger transactions with 
efficiency impetuses even leading to monopoly might make markets more 
efficient, if the market can support only one player. 
However, neither wording of the former substantive tests in the Baltic countries, 
nor the practice of applying them, by placing a focus on dominance left any room 
for the efficiency issues. 
522 See article 14 (2), Law on Competition of 1999. 
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6.2.4. Consistency of efficiency gains with the new substantive tests in the 
Baltic countries 
As discussed in chapters 1 and 5, the Baltic countries showed an eagerness 
to join the EU and have attempted to go step-in-step with the EC policy, including 
the Competition policy. Changes made to the ECMR in 2004 spurred the 
Competition Authorities of the Baltic countries to review their merger control 
regimes. To ensure further harmonisation with the EU, the Competition Laws, 
particularly the substantive tests for merger appraisal, in the Latvian and 
Lithuanian jurisdictions have been changed. There have been no amendments in a 
substantive test for merger appraisal in the Estonian jurisdiction, and a dominance 
test is still applicable. However, the groups are currently working on amending 
the legislation on concentration provisions (Annual Report, 2004). Despite the 
absence of the efficiency defence in the jurisdiction of Estonia, to small extent 
efficiency issues were considered in the Tallinna Piimatööstuse AS/ Meieri 
Tootmise AS case523. In this case the Competition Board referring to the stricter 
EU requirements on dairy products, in its decision noted that investment was 
necessary to meet these requirements. Since, the compatibility of the merger 
transaction did not raise any serious doubts, the Competition Authority of Estonia 
did not analyse further the efficiency claims in more detail (Paas, 2005). This case 
expresses a positive approach towards efficiencies by the Board. However, it is 
not clear whether the same position would have been held if the case had anti- 
competitive effects as well as pro-competitive effects. Future practice and 
therefore the law will show, which policy will be chosen by the Competition 
Board of Estonia. 
It can be contended that the current Latvian substantive test for the 
appraisal of concentrations is the most favourable to efficiency gains in 
comparison to the substantive tests of the other Baltic states. This is because the 
Latvian jurisdiction applies a combination of both dominance and SLC tests 
(Jefremova, 2004). Section 16 paragraph 3 of the Competition Law of Latvia 
states that the Competition Council of Latvia by its decision shall prohibit a 
523 Nr. 55-KO: koondumine Nr 12-ko/2002. Available in Estonian at web-site: 
hltp: //www. konkurentsiamet. ee/dokLimendid/ko2OOO255. htm (In Estonian). 
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merger transaction `[ .] as a result of which a dominant position is created or 
strengthened, or which may significantly reduce competition in any concrete 
market'. According to the new substantive test of Latvia, a merger transaction can 
be prevented in the presence of either of the conditions: i) when a merger leads to 
the creation or strengthening of a dominant position, or ii) when a merger may 
reduce competition significantly. The notion of dominance was left, but 
nonetheless, the limb of SIEC has been lifted and gained an equal weight as a 
limb of dominance. Bearing in mind that there have been no further guidelines 
issued by the Competition Council to define the criteria in applying the new 
substantive test and no explicit efficiency defence exists, it is not clear how the 
test will be interpreted. Its efficiency will be tested in the years to come, when the 
Competition Council of Latvia will develop its approach in the application of the 
substantive test. 
The past practice in Latvia proves that the focus was on dominance rather 
than on efficiency gains524. According to Lasmane (the official who deals directly 
with merger cases in the Competition Council of Latvia), once the creation or 
strengthening of dominance is found, any efficiency considerations are irrelevant 
(Lasmane, September, 2004). However, a different opinion was given by 
Jefremova, a board member of the Competition Council in Latvia. During the 
International Workshop on Competition Policy in Seoul in 2003 she mentioned 
that despite the absence of efficiency defence in Latvian law, the efficiency issues, 
nevertheless, can be considered in `borderline' cases. The borderline cases have 
been defined as the situation, when there are concerns about the emergence of a 
dominant position by the merging parties, but it is not clear how the merger 
transaction will affect the competition and consumers. In this case the efficiency 
gains can be used to mitigate a finding of dominance if the merging entities fulfil 
two conditions. They have to prove that efficiency gains will be achieved through 
the merger and the benefits from the efficiency gains will be passed on to 
consumers525. However, there is no written provision in the Competition Law of 
Latvia as regards these rules for the assessment of efficiency gains. Furthermore, 
there have been no cases in so far in the jurisdiction of Latvia, where the merger- 
524 The statement relied on the information obtained during the interviews held in September- 
October, 2004 at the Competition Council of Latvia. 
525 See the speech delivered by T. Jefremova, during the International Workshop on Competition 
Policy in Seoul, 29 April -3 May, 2003. 
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specific efficiency gain would be considered. Nonetheless, theoretically, this 
policy towards the interpretation of efficiencies in the Latvian jurisdiction can be 
referred to `integrated approach' as discussed above, where a dominant position 
would not be created or strengthened, as efficiency gains help to mitigate a 
finding of dominance. This approach was criticised by Lowe for its limited scope, 
as it is conceptually difficult for merging entity to challenge that efficiency would 
stop them from having the ability to act on the market without being effectively 
constrained by others, or otherwise influence price, production or innovation 
(Lowe, October, 2002). 
Furthermore, the researcher considers that such an approach vis-a-vis 
efficiency claims is inappropriate for the Latvian jurisdiction because of the 
following reasons. First of all, this approach places an unnecessary burden on the 
merging parties and on the Competition Council of Latvia, which do not have 
sufficient practice in applying merger control rules. Secondly, this approach does 
not provide enough transparency, for instance, what are the criteria of the 
evaluation of efficiency issues in the merger cases. Transparency is very 
important for the Baltic countries, which have additional informative and 
educative competition goal to teach society about the principles of fair 
competition. Also, lack of transparency may lead towards corruption. An example 
here might be the situation in the jurisdiction of Lithuania as discussed in chapter 
3. 
In response to the modernisation of the EC substantive test for the 
appraisal of merger transactions, the Competition Council of Lithuania has also 
modified the substantive test. The substantive test in the Lithuanian jurisdiction as 
aforementioned is related to three decisions of the Competition Council of 
Lithuania: approval, conditional approval and prohibition of a proposed 
transaction. The legal text of article 14 (3) has been amended and now provides 
that the Competition Council of Lithuania may refuse to approve concentration, 
`[ 
.] where concentration will establish 
or strengthen a dominant position or 
substantially restrict competition in a relevant market'. The wording of this test 
(which is similar to the modified Latvian substantive test) enables to check 
transaction on either of two conditions: (i) whether it creates or strengthens a 
dominant position; or (ii) whether it substantially restricts competition in a 
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relevant market. It can be contended that the efficiency issues may be considered 
under the second part of the test. This change is welcome, however, it does not 
give enough clarity, as article 14 (2) was left unchanged, which states that the 
Competition Council may impose the conditions and obligations for the parties 
involved in order to prevent the creation or strengthening of a dominant 
position526. This provision clearly emphasises the focus on dominance. After the 
last modification in 2005, the Competition Council of Lithuania has amended the 
explanations concerning the establishment of a dominant position 527. While 
assessing the creation of a dominant position through merger transactions, the 
Competition Council may take into consideration the `[ .] well-grounded 
explanations of the undertakings concerning the efficiencies that are beneficial to 
consumers, are an integral part of the merger and are verifiable' 528. The 
influence of the EC guidelines can be seen here; however, the Competition 
Council does not explain these conditions further. Nevertheless, it shows that the 
Competition Authority of Lithuania like Latvia may consider efficiency issues in 
order to mitigate a finding of dominance, which, as discussed above, is not the 
most `appropriate' approach for the Baltic countries. Furthermore, if the 
interpretation of the modified substantive tests in Latvia and Lithuania is used as 
defined by Riesenkampft529, the emphasis will still be on dominance, despite the 
changes in the substantive tests. Following the Riesenkampft reasoning, any 
efficiency gains will not be evaluated under the SIEC limb once dominance is 
found. Any efficiency issues can be considered only by a means of mitigating 
finding of dominance. To conclude, the Baltic countries (namely Latvia and 
Lithuania) should follow the Fountoukakos and Ryan's (2005) interpretation and 
place the emphasis on the SIEC limb 
530 (referring to the second part of the 
substantive tests in Latvia and Lithuania). 
526 See article 14 (2), Law on Competition of 1999. 
527 Resolution No. 17 on the Explanations of the Competition Council concerning the establishment 
of a dominant position, 17 May 2000. 
528 Ibid, Fn. 525, para 38. 
529 As discussed in chapter 1, section 1.2.7.3., where Riesenkampft referred that the same standard 
for the assessment of merger transactions can be used in the 
future. If it is the case that a merger 
creates or strengthens a dominant position, a significant 
impediment to competition can be 
assumed without further examination. 
530 For further discussion, see chapter 1, section 1.2.7.3. 
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From written provisions on the substantive issues as discussed above, the 
conclusion that can be made is that in contrast to the EC approach, which employs 
both positive and negative approach of merger's effects on competition 531, the 
Baltic countries adopt a negative approach towards merger transactions. This 
negative approach may mean that the Baltic countries are reluctant to admit pro- 
competitive effects of merger transactions on competition. 
In consensus with Mano (2002), the researcher considers that the lack of 
efficiency considerations can be logically interpreted as a sign that the merger 
control regimes in the Baltic countries are orientated towards dominance or 
market power rather than efficiency enhancing. As result of this logic it might be 
predisposed that the regulators of the Competition Authorities mistreat the 
possibilities of the pro-competitive effects that merger transactions can provide 
and look suspiciously at the effects of the mergers on competition. 
6.2.5. Efficiency defence in other jurisdictions 
The efficiency defence is explicitly recognised in other jurisdictions. In the 
UK together with the Enterprises Act of 2002 the Guidelines of merger 
assessment was introduced, which has explicit rules on merger specific efficiency 
gains. Efficiency defence is also recognised in other jurisdictions such as Spain, 
France and others. Apart from old Member States, some new Member States also 
have efficiency defence. The most suitable example to compare with the Baltic 
countries might be Malta, which like the Baltic countries joined the EU on 1 May 
2004. Also, as with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, Malta refers to a small market 
economy. The difference is that the smallness of Malta is defined by the 
geographic conditions (as well as the population), meanwhile, the Baltic states 
were land `islands' because of political reasons. 
In contrast to the Baltic countries, which have a compact Competition Law 
or Competition Act in the case of Estonia, that contain all competition rules 
including merger control regime, the Maltese jurisdiction has a Merger Control 
531 See art. 2 (2) and 2 (3) of the ECMR No. 139/2004. 
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Regulation532, which came into force on 1 January 2003. The Maltese Merger 
Regulation allows two types of merger defence: (i) efficiency defence; and (ii) a 
failing firm defence. They were both introduced into the jurisdiction of Malta 
even before the EC guidelines on horizontal merger assessment came into force. 
In the Maltese jurisdiction the merging firms may claim that efficiencies 
achieved through a merger would ultimately offset any anti-competitive effects, if 
the efficiency gains would ensure that the price is maintained at or below the pre- 
merger level. Three criteria must be satisfied for such a defence to succeed and get 
approval from the Office for Fair Competition, which is the Competition 
Authority of Malta. The first criterion is that the efficiencies must be verifiable, as 
the more verifiable efficiencies are, the more likely the Office for Fair 
Competition would uphold the defence. It means that not all types of efficiencies 
will be approved. For instance, productive efficiencies, such as the reduction of 
production costs would be more effective than efficiency claims by the merging 
parties based on improved management, since the latter is considered less 
verifiable (Buttigieg, Spring, 2003: 45-46). The second criterion similar to the EC 
or other jurisdictions is that efficiency must be merger specific by meaning that 
efficiency gains cannot be achieved by other means. The third criterion is so 
called `pass-on requirement' that is designed to take into account only those 
efficiencies, which are passed on to consumers in Malta in the form of lower 
price, or in the form of innovation, choice or quality of products/services, if the 
price remains the same or even if slightly increased in the short term533. The last 
criterion shows that like in the EC or even US jurisdictions (on which the Maltese 
efficiency defence was modelled), the Maltese jurisdiction also addresses the 
consumer welfare standard rather than total welfare standard in assessing merger 
transactions. The Guidelines accompany the Regulation on control of 
concentrations, which further explain the various types of efficiencies that the 
Office for Fair competition would consider in merger cases. 
Hence, the Maltese jurisdiction introduced explicit efficiency 
consideration in the assessment of merger transactions. Taking as an example the 
532 Regulation on Control of Concentrations 2002, LN 294 of 2002. Before the regulation came 
into force, Malta did not have a proper merger control regime. Any merger transactions were, 
albeit often unsuccessfully covered by the provision of the abuse of a dominant position. 
533 See comments of Buttigieg on the regulation, The Substantive Standard for Merger Evaluation 
in Malta, Bank of Valletta Review, No. 27, Spring 2003. 
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other jurisdictions, the Baltic states should also consider introducing explicit 
efficiency gains in their jurisdictions, which will give more certainty and 
transparency. 
6.3. Market power and the theory of harm from a legal perspective 
As was mentioned in chapter 4, a market power for anti-competitive 
purpose matters, because if a firm obtains a market power, it has an ability to 
maintain prices significantly above the competitive level for a sustained period of 
time. In order to measure market power created through merger transactions for 
competition policy, the Commission has developed a methodology. It involves 
defining the relevant market, which consists of geographical and product markets, 
then assessing possible anti-competitive effects and finally any counter-balance 
effects, such as buyer power and new entry barriers etc. 534 The market definition 
plays an essential role in the merger control regime: the wider product and 
geographical market definitions are used, the less likely that the merger 
transactions will be considered as problematic. The substantive test is a 
cornerstone of the merger control regime, as it sets up criteria, which merger 
transactions should be prohibited and which can go ahead. The following sections 
will analyse all these issues specifically. 
6.3.1. Market definition within the EC 
Market definition is described by the Commission as a tool to identify and 
define the boundaries of competition between the firms; otherwise, market 
definition determines the framework in which the analysis of a merger 
transaction's effects on competition will be carried out 
535 According to the 
Commission's notice on relevant market, the main purpose of market definition is 
to identify in a systematic way the competitive constraints that the firms involved 
in the merger face by determining the actual competitors that are capable of 
534 The following sections do not distinguish different types of mergers, as the same market 
definition and substantive test are applied to all mergers regardless of form. Although different 
theory of harm is applied for each merger type, the Commission has issued insofar only Guidelines 
on horizontal mergers. 
535 See the Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community 
competition law (97/C 372/03) at the para 2. 
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constraining the behaviour of undertakings in question and to prevent them from 
behaving independently of effective competition pressure. It is because the 
exercise of market power depends on the extent to which firms are able to raise 
prices above the competitive level, which may be directly measured by using the 
own-price elasticity of demand facing the firm 536 There is an interest of 
undertakings to understand how the Commission or the national competition 
authorities define the markets, as they can predict whether there is a risk for their 
transaction being prohibited. 
While assessing a merger case, a relevant market has to be defined as a 
combination of geographic market and product market. The benchmark criterion 
to define relevant product market was formulated before the Commission issued 
the Notice on market definition by the ECJ in the Continental Can case537, by 
stating that `[.. ] the possibilities of competition can only be judged in relation to 
those characteristics of the products in question by virtue of which those products 
are particularly apt to satisfy an inelastic need, and are only to a limited extent 
interchangeable with other products'. In 1979 the Commission issued the Notice 
on Market definition, which defines a relevant product market as a market 
including all those products and/or services which are regarded as interchangeable 
or substitutable by the consumer, by reason of the characteristics of the 
products/services, their prices and their intended use538. In the United Brands 
case539, the ECJ stated that geographic market definition is the `[.. ] geographic 
area in which it is marketed and where the conditions of competition are 
sufficiently homogeneous for the effect of the economic power of the undertaking 
concerned to be able to be evaluated'. According to Lindsay (2003), a geographic 
market definition is very similar to a product market definition due to the 
products/services' characteristics, which include the location. This means that 
physically identical products/services can be seen in different locations as 
different economic products. Thus, a relevant geographic market combines the 
area, in which the parties concerned are involved in the supplying and demanding 
of products and/or services, in which the competition's conditions are sufficiently 
536 OJ C 372,97/C 3 72/03, I, 4.2.1. See also comments on the market definition by Camesasca, 
1999, pp. 89-95. 
537 Continental Can / Commission, case 27/76, E. C. R. 1978, pp. 207. 
538 OJ C 372,97/C 372/03, at the para 7. See also United Brands / Commission case 27/76 E. C. R. 
1978, Hoffman-La Roche / Commission (Vitamins) case 85/76, E. C. R. 1979 etc. 
539 United Brands / Commission, case 27/76, E. C. R. 1978, the para 11. 
266 
homogeneous, and which can be distinguished from neighbourhood areas because 
the competition's conditions are appreciably different in those areas54o These 
market definitions provide general legal principles and are open to interpretation. 
According to Navarro et al. (2004: para 5.12-5.13), these definitions on their own 
provide very little guidelines, to the meaning of relevant market, and the criteria, 
and evidence on which the Commission places its decisions when defining 
markets in practice. Hence, the Commission has a room to develop these 
definitions through the cases and give them a working meaning. For instance, the 
Notice does not provide: what does constitute a barrier to entry, the manner in 
which international comparisons of prices should be assessed in order to measure 
differences, and at what point these differences are significant. All these questions 
are significant for defining the relevant market definition in a given case (Navarro 
et al., 2004: para 5.13). 
For the Commission's Notice on the market definition there are three main 
aspects, demand-side substitutability, supply-side substitutability and potential 
competition to define market. In the demand-side substitutability the Commission 
uses a test known among economists as the SSNIP test otherwise `hypothetical 
monopolist test'. The SSNIP stands for small but significant non-transitory 
increase in price, as it examines how consumers would react to a hypothetically 
small but not insignificant permanent price rise, which is defined as a range from 
5 to 10%. The emphasis of the demand-side substitutability is on the ability of the 
customers to switch to alternatives in response to a significant price increase. For 
instance, in the Du Point / ICI case 541, the Commission stated that for two 
products to be regarded as substitutes the direct consumer `[ .] must consider it a 
realistic and rational possibility to react to, for example, a significant increase in 
the price of one product by switching in a relatively short period of time'. As it 
can be seen there is no precise measurement, as for instance, a time period 
542 
The Commission in its Notice on Market Definition systemised the criteria 
to be followed in defining the product market definition. These include functional 
540 OJ C 372,97/C 372/03, at the para 8. 
541 Case IV/M 214,1992 OJ L 7/13, at the para 23. 
542 Compare with the US Guidelines, the Authorities defined the consumers' reaction within one 
year. This approach has been criticised by some scholars, as different implications occur in 
different economic sectors. For instance, the shoes and aircraft markets are different where the 
orders of the latter are planned for several years ahead. For further comments, see Navarro et al., 
2005, at paras 5.33-5.39. 
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substitutability, evidence of substitution in the recent past, use and characteristics 
of products, consumer preferences, barriers and costs that limit or impede 
effective substitution, quantitative criteria, and different categories of clients and 
captive clients, and price discrimination. While defining the relevant product 
market, the Commission may rely on the physical characteristics and functionality 
of the products involved (Cook and Kerse, 2000: 135). Physical characteristics 
may embrace speed of operation, level of performance, diversity of application 
and many other factors. However, if the products perform the same functions it 
does not necessarily mean that they belong to one and the same product market. 
The sole focus on functional substitutability may lead to the wrong result. For 
example, the Commission in Nestle /Perrier case543 rejected the arguments of the 
merging parties that mineral water and all remaining non-alcoholic drinks can be 
defined as one market, i. e. to quench thirst. The Commission stated that partial 
functional substitutability alone is not sufficient to establish substitutability in 
competition terms. This position was expressed in a number of the cases544, the 
most recent being the Newscorp / Telepiu case545, where the pay TV and free-to- 
air TV were defined as two separate markets. 
As regards geographic market definition, depending upon the 
product/service in question, a wide range of factors may be relevant in order to 
determine a geographic market. The Commission commonly refers to the 
following factors: comparative prices, trade patterns, location and identity of 
suppliers and purchasers, consumer preference and national demand 
characteristics, the nature of products/services concerned, entry barriers, supply 
conditions, transport costs, and other regulatory factors. Despite the EC 
Commission's single market programme, the scholars admit that the Community 
market is not yet fully integrated and as a result the relevant geographic market 
for certain products are still national in scope. Also, there are trends established in 
the EC of a geographic market depending on sector. For instance, Cook and Kerse 
(2000: 140) argue that the Commission tends to regard the food and retailing 
543 Case IV/M 190, [1992] OJ L 356/1. 
544 See also cases Coca - Cola Enterprises /Amalgamated Beverages Great Britain, case IV/M 
794, [1997]; Solvay / Wienerberger, case IV/M 565, [1995]; Dalgety / The Quaker Oats Company, 
case IV/M 554, [1995]; Nordic Satellite Distribution case IV/M 490, [1995]; Cable and Wireless / 
Veba case IV/M 618, [1995] and others, where the Commission has defined the markets narrower 
than based only on functionality. 
545 Case COMP/M 2876, [2004], OJ L 110/73. 
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sectors as regional or even local markets. It may be illustrated by the Tesco / 
Catteau case, where it was stated that `1.. ] supermarkets draw customers from a 
local catchments area'546 
Both market definitions are considered by the ECJ as a necessary pre- 
condition for any assessment of the effect of a merger transaction 547. However, 
despite the fact that a market definition is a very important starting point for a 
competitive assessment, it is not an end in itself Monti, the competition 
commissioner by pointing out the importance of the definition mentioned that `[.. ] 
market definition is not an end in itself but a tool to identify situations where there 
might be competition concerns [.. J. We use market definition and market shares as 
an easily available proxy for the measurement of the market power enjoyed by 
firms. [. ] What is ultimately important is to understand the nature of the 
competitive situation facing the firms involved in a [. ] proposed merger. The 
market definition is a first - and very important - step in the analysis'548 Hence, 
the market definition is an important step in the analysis of a merger transaction, 
and incorrect market definition will lead to misleading analysis of the impact of a 
merger transaction on competition. For instance, if markets are defined too 
narrowly, the mergers which do not harm or even may benefit consumers may be 
prohibited; or on the contrary if markets are defined too widely, the merger 
transactions which harm consumers may be cleared. 
The Commission is not bound to follow its previous decisions as regards 
market definition and it may differ depending on the activities of the merging 
parties or the effects of the merger transaction (Lindsay, 2003). For instance, in 
the Industri Kapital (Nordkem) / Dyno case 549 the Commission defined the 
geographic market for the analysis based on the area of the activities of the parties 
involved, which was regional550. Quite often the Commission leaves the question 
546 C. M. L. R. 402 [1993]. 
547 See, for instance, case T-2/93 Air France l Commission [1994] E. C. R. 11-323 (at the para 80); 
joined cases C-68/94 and C-30/95 France l Commission [1998] E. C. R. 1-1375 (at the para 143); or 
case T-342/99 Airtours plc / Commission [2002] (at the para 19). 
548 The speech by Monti, Market Definition as a cornerstone of EU Competition Policy, delivered 
on the Sch of October, 2001, available at the web-site: 
http: /europa. eu. int/conuiVcompetition/speeches/index _2001. 
html 
549 Case COMP/M. 1813, [2001] O. J. L154/41. See also comments on this case by Lindsay (2003), 
pp 70. 
350 For the examples of how the market definition may differ depending on the activities of the 
merging entities or the effects of the merger transactions, see Lindsay, The EC Merger Regulation: 
Substantive Issues, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003, pp. 68-70. 
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of the market definition open. In his speech the competition commissioner Monti 
(2001) expressed that the market definition is defined only when it is strictly 
necessary due to limited resources and `[ .] if none of the conceivable alternative 
market definitions for the operation in question give rise to competition concerns, 
the question of market definition will normally be left open ssl A few cases 
provide a good example of this approach, where the Commission concluded that 
there was no need to define a market definition, as a transaction nevertheless 
would be compatible without having to adopt a definitive conclusion about the 
extent and the limits of the market. For instance, in the Compaq / Tandem case552 
the Commission left open the product market definition, since it did not create any 
competition problems, as the joint market share of both companies was 
minimal553. In the Sara Lee / BP Food case554 it was stated that bearing in mind 
small market shares of CFBG (i. e. the food division of BP which was acquired by 
Sara Lee) even under the narrowest possible market definition, the transaction 
would not create or reinforce a dominant position. There have been several 
cases555 where the market definition question was left open due to the opposite 
reason, as under any alternatives being considered, a transaction would lead to the 
creation of a dominant position (as a dominance test was applied at that time) 
(Navarro et al., 2004: para 5.17). 
The Commission has often been criticised for defining the markets too 
narrowly. It may be recalled that in the Nordic cases, discussed in chapter 5, the 
parties had argued that the geographic market was the whole EEC. However, the 
Commission took a view that the market is national rather the EEC. 
6.3.2. The substantive test of the EC and market power 
The former substantive test for the appraisal of merger cases applied in the 
EC as aforementioned was a dominance test. The dominance test was a two-tier 
551 Ibid, Fn. 43. 
552 Case IV/M963,1997. 
553 The market definition was left open in the following cases, see for instance, Georg Fisher / 
Disa case IV/M 1009,1998; Nestle /San Pelligrino case IV/M 1065,1998; Basf 
/ Shell case IV/M 
1041,1997; BP /Hoels case IV/M 1078,1998; Dow Jones /NBC-CNBC Europe case IV/M 1081, 
1998 etc. For the comments on the cases, see Navarro et al., 2005, at paras 5.08-5.18. 
554 Case 4 C. M. L. R. 23,1993. for the comments, see Cook and Kerse, 2000, pp. 133. 
555 See for instance, Exxon /Mobil case IV/M 1383,1999; and Astra Zeneca /Novartis case IV/M 
1806,2000. 
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test with two limbs implied, namely the creation or strengthening of a dominant 
position and a subsequent finding of significant impediment of competition. In 
practice, according to the old article 2 (3), a merger transaction would be 
challenged if it was likely that the merged entity would have a `dominant 
position' in the market, where a firm in a domain of a dominant position has been 
generally defined as the firm with the largest market share. Hence, according to 
the former substantive test, the creation or strengthening of a dominant position 
was a dominant criterion for challenging merger transactions otherwise it was a 
`legal straight-jacket' that all competitive scenarios must wear. 
During the review of the ECMR in the 2001 Green Paper the discussion 
was launched on the merits of the dominance test, whether there should be a move 
from the dominance test to the SLC. The major concern was the `gaps' left in the 
former dominance test. As was mentioned above, the first condition, the creation 
or strengthening of a dominant position played a major role giving the second 
condition (a significant impediment of competition) less importance, otherwise, 
without the first condition being met, the second condition could hardly be used to 
challenge a merger transaction. The new substantive test of the 2004 ECMR lifted 
the second condition to the major importance. Hence, the focus now is not on 
dominance, but rather on a `significant impediment of competition'. The creation 
or strengthening of a dominant position is now referred as an example of a 
significant impediment of competition556 
6.3.3. Theory of harm 
6.3.3.1. Overview 
Chapter 4 analysed possible anti-competitive effects of a merger 
transaction acknowledged in the economic literature. These are unilateral effects 
and co-ordinated effects. Unilateral effects result in the situation, where a merger 
allows the merged entity by eliminating the competitive restraints to increase its 
prices regardless of the response of the remaining firms. Meanwhile, co-ordinated 
556 The further discussion of the new substantive test was provided in the section 6.1.3.2.1. and 
chapter 1. 
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effects occur where a merger transaction creates a more favourable environment 
for tacit collusion. 
The EC Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal merger has departed 
from this traditional categorisation and presented three types of potential effects 
instead of the traditional two. The Commission has introduced a new definition of 
a paramount market position, where a merger is said to create or strengthen a 
paramount market position, if as a result of the transaction the merged entity 
enjoys a very large market share and a considerable market share advantage over 
rival firms. The second category is defined by the Commission as `non-collusive 
oligopolies', which applies in a situation where the merged entity will have 
market power notwithstanding that it will not hold a paramount market position. 
For instance, when the merging entities do not hold the largest market share, but 
the merger nevertheless is between suppliers of differentiated products, which are 
regarded by consumers as close substitutes or between suppliers whose 
competitors are capacity-constrained. Since both categories may cause unilateral 
effects and for economists557 is considered identical (as whether the merged entity 
will have the power profitably to reduce value for money, choice or innovation 
through its own acts without the need for a co-operative response from rivals), the 
researcher considers that further analysis by distinguishing into two groups rather 
than one is unnecessary and might only lead to the confusion for the Competition 
Authorities of the Baltic countries. The final category refers to collective 
dominance, as a merger having co-ordinated effects. 
As there are differences in the assessment of unilateral effects and co- 
ordinated effects due to different factors being taken into account, these effects 
will be further discussed separately. 
6.3.3.2. Single dominance. The EC case 
The former substantive test for merger appraisal was strongly linked to the 
concept of dominance as set out in article 82 of the Treaty. The definition of 
dominance in application to article 82 was defined by the ECJ in Hoffman / La 
557 See for instance, comments on unilateral effects by Lindsay (2003), pp. 146. 
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Roche case558, which was also referred with regards to the ECMR in further cases, 
by stating that a dominant position relates to `[.. ] a position of economic strength 
enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to prevent effective competition being 
maintained in the relevant market by affording it the power to behave to an 
appreciable extent independently of its competitors, its customers and ultimately 
of the consumers'. Hence, the essential element of dominance is an ability to act 
independently of the competitors and consumers, otherwise, be free from the 
pressure imposed by competition as regards price, quality and conditions of 
business. However, while article 82 focuses on structure leading to abuse, the 
Merger Regulation concentrates on the future structure of a market alone, and the 
potential for competition following the concentration. Bearing in mind that a more 
dynamic analysis is more appropriate in the ECMR context, a dominance concept 
should be associated with more obviously effects-related criteria contained in the 
SIEC limb (the second limb referring to the former substantive test) 
(Fountoukakos and Ryan, 2005: 280). The language of the dominance test and the 
involvement of article 82 thereof resulted occasionally in a perception of the 
Commission's approach by which its merger decisions were too concerned with 
static, legalistic factors and less with dynamic otherwise economic factors 
(Fountoukakos and Ryan, 2005). By placing the emphasis on SIEC limbs the new 
substantive test solved these inadequacies. The Explanatory Memorandum 
explained further that the modernisation of the ECMR `[ .] 
has the additional 
advantage of not linking the definition of dominance under the Merger Regulation 
to any further interpretations given by the ECJ to the concept of dominance under 
Article 82 of the Treaty'. 
With regard to the assessment of dominance Goyder (2003: 361-362) 
defines several factors in order to assess a degree of dominance in any particular 
market. The first factor is the aggregate of the market shares that the merged 
entity would have after the transaction provided they are durable in nature rather 
than temporary. While assessing the market, the concept of dominance has to seek 
the balance between the existing facts and likely future developments. Although 
the EC does not provide the particular market shares, from the recitals it seems 
558 Case 85/76 [1979] E. C. R. 461 para 38. See also case 27/76 United Brands/ Commission [1978] 
E. C. R. 207 at the para 65; Case T-30/89 Hilti / Commission [1991] E. C. R. 11-1439 (at the para 90); 
or Case T-102/96 Gencor / Commission [1999] E. C. R II-753 (at the para 200). 
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that a combined share of less than 25% does not raise a presumption of 
dominance. However, if the share reaches 40% and increases up to 65% or even 
70%, then it may be difficult to refute unless in extremely unusual circumstances 
like, for instance, in the Alcatel case559, where the Commission authorised the 
creation of a firms with a post merger market share of 83%56o In AKZO case561 an 
undertaking holding a market share of 50% was held to have a dominant position 
by the ECJ. Although, as the EC practice shows, undertakings with a market share 
of 40% or 50% are as a rough rule of thumb presumed to be dominant, the 
competition commissioner Kroes emphasises that high market shares are not on 
their own significant to conclude that a dominant position exists and therefore 
risks failing to take proper account of the degree to which competitors can 
constrain the behaviour of the allegedly dominant undertakings (Kroes, 2005). 
Hence, in assessing dominance the Commission will conduct a detailed analysis 
consisting of the market position of the allegedly dominant firm, the market 
position of competitors, barriers to expansion and entry and the market position of 
buyers (Kroes, 2005). Thus, the second criterion in Goyder's classification the 
relationship of the market share of the merging entity and its competitors is also 
another important factor. Apart from that, other factors would have to be 
examined as in relation to the respective strengths of the firms, such as an 
individual product range, the quality of their R&D in a technical industry, the 
strength of the customer base and the way in which market shares had developed 
in the past. 
The third factor is based on industries, as more traditional industries may 
show a marked degree of stability. Namely, in industries that are subject to 
innovation and/or R&D, market shares are likely to vary and are a less certain 
indicator of a market power. On the contrary, in the market, such as in Tetra 
Pak/Alfa-Laval 562 case a market share exceeding 90% was maintained 
consistently for a considerable number of years supported by a wide range of 
technological advantages over all its competitors. 
559 Case IV/M0422, [1991] 4 CMLR 778. 
560 It is primarily because of the existence of countervailing buyer power as well as the ability of 
competitors to increase supply to the merged entity. 
561 AKZO/Commission [1991] ECR 1-3359. 
562 Case IV/M68 [1992] 4 CMLR M81. 
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Fourthly, other commercial strengths can also play a role, such as 
intellectual property rights, over-capacities in neighbouring markets, the forecast 
of likely product demand and changing patterns of raw material supply and the 
changes in technical standards and so on 563 
6.3.3.3. Collective dominance. The EC case 
The concept of the term `collective dominance' was not explicitly covered 
by the wording of the old EC Merger Regulation. Article 2(3) of the former 
substantive test prohibits the creation or strengthening of a dominant position, 
which from its use of the words prima facie appears to suggest that the Regulation 
applies to single dominance rather than collective dominance (Motta, 2000). 
Nevertheless, the Commission's recognition to apply `dominance' flexibly was 
evident in the case law, where the concept was attempted to extend to the notion 
of joint or collective dominance. The concept of collective dominance was 
developing throughout the 1990s in parallel with the evolution of the same 
concept under article 82, which allowed the Commission to intervene against the 
mergers leading to oligopolistic market structures (Fountoukakos and Ryan, 
2005: 281). The first to bring the applicability of the Regulation to the creation or 
strengthening of a dominant position by collectively two or more firms was the 
Nestle /Perrier case 564 The application of the concept of collective dominance to 
the Regulation was also acknowledged by the ECJ in the France v Commissioner 
case565, where the court stated `[.. ] the applicants 'submission to the effect that the 
choice of legal bases in itself mitigates in favour of the arguments that the 
Regulation does not apply to the collective dominant positions cannot be 
accepted'. Hence, the collective dominance in the EC law has been developed 
through the case study. 
Collective dominance may arise in the situation, where considering the 
actual characteristics of the relevant market and the changes in its structure that 
the merger transaction would entail, the alteration of market structure would make 
each member of the dominant oligopoly; as it becomes aware of common 
563 For further reading, see Goyder, 2003, pp. 361-363. 
564 M. 190 [1992] OJ C 53. 
565 Cases C68/94 and 30/95 [1995] 4CMLR 829. 
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interests, consider it possible, economically rational, and preferable, to adopt on a 
lasting basis a common policy on the market with the aim to sell at above 
competitive prices, without entering in agreement 566 Furthermore, the 
commissioner, Monti (2000)567, also gave a definition that can be considered as 
collective dominance. He stated that `[.. ] the presence of such factors increases 
the likelihood that major market players monitor each other's behaviour, detect 
deviation from tacitly agreed price and retaliate against the one who deviates'. 
As regards the criteria for finding a collective dominance, in the Gencor / 
Lonrho case 568 the Commission mentioned that structural links between the 
market parties were not essential for finding collective dominance and it was 
sufficient if links of an economic nature, as to whether the economic conditions of 
the market lead the firms to co-ordinate their behaviour, was established. Also, in 
this case the Commission identified the characteristics of an oligopolistic market, 
such as high concentration, homogeneous products and maturity level of products, 
transparency of prices and capacity, high barriers to enter and growth, stable 
demand and modest growth, absence of buyer power, symmetry of market shares 
and costs structures. However, a high level of concentration is not in itself a 
sufficient factor to determine the existence of collective dominance 569. As a 
general rule of thumb, the Commission is reluctant to pursue a theory of collective 
dominance if the relevant market is characterised by the existence of more than 
six market players in a pre-merger situation. For instance, in the Price Waterhouse 
/ Coopers & Lybrand case 570 the Commission stated `[ .] 
from a general 
viewpoint, collective dominance involving more than three or four suppliers is 
unlikely simply because of the complexity of the interrelationships involved, and 
the consequent temptation to deviate'. Hence, a safe harbour situation can be 
assumed when more than six market players have a combined market share of less 
than 60 to 70% (Dethmers, 2005). Despite having all these factors as presented in 
Gencor / Lonrho case, the oligopolistic conduct can barely occur pursuant to 
economists in the absence of some mechanism for co-ordination. In the appeal of 
566 See Airtours / Commission, case T-342/99 at the para 61; also see Gencor /Lonrho case T- 
102/96 at the paras 276 and 277. 
567 Speech delivered at the EC Merger Control 10th Anniversary Conference, Brussels, 14-15 
September, 2000. 
568 Case IV/M 619. 
569 See Court's position expressed in Kali and Salz case. 
570 Case COMP/M. 1016, at the para 72. 
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the Airtour judgement, the Court pointed out the need for the Commission to 
establish the existence of a credible monitoring and retaliation mechanism. Three 
conditions were set out in this case as a requirement to prove the finding of 
collective dominance. The first condition is a market transparency, as each party 
of the dominant oligopoly must have the ability to know the other party's 
behaviour. The second condition is that the tacit co-ordination must be sustainable 
over time. The third condition is that the foreseeable reaction of current and future 
competitors and consumers should not be able to jeopardise the common policy. 
However, as discussed in chapter 4, unlike with unilateral effects, the 
economists have not been able to provide econometric techniques for the 
assessment of collective dominance. No economic or analytical techniques are 
available that can predict with certainty the propensity of firms to collude in a 
market (Kuhn, Kai-Uwe, 2002). According to Dethmers (2005: 644), lack of 
detailed economic analysis on collective dominance is evident from the fact that 
the Commission has never applied any detailed econometric techniques to assess 
collective dominance in so far with the exception of the Sony /BMG case' s7 
The lack of a systematic and consistent approach of the EC towards a collective 
dominance was the target of many critical comments. The question was raised 
whether the dominance test can be applied to mergers producing non-co-ordinated 
(or unilateral) effects in situations of oligopoly. A stretch of the plain meaning of 
the concept of dominance was widely objected due to its legal uncertainty 
associated with a definition of dominance that could be stretched without the 
limit. The lack of clarity in the application of unilateral effects in oligopoly 
situations raised concern that the Commission could use such analysis in an 
opportunistic manner (Homer, 2006: 29). The Commission was criticised for 
leaving the `gap' in the identification of collective dominance. Nonetheless, 
571 Case COMP/M. 3333,2004, at the paras 69-74. In this case the combined market shares of 
oligopolists exceed 70 to 90% of the relevant market and were considered as a five-to-four merger 
(four-to-three in Greece). Here, the Commission scrutinised whether any price co-ordination, on 
the basis of a parallelism in average price, could have been reached in using list prices as a focus. 
Further examination involved the different majors' discounts, whether they were aligned and 
sufficiently transparent as to allow monitoring of any price co-ordination on the level of net price. 
After that, the Commission looked at a list-price/net-price correlation analysis. Finally, the 
Commission examined the potential variations in discounts on price and came to the conclusion 
that the indications to identify the co-ordinated behaviour were insufficient to establish the 
existence of a collective dominance. 
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Dethmers (2005,640-641) and other scholars stated that the new ECMR and the 
Guidelines now close the `gap'; as the two theories of harm are defined in the 
Guidelines, namely unilateral and co-ordinated effects, enabling the Commission 
to assess individual dominance, collusive collective dominance and non-collusive 
oligopolies (referring to unilateral effects). According to paragraph 41 of the 
Guidelines `[.. ] coordination is more likely to emerge in markets where it is 
relatively simple to reach a common understanding on the terms of coordination'. 
In addition, like in the Airtours judgement, the Guidelines set out three conditions 
for co-ordination to be sustainable. However, in contrast to Airtours, the 
Guidelines provided a non-exhaustive list of factors which could be indicative of 
unilateral effects. The examples include large market shares, the degree of 
substitutability of competitors' products, limited switching possibilities, limited 
possibilities of increased supply, barriers to entry and the elimination of a 
competitive constraint (Guidelines, paras 27-37)572. 
Co-ordinated and unilateral effects encompass the totality of possible anti- 
competitive effects flowing from a merger, hence, the new substantive test closes 
any perceived `gap' and therefore should be able to cover all anti-competitive 
merger scenarios. 
6.4. Market power and the theory of harm in the Baltic countries 
6.4.1. Market definition within the Baltic countries 
As discussed above the Commission's Notice on the market definition 
establishes very general principles. Also, the practice proves that the Commission 
quite often does not define a market and leaves it open. It means there is a wide 
scope left for the national competition authorities to define market definitions. 
This section will show how the Competition Authorities of the Baltic countries are 
dealing with the task of defining the markets. In consistency with the policy of the 
EC, the Competition Authorities in the Baltic countries except Estonia also have a 
market definition consisting of two parts. It is a product market and geographic 
market. 
572 For further comments, see Homer, 2006. 
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In contrast to the EC policy and other Baltic countries, the Estonian 
Competition Act has one definition of the goods market to combine both product 
and geographic markets. §3 of the Estonian Competition Act provides a 
definition of the goods market as `[.. ] an area covering, inter alia, the whole of 
the territory of Estonia or a part thereof where goods which are regarded as 
interchangeable or substitutable (hereinafter substitutable) by the buyer by 
reason of price, quality, technical characteristics, conditions of sale or use, 
consumption or other characteristics are circulated'. However, the law does not 
provide further explanation and there are no specific criteria set out how the 
Competition Board defines a relevant market. 
The Competition Law of Latvia defines a relevant market and a relevant 
market of a good. Paragraph 4 article 1 of the Competition Law states that a 
relevant market is `[.. J a market of a concrete good which is evaluated in 
connection with a relevant geographical market'. Meanwhile, a relevant market 
of a good is defined as a market of a particular good, which includes all those 
goods that may be substituted for this specific good in a relevant geographical 
market, taking into account the factor of substitution of demand and supply, the 
specific features of the good and its utilisation characteristics573. As with the 
situation in Estonia, the Latvian Competition Law does not provide more detailed 
information on a relevant market definition. The question of a geographic market 
definition in the Latvian jurisdiction was raised in the Stevedoring Services 
case574. The product market was determined as stevedoring services performed on 
`general cargo' including containerised cargoes, where most of these cargoes 
shipped through Latvian ports were trans-shipped to and from inland points 
outside the territory of Latvia. Geographic market was defined as a market of 
Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Kaliningrad, St. Petersburg and Helsinki. For 
delivering a wide market definition in this case, the Competition Council relied on 
the information that the shippers of all these ports were generally indifferent as to 
which of these Baltic sea's ports to use and their decision was based on the factors 
of price, speed and safety. The merger transaction did not pose a high degree of 
market power in such a broad geographic market definition and the transaction 
s. 3 See paragraph 5, article 1, Competition Law of Latvia of 2001. 
574 For further comments, see OECD, 1999. 
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was approved575. However, such broad geographic market definition is not always 
determined in the jurisdiction of Latvia. The SIA Latvia Statoil / SIA Shell Latvia 
was the case576 where the Competition Council of Latvia paid special attention to 
the definition of the relevant geographic market and applied more specific 
restrictions than those notified by the parties. Four separate relevant markets in 
the towns of Latvia, namely Riga, Liepaja, Ventspils and Daugavpils were 
defined. The following factors were taken into consideration: (i) consumers were 
not economically motivated to buy petrol and diesel outside the town territories; 
(ii) the major part of citizens in Latvia reside and work in the same administrative 
territory or its vicinity and the fuel is purchased where the major part of consumer 
activities (work and social life) take place; (iii) petrol station penetration 
indicators in some town territories were compared with indicators of the territory 
of the entire country. Both types of indicators were substantially different. 
According to article 3 paragraph 5 of the Law on Competition of 
Lithuania, a relevant market is defined as a market of certain goods in a relevant 
geographic market. Geographic market means the territory, in which the 
conditions of competition in a relevant product market are in essence similar to all 
undertakings and which may be distinguished from adjacent areas577. Meanwhile, 
a product market is defined as the aggregate of goods, which from the consumers' 
view are appropriate substitutes according to their characteristics, application and 
prices 578. Apart from these provisions in the Law on Competition, the 
Competition Council of Lithuania also issued Explanations of the Competition 
Council concerning the Definition of the Relevant Market579. The purpose of this 
document is to increase the clearness and transparency of decisions of the 
Competition Council of Lithuania, as it provides the key principles and criteria for 
the definition of a relevant market. It in turn facilitates the firms involved in a 
transaction to understand what information is necessary for the defining market 
definition and on what criteria the decision is based. These explanations have 
575 For further comments on this case, see OECD, Competition Law and Policy in the Baltic 
countries, 1999, pp. 70. 
576 The comments on this case were presented by the regulators of the Competition Council of 
Latvia during the interview held in Latvia, September 2004. 
577 Paragraph 7, article 3, the Law on Competition of Lithuania. 
578 Paragraph 6, article 3, the Law on Competition of Lithuania. 
s'9 No. 17,24/02/2000, Vilnius, Official Gazette, 2000, No. 19-487. Available at web-site: 
www. konkuren. lt 
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been drafted on the basis of the Commission Notice on relevant market 
definition580, as discussed above. Similar to the Commission's Notice, the criteria 
defining of the relevant market involve the demand substitution, being the most 
important factor, then the supply substitution. The potential competition is not 
normally taken into account for defining the market. Nonetheless, this factor can 
be carried out at a subsequent stage, once the position of the firm in the relevant 
market has been ascertained, and where such position gives rise to concerns from 
a competition point of view581 
Moreover, like the EC the Explanations provide the criteria for the 
assessment of geographic market definition, these include: (i) evidence of 
purchases performed in the other area in the recent past; (ii) principal 
characteristics of demand; (iii) views of customers and competitors; (iv) current 
geographic pattern of purchases; (v) trade flows (patterns of shipment); and (vi) 
barriers and switching costs associated to divert orders to companies located in 
other areas. For the defining product market definition, or substitutability of two 
products in particular, the Competition Council examines the following factors: (i) 
evidence of substitution in the recent past; (ii) quantity tests; (iii) views of 
customers and competitors; (iv) consumer preferences; (v) barriers and costs 
associated with switching demand to potential substitutes; and (vi) different 
categories of customers and price discrimination. Similar to the policy of the EC, 
the Competition Council of Lithuania provides imprecise criteria for defining the 
relevant market definition, which can be further developed in the merger cases. 
In the UAB ZIPS / UAB Vesiga case582 and the UAB Vesiga / UAB VMGH 
case583 scenario the approval was given by the Competition Council on 15 July 
2004 by letting UAB ZIPS acquire 100% of UAB Vesiga shares. However, the 
transaction was not completed as the parties involved in the group of this 
transaction584 decided that it was more economically useful for the other parties to 
merge. As a result, the notification for the new transaction, namely for the UAB 
580 97/C 372/03. 
581 See chapter 3, paragraph 13, Explanations of the Competition Council concerning the definition 
of the relevant market. 
582 UAB ZIP3/UAB Vesiga, No IS - 112,15/07/2004. 
583 UABVesiga/UABVMGH, No. 1S- 86,14/07/2005. 
584 For the explanation, see the following chain: UAB `Zabolis and partneriai' holds 100 % market 
shares of UAB `ZIP3', there UAB `ZIPS' holds 100 % market shares of UAB `VMGH' and UAB 
`VMGH' holds 100% of UAB `Vilniaus majonezo gamyba'. 
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Vesiga / UAB VMGH acquisition, took place in July 2005. These cases could be 
looked at collectively, given the same analysis in defining a product market had 
been applied in both cases and the parties involved were the same (i. e. UAB ZIPS 
holds 100% share of UAB VMGH). By basing its decision on consumer's survey 
presented by the merging parties as the main evidence, the Competition Council 
of Lithuania determined that the product market in this case was `sauces and 
seasonings'. To this one group the Council assigned all of the following products, 
such as mayonnaise, ketchup, tomatoes sauce, mustard, ground horse-radish, salad 
cream and soured cream. The Competition Council in its decision noted that as a 
result of this transaction, the concentration in the mayonnaise market will be high. 
Nevertheless, the merger transaction was approved, because the decision was 
based on a wider `sauces and seasonings' product market rather than on the 
mayonnaise market (Malinauskaite, 2006). However, the EC practice has 
criticised a simple functionality test to define a product market definition (Cook 
and Kerse, 2000: 137-136). If the products perform the same functions it does not 
necessarily mean that they belong to one and the same product market. The focus 
solely on functional substitutability may lead to an inappropriate result. As 
already mentioned above, in the Nestle l Perrier case, the Commission rejected a 
product market definition based on simple functionality by stating that `[.. ] a 
limited substitutability in terms of functionality alone is not sufficient to establish 
substitutability in competition terms '585. The Commission rejected the merging 
parties' product market definition as non-alcoholic drinks, and determined that 
mineral water constitutes a separate product market. According to Cook and 
Kerse586, a test based on pure functionality would often give the wrong results. 
The question here is not as simple as what alternatives could be found to serve the 
same purpose if one product was not available. This is because those alternatives 
might not be suitable equally for all groups of customers. Bearing in mind that the 
product market definition in Vesiga case heavily relied on a consumers' survey, 
the scholars argue that these surveys should be treated with caution, as they are 
unscientific and do not substitute for proper price correlation analysis. Any 
585 See para 9, [1992], OJ L 356/1. 
586 Cook and Kerse, E. C. Merger Control, Sweet 
& Maxwell, 2000, p. 136. 
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decisions based on surveys must be carried out with caution and awareness, as the 
surveys is the art and science to ask the right people the right questions. 587 
It has been suggested that a careful analysis of a product use, functionality 
and physical characteristics is more reliable than customer surveys588. However, it 
cannot be asserted that surveys should be excluded at all, but nevertheless, any 
market researches must be checked. For instance, in the Procter & Gamble / VP 
Schickedanz case589, the Commission carried out a detailed examination of several 
market research studies. The Commission in this case was checking whether 
tampons and sanitary towels belonged to the same feminine hygiene product 
market definition as submitted by the merging parties, since both products had 
identical use and functionality as relied on their general market research. 
However, the Commission instructed independent experts to provide their opinion 
on the submitted consumer studies and their quality. Although both products 
performed the same function, the increase in price was insufficient for most 
customers to switch; as a result the Commission concluded that tampons and 
sanitary towels belonged to two separate markets. This case proves that the 
Commission will check the quality of consumer's surveys and sometimes will 
even invite an independent expert to make a conclusion. As far as the Baltic 
countries are concerned, the lack of resources could very well mean that reliance 
on independent experts is limited. However, as the case in Lithuania showed, such 
surveys should really be examined. 
The interviews held at the Competition Authorities of the Baltic countries 
confirmed that the major problem for the Competition Authorities is to define the 
relevant markets. The general principles established in the Commission's Notice 
on the market definition and the Commission's policy quite often leave the 
question of market definition open and give a wide scope for the national 
competition authorities to define market definitions. It can be illustrated by the 
Vesiga case in Lithuania, that reliance mainly on the market research provided by 
587 For further reading about the customer surveys, see for instance, the article written by Hughes 
M., and Beale N., Customer Surveys in UK Merger Cases - the Art and Science of Asking the 
Right People the Right Questions, E. C. L. R., 2005, pp. 297-303. 
588 For further reading, see Cook and Kerse, 2000, pp. 136-137. Also see Hughes and Beale, 2005, 
pp. 297-303. 
589 Case IV/M 430 [1994] OJ L354/32. 
283 
the merging parties gave a broad definition of product market59o The market 
definition is an important step in the analysis of a merger transaction. It is not only 
because incorrect relevant market definition will lead to misleading results on the 
impact of a merger transaction on competition in a single case, but also future 
cases can be based on a similar basis forming deluded precedents 591 Furthermore, 
disparity in approaches taken by the EC and the Baltic countries in delineating the 
relevant market definitions can be problematic where the commitments of the 
Baltic countries are to employ and apply concepts in competition law in a manner 
consistent to the EC approach. 
6.4.2. The substantive tests of the Baltic countries and market power 
All Baltic states adopted the dominance test, which was almost identical to 
the former substantive test for merger approval in the EC jurisdiction. Even the 
wording of the substantive test was similar to one applied in the EC. For instance, 
§ 22 (2) of the Estonian Competition Act provides that a concentration shall be 
prohibited `[.. ] if it may create or strengthen a dominant position as a result of 
which competition would be significantly restricted in the goods market'. Hence, 
like in the EC case, the priority was given to the creation or strengthening of a 
dominant position (otherwise the first limb), leaving the significant restriction of 
competition as a supportive condition. 
The old substantive test of Latvia for the appraisal of merger transactions 
had a clear emphasis on a single dominance, which as was presumed 
automatically hinders or otherwise restricts competition. To follow the EC 
amendments and to close gaps of the former substantive test, the new test was 
introduced in the Latvian jurisdiction for the appraisal of merger transactions. The 
new substantive test states that the Competition Council of Latvia by its decision 
shall prohibit merger transactions as a result of which a dominant position is 
created or strengthened, or which may significantly reduce competition in any 
concrete market 592. Hence, the substantive test expanded the power of the 
590 A wide product market definition, based on the consumers' survey as the main evidence, was 
also defined in Alita case. For the comments on this case, see Malmauskaite, 2006. 
591 Despite the fact that a market definition ought to be defined in every individual merger cases on 
case-by-case basis. 
592 See section 16, paragraph 3 of the Competition Law of Latvia. 
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Competition Council of Latvia to prevent not only the potential harm of a single 
dominance but also the harm from a collective dominance (Jefremova, 2004)593 
The Competition Council of Lithuania also applied a dominance test for 
the appraisal of merger transactions, which was changed into a modified 
dominance test following the EC modernisation. Despite the modification of the 
Lithuanian substantive test, the focus on dominance can be found in the following 
articles. Article 14 (2) of the Law on Competition of Lithuania provides that 
concentration transactions may be permitted but only with conditions, where the 
conditions involve the prevention of the `creation or strengthening of a dominant 
position' (this provision was left unchanged). Paragraph 3 of article 14 provides 
that the Competition Council of Lithuania may refuse to approve concentration, 
`[ 
.] where concentration will establish or strengthen a dominant position or 
substantially restrict competition in a relevant market'. The similar wording of 
the substantive test of article 14 (3) is applied also in post-merger control. Article 
141 of the Law on Competition of Lithuania states that the Competition Council 
within twelve months from the implementation of concentration in question has a 
right to obligate the merged undertakings to submit notifications on concentration 
and mutatis mutandis apply the concentration control procedure, if it becomes 
probable that concentration will result in the creation or strengthening of the 
dominant position, or a significant restriction of competition in the relevant 
market. The wording of the substantive test for an appraisal of merger transactions 
in the jurisdiction of Lithuania is ambiguous. A transaction is first of all checked 
according to either part of the test: whether it will establish creation or 
strengthening a dominant position; or whether a notified transaction will restrict 
competition substantially. If neither of these conditions is met, then the 
transaction is approved594 If, for instance, there is a threat that a transaction will 
create or strengthen a dominant position, then in this case the transaction still can 
be approved by imposing conditions to prevent the creation or strengthening of a 
dominant position59s However, if there are concerns that a transaction will restrict 
competition substantially, then again it is checked, whether the transaction can be 
593 Comments on the new substantive test was presented by a board member of the Competition 
Council Jefremova during the interview held in Latvia in September 2004. However, there has 
been no practice insofar of collective issues in merger cases. 
594 See article 14 (1) of the Law on Competition. 
595 See article 14 (2) of the Law on Competition. 
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approved on conditions. It means article 14 (2) will apply, which states that the 
conditions imposed by the Competition Council of Lithuania involve the 
prevention of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position. As a result, 
despite the changes in the substantive test, the focus is still on dominance. 
So far the Competition Authorities of the Baltic countries have cleared all merger 
transactions 596 The question one might ask is why do the Baltic states have such a 
situation: whether it is linked to a slack attitude on the Competition Authorities' 
part in the enforcement of merger control; or whether the policy held in all 
Competition Authorities of the Baltic countries is to blame. The Estonian 
Competition Authority is `the youngest' in comparison with the other two 
Competition Authorities of the Baltic states in the context that only since the end 
of 2001 the Competition Board has gained power to challenge anti-competitive 
merger transactions. Until 2004 the Competition Council of Latvia had high 
thresholds for the notification of mergers, and as a result used to have about 4-5 
merger notification cases per year, which were all approved. After the enquiries to 
the Competition Authorities, the researcher came to the conclusion that this 
situation can be explained by the policy held in all Authorities. There is a practice 
held in the Competition Authorities to discuss the proposed merger transaction in 
advance. Upon learning of a possibility in a particular case that a dominant 
position may be created and the restriction of competition may arise, and 
consequently such a transaction would not be approved, the firms (owners or legal 
representatives), quite infrequently, abandon their intentions to effect 
concentration or withdraw their concentration notifications. For instance, the 
notification of the intended concentration in Lithuania in the AB Panevezio Pienas 
/ AB Rokiskio Saris 597 case was submitted four times; in three cases it was 
withdrawn, as the Council would not approve such a transaction. Each time the 
applicant would indicate a different reduced size of targeted shareholding, and 
emphasise that the main purpose of the concentration effected by AB Rokiskio 
Saris is to acquire an interest in AB Panevezio Pienas of the size ensuring a 
significant influence in the process of decision making while preventing any 
596 With one exception in the Lithuanian jurisdiction in Sugar case, where the Competition 
Authority blocked the decision. However it was overturned by the Government. 
597 Decision No. IS - 29,03/04/2003, available at web-site: 
http: //www. konkuren. It 
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devaluation of shares. A similar situation was in the Aibe case, where three 
mandatory notifications of concentration were submitted by the network Aibes9s 
6.4.3. Single dominance. The study of the Baltic countries 
The main focus of the Competition Laws of the Baltic countries is on 
single dominance rather than on collective dominance. All Baltic countries apply 
a dominance test or modified dominance test like in the case of Latvia or 
Lithuania for the appraisal of concentration transactions with the main focus being 
on single dominance. All Baltic countries place emphasis on market share rather 
than concentration index to define a dominant position. For instance, the first 
paragraph of § 13 of the Competition Act of Estonia provides that an undertaking 
is in a domain of a dominant position if it `[.. ] accounts for at least 40 per cent of 
the turnover in the goods market or whose position enables the undertaking to 
operate in the market to an appreciable extent independently of competitors, 
suppliers and buyers'. The second part of the definition of dominance is in line 
with the EC policy. However, a strict bind to a market share of at least 40% is 
troublesome. According to the theory of markets, even very high market shares do 
not grant a position of dominance if entry into the relevant market is easy (OECD, 
1999: 31). For instance, the Commission approved the merger with 83% of the 
market share 599 The potential competition from outside the market should also be 
analysed instead of automatic bind to the 40% of market shares for defining a 
dominance held by an undertaking 600 For Schinkel and Thielert, although the 
explicit definition of dominance could be seen as a measure to increase the 
transparency of the Estonian Competition Act, the definition in terms of rigid 
market share can easily lead to erroneous results6o1 
According to the Latvian Competition Law, section 1, paragraph 1, a 
dominant position is `[.. ] an economic (commercial) position in a relevant market 
of a market participant or several market participants if the market share of such 
participant or the participants in this relevant market is at least 40 per cent and if 
598 See Annual Report of 2003, available at web-site: http: //www. konkuren. lt 
599 In Alcatel case as discussed above. 
600 See Fishwick, 1989, pp. 455. Also see Schinkel and Thielert. 
60' For further reading, see Schinkel, M. P. and Thielert, J., Estonia's Competition Policy: A 
Critical Evaluation towards EU Accession. 
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such participant or such participants have the capacity to significantly hinder, 
restrict or distort competition in any relevant market for a sufficient length of time 
by acting with full or partial independence from competitors, clients or 
consumers'602. For instance, in the SIA Latvia Statoil / SIA Shell Latvia case603 the 
Competition Council of Latvia in assessing unilateral effects of the proposed 
transaction concluded that the petrol and diesel retail market share in separate 
geographic markets, namely in Liepaja, Daugavpils and Riga will not reach 40%, 
while in Ventspils it will be approximately 40%. As regards more recent 
developments, the Latvian government has considered draft amendments to the 
Competition Law in order to strengthen the effectiveness of competition policy by 
extending the definition of a dominant position. One of the criteria for submitting 
the notification report has been strengthened: the parties involved in the 
transaction have an obligation to notify if their total market share exceeds 35%. 
Thus, the definition of a dominant position in Latvia will be extended by 
replacing, considerably low by the EC standard604, a 40% market share test to 
35%. 
Similar to the case of Estonia, the Law on Competition in Lithuania also 
binds to 40% of market shares in order to define a dominant position. For 
instance, paragraph 11 of article 3 states that `[.. ] unless proved otherwise, the 
undertaking with the market share of not less than 40% shall be considered to 
have a dominant position in the relevant market 
605 The definition, in terms of 
rigid market shares of 40% as suggested by scholars can lead to erroneous results 
and should be re-considered by the Competition Authorities of the Baltic 
countries. 
In contrast to the EC, all Baltic states imposed rigid policies for defining 
dominance referring to 40% of market shares (or 35% like the case of Latvia). 
602 See Competition Law of Latvia, 22 April 2004, section 1, paragraph 1. 
603 SIA Latvia Statoil /SIA Shell Latria, 2003. 
604 As was mentioned above, in Alcatel case, the parties 
had 83% of the market shares (though they 
were not considered as having a dominant position), 
in AKZO case the merged entity with 50% of 
the market shares was determined as having a 
dominant position. Also, Gal in her theory 
suggested that mergers, especially where the 
dominance definition involves firms with market 
shares equal to or lower than 50%, should 
be approved. 
605 Different from the other Baltic countries, the Competition Council of Lithuania has issued the 
explanatory document concerning the establishment of a 
dominant position, which was modified 
in 2005 after the modernisation of the EC merger control policy. 
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Such strict bind to a market share of 40% is troublesome, as it can lead to 
erroneous results. It can be noted that even very high market share does not grant 
a position of dominance if entry into the relevant market is easy. 
6.4.4. Collective dominance. The study of the Baltic countries 
The focus in the jurisdictions of the Baltic states is on a single dominance. 
For instance, neither the Competition Act of Estonia, nor the current practice of 
the Estonian Competition Board (Konkurentsiamet) gives direct answers whether 
a merger transaction could be challenged on oligopoly grounds (Simovart and 
Paas, 2006: 77). As aforementioned there are working groups assigned to work on 
the provisions of merger control regime, thus, it can only be expected that the 
legal text in future will define the notion of collective dominance. 
Similarly to the Estonian case is a situation in the Latvian jurisdiction, 
where the Competition Law does not provide any provision on collective 
dominance and only a single dominance is defined. However, the wording of the 
new substantive test shows that the issues on collective dominance can be covered 
by the second part of the substantive test for the appraisal of concentration 
transactions. It was also confirmed by the board member Jefromava that the issues 
of collective dominance fall to the second part of the substantive test. However, 
there is no practice so far in the jurisdiction of Latvia of the assessment of merger 
cases involving a collective dominance. 
In contrast to the other Baltic countries, the Law on Competition of 
Lithuania refers to jointly held market shares by a number of firms in order to 
define what can be called a collective dominance. The second part of paragraph 
11 article 3 states that `[.. ] each of a group of three or a smaller number of 
undertakings with the largest shares of the relevant market, jointly holding 70% 
or more of the relevant market shall be considered to enjoy a dominant position'. 
However, in practice, the Competition Council of Lithuania is reluctant to refer to 
a collective dominance as the ground of challenging a merger transaction. For 
instance, the issues of a collective dominance was analysed in the AB Rokiskio 
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surfs / AB Panevezio Pienas case 606 in the jurisdiction of Lithuania, where 
horizontal overlaps occurred due to both companies being active in producing 
dairy products, which is considered as a concentrated market in Lithuania. This 
case was highly criticised by the former board member of the Competition 
Council Pajarskas for the lack of evidence to prove collective dominance. It was 
not clear whether firms would have economic links that would enable them to co- 
ordinate their behaviour and that consequently would lead to co-ordinated effects. 
Thus, collective dominance was dismissed and the decision was based on a single 
dominance and it was approved upon the conditions set out by the Council. 
Chapter 4 analysed two countervailing merger motives with two contrasting 
effects on competition, as efficiency gains achievable through merger transactions 
and the ability to create or strengthen market power as a result of mergers from an 
economic perspective. Meanwhile, the emphasis of this chapter was on legal 
analysis. The question was raised to what extent commercial motives analysed in 
chapters 3 and 4 affect and influence the regulatory authorities of the EC and in 
parallel of the Baltic countries. 
The analysis of the past merger cases revealed the controversial EC policy 
towards efficiency gains achievable through merger transactions, as efficiencies 
were treated as an offence rather than defence in some cases, as discussed in this 
chapter. According to the former EC policy, any efficiency considerations could 
have been taken into account only up to the limit of dominance; once a fear that a 
dominant position might be created or strengthened was established, any 
efficiency issues were out of the scope of the analysis. The former substantive test 
of the EC placed the emphasis on the creation or strengthening of a dominant 
position leaving significant impediment of competition at a second place. 
As the Baltic countries by signing the European Agreements committed to ensure 
their harmonised interpretation and application of the EC competition law and 
policy, the position held at the time in the EC vis-a-vis efficiency gains achievable 
through mergers have been transposed to the Baltic states. All three countries 
introduced dominance tests for merger appraisal with the wording being almost 
identical to the former EC substantive test. Hence, the creation or strengthening of 
606 Case No. 1 S-29,03/04/2003. The notification was submitted 3 times each time providing lower 
market shares in order to get approval from the 
Competition Council. 
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dominance though merger transactions has become a deep-rooted element in 
merger analysis of the regulatory authorities in the Baltic countries. The concept 
of dominance as defined in the Hoffman case has been also transposed. However, 
different from the EC, all Baltic states imposed rigid policies for defining 
dominance referring to 40% of market shares. Such strict bind to a market share 
of 40% is troublesome, as it can lead to erroneous results. It can be noted that 
even very high market share does not grant a position of dominance if entry into 
the relevant market is easy. 
In contrast to single dominance, which can be considered as the main focus in the 
Baltic countries, merger transactions leading to collective dominance or oligopoly 
situations has not been developed yet and is given little importance. For instance, 
in Estonia neither the Competition Act nor the current practice of the Competition 
Board give guidance to whether a merger could be challenged on oligopoly 
grounds. In Latvia, a similar policy applies, as there are no guidelines or other 
provisions issued, or case law as regards collective dominance. However, the new 
substantive test was imposed in Latvia to follow the EC modernisation, where the 
situation of collective dominance can be challenged under the second part of the 
test, which provides that provisions on merger control are to prevent the reduction 
of competition in any relevant market. Different from the other Baltic states, 
Lithuania defines a concept of collective dominance referring to 70% jointly held 
market shares by a number of firms. However, the practice shows, as discussed in 
this chapter, that the Competition Council lacks knowledge and experience in 
proving collective dominance. Thus, the Baltic countries need to develop their 
laws in order to cover the oligopolistic cases, as these types of situation together 
with a single dominance are in a domain in small market economies. 
The Commission has started a new era in developing merger control mechanism 
after the major reforms of the ECMR. The new substantive test was introduced, 
which is more in favour to efficiency issues than its predecessor. Also, the 
Commission explicitly has acknowledged the importance of efficiency issues in 
merger cases by issuing the Guidelines on horizontal mergers, which have the 
provisions on merger-specific efficiencies. Generally speaking the EC approach 
towards merger control regime has shifted towards a more economic based 
approach. However, the Baltic countries are left behind and there is insufficient 
economic analysis provided in the assessment of merger cases, what is especially 
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important for the countries of small market economies, like ones of the Baltic 
countries. The focus on a single dominance is mistaken. As N. Koers (2005), a 
new competition commissioner, indicates even dominant companies can compete. 
As stated above, the current Latvian substantive test for the appraisal of 
concentrations is the most favourable to efficiency gains in comparison to the 
substantive tests of the other Baltic states. Any efficiency issues now can be 
covered under the second part of the test, the limb of SIEC. Bearing in mind that 
there have been no further guidelines issued by the Competition Council to define 
the criteria in applying the new substantive test and no explicit efficiency defence 
exists, it is not clear how the test will be interpreted. Its efficiency will be tested in 
the years to come, when the Competition Council of Latvia will develop its 
approach in the application of the substantive test. 
292 
Chapter 7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This comparative study examined the merger control mechanisms at the EC and at 
the national levels, namely Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Globalisation process 
has caused a surge of cross-border as well as domestic merger transactions within 
the jurisdiction of the EC. The Baltic countries were not an exception; after the 
opening of borders to international trade, merger transactions have become an 
important fact in the Baltic countries. Thus, with the emergence of merger 
transactions, there was a necessity to introduce merger control regimes in the 
Baltic countries in order to prevent the anti-competitive merger transactions. After 
re-gaining their independence, the Baltic countries had a choice to turn to the 
West or remain with the East. The Baltic states decided to turn to the West after 
the 50 years of occupation from the East. Joining the EU was considered the best 
choice for these countries. The merger control mechanism in the Baltic countries 
was transposed as a part of the acquis communautaire as a quid pro quo for being 
admitted in the EU. Hence, the EU has been remarkably effective in stimulating 
the development of competition policy and laws, including merger control regime, 
in the Baltic states. However, for the inexperienced Competition Authorities of 
the Baltic states the introduction and enforcement of merger control mechanisms 
has not been an easy task. 
This research has attempted to ascertain to what extent the approach towards 
merger control regime taken in the Baltic countries is different from its counter- 
part - the EC. The thesis has built the methodology to assess the approaches vis-a- 
vis merger control rules taken at two different levels: at the supra-national - the 
EC and at the national - the Baltic states. As far as the methodology is concerned, 
the research employed a comparative law analysis with an inter-disciplinary 
approach. Explicit recourse to economic theories was essential for understanding 
the rationale behind the competition law, which is widely accepted as a `no-man's 
land' between law and economics. Considering that the comparative law method 
has been adapted to suit the needs of the EU both in harmonising and 
approximating the commercial and competition laws of its members and in 
facilitating the CEECs including the Baltic countries in their modernisation 
programmes, often with the goal of membership of the EU, the comparative 
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method and comparison itself has been an essential tool for generating knowledge 
in this thesis. Bearing in mind that the Baltic countries committed themselves to 
employ and apply concepts in competition law in a manner consistent with the EC 
approach, the more rewarding emphasis of the thesis was on finding the 
differences rather than similarities 607 in approaches adopted by the Baltic 
countries towards merger control regime from the EC. 
The first chapter, which is an introductory chapter, analysed the emergence and 
further development of competition law and policy, including merger control 
regime in the EC and in parallel in the Baltic countries from the historical point of 
view. The question in this chapter was raised as to what extent the Baltic countries 
share a similar historical development experience with the EC as far as merger 
control is concerned. It has been ascertained that different from the EC, where the 
merger control regime has developed over time, the merger control mechanism in 
each Baltic country was transposed as a part of the acquis. The implementation of 
the merger control mechanisms in the Baltic countries has not been a single act 
per se. It has constituted as a new revolution for these countries, as their whole 
legal, economic and political environments have been changed. The merger 
regime was introduced into the legal systems of the Baltic countries, while they 
have been still going through economic, legal and political reforms. 
Considering that merger control regimes in each Baltic state were transposed from 
the EC, there are no doubts about the high influence of the ECMR on these 
countries. In general terms, the competition law and policy in the Baltic countries 
is a compact version of the competition law and policy of the EC. However, in 
contrast to the EC law, the merger control rules and other aspects of competition 
law as an abuse of a dominant position, prohibited agreements and other 
restrictions of fair competition are governed by a single document - Competition 
Law in each Baltic country (or Competition Act as in the Estonian case). 
Despite quite often being portrayed as one unit, the research attempted to discuss 
the distinguished features of each Baltic state. A different approach towards the 
607 Though it was not a rigid rule. 
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introduction of merger control mechanism had been taken in each of them. Latvia 
had set up high thresholds for merger notification. Thus, only very large merger 
transactions fell under the jurisdiction of the Latvian Competition Council. The 
prevention of mergers leading to the creation of a dominant position was hardly 
possible, as only firms already in a domain of a dominant position could have 
been challenged. The Competition Board of Estonia was empowered to prevent 
anti-competitive mergers only in 2001; before that the Board acted as a Register 
body in order to learn the features of the Estonian markets and prepare to deal 
with merger cases in the near future. Such information gained was a good practice 
before imposing full control over anti-competitive mergers. 
Lithuania had the `strictest' merger control regime from its introduction in 1992 
in comparison with the other Baltic states. The merger transactions leading 
towards the creation or strengthening of a dominant position could have been 
blocked by the Competition Council of Lithuania. That said, until 1999 the 
Competition Council's power to block mergers was subject to intervention by the 
Lithuanian Government who had the power to overturn such decision taken by the 
Competition Council 608. Both institutions, i. e. the State Competition and 
Consumer Protection Office and the Competition Council, responsible for the 
enforcement of competition law in Lithuania until 1999 lacked formal 
independence from the government. The links with government may have a 
detrimental impact on the business community's acceptance of decisions. Hence, 
the situation has changed since Lithuania adopted the `integrated agency model' - 
a single independent enforcement agency named the Competition Council, which 
discharges investigative, enforcement and adjudicative functions of competition 
law and policy in Lithuania. The Latvian Competition Council acts under the 
supervision of the Ministry of Economics. However, the Ministry of Economics 
does not have the power to influence the investigations and the decisions of the 
cases taken by the Competition Council of Latvia. The Estonian Competition 
Board is a governmental agency within the administrative jurisdiction of the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications. However, it could be 
considered that the Board acts as an independent body with regards to its role in 
the decision-making process. In contrast to Latvia and Lithuania, the Estonian 
608 It happened once, when the Council's decision was overturned by the Government (see Sugar 
case). 
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institutional model is based on the `bifurcated judicial model', where the Board's 
officials investigate the alleged competition law violation and the court 
adjudicates upon and enforces the competition law. Hence, despite being 
portrayed as one unit, the Baltic countries share distinctive features: each Baltic 
state employed different approaches to the introduction of merger control rules in 
their jurisdictions, differences can also be distinguished in the institutional models 
chosen by these countries for the enforcement of competition law and policy. 
Furthermore, the study examined the motives behind firms' decisions to merge, in 
particular firms operating in and from the Baltic countries. Questions were raised 
as to what are the impetuses for firms to merge in the jurisdictions of the Baltic 
countries and whether these motives have specific implications within the Baltic 
states in comparison with theory. The motives were examined in order to 
determine the rationale behind the mergers as that in turn might help to 
understand their effects on competition. In the study, it was clear that the actual 
reasons for mergers in the Baltic countries are no different to the ones described in 
theoretical discourses. That said, three main trends were distinguished. First of all, 
the motives for the majority of merger cases notified to the Competition 
Authorities of the Baltic countries were to achieve and/or increase efficiencies and 
as a result of this be able to compete internationally. Secondly, foreign companies 
acquire or merge the national Baltic firms for an easy and quick way to enter in to 
the unknown market. Another international element was the spill-over effects on 
the Baltic countries' markets from the merger transactions between parents 
companies through subsidiaries based in the Baltic states. 
Apart from commercial motives, the study also revealed socio-political aspects of 
merger effects in the context of the Baltic states. However, despite establishing 
the possibility of merger transactions having socio-political effects, especially in 
conglomerate merger cases, the research did not aim to prove whether these 
aspects should be (or not) taken into account by the competition authorities in 
merger analysis. This issue requires further analysis. 
Despite exploring various motives for merger further, the study made focus on 
two main motives with two countervailing effects on competition. These are pro- 
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competitive and anti-competitive effects, as there is a trade-off between them. As 
regards the pro-competitive effects, through merger transactions efficiencies can 
be achieved resulting in gaining benefits such as products produced, services 
provided at lower costs and/or higher quality and/or the creation of new 
products/services. Thus, mergers can deliver a wide variety of benefits to 
consumers or to competition in general. On the contrary, mergers can pose certain 
risks as well. Mergers may contribute to the creation of market power and as a 
result lead to higher prices for consumers, or take advantage of their market 
strength to disadvantage smaller competitors through various means, or generally 
facilitate co-ordination among the firms. Hence, merger transactions can impose 
anti-competitive effects. These two countervailing effects on competition were a 
recurring element throughout the thesis and has been analysed from both 
economic and legal perspectives. 
Chapter 4 critically evaluated both positive and negative effects on competition 
that a merger transaction may impose. The analysis of these two effects was 
highly important as there is a trade-off between them. The comparison of the 
length to which mergers extend market power with gaining efficiencies has been 
recognised as a highly complex and controversial subject. Referring to economic 
theories, it was noted that any efficiency gains achieved through all types of 
mergers play an important role in merger analysis and cannot be ignored. The 
economic theories discussed showed that under certain circumstances efficiencies 
may offset any anti-competitive effects. Horizontal, vertical and conglomerate 
mergers were distinguished and analysed separately due to the differences in anti- 
competitive effects (as unilateral or co-ordinated effects) on competition. As 
different types of mergers may have anti-competitive effects with horizontal 
mergers causing the most concerns, so all these types of mergers may enhance 
efficiencies. The conclusion was made that regardless of merger transaction type, 
mergers can impose pro-competitive and/or anti-competitive effects on 
competition upon the existence of certain conditions. This is why both effects 
should be analysed and balanced. 
Moreover, the specific implications were placed on small market economies. 
Merger control is an important mechanism for small market economies because of 
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two main reasons. First of all, merger transactions increase concentration in a 
market structure. For small market economies, which are usually defined as 
having concentrated markets, mergers may lead to a further concentration, simply 
because these transactions reduce the number of market players and increase 
market shares of merging entities 609 Secondly, merger transactions may enhance 
efficiencies, which were not attainable in the pre-merger situation. Hence, mergers 
may allow firms to overcome insufficient size to achieve the efficiencies, which 
may arise in oligopolistic structures of small market economies. This is because in 
small markets there are a limited number of market players and market can serve 
only to a limited number of players as a result only a limited number of firms can 
act effectively in the market. The limited measures in small market economies 
augment the need for the optimal merger control. In this case, concentrated market 
structure might need to become further concentrated in order to achieve minimum 
efficient scales, even a merger to monopoly can lead to a reduction in prices. 
Bearing in mind that competition policy is intended to prevent the creation of anti- 
competitive market structures, which in turn result in higher prices and inefficient 
output; it is particularly challenging to find the balance between productive 
efficiency gains and competitive conditions in small market economies. Rigid 
policy toward mergers may prevent desirable efficiency-enhancing merger 
transactions in small market economies to take place and instead entrench 
inefficient market structures. Moreover, this rigid merger control policy is 
especially undesirable when economies become increasingly exposed to 
international competition, as is the case in the Baltic countries, where after 
opening up their borders the local companies have faced international 
competition. Merger policy in this case should not prevent local firms in small 
market economies from trying to achieve efficiencies in order to overcome 
competitive disadvantage, which results from limited domestic demand. For large 
economies in most instances the efficiencies may still be created as most of their 
industries include a large number of companies which have already realised their 
economies in scope and scale. Meanwhile, for small market economies the 
adoption of such a policy would result 
in the prevention of many beneficial 
mergers. Hence, efficiency considerations 
in small market economies must play 
609 Also, merger transactions may facilitate tacit collusion or co-operative 
behaviour. 
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an important role, considering the fact that merger transactions may help the 
realisation of potential efficiency gains, for instance, in oligopolistic markets, 
which would otherwise remain unexploited due to lack of their optimal size. 
In the course of evaluating the different economic models applicable to mergers, 
the conclusion is made that the balancing approach is the most suitable for small 
market economies, because it recognises efficiency defence as any merger 
transactions should be permitted, if the efficiency gains achieved through the 
merger are great enough to offset any anti-competitive effects. The efficiency 
considerations should be left to the last stage as to avoid unnecessary burden 
placed on parties as well as the Competition Authorities of the Baltic states, which 
have insufficient knowledge and experience to deal with the complicated analysis 
of efficiency gains, especially with dynamic efficiencies, which are difficult to 
evaluate. As regards the technique, it brings to a conclusion that a sequential 
model, particularly a modified version of a sequential model, is the most suitable 
for the Baltic countries. This model contains two main stages. The first stage 
works as a filter: larger merger transactions, which meet the thresholds set by the 
Competition Authorities of the Baltic countries, are examined by the regulators by 
using structural indicators, which does not require high information costs and does 
not consider any efficiency issues, which are presumed neutral or sufficient 
enough to outset any anti-competitive effects. Only those merger transactions, 
which crossed the upper threshold set up in the first stage, go for a further 
examination into the second stage. Here, the efficiency gains are examined, even 
in merger cases leading to a monopoly or close to monopoly situation. Hence, 
this approach will limit a number of cases, which require in-depth analysis and as 
a result will save high information costs. Also, the modified sequential approach 
allows an in-depth analysis for some `problematic' merger transactions, which 
might have high concern of sufficient realisation of efficiency gains to offset the 
anti-competitive effects. 
Since the competition policy determines which mergers might be considered 
harmful and which ones beneficial, the study analysed the competition policy and 
its goals vis-a-vis merger control. Since the explicit aim of the Baltic countries has 
been to bring their competition law and policy in line with the EC competition 
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policy, it is no surprise that these countries have transposed competition law and 
policy virtually identical to the EC competition policy. Likewise incorporated in 
the Treaty, all Baltic countries refer to undistorted competition as a main objective 
of competition policy. However, with the priority given to the political objective - 
as the integration into the EU, the Baltic states have not explored their `pure' 
competition policy. In contrast to the EC, there after modernisation the 
Commission explicitly admitted possible positive effects of mergers on 
competition, as the importance of efficiencies in merger analysis, the position vis- 
a-vis efficiencies achievable through mergers in the Baltic countries is 
controversial and vague. The Baltic countries are required to improve their 
competition policy in order to keep in line with the modernised EC competition 
policy. Also, a clear position of the efficiency gains achievable through merger 
transactions in order to increase competitiveness and the safeguarding of the 
consumer interest should be explicitly expressed. 
Apart from economic theories, the thesis provided a legal analysis. Questions 
were raised as to what extent the commercial motives affect and influence the 
Regulatory Authorities of the Baltic states and to what extent is the approach vis- 
a-vis merger control rules taken by the Baltic countries different from its counter- 
part - the EC. The merger control mechanisms in the Baltic states were introduced 
as a part of the acquis and has been highly influenced by the ECMR. The first 
competition law of each Baltic country was already to a large extent inspired by 
the Community competition rules, but nevertheless, the Baltic countries made 
further amendments to follow the changes under the Community law. The 
wording of the substantive tests for merger appraisal in each Baltic state has been 
almost identical to the former dominance test of the ECMR. However, it has been 
discovered that the wording of the substantive tests and the practice of applying 
them demonstrate that the decisive criterion of the Competition Authorities of the 
Baltic states is on `finding a dominance'. The EC merger control policy has 
shifted towards a more economic based approach with the emphasis being placed 
on the effects on competition. Meanwhile, the Competition Authorities of the 
Baltic states place their focus mainly on market structures rather than analysing 
the effects of merger transactions. The focus on market structure rather than on 
the effects on competition is irrational policy for the countries of small market 
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economies. This is because one of the features of small market economies is that 
most of their markets are concentrative. It in turn means that mergers would lead 
to concentrating markets even more. Hence, if taken literally almost all mergers 
would have to be prevented, if the focus is on market structures. Whereas, an 
emphasis of the merger's effects on competition allows wider evaluation, as 
merger transactions may lead to markets becoming more concentrative which 
might be a necessary evil considering limited measures in small market 
economies to exploit efficiencies. Thus, merger transactions with the impetuses to 
achieve efficiency gains, even if they lead to more concentrated markets should be 
treated in favour by the Competition Authorities in the Baltic countries, as these 
transactions may make market more efficient and more competitive. 
From written provisions on the substantive issues in the Baltic countries, the 
conclusion can be made that in contrast to the EC approach, which employs both a 
positive and a negative approach of the effects of merger on competition, the 
Baltic countries adopt a negative approach towards merger transactions. This 
negative approach may mean that the Baltic countries are reluctant to admit pro- 
competitive effects of merger transactions on competition. The lack of efficiency 
considerations can be logically interpreted as a sign that the merger control 
regimes in the Baltic countries are orientated towards dominance or market power 
rather than efficiency enhancing. As result of this logic it might be predisposed 
that the regulators of the Competition Authorities mistreat the possibilities of the 
pro-competitive effects that merger transactions can provide and look suspiciously 
at the effects of the mergers on competition. 
Considering the Competition Authorities of the Baltic countries do not have an 
explicit efficiency defence, it might have twofold consequences. By not taking 
efficiencies explicitly into consideration as a possible positive impact of merger 
transactions on economic welfare, this on one hand involves a risk of blocking the 
occasional merger with possible pro-competitive effects. On the other hand, there 
is a risk that some efficiency-enhancing mergers might not be pursued in the first 
place. 
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In conclusion, the study revealed that the approach towards merger control 
mechanism taken in the Baltic states is different from the EC. After the EC moved 
towards a more economic based approach, the Baltic countries are left behind. 
Insufficient economic analysis is provided in these countries in merger cases. The 
Baltic countries should consider moving towards a more economic based 
approach by focusing on specific implications of their markets' features and 
placing emphasis on the effects of merger transactions on competition (dynamic 
aspects) rather than on market structure (static aspects). 
The current tendency can be seen that after the modernisation of the ECMR, the 
Baltic countries are willing to make improvements in their Competition Laws. For 
instance, the Competition Authorities of Latvia and Lithuania have modified their 
substantive tests for the appraisal of merger transactions to correspond to the 
modernisation of the ECMR. There have been no changes so far in the jurisdiction 
of Estonia as regards the modification of the merger control provisions. 
Nonetheless, there is a group working on the modernisation of the provisions on 
concentration. Thus, these provisions are due to be improved in the near future. 
In response to the ECMR modernisation, the substantive tests were modified in 
Latvia and Lithuania. The conclusion is made that the current Latvian substantive 
test for the appraisal of concentrations is the most favourable to efficiency gains 
in comparison to the substantive tests of the other Baltic states. Any efficiency 
issues now can be covered under the second part of the test, the limb of SIEC. 
Bearing in mind that there have been no further guidelines issued by the 
Competition Council of Latvia to define the criteria in applying the new 
substantive test and no explicit efficiency defence exists, it is not clear how the 
test will be interpreted. 
The study revealed that the Baltic countries are familiar with the notion of 
merger-specific efficiencies. The possibility of consideration of efficiency 
issues 
in merger cases was expressed in Latvia, where efficiencies could 
be analysed in 
borderline cases as to mitigate finding of dominance. However, this position is not 
explicitly expressed. Different from the other 
Baltic states, Lithuania issued the 
guidelines on explanations of the concept of 
dominance, where the notion of 
efficiencies were also introduced. 
Thus, likewise in Latvia a finding of dominance 
302 
can be mitigated. This policy expressed in Latvia and Lithuania, where a 
dominant position would not be created or strengthened, as efficiency gains help 
to mitigate a finding of dominance, was criticised by Lowe (2002) for its limited 
scope, as it is conceptually difficult for merging entities to challenge that 
efficiency would stop them from having the ability to act on the market without 
being effectively constrained by others, or otherwise influence price, production 
or innovation. Also, this approach is not suitable for the Baltic countries, because 
of the following reasons. First of all, this approach places an unnecessary burden 
on the merging parties and on the Competition Authorities, which do not have 
sufficient practice in applying merger control rules. Second, this approach does 
not provide enough transparency, for instance, what are the criteria of the 
evaluation of efficiency issues in the merger cases. Transparency is very 
important to the Baltic countries because governmental agencies require 
transparency to enable them to properly discharge their obligation to inform and 
educate their citizens on the principles of fair competition. Without transparency, 
the general citizenry will lose confidence in the authorities as enforcers and 
decision makers in competition matters. Also, in the context of merger control 
rules, transparency means that the merging parties should be able to predict the 
reaction of competition authorities with sufficient reliability. Hence, the 
introduction of explicit merger-specific efficiency gains is an important tool for 
the Baltic states, which will also increase the transparency and accuracy of the 
merger review process in these countries. 
This research is an introductory study of merger control regimes in the Baltic 
countries. This is because there is insufficient practice of enforcing merger rules 
in these countries at present, as they are still in the process of adapting and 
modernising their merger control regimes. Future research can evaluate whether 
the Baltic countries will follow the EC approach of introducing a more economic 
based approach, which will allow taking into account their different market 
structures and how the rules adapted will be enforceable 
in practice. Hence, the 
efficiency test (if introduced) in the merger control regimes of the Baltic countries 
will be tested in the years to come when the 
Competition Authorities of these 
countries will develop their approaches 
in the application of their modernised 
merger control rules. 
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